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FUPANY, 


THE REIGN OF LAW. 


By tHe DUKE OF ARGYLL. 


THIRD AMERICAN EDITION. 


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NEW YORK: 


Pree tt Pee. LENT &: COMPANY, 
451 BROOME STREET. 
1872. 





PREFACE TO THE.FIFTH EDITION, 


ED 


78 preparing a Fifth Edition of this work, 
hy I have to acknowledge the favour — far 
greater than I expected—with which it has been 
received. The argument which it maintains is 
at variance with the philosophy of some of the 
most active and popular thinkers of the time; 
and on a few important points it deviates from 
the view commonly adopted by men with whom 
I am more generally agreed. Some adverse 
comment was therefore not only to be expected 
but desired. Most sincerely do I thank those 
who, in numerous Journals and Reviews, have 
undertaken this duty, for the uniformly courteous 
and even kindly spirit in which their criticisms 


have been expressed, 


‘VI PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION, 











| 


PeAbe this Edition no alteration has been made 
involving any change of principle or opinion. 
Here and there words have been added or re- 
moved according as individual’ passages appear 
to have been misunderstood. Throughout some 
of the chapters substantial additions have been 
made in reply, direct or indirect, to my principal 
opponents, whilst discussions, more detailed than 
were suitable for the text, have been committed 
to Notes at the end of the volume. 

These additions and Notes have reference chiefly 
to the following articles which appeared in review 
of the “ Reign of Law: 

Ist. An Article, by Mr. Alfred R. Wallace, 
the Duarterly Fournal of Science, for Octanen | 
1867. This article is in defence and illustration 
of Mr. Darwin's “ Theory on the Origin of Species.” 
The eminence of Mr. Wallace as a Naturalist, the 
extent of his researches in some of the most re- 


markable Faunas of the world, and the fact that, 





f 
PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION. vii 





before the publication of Mr. Darwin’s book, he 
had come to kindred, if not identical conclusions,— 
all render him peculiarly competent to defend the 
“Theory,” and to present it in the strongest light. 
I have therefore added to the text several passages 
suggested by the challenge he makes, and by the 
reasoning he employs. A further discussion of his 
paper will be found in Note A. 

2d. An Article, by Mr. George H. Lewes, in the 
Fortnightly Review, for July, 1867, dealing with 
the main argument and conclusion of this work 
from the well-known poirt of view of the “ Positive 
Philosophy.” Wherever in the text there seemed 
a fitting place for doing so, I have inserted pas- 
sages which deal with the reasoning of his paper, 
or with the same reasoning as it appears in a more 
systematic form in the Prolegomena to Mr. Lewes’s 
“History of Philosophy.” 

3d. An Article in the Dublin Review, for April 
1867, which I am permitted to attribute to the 


——_ 


Vill PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.. 


learned editor of that periodical, Dr. Ward. The 
more special object of his adverse comment is the 
view I have taken of the doctrine of Free Will— 
a doctrine which Dr. Ward, with some warmth, 
accuses me of having virtually abandoned whilst 
professing to defend it. A slight alteration in the 
text may perhaps help to remove some objections, 
which rest entirely upon a misunderstanding of the 
sense in which particular words are used. But 
behind and beyond any misunderstanding of this 
kind, there lies apparently a substantial difference 
in respect to which my view remains unaltered. 
This difference will be found discussed in Note F, 
at the end of the volume. 

4th. An Article in the Contemporary Review, 
for May 1867, by Mr. J. P, Mahafly. With 
reference to his observations, as well as to those 
of some other critics, I have somewhat expanded 
several passages which deal with the Supernatural, 


and with the various relations in which miracles 


* 





PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION. | ix 
have been conceived to stand towards the “ Reign 
of Law.” I have also, in a special Note (G), replied 
to a criticism in this paper, referring to the subject 
of Necessity and Free Will. 

Other Notes have been added in illustration or 
support of various passages in the text. 

As regards the intention I had at one time 
entertained of adding a chapter on “Law in 
Christian Theology,” further reflection has only 
confirmed me in the feeling that this is a subject 
which cannot be adequately dealt with in such 
a form. I can only again ask my readers to 
remember that although some ideas which belong 
to this subject, or touch it at various points cannot 
be, and have not been, avoided, yet the desire aad 
intention to postpone it, in so far as it was possible 
to do so, has left blanks which every careful eye 


must see. 


INVERARAY, Jan, 1868, 

















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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 


——___ 


OME portions of this work have already 
appeared at various times in the Eadzn- 
burgh Review, in Good Words, and in Addresses 
to the Royal Society of Edinburgh during the 
years in which I had the honour of being Pre- 
sident of that Body. The deep interest of the 
matter dealt with in those Papers has induced 
me to expand them, to add new chapters on 
other aspects of the same subject, and to pub- 
lish the whole in a connected form. 
Among many other deficiencies which may be 
observed in this Volume, there is one which 
demands explanation, lest a serious misundev- 


standing should arise. I had intended to con- 





xii PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 





clude with a chapter on “Law in Christian 
Theology.” It was natural to reserve for that 
chapter all direct reference to some of the 
-most fundamental facts of Human nature. 
Yet without such reference the Reign of Law, 
especially in the “Realm of Mind,” cannot 
even be approached in some of its very 
highess and most important aspects. For the 
present, however, I have shrunk from entering 
upon questions so profound, of such critical im- 
port, and so inseparably connected with religious 
controversy. In the absence of any attempt 
to deal with this great branch of the inquiry, 
as well as in many other ways, I am painfully 
conscious of the narrow range of this work. I 
can only offer it as a very small contribution 


to the discussion of a boundless subject. 


INVERARAY October, 1866, 


Geen tT EON 1. 


CHAPTER I, 


THE SUPERNATURAL. 


- Paga 
The term Supernatural employed in different and contradic- 


TOLY SENSES 2°) 2. 0) s oy Meirhegars) 8 di but de} siete) I 
The Natural casting out the Supernatural. . . . 3 
Nature, in its widest sense, to be understood as aeiaiais all 

causal agencies, especially Man’s Mind and Will. . . . 5,6 
Man’s agency the most Natural of allagencies . . F /: 
Man’s Mind and Will regarded as. belonging to the Seeks 

IE Prat Al ctv ay, ies Vibert > 
Relation of Man’s agency to the acne inti eat of N sacs iva GBI 
“Supernatural”? power—Is it Power independent of the use 


Siemans he ‘ 14 
Relation of God to the pales of ae eorecunents dalled 

pe baws ts. <: : nae ab qa BS 
Mansel’s position, that a Miracles isa pete eis Wark A ree a te 
Gibbon’s attempt to account for the btn of Christianity by 

Watural causes 2... Piney a ts oe ae 
Preservation of the Jews fe means PENS to fleck a 

Bireime FS UTPOSE Le Ss hws ib. 


Nothing in Religion incompatible bot ait belief that Ay 
exercises of God’s power, ordinary and extraordinary, are 
effected through the instrumentality of means. . . . « 22 

Pameipal. tb ulloch’s view of} Miracles) 6.0. hue iefliv ie 23 

ecwesraen Oo Miracles, 64. 6.) ehile Leltl ett a .e e tel Bl 24 

Pepeeteat (Ut NE MISSES. > oe > 6 ele kt 0h ete Zs 








XIV “CONTENTS. 


Truths and Difficulties of Religion —their type in the course 

and constitution of Nature. . . és ne, 
Guizot’s argument, that Man is the ecult either of Material 

forces or Supernatural power . . & + -« -« «© 99 06 ue 
The Development hypotheses. 2°. 05.5 = Seno 
No distinction in Scripture between Natural and Supernatural 
‘¢ Silent Members” in animal frames . . °. +) ee 
Perception of Correspondences as much a fact as the sight 

or touch of the things in which they appear . . . « .« 
Fertilisation of Orchids.—... .. ss Ss 


ee See 


33 
37 


Intention the one thing which Darwin seas <->, “pee 38, 39 


Orchids in all their marvellous forms developed out of the 
archetypal arrangements of Threes within Threes . . . 
Ideas of Order based on Numerical Relations meet us at 
évery turn in Nature. «Ss a ee . 
The distinction drawn between the Natural and the Sper 
natural a-distinction artificial, arbitrary, and unreal. . . 
Belief in the existence of a Personal God essential to all Reli- 
Pion Ae He i PR ae ree 
Decay of many Creeds and Confessions through dissociating 


the doctrines of Christianity from the analogy of Nature . 


CHAPTER II, 
LAW: ITS DEFINITIONS, 


Reign of Law in the world around us and-within us eae 
Importance of looking sharply on Forms of Words professing 
to represent scientific truths, . 4 3-5 725) )g une 
Religion and Science closely connected. . . 2. 6 0 « e 
The Instinct which seeks for harmony in the truths of Science 
and the truths of Religion a higher Instinct than the dis- 
position which pretends there is no relation between them . 


Te idea that Prayer to God is only a good way of preaching 
to ourselves. 2 «6 « 


e e e 6 e e e e e e e e 


44 
49 
50 
51 


52 


55 
56 


57 


58 
60 





CONTENTS. 





Essence of the belief in Prayer, that the Divine Mind is acces- 
sible to supplication, and the Divine Will capable of being 


mioveacthereby'.)iais ss as west a Gee ale 
Law, human and Divine, the xaifortalive expression of Will 
enferced by Power .. . oR SOP eee okt oy MD. es 


The Five different Senses in whith ey is habitually used :-— 
First, as applied to an observed Order of Facts . . . . 
Secondly, to that Order, as involving the action of some 

Force, or Forces, of which nothing more may be known. 
Thirdly, as applied to individual Forces, the measure of 
whose operation has been more or less defined. . . . 
fourthly, as applied to those Combinations of Force which 
have reference to the fulfilment of Purpose, or the dis- 
Ghareeor Punction 4. ... sense) oe at eee 
Fifthly, as applied to Abstract Conceptions ies he Mind . 

These great leading significations circle round the Three great 
questions Science asks of Nature—the What, the How, and 
PREMVUIM So ww Swe Ae ae eye) olathe 

The Three Laws of Kepler the simplest iustration of Law 
applied inthe /zvs¢ Sense . . . Ries area 

An observed Order of Facts can wahie arise wt of the action 
of some compelling Force . . . oe 

Law of Gravitation the great example ey Lig in the T, hird 
RT ioe ae ae ae ee ee ee 

ailee a ermebrerislement’s)-fi'e bo ea ee ek 

* Laws in the first three senses explain nothing, save that ie 
order of subordinate phenomena is dueto Force. . . . 

Law of Gravitation the best example of what Law is, and 
SCOR UNORS gi gatas ee 4 RI 

Languages grow according to rules of which the men who 
speak them are unconscious. . . ‘ Pe eo as 

What happens around us in Nature tite result of different 
and opposing Forces nicely balanced. « . « «© « « 

Principle of Adjustment as the instrument and result of Pur- 
pose always reached at last in the course of every physical 
EE a ae a a ee et oe ee ee 


ee 


Xvl CONTENTS. 


Law in the highest Sense — Combination for the accomplish- 
ment of Parposé 4 6 «) st Hose ood Se 
Some Philosophers say the question ‘‘ Why?” should never be 
asked gi fle Seo Salsa) "Nl Gee ae Ce 
The facts of Adjustment and of Function constitute not Final 
but Immediate Purpose. . . « & e © «© « © © « 
The Function of an organ is its Purpose « . «© « «© « « 
Doctrine of Contrivance and Adjustment not so metaphysical 
as the doctrine of Homologies < 4. 4) 4) 6/5 See 
Impossible in describing physical phenomena to avoid phrase- 
ology moulded on our own conscious Personality and Will . 
Ultimate fact of Astronomical Science not the Law of Gravi- 
tation, but the Adjustment between that Law and others 
less-known, 2» »') «,.« le) a J alee 
Revolution of the Seasons depend on a multitude of Laws, 
Astronomical, Chemical, Electrical, Geological, &.. . . 
Chemical Science rich in illustration of Forces in mutual Ad- 
jesiment . 9 eso) ow, es, ee en 
‘‘ Theine” and ‘‘ Strychnine” differ from each other only in 
the proportions in which they are combined . ... . 
How our Wills exercise a large and increasing power over the 
Material World... . 3 * « «. s0)) See 
Laws of Nature immutable only in one Sense. . . . . . 
Laws of Nature employed in the System of Nature in a 
manner precisely analogous to that in which we employ 
them—Examples furnished in the Shells of Barnacles and 
in the Menai Bridge . , a 


Purpose never attained in Nature save by the enlistment of 
Laws as instruments . 


Battery of the Torpedo compared with Man’s Electric Battery 
The Purpose what we know in the Battery of the Electric Fish 
We forget that Man’s works, no less than Nature’s, are done 

through the means of Law’. 2 gs cells | stun 
Fifth meaning of Law—the designation of some purely Ab- 


stract Idea, as, for instance, the First Law of Motion in 
Mechanics . , 


e ° ® ® s e s e ® t e e ® @ 


go 


92 
a5 
94 
95 


97 
20. 


99 


100 
IOI 
104 


107 


108 


Se eeannnTanneee ee 
CONTENTS. XV 





Page 
This Law never operates in itself, but is complicated with 
other Laws, producing a corresponding complication in 

BUM NE oe pecs in, ok! os as) eal Goes, cei ee TOD 
Suggestions of Materialism lie thickest to the eye on the sur- 

face of things rather than belowit. . . . . eee ue EIS 
Physical Science cannot do more than widen the foundation 

Gummeneent Spiritual beliefs... ers, on gs se oe = ETA 
The modern idea of Law known instinctively to Man since 

first he made a Tool and used it as the Instrument of Pur- 

RI Gi gh ok® oo gD are eh 16) oy wl, si og ooo sy oy, 2 We 
Two great enemies to Materialism ; one rooted in the Affec- 

Suge tuereinen in the-Inteliect . 5.) ae we «CS 
Transcendental character of the results of Physical research . 116 
All Nature’s realities are in the region of the Invisible. . . 118 
Life, according to Huxley and Carpenter, the Cause of Organi- 

RE et ir sh sage cp) 0n,'s oy 8 
Material Force, a force which acts on Matter. . . «© « « IIQ 
Our Conceptions of Force traced to their fountain-head . . 120 
Force of Gravitation regarded by Herschel as ‘‘ the direct, or 

indirect, result of a Consciousness, or a Will, existing some- 

Ie eres ee ee) eee 6 te ew 2D 
The idea of a Personal Will apart from the Forces which | 

work in Nature, is said by some men to be a mere Pro- 

jection of our own Personality into the world beyond . . 123 
A Watch the abode of a ‘‘ Watch-force” . . . ... «. © 124 
The greatest mystery of all—the analogy betwcen Man’s 

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CHAPTER IIL 


CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY ARISING OUT OF THE REIGN 
OF LAW. 


Necessity of Contrivance for the accomplishment of Purpose. 126 

Contrivance in the Navigation of the Air . . « . « « « [29 

‘The Way of an Eagle in the Air”, 2. 2 0 © 0 ec oo be 
b 


a rr a 


XVII CONTENTS, 


Force of Gravitation the principal Force in flight . .. . 
Resisting Force of the Atmosphere the next Law appealed to 
Elasticity and reacting Force of the Air anotherLaw . . . 
Great Force of a downward Blow from a Bird’s Wing . . « 
Convex and Concave Surfaces required in Wings. . « « » 
The Feathers must underlap each other . . . « « « « 
How the power of forward Motion is given to Birds . . . 
This theory of Flight may he tested by theeye . . 2 « « 
Experiment with a Heron’s stretched Wing . « « « «© « 
Why no Bird'can fly backwards ~ .. =. 5 3 see 
The heavier a Bird the greater its possible velocity . . . . 
Erroneous notion of Birds having Air-cells for the inhalation 

and stowage of heated Air . 9.9. 4 =) « 4 eu 
What Forces the movements of flying animals are governed by 
Birds whose Wing is adapted for diving and flight . . . . 
Wings rather long than broad in Birds of great powers of 

filght . 226 ce © se om sas es ip ke 
A long Wing nothing but a long Lever. . . . = & os0s 
Description of the Albatross sailing or wheeling round a 

SRID oe 0 0 ee ce ce Nee) a 0 ee er 
Sharp-pointed Wings also possessed by such Birds . . « « 
What sharpness, or roundness, of Wing depends on . «6 « 
On what the propelling power of a Bird’s Wing depends . . 
How Birds can remain stationary in the Air ... . . « « 
Use of the Tailin Birds . 2 9, % 1s. 9s en eee 
How Birds turnin flight . ... . oe ee ae 
Humming Birds the most remarkable cfaarnes of the ma- 

chinery of flight . .. . 6 ots 
Adjustments to Purpose in a Wing- oatner! o. eG 2s Pee 
Why Man has failed in Air Navigation. . 2. © © « «-« 


CHAPTER IV. 


Page 
130 
131 
132 
134 
136 

26, 
138 
139 
140 

20. 
144 


145 
146 
148 


150 
151 


154 
2b. 
156 
157 . 
159 
162 
163 


166 
163 
170 


APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE- 


Structures of which we cannot see the use. . . . 6 «© e 
Mr. Darwin’s curious mistake about Green Woodpeckers . « 


Ly ge 
176 





ented $$ —$$—_——- 


CONTENTS. 





Adapted colouring in Nature for purposes of Concealment . 
Only employed under certain conditions . . cdlag- 
The Green Woodpecker does not come under oe ebvattions 
Strongly contrasted colouring in Woodpeckers . . . «. .« 
Birds amongst whom the assimilated colouring prevails. . 
Purpose of Concealment in the Woodcock’s plumage Ser tie * 
Piers 8 955 oh hg oe eR Say ar Gn 
Insects in which imitation, with a view to Condebliveitt ex- 
tens ta-Colour): Form, and Structure) & oS Ae ee 
Beauty in Nature a Purpose, an Object, andan End... 
Ornament, as much an End in the Workshop of Nature as in 
‘the Jewellers Workshop. . . 2. 6... Je, 
Instance in Nature where Ornament takes the form of Pic- 
formar hepresentation= iui Ue) A PE es 
In many Animal structures, perhaps in all save one, there are 


parts the presence of which cannot be explained. . . 194, 


Those aborted limbs parts of a universal Plan . «6 .« .. 
Pee amor tus kind: itself a Purpose of ie Hse! obi e als 
African Notion that the Ostrich’s. toes correspond to Man’s 
thumb and forefinger. . . eer eee : 
Aborted Wings of the Ostrich palin correspond to the hie 
0 eee te aa ee ar are are eer 
Homology in Structure and Analogy in Use . . « 2. « 
Original conception of the framework of Organic Life has its 
Pee Geveopment in: Man). 26 6) ete ol! are ; 
In Nature, Use must be interpreted as including heswat Use, 
Potential Use, and Ornament... . «...«-e ee. 


CHAPTER V. 
CREATION BY LAW. 


Law, according to Physiology, is never absent:as a Servant . 
A like Order in the existing World, and in the past History 
Meee VOROIN oh ato 6h o8 of «* oe? of of of wo a 6 


b2 


xix 





Page 


177 
1738 


179 
20. 
181 
182 
184 


tb. 
188 


IQl 


192 


208 


209 





XX. - CONTENTS. 





Page — 
Gradual Modification of Type in Animals. . . . «6 « « 215 
No knowledge of the Forces to which the phenomena of Life 
can be traced ~2 os fes «tej ©) Je bone 
Development Theory in its earlier forms . . .« « »« « « 214 
Consequences of hiding our Ignorance of the causes of Phe- 
nomena by declaring them the result of Law . . . . . 2197 
Darwin does not profess to trace the Origin of New Forms to 
any definite Law. « 2. .:>s -« @/@ eis) Dee a 
Darwin’s Theory ot a Theory on *‘ The Origin of Species”. 219 


His Theory incurs the risk of being self-condemned . . . 220 
Humming Birds as exhibiting Mysteries of Creation . . . 221 
Absolute Distinctiveness from all other Families of Birds. . 222 


Bond that unites all the forms of this Family. . . . .« « 223 
‘*Centres of Creation” as regards Humming Birds. . . »« 225 
Differences generic and specific between Humming Birds. . 226 
Plan in which mere Variety has been anaim. . . . . . 228 
No connexion between the Humming Bird’s splendour and 

any Function essential to life ..-a) 0 4 eee ee ees 
** Coquette” Humming Binds « +.0 ..°.0% 4) Gee ee 
Curious example in Humming Birds of Variety for Ornament’s 

Sake ey ecified bed hie oer ee 6 SS Ree 
Mere Beauty and mere Variety for their own sake .-. . . 235 
‘*Natural Selection”? does not account for the origin and 

spread. of Humming Birds: ..02-40%) 5S a 
Each new Variety must be born Male and Female . . . . 237 
Possibility of new Births being the means of introducing new 

SPCCleS 0 ge ce yo ce eo ty feet mStar 
Principle of ‘* Natural Selection” has no bearing on the . 

*“Origin of Species”. . 5° 6 =e. ie my ile nn np en 
‘Correlation of Growth”... %@)s sl ses) ae ee 
Correlation of Growth in the Inorganic world . . . « « 242 
Correlation of Growth having reference to Mental Purposes . 245 
Mr. Darwin has not pointed out clearly the distinction be- 

tween these two kinds of Correlation. . . . « « «* « 246 
Wonders of Correlation revealed by Disease and Malforma- 

lion, &c. 0 2 0 bos 6 86 0h s ue en 





——— 


CONTENTS. 





Correlation between the internal Structure of the Teeth in 
Animals and the Structure of distant portions of their 
er rca: outs o, inaga! owl wl at Ve Ri aitfeahes Se Le hw Le 

One Force directs the Form and Structure of every Organism 

No conception of any Force emanating from external things, 
and moulding the Structure of an Organism in harmony 
SNE RE ew eh aly Ageine) Way ere 

Forces of Organic Growth worked under rules of close Ad- 
justment to external conditions. — Examples of this in 
Ducks. Gulls, and Divers & a9 6 eel ee a Wes 

More correlated Correlations. — Wing-feathers and Auricular- 
ert er ait Dirda crs i.) ae er 8s at tthe 

New Species can be created only by a Creative Will giving to 
Organic Forces a foreseen direction . . 2. 2. « « © « 

Scientific men, in seeking expression for ultimate ideas 
arrived at by physical: research, are forced to borrow the 
language of mechanical invention. . . . « « « «© « 

Mr. Darwin presenting under one phase two Ideas radically 
OE te ane ee eer ee ee 

* Adherence to Type” and ‘‘ Correlation of Growth” not in 
the nature of Physical Causes but of Mental Purposes . . 

Correlation of Growth, in the sense of external adaptations, 
the most general of Nature’s Laws . 1. . 6. 1. 2 «© 

The only Senses in which we get a glimpse of Creation by 

ROE ea se a4 oe Owe ie eS TES 8S 

_ No reason why Inheritance should produce Organisms unlike, 
or only very partially like, eachother ... . ae tack, 

Affinities and Differences between Man and the Lower 
Animals... . .°-« ware % . ‘ ; 

Theory of Creation ‘e Birth cleaties with the Theory ot 
a) ratueal celection™ 3200 a SPOUSE Pe a8 

No fictions in Nature, ad nojbad jokes eR PO ee ek 

Some essential Resemblances between all forms of Life . . 

The two Theories of Man’s Origin . 5. 1-35 6 et ee 

Wesee.the Purpose, not the Method -..- s+. « e's e 

AlL.ultimate Truth beyond the reach of Science . 6 « oe e 


ny 


- xxi 





Page 


248 
249 


251 





xxil CONTENTS, 





The Reign of Law—the reign of Creative Force, directed by 
Creative Knowiedge, worked under the control of Creative 
Power, and in fulfilment of Creative Purpose . 2 « « e 


CHAPTER VI. 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 


Phenomena of Mind under the Reign of Law. . . 4. . 
One Force in Nature the Source and Centre of all the rest, 
and all governed by Principles of Arrangement purely 
Mental; we know nothing directly of the ultimate Seat of 
Force in any form; the nearest conception we can have of 
it is derived from our consciousness of Vital Power . . . 
If these conclusions be true, it need not surprise us to see 
that Law, in the same Sense, prevails in the phenomena 
both of the Material world and of the world of Mind. . . 
The Mind not conscious of its dependence on Material 
Organs’. 6 6 0s 8a 8, 2 2 ee ae a 
No Series of Facts more complete and conclusive than the 
chain connecting the functions of the Brain with the phe- 
nomena of Mind feu ss iw bw. ue Dow ae 
Thought not to be confounded with Brain. .« .« e« « e « 
Phrenology mere Confusion of Thought . . . « © » e 
Physiology can never be the basis of Psychology. ... . . 
Connexion between Mind and Brain a Law only in the Sense 
of Law as applied to “an Observed Order of Facts”. . . 
Severe Thinking attended with expenditure of Force . . . 
Difficulties from misconception of what Matter is and the 
Forces we call, Material ...: i085 950 get ee 
Large class of phenomena connected with Mind, of which 
Consciousness does not informiais. 944 diss seule ese 
Men often impelled by Motives they are unconscious of . . 
How we can detect the action of Forces which have told 
upon our-Minds ..° 3. 2c. ods ae an ke 
Origin of Ideas ; how far due to Experience or to Intuition . 





Page 


273 


274 


275 


20. 
276 
279 

26. 
280 


282 


283 
284 


285 


286 
287 


289 
a, 





CONTENTS. 





Muscular Contractions of two kinds. .« « »« 6 e © « e 
Almost certain that the Mind has automatic faculties and 
others which work independently by Experience. . . . 


Intuitive Power of mumerical Computation . . . . 2 . 


In discussing the Origin of Ideas, there is great want of De- 
mom rtne Use of terms’. PO 

An Idea is as it were an organic Growth: — its ‘Materials 
from the external world, its Structure from within 

Intuition in the Young of the Lower Animals, when removed 
frome inemyParents eS PO eel os we 

In Birds, which have comparatively no Infancy... ee e« » 

Inheritance of Physical and Mental qualities . . 2. « » » 

Orderly progress of Events in the history of Nations . . . 

The aggregate of Motives, or Forces, which move the Mind, 
may be called the Laws which determine Human Action 
MUNIN G eters tl er s/h s sos "es ese p ee cies ow ie 

The Lower Animals moved by fewer Motives than Men, and 
Savages by fewer Motives than civilized Men 

Difficulty of predicting Conduct proportional to the erakben 
Birr etrvesdy Fisker et Lethrels Pye ylowiseres ve 

Secret of the boundless Difference between Man and the 
fughest’ Animalsbelow him 10.) 1605. epee ele 

Man never free from relations pre-established between the 
Structure of his Mind and the System of Things in which it 


1S Fonte LO TOVE aii by tk ee ee eee wee : 
Real Progress on the question of Necessity and Free Will . 
Still clearer Definitions needed . ... ab Fis ees 
Perfect Knowledge must be perfect Ford enguledna SG? hive 
Scomieak mtecedents (63 5 wives a ais Hit 
Reconcilement of Freedom of Will with hs sa of Causa- 

CSE Noel CM ee oo . 
Mr. Mill’s contradictory et as ‘a the Fiecieance of 

Vat se. 38 25 | Ba Brae te a als ra ve 
Comte on “ Changeable Will rial eeg-< aga 


Stability of Character inseparably eden enw: a variable 


ULE nue bat we Bead Neds eth ef ay) bre) eri: dil dteries qin met & 





395 


307 
309 
312 
313 
314 


315 
319 


320 


XXIV CONTENTS. 


a 





An.“ Arbitrary” or a‘ Capricious” Will; 2) ese 
To operate on Human Character we must place it under 
favourable outward Conditions. . . « »« « 0 e « e 


CHAPTER VII. 
LAW IN POLITICS. 


Direct appeals to the Reason, or the Feelings, of men, useless 
when those faculties have not been placed under favourable 
Conditions. . = « 67 %w jm e - @ ier nee 

How far these Conditions are subject to the Control of Will 
through the-Usé of Means. 290 a) cog ee 

The Collective Will of Society operates on the Conduct of its 
members in two Ways—by Authority, and ‘ altering Con- 


ditions e e 6 e e e e e e e e e e e 
True Conception of Natural Law Sian on ise Progress of 
Physical Investigation S72 Nene s 6 0 ew 


Plato’s odious Conception of Human sees ath ee ee 
Aristotle occasionally and almost unconsciously resorts to true 

methods of Scientific Reasoning=+.7 92), lee ene 
Why he missed the great Secret of modern Political Science . 
Necessity of groping among little and common things a hard 

lesson for the Intellect. . Jas S225 Sa 
Forces in Human Nature so constant that they affect the great 


majority of. men e0oN% ° oe -<e2 8 e e er @ eo 8 
How these are to be ere © cp ig iad st agar ea 
The word “ Natural? 49; = ns oi eee 


Laws founded on a right exercise of Raaon are Natural Laws 

in the best and highest'sengse “27. 9 (oye 
The most difficult Problem in the Science of Government. . 
Two great recent Discoveries in this country in the Science of 

Government... .:.. ite fawkes ee ope Me 
The one great Error of Anca Systems of Political Piilckbghy 
How opposite the doctrine of modern Politicians . . , ‘ 
Law of Spain, prohibiting Gold from leaving the country. . 


324 


325 





CONTENTS. XXV 





: Page 
Essential idea of the Old Commercial mee oe we ee 357 
Of the New e e ° e ° e ott we 3. @é" 20. 


Adam Smith’s Dendecation of Laws sceneries free Inter- 

change in the Products of Labour and in the free Employ- 

ment of Labouritself . . ~~ Pid io Sethi ee) 
Connexion of the work of James Watt ae Acai Smith » © 339 
Watt’s reduction to obedience of one of the most tremendous 

Forces of Nature. . .-.- » « «© ‘« ee 340 
How Adam Smith’s work was harder than pikes Watt's ee Sa 8 
Watt’s history a cee illustration of the Follies of Restric- 

tion’: s" 7. ° ° ° 342 
Order of Progress in aM a See ne of eA ER 

Silence and Inaction brought to an end by shorter Periods 

of almost preternatural Activity.—TIllustrations . . . . 343 
Statute of Apprenticeship in the time of Adam Smith . . . 344 


Spinning and Weaving in 1760... . went 345 
How the Survivance of the Ancient Aisnihtts Tihdateles s 
came no longer possible . . . « PO ae eer ar 246 


Beginning of the Factory System . . Sree wee ee 347 
System of Apprenticeship in the earlier Mills wee eoe 348 
Physical Degeneracy, Mental Ignorance, and Moral Cor. eee 


in the Factories . . : id, 
The first Factory Act, seteiaidea e ihe elder Si Robert 

Vice aes ea oe : Ure ae Sis eta re ae 
Abandonment of the i ST Sten Pe ear 350 


Exhausting and demoralising Labour in Factories by Children 351 

The great Parliamentary Debate: How far it is wise or legiti- 
“mate to interfere for Moral ends with the Freedom of the 
Giauar Will 2 eS ew Fe Ansty gs 2 

In what Sense the Children’ s Labour was free” and was 
RAE TEC es Lien ves PREM eis RA ee S55 

Arguments, founded on the Gonthaaicy of Natural Laws, 
against Legislative Interference with the ‘‘freedom” of 

_ Individual Will > ee ee : 354 

The supporters of Restriction hemsebrct deuoricnt of we 
fundamental Principles at issue . 2. >. 6 2 6 © «© « 355 


mm nner 


XXVI CONTENTS. 





The true doctrine of Necessity exemplified in the conduct of 
Employers and Employed. .. . « « + « « 0 Hig Wag 

Antagonism between Natural Law and Human Law . . 

Results to be attained only by the higher Faculties of our 
Nature imposing their Will in authoritative ee of 


Human Law. . . coy 
The Factory Acts the ee Legislative Reciaenes afin a great 
Natural Law . e e ° an . « 


Double Movement in Lasilasans since the First FactoryAct . 


Page - 


356 


2b. 


358. 


360 
361 


Principle on which the great counter-movement depends . . 363 


Progress in Political Science nowhere happier than in Factory 
Legislation .« iss oes Sis Ae « fhe jpn age ieee 
Example how External Conditions and Mental Character can 
be affected powerfully by positive Institution . . . . . 
Adjustment in the Realm of Mind by setting one Motive to 
counieract another. 4... «. «, sie | atlas inane 
How new Motives may be evoked . . 2 » © © © «© @ 


The Spirit of Association—a Force in the Realm of Mind . 
The Law of Competition . .. at hacs 
Good effected by Combination a bicker Goad than that resnity 

ing from Factory Legislation . . . Lt tees 


Combination, an Appeal to the Law of ‘Conbiteaes the 
Power of Adjustment... &) 4 a2 @N. 25ee eee 
Sources of Error which pervert the Aims of voluntary Associa- 
LOT Ys yo0 late ee eee ae oe “et APRS eeee 
History of Combination among the Werkins Classes until- 
lately a sad history of Misdirected Effort . . . « « « 
Difficulties of our time to be met by unshaken Faith in great 
Natural Laws and in the free Agency of Man to secure by 
appropriate means the working of those Laws for good. 
The Law of Inequality not to be violated with impunity . . 
Substantial economic Advantage secured wherever the Hours 
of Labour are reduced without a Si et Reduction 
in Wages 2.73, Ter « ote Laie 
The very attempt of the Workin Cas to Soren through 
Combination their own Affairs is an Education in itself. . 


364 


366 


368 
369 
379 


372 


ib. 


374 


380 


CONTENTS, XXVil 





Nature a great Armoury of Weapons and Implements for the 
mereieeraruseiot Will). . «ok alsa ltl et us wee 
As regards the great Science of Politics, men still, as it were, 
only at the break ofday. . . . ; ae 
We look on the Facts of Nature and Hees Life nvGuel the 
dulled eyes of Custom and Traditional Opinion . . . . 
Natural Openness and Simplicity of Mind characteristics of 
the individual men who have exerted the most powerful In- 
fmemiee tor cood On Society. 6 fe wa 
Power of the Agencies which the whole Constitution and 
Course of things offers to Knowledge and Conirivance . 
Instinct on her own narrow path a surer Guide than Reason 
Some Causes no longer in existence which produced the Over- 
throw of the great historical Nations of Antiquity. . . . 
Memorable Examples, in the last and present generations, of 
the Reign of Law over the Course of Political Events . . 
Modern Civilization presents the phenomena of Development 
SOMME MEG hone oa. eS ae 8 ke el 8 
The most certain of all the Laws of Man’s Nature . »« « .« 
This the Law to which Christianity appeals . . 2. «6 © - 
An immense satisfaction to know that the Result of Logical 
Analysis but confirms the Testimony of Consciousness, and 
runs parallel with the Primzeval Traditions of Belief. . . 
Our Freedom a Reality—nota Name .. . es 6 
Laws of Nature come visibly from One Pet ane Mind . . 
Their Purposes best fulfilled when made the Instruments of 
intelligent Will and the Servants of enlightened Conscience 


LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 


POWs 6 el 6 6 ee es 8 Ue wt ge facing 
Wing MUeEOOUE Sg) eo! ei. «6: eo -e o> Bh ee ce ee 
Muameere Crongden FIOVEr 6 ots ew 6 eh ee «8 ie 
Sparrow: Hawk—Merlin—Kestrel Hovering . 2 »« 0 « » 


39° 


147 
154 
156 
101 





THE REIGN OF LAW.) 


CHAPTER I. 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 


"| ‘HE Supernatural—what is it? What do we mean 

by it? How dowe define it? M. Guizot? tells 
us that belief in it is the special difficulty of our time— 
that denial of it is the form taken by all modern assaults 
on Christian faith ; and again, that acceptance of it lies 
at the root, not only of Christianity, but of all positive 
religion whatever. These questions, then, concerning the 
Supernatural, are questions of first importance. Yet we 
find them seldom distinctly put, and still more seldom 
distinctly answered. ‘This is a capital error in dealing 
with any question of philosophy. Half the perplexities 
of men are traceable to obscurity of thought hiding and 
breeding under obscuritv of language. ‘“ The Super- 


4 “TFglise et la Suciété Chretienne en 1861,” ch. iv. ps 19. 


B 


ox eee 


2 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





natural” is a term employed often in different, and 
sometimes in contradictory, senses. It is difficult to 
make out whether M. Guizot himself means to identify 
belief in the Supernatural with belief in the existence of 
a God, or with belief in a particular mode of Divine 
action. But these are ideas quite separalie and distinct. | 
There may be some men who disbelieve in the Super- 
natural only because they are absolute atheists ; but it is 
certain that there are others who have great difficulty in 
believing in the Supernatural, who are not atheists. 
What they doubt or deny is, not that God exists, but that 
He ever acts, or perhaps can act, unless in and through 
what they call the “Laws of Nature.” M. Guizot, 
indeed, tells us that ‘God is the Supernatural in a 
Person.” But this is a rhetorical figure rather than a 
definition. He may, indeed, contend that it is inconsis- 
tent to believe in a God, and yet to disbelieve in the 
Supernatural; but he must admit, and indeed does 
admit, that such inconsistency is found in fact. 
Theological and philosophical writers frequently use 
the Supernatural as synonymous with the Superhuman. 
But of course this is not the sense in which any one can 
have any difficulty in believing in it. The powers and 
works of Nature are all superhuman—more than Man 
can account for in their origin—more than he can resist 


in their energy—more than he can understand in their 





THE SUPERNATURAL, 3 





effects. ‘This, then, cannot be the sense in which so 
many minds find it hard to accept the Supernatural ; nor 
can it be the sense in which others cling to it as of the 
very essence of their religious. faith. What, then, is that 
other sense in which the difficulty arises? Perhaps we 
shall best find it by seeking the idea which is competing 
with it, and by which it has been displaced. It is the 
Natural which has been casting out the Supernatural— 
the idea of Natural Law,—the universal reign of a fixed 
Order of things. ‘This idea is a product of that immense 
development of the physical sciences which is charac: 
teristic of our time. We cannot read a periodical, or 
go into a lecture-room, without hearing it expressed. 
£ ,metimes, but rarely, it is stated with accuracy, and 
with due recognition of the limits within which Law can 
be said to comprehend the phenomena of the world.. 
But generally it is expressed in language vague and 
hollow, covering inaccurate conceptions, and confounding 
under common forms of expression ideas which are 
essentially distinct. The mere ticketing and orderly 
assortment of external facts 1s constantly spoken of as if 
it were in the nature of Explanation, and as if no higher 
truth in respect to natural phenomena were to be attained 


or desired.! And herein we see both the result for which 


‘ 1 Those who have followed the course of recent speculation will 
recognise this sentence as intended to describe the characteristic 


B2 








4 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





Bacon laboured, and the danger against which Bacon 
prayed. It has been a glorious result of a right method 
in the study of Nature, that with the increase of know- 
ledge the “human family has been endowed with new 
mercies.” But every now and then, for a time at least, 
from “the unlocking of the gates of sense, and the 
kindling of a greater natural light, incredulity and intel- 
lectual night Aave arisen in our minds.” 

But let us observe exactly where and how the difficulty 
arises. The Reign of Law in Nature is, indeed, so far 
as we can observe it, universal. But the common idea 
of the Supernatural is that which is at variance with 
Natural Law, above it, or in violation of it. Nothing, 
however wonderful, which happens according to Natural 
Law, would be considered by any one as Supernatural. 
The law in obedience to which a wonderful thing 
happens may not be known; but this would not give it a 


supernatural character, so long as we assuredly believe 


principle ef the Positive Philosophy.. I am glad to observe that so 
competent a judge as Mr. George H. Lewes says of it :—‘* Although 
not, perhaps, the most dignified or explicit statement of the Positive 
point of view, this may be accepted as essentially correct.” —Fort- 
nightly Review, July 1867. 

1 “This also we humbly beg, that human things may not preju- 
dice such as are Divine, neither that from the unlecking of the gates 
of sense, and the kindling of a greater natural light, anything of 
incredulity or intellectual night may arise in our minds towards 
Divine mysteries,”—‘‘ The Student’s Prayer.” Bacon’s Works, 


i ee 


THE SUPERNATURAL. 5 





that it did happen according to some law. Hence, it 
would appear to follow that a man thoroughly possessed 
of the idea of Natural Law as universal, never could 
admit anything to be supernatural; because on seeing 
any fact, however new, marvellous, or incomprehensible, 
he would escape into the conclusion that it was the 
result of some natural Law of which he had before been 
ignorant. No one will deny that, in respect to the vast 
majority of all new and marvellous phenomena, this 
would be the true and reasonable conclusion. It is not 
the conclusion of pride, but of humility of mind. 
Seeing the boundless extent of our ignorance of the 
natural laws which regulate so many of the phenomena 
around us, and still more of so many of the phenomena 
within us, nothing can be more reasonable than to con- 
clude, when we see something which is to us a wonder, 
that somehow, if we only knew how, it is ‘all right ”"— 
all according to the constitution and course of Nature. 
But then, to justify this conclusion, we must understand 
Nature in the largest sense,—as including all that is 


** In the round ocean, and the living air 
And the blue sky, asd iz the mind of man,” 1 


We must understand it as including every agency which 
we see entering, or can conceive from analogy as capable 


2 “Tintern Abbey.”— Wordsworth, 











6 THE REIGN OF LAW. 








of entering, into the causation of the world. First and. 
foremost among these is the agency of our own Mind 
and Will. Yet, strange to say, all reference to this 
agency is often tacitly excluded when we speak of the 
laws of Nature. One of our most disting ished living 
teachers of physical science? began, not long ago, a 
course of lectures on the phenomena of Heat by a rapid 
statement of the modern doctrine of the Correlation of 
Forces—how the one was convertible into the other— 
how one arose out of the other—how none could be 
evolved except from some other as a pre-existing source. 
“'Phus,” said the lecturer, “we see there is no such thing 
as spontaneousness in Nature.” What '—not in the 
lecturer himself? Was there no “spomtaneousness” in 
his choice of words—in his selection of materiais—in his 
orderly arrangement of experiments with a view to the 
exhibition of parttcular results? It is not probable that 
the lecturer was intending to deny this; it simply was 
that ke did not think of it as within his field of view. 
His own Mind and Will were then dealing with the 
“laws of Nature,” but they did not occur to him as form- 
ing part of those laws, or, in the same sense, as subject 


to them. 


Does Man, then, not belong to Nature? Is he above 


2 Professor Tyndall, 





a 





THE SUPERNATURAL y? 





it—or merely separate from it, or a violation of it? Is 
he supernatural? If so, has he any difficulty in believing 
in himself? Of course not. Self-consciousness is the 
one truth, in the light of which all other truths are 
known. Cogito, ergo sum, or volo, ergo sum—this is the 
one conclusion which we cannot doubt, unless Reason 
disbelieves herself. Why, then, are the faculties of the 
human mind and body not habitually included among the 
“laws of Nature?” Because a fallacy is getting hold 
upon us from a want of definition in the use of terms. 
“‘ Nature ” is being used in the narrow sense of physical 
nature. It is conceived as containing nothing beyond 
_ the properties of Matter. Thus the whole mental world 
in which we ourselves live, and move, and have our 
being, is excluded from it. But these selves of ours do 
belong to Nature. At all events if we are ever to 
understand the difficulties in the. way of believing in the 
Supernatural, we must first keep clearly in view what we 
intend to understand as included in the Natural. Let us 
never forget, then, that the agency of Man is of all others 
the most natural—the one with which we are most 
familiar—the only one, in fact, which we can be said, 
even in any measure, to understand. When any wonder- 
ful event can be referred to the contrivance or ingenuity 
of Man, it is thereby at once removed from the sphere of 
the Supernatural, as ordinarily understood. 


rr RD, 


8 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





It must be remembered, however, that we are now: 
only seeking a clear definition of terms ; and that pro- 
vided this other meaning be clearly agreed upon, the 
Mind and Will of Man may be considered as separate 
from “nature,” and belonging to the Supernatural. This 
view is taken in an able treatise on “ Nature and the 
Supernatural,” by Dr. Bushnell, an American clergyman.! 
Dr. Bushnell says :—“ That is supernatural, whatever it 
be, that is either not in the chain of natural cause and 
effect, or which acts on the chain of cause and effect in 
nature, from without the chain.” Again :—“ If the pro- 
cesses, combinations, and results of our system of nature 
are interrupted or varied by the action, whether of God, 
or angels, or men, so as to bring to pass what would not 
come to pass in it by its own internal action, under the 
laws of mncre cause and effect, such variations are in like 
manner supernatural.” There is no other objection to 
this definition of the Supernatural, than that it rests upon 
a limitation of the terms “ Nature” and “ natural,” which 
is very much at variance with the sense in which they 
are commonly understood. ‘There is, indeed, a distinc. 
tion which finds its expression in common language be- 
tween the works of Man and the works of Nature. A 
honeycomb, for example, would be called a work of 


7 “Nature and the Supernatural, as together constituting the one 
System of God.” By Horace Bushnell, D.D, Edinburgh, 1860, 








ee 


THE SUPERNATURAL. 9 


Nature, but a steam-engine would not. This distinction 
is founded on a true perception of the fact that the 
Mind and Will of Man belong to an order of existence 
very different from physical’ laws, and very different 
also from the fixed and narrow instincts of the lower 
animals. It is a distinction bearing witness to the uni- 
versal consciousness that the Mind of Man has within 
it something of a truly creative energy and force—that 
we are in a sense “fellow-workers with God,” and have 
been in a measure “made partakers of the Divine 
nature.” Nevertheless, it would be using the word in a 
sense very different from that in which it is generally 
accepted, were we to call the steam-engine a super- 
natural work. Yet it does answer strictly to the de- 
finition of Dr, Bushnell in being ‘the result of natural 
Law varied by the action of men.” It is made by 
“acting on the chain of cause and effect in nature from 
witnout the chain.” SButthen, be it observed, that under 
the same definition ail the contrivances of Nature become 
Supernatural the moment they are conceived as the work 
of a Mind using what we call the elements of nature for 
the accomplishment of its designs. If, for example, it is 
open to us to conceive that such a creature as a Bee 
cannot have been made out of those elements “ by their 
own internal action,’ then we must regard both this 


creature and the wonderful products of its instinct as 





Io ae THE REIGN OF LAW. 





belonging to the Supernatural. The honeycomb and the 
steam-engine would thus come under the same category-— 
with this only difference, that the mind which made the 
steam-engine, being connected with a. Body, is visibly 
known to us, whereas the Mind which made the Bee is 
withdrawn from sight. But both can be equally regarded 
as the result of Mind “acting on the chain of cause and 
effect from without the chain.” Nor can we stop here. 
The same process of analysis will carry us farther m the 
same direction. We often speak, as Dr. Bushnell does 
here, of the elementary forces of Nature as “acting” by 
themselves. But there is no other meaning m these 
words than an expression of the fact that we neither see 
nor understand the connexion of those elementary forces 
and Mind. But this ignorance of ours affords no manner 
of presumption that such connexion does not exist. On 
the contrary, though the manner. of that connexion be 
unknown, it is much more conceivable to us that some 
connexion does exist than that it does not. If therefore 
the distinction between the Natural and the Supernatural 
be the distinction between that which is and that which 
is not the work of Mind, then it becomes a purely arbi- 
trary distinction. It assumes that we can distinguish 
between cases in which the properties of matter work 
under the direction of Mind, and other cases in which 
they work “of themselves.” But this is a line which we 











THE SUPERNATURAL. rr 


a 





draw for ourselves. There is no reason to suppose that 
it has any reality in the constitution of things. It is not 
in those things, but in the point of view from which we 
regard them, that the distinction lies. We have only to 
change that point of view, and the distinction vanishes. 
All Nature becomes Supernatural, because all her 
elements, both in themselves and in their combinations, 
are only conceivable as first established, and then em- 
ployed by the powers of Mind. 

But if this definition of the Supernatural displeases 
us, as tending to confound distinctions which we had 
thought were clear, let us take another definition. Let 
us take the Natural in that larger and wider sense, in 
which it contains within it the whole phenomena of 
Man’s intellectual and spiritual nature, as part, and 
the most familiar of all parts, ofthe visible system of 
things. This is a definition more consonant with 
common language. In all ordinary senses of the term, 
Man and his doings belong to the Natural, as dis- 
tinguished from the Supernatural. 

We are now from another point of view coming 
nearer to some precise understanding of what the ~ 
Supernatural may be supposed to mean. But before 
we proceed, there is another question which must be 
answered—What is the relation in which the agency of 
Man stands to the physical laws of Nature? The 





T2 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





answer, in part at least, is plain. His power in respect 
to those laws extends only, first to their discovery and 
ascertainment, and then to their use. He can establish 
none: he can suspend none. All he can do is to guide, 
in a limited degree, the mutual action and reaction of 
the laws amongst each other. ‘They are the tools with 
which he works—they are the instruments of his Will. 
In all he does or can do he must employ them. His 
ability to use them is limited both by his want of know- 
ledge and by his want of power. The more he knows of 
them, the more largely he can employ them, and make 
them ministers of his purposes. ‘This, as a general rule, 
is true; but it is subject to the second limitation just 
pointed out. Our power over Nature does not neces- 
sarily keep pace with our knowledge of her Laws. Man 
already knows far more than he has power to convert to 
use. It is a true observation of Sir George Lewis,! that 
Astronomy, for example, in its higher branches, has an 
interest almost purely scientific. It reveals to our know- 
ledge perhaps the grandest and most sublime of the 
physical laws of Nature. But a much smaller amount of 
‘knowledge would suffice for the only practical appli- 
cations which we have yet been able to make of these 
laws to our own use. Still, that knowledge has a refl-~ 


4 “ Astronomy of the Ancients,” p, 254. 


a ee a 





THE SUPERNATURAL, T3 





influence on our knowledge of ourselves, of our powers, 
and of the relations which subsist between the consti- 
tution of our own minds and the constitution of te 
universe. And in other spheres of inquiry, advancing 
knowledge of physical laws has been constantly accom- 
panied with advancing power over the physical world. 
It has enabled us to do a thousand things, any one of 
which, a few generations ago, would have been con- 
sidered supernatural. Nor can it be said that this judg- 
ment of their character would have been erroneous. 
These things would have been superhuman then, though 
they are not superhuman now. ‘The same lecturer who 
told his audience that there was nothing spontaneous in 
Nature proceeded, by virtue of his own knowledge of 
natural laws, and by his selecting and combining power, 
to present a whole series of phenomena—such as ice 
frozen in contact with red-hot crucibles—which certainly 
did not belong to the “ordinary course of Nature.” 
Such an exhibition a few centuries ago would, beyond 
all doubt, have subjected the lecturer on Heat to painful 
experience of that condition of matter. Nevertheless the 
phenomena so exhibited were natural phenomena—in 
this sense, that they were the product of natural laws. 
Only these laws were combined in action under extra- 
ordinary conditions, and these conditions were governed 


by the purpose and design of the lecturer, which design 


=e 


14 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


was “ spontaneous,” if there is any meaning in the word. 
In like manner, if the progress of discovery is as rapid 
during the next four hundred years as it has been during 
the last period of the same extent, men will be able to 
do many things which would now appear to be “ super- 
natural.” There is no difficulty in conceiving how a 
complete knowledge of all natural laws would give, if 
not complete power, at least degrees of power, immensely 

greater than those which we now possess. Power of this 

kind, then, however great in degree, clearly does not 

answer that idea of the Supernatural which so many 

reject as inconceivable. What, then, is that idea? Have 

we not traced it to its den at last? By “supernatural” 

power, do we not mean power independent of the use.of 
means, as distinguished from power depending on know- 

ledge—even infinite knowledge—of the means proper to 

be employed ? 

This is the sense—probably the only sense—in which 
the Supernatural is, to many minds, so Gifficult of 
belief. No man can have any difficulty in believing 
that there are natural laws of which he is ignorant; 
nor in conceiving that there may be Beings who do 
know them, and can use them, even as he himself 
now uses the few laws with which he is acquainted. 
The real difficulty lies in the idea of Will exercised 
without the use of means—not in the idea of Will 


THE SUPERNATURAL. 15 
exercised through means which are beyond our know- 
ledge, or beyond our reach. 

Now, have we any right to say that belief in ¢/zs is 
essential to all Religion? -If we have not, then, it is 
only putting, as so many other hasty sayings do put, 
additional difficulties in the way of Religion. The rela- 
tion in which God stands to those rules of His govern- 
ment which are called “laws,” is, of course, an inscrutable 
mystery to us. But the very idea of a Creator involves 
the idea not merely of a Being by whom the properties 
of Matter are employed, but of a Being from. whose Will 
the properties of Matter are derived. This, indeed, is 
the proper work of Creation, as nearly as we can form 
a conception of it. It is true that in forming this 
conception we pass beyond the bounds of our own 
experience, because “we pass from that in God of 
which there is an image in Man, to that which is dis- 
tinctive of God as God.” But this we must do in 
forming any idea of a God at all. We must conceive 
the Creator as first giving existence to the means, 
and then using them for the accomplishment of ends. 
“We cannot conceive of the original relation of this 
Universe to God as that of an infinite multitude of laws 
to an infinite Mind, having (only) perfect knowledge 
of them, and using this knowledge in turning them to 


account, in accomplishing designs of infinite wisdom. 





ee NR He A 


16 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





We cannot conceive of infinite wisdom thus, as it were, 
finding infinite resources already existing.”* All this is 
true. But those who believe that God’s Will does govern 
the world, must believe that ordinarily, at least, He does 
govern it by the choice and use of means,—which means 
were again pre-established by Himself. Nor have we any 
certain reason to believe that He ever acts otherwise. 
Extraordinary manifestations of His Will—signs and 
wonders—may be wrought, for aught we know, by similar 
instrumentality—only by the selection and use of laws 
of which Man knows and can know nothing, and which, 


if he did know, he could not employ.? 


1 J am glad to be able to quote these passages from one of my 
earliest and most valued friends, the Rev. J. McLeod Campbell. 
They occur in an Introduction to a new edition of his work on the 
“Nature of the Atonement” (Macmillan and Co. 1867)—an Intro- 
duction marked by characteristic depth of thought and feeling. 

2 This chapter, originally published as an article in the Zainburgh 
feview for Oct. 1862, has been referred to in the remarkable work 
of Mr. Lecky on-‘‘ The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in 
Europe,” (vol. i. ch, ii. p. 195 note,) as conveying “a notion of a 
miracle which would not differ gezerically from a human act, though 
it would still be strictly available for evidential purposes.” I am 
quite satisfied with this definition of the result. Beyond the imme- 
diate purposes of benevolence, which were served by almost all the 
miracles of the New Testament, the only other purpose which is ever 
assigned to them is an ‘‘ evidential purpose ”— that is, a purpose 
that they might serve as signs of the presence of superhuman 
knowledge, and of the working of superhuman power. ‘They were 
performed—in short —to assist faith, and not to confound reason, 


st 


THE SUPERNATURAL. ee & 





Here, then, we come upon the question of miracles— 
how we understand them? what we would define them 
to be? The common idea of a miracle is, a suspension 
or violation ofthe laws of Nature. This is a definition 
which places the essence of a miracle in a particular 
method of operation. But there is another definition 
which passes over the question of method altogether, 
and dwells only on the agency by which, and the purpose 
for which, a wonderful work is wrought. ‘ We would 
confine the word miracle,” says Dr. M‘Cosb,} “to those 
events which were wrought in our world as a sign or 
proof of God making a supernatural interpositicn, ora 
revelation to Man.” The two most essential conditions 
in this view of a miracle, are that it is a work wrought 
by a Divine power for a Divine purpose, and is of a 
nature such as could not be wrought by merely human 
contrivance. This definition of a miracle does not neces- 
sarily exclude the idea of God working by the use of 
means, provided they are such means as are out of 
human reach. Indeed, in an important note (p. 149), 
Dr. M‘Cosh explains that miracles are not to be con- 
sidered “as against Nature” in any other sense than 
that in which “one natural agent may be against another 
—as water may counteract fire.” This eminent writer 

1 “The Supernatural in relation to the Natural.” By the Rev. 
James M‘Cosh, LL.D. Macmillan, Cambridge, 1861. 

c , 





ae 


18 THE REICN OF LAW. 





has approached the subject by the right method, because 
he has addressed himself first to the solution of the one 
question which is an essential preliminary to all sub- 
sequent discussion :—‘' low much is contained in the 
Natural?” Not until this question is answered, can the 
Supernatural be defined. Yet the answer given by Dr. 
M‘Cosh shows the inherent and the insuperable difficulty 
which attends the giving of any answer at all. “In this 
world,” he says, “there is a set of objects and agencies 
which constitute a system or Cosmos which may have 
relations to regions beyond, du¢ zs all the while a self- 
contained sphere, with a space around wt—an Island so 
far separated from other lands. This system we call 
Nature” (p. ror). This definition of the Natural is 
perhaps as accurate and as full as any that can be given. 
It assumes, however, that the boundaries of the Natural 
are known. But the essential difficulty of separating 
between the Natural and the Supernatural is this— 
that the boundaries of the Natural are of known— 
that we cannot trace the shores of this “island ”—that 
even if we could see any distinct separation between 
them and the space around them, we have not ex- 
plored the “island” itself completely, and therefore we 
cannot say of any agency working thérein, that it comes 
from beyond the Sea, Mr. Mansel, in his “Essay on 


Miracles,” adopts the word “superhuman” as the most 





THE SUPERNATURAL. 19 
accurate expression of his meaning. He says, “ A super- 
human authority needs to be ‘substantiated by super- 
human evidence ; avd what is superhuman ts miraculous.” 
It is important to observe that this definition does not 
necessarily involve the idea of a “ violation of the laws of 
Nature.” It does not involve the idea of the exercise of 
Will apart from the use of means. It does not imply | 
any exception to the great law of causation. It does not 
involve, therefore, that idea which appears to many so 
difficult of conception. It simply supposes, without any 
attempt to fathom the relation in which God stands to 
His own “ laws,” that out of His infinite knowledge of 
these laws, or of His infinite power of making them the 
instruments of His Will, He may and He does use them 
for extraordinary indications of His presence.? 

t The reluctance to admit, as belonging to the domain, 
of Nature, any special exertion of Divine power for 


2 “ Aids to Faith,” p. 35. Inanother passage (p. 21), Mr. Mansel 
says, that in respect to the great majority of the miracles recorded 
in Scripture, ‘‘the supernatural element appears . . . in the exer- 
cise of a personal power transcending the limits of man’s will. 
They are not so much supermaterial as superhuman.” 

2 I agree with Mr. J. M. Campbell when he says, in the Intro- 
duction already quoted, ‘‘It appears to me that we do not know 
enough to say, as regards anything transcending our knowledge of | 
Law, in which way we should view it—whether as belonging to the 
system of Law, but to a region of it out of our sight, or as outside 
of that system, and as having the same immediate relation to God 
which the system of Law ultimately has,”— P. xxxv. 


C2 


Ee’? OO oor 


20 THE REIGN OF LAW. 








special purposes, stands really in very close relation- 
ship to the converse notiou, that where the operation 
of natural causes can be clearly traced, there the exer- | 
tion of Divine power and Will is rendered less certain 
and less‘convincing. ‘This is the idea which lies at the 
root of Gibbon’s famous chapters on the spread of 
Christianity. He labours to prove that it was due to 
natural causes. In proving this, he evidently thinks he 
is disposing of the notion that Christianity spread by 
Divine power; whereas he only succeeds in pointing 
out some of the means which were employed to effect 
a Divine purpose. In like manner, the preservation 
of the Jews as a distinct People during so many cen- 
turies of complete dispersion, is a fact standing nearly, 
if not absolutely, alone in the history of the world. It 
is at variance with all other experience of the laws 
which govern the amalgamation with each other of dif- 
ferent families of the human race. The case of the 
Gipsies has been referred to as somewhat parallel. But 
the facts of this case are doubtful and obscure, and 
such of them as we know involve conditions altogether 
dissimilar in kind. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the preservation of the Jews, partly from the relation 
in which it stands to the apparent fulfilment of Pro- 
phecy, and partly from the extraordinary nature of the 
fact itself, is tacitly assumed by many persons to come 


a 


eee ‘THE SUPERNATURAL, 21 





strictly within the category of miraculous events. Yet 
in itself it is nothing more than a striking illustration 
how a departure from the “ ordinary course of nature” 
may be effected through the instrumentality of means 
which are natural and comprehensible. An extraordi- 
nary resisting power has been given to the Jewish 
People against those dissolving and disintegrating forces 
which have caused the disappearance of every other 
race placed under similar conditions. ‘They have been 
torn from home and country, and removed, not in a body, 
but in scattered fragments, over the world. Yet they 
are as distinct from every other people now as they were 
in the days of Solomon. Nevertheless this resisting 
_power, wonderful though it be, is the result of special 
laws, overruling those in ordinary operation. It has 
been effected by the use of means. Those means 
have been superhuman—they have been beyond human 
contrivance and arrangement. ut they belong to 
the region of the Natural. They belong to it not 
the less, but all the more, because in their concatena- 
tion and arrangement they seem to indicate the purpose 
of a living Will seeking and effecting the fulfilment of 
its designs. This is the manner after which our own 
living wills in their little sphere effect their little objects. 
Is it difficult to believe that after the same manner also 
the Divine Will, of which ours is the image only, works 


and effects its purposes? 


renee ei ar IAA LOL ORLA 


22 THE REIGN OF: LAW. 





Our own experience shows that the universal Reign 
of Law is perfectly consistent with a power of making 
those laws subservient to design—even when the know- 
ledge of them is but slight, and the power over them 
slighter still. How much more easy, how much more 
natural, to conceive that the same universality is com- 
patible with the exercise of that Supreme Will before 
which ail are known, and to which all are servants! 
What difficulty in this view remains in the idea of the 
Supernatural? Is it any other than the difficulty in be- 
lieving in the existence of a Supreme Will—in a living 
God? if this be the belief of which M. Guizot speaks 
when he says that it is essential to religion, then his 
proposition is unquestionably true. In this sense the 
difficulty of believing in the Supernatural, and the diffi- 
culty of believing in pure Theism, is one and the same. 
But if he means that it is necessary to religion to be- 
lieve in even the occasional “ violation of law,”—if he 
means that without such belief, signs and wonders cease 
to be evidences of Divine power,—then he announces a 
proposition which cannot be sustained. There is nothing 
in Religion incompatible with the belief that all exer- 
cises of God’s power, whether ordinary or extraordi- 
nary, are effected through the instrumentality of means 
—that is to say, by the instrumentality of natural laws 
brought out, as it were, and used for a Divine purpose. 
To believe in the existence of miracles, we must indeed 


THE SUPERNATURAL. 23 





believe in the Superhuman and in the Supermaterial. 
But both these are familiar facts in Nature. We must 
believe also in a Supreme Will and a Supreme Intelli- 
gence ; but this our own Wills‘and our own Intelligence 
not only enable us to conceive of, but compel us to 
recognise in the whole laws and economy of Nature. 
Her whole aspect “answers intelligently to our intelli- 
gence—mind responding to mind as in a glass.”!_ Once 
admit that there is a Being who—irrespective of any 
theory as to the relation in which the laws of Nature 
stand to His Will—has at least an infinite knowledge of 
those laws, and an infinite power of putting them to use— 
then miracles lose every element of inconceivability. In 
respect to the greatest and highest of all—that restora- 
tion of the breath of life which is not more mysterious 
than its original gift—there is no answer to the question 
which Paul asks, “Why should it be thought a thing 
incredible by you that God should raise the dead ?” 

This view of miracles is well expressed by Principal 
Tulloch :— 

“The stoutest advocate of interference can mean 
nothing more than that the Supreme Will has so moved 


the hidden springs of nature that a new issue arises 


1 “Beginning Life: Chapters for Young Men on Religion, Study, 
and Business, Chap. iii., The Supernatural.” By John Tulloch, 


D.D. Principal of St. Mary’s College, St. Andrew’s, Edinburgh, 
1860, P, 29. 








24 | THE REIGN OF LAW. 





on given circumstances. The ordinary issue is sup- 
planted by a higher issue. The essential facts before 
us are a certain set of phenomena, and a Higher Will 
moving them. How moving them? is a question for 
human definition; but the answer to which does not 
and cannot affect the Divine meaning of the change. 
Yet when we reflect that this Higher Will is every- 
where reason and wisdom, it seems a juster as well as 
a more comprehensive view to regard it as operating 
by subordination and evolution rather than by ‘inter- 
ference’ or ‘violation.’ According to this view, the 
idea of Law is so far from being contravened by the 
Christian miracles, that it is taken up by them and 
made their very basis. They are the expression of a 
Higher Law, working out its wise ends among the 
lower and ordinary sequences of life and history. These 
ordinary sequences represent nature—nature, however, 
not as an immutable fate, but a plastic medium 
through which a Higher Voice and Will are ever 
addressing us, and which, therefore, may be wrought 
into new issues when the Voice has a new message, 
and the Will a special purpose for us.” } 

It is well worthy of remark, that Locke, who laid 
great stress on the Christian miracles, as attesting the 
authority of those who wrought them, declines, never- 
theless, to adopt the common definition of that in 


* “ Beginning Life,” &c. pp. 85, 86. By John Tulloch, D.D. 





i: THE SUPERNATURAL. 25 





which miraculous agency consists. ‘A miracle then,” 
he says,! “I take to be a sensible operation, which, 
being above the comprehension of the spectator and, 
in his opinion, contrary to the established course of 
nature, zs taken by him to be Divine.” And in reply 
to the objection, that this makes a miracle depend on 
the opinions or knowledge of the spectator, he points” 
out that this objection cannot be avoided by any of 
the definitions commonly adopted ; because “ it being 
agreed that a miracle must be that which surpasses the 
force of nature in the established steady laws of cause 
and effect, nothing can be taken to be a miracle but 
what ts judged to exceed those laws. Now every one 
being able to judge of those laws only by his own 
acquaintance with nature, and his own notions of its 
force, which are different in different men, it is un- 
avoidable that that should be a miracle to one man 
which is not so to another.” In this passage Locke 
recognises the great truth, that we can never know 
what is above Nature unless we know all that is 
within Nature. But he misses another truth, quite as 
important,—that a miracle would still be a miracle even 
though we did know the laws through which it was 
accomplished, provided those laws, though not beyond 
human knowledge, were beyond human control. We 
might know the conditions necessary to the performance 


1 “ A Discourse on Miracles.” 





26 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


of a miracle, although utterly unable to bring those 
conditions about. Vet a work performed by the bring- 
ing about of conditions which are out of human reach, 
would certainly be a work attesting superhuman power. 
Nevertheless so deeply ingrained in popular theology 
is the idea that miracles, to be miracles at all, must 
‘be performed by some violation or suspension of the 
laws of Nature, that the opposite idea of miracles being 
performed by the use of means is regarded by many 
with jealousy and suspicion. Strange that it should be 
thought the safest course to separate as sharply and as 
widely as we can between what we are called upon to 
believe in Religion, and what we are able to trace or 
understand in Nature! With what heart can those who 
cherish this frame of mind follow the great argument of 
Butler? All the steps of that argument—the greatest in 
the whole range of Christian philosophy—are founded 
on the opposite belief, that all the truths, and not less all 
the difficulties of Religion, have their type and likeness 
in the “constitution and course of Nature.” As wé 
follow that reasoning, so simple and so profound, we 
find our eyes ever opening to some new interpretation of 
familiar facts, and recognising among the curious things 
of earth, one after another of the laws which, when told. 
us of the spiritual world, seem so perplexing and so hard 
to accept or understand. ‘To ask how much further this 
argument of the “ Analogy” is capable of illustration and 





THE SUPERNATURAL. 27 








development, is to ask how much niore we shall know 
of Nature. Like all central truths, its ramifications are 
infinite—as infinite as the appearance of variety, and as 
pervading as the sense of oneness in the universe of God. 

But what of Revelation? Are its history and doc- 
trines incompatible with the belief that God uniformly 
acts through the use of means? ‘The narrative of Crea- 
tion is given to us in abstract only, and is told in two 
different forms, both having apparently for their main, 
perhaps their exclusive object, the presenting to our 
conception the personal agency of a living God. Yet 
this narrative indicates, however slightly, that room is 
left for the idea of a material process. ‘“ Out of the dust 
of the ground ;” that is, out of the ordinary elements of 
ms, ature, was that Body formed which is still upheld and 
perpetuated by organic forces acting under the rules of 
Law. Nothing which Science has discovered, or can 
discover, is capable of traversing that simple narrative. 
On this subject M. Guizot lays great stress, as many 
others do, on what he calls the Supernatural in Crea- 
tion, as distinguished from the operations now visible in 
Nature. “De quelle fagon et par quelle puissance le 
genre humain a-t-il commencé sur la terre?” In reply to 
this question, he proceeds to argue that Man must have 
been the result either of mere material forces, or of a 
supernatural power exterior to, and superior to Matter. 
Spontaneous generation, he argues, supposing it to exist 





28 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





at all, can give birth only to infant beings—to. the first 
hours, and feeblest forms of nascent life. But Man—the 
human pair—must evidently have been complete from the 
first ; created in the full possession of their powers and 
faculties. ‘“C’est a cette condition seulement qu’en ap- 
paraissant pour la premiere fois sur la terre /homme aurait 
pu y vivre—s’y perpétuer, et y fonder le genre humain. 
Evidemment l’autre origine du genre humain est seul ad- 
missible, seul possible. Le fait surnaturel de la création 
explique seul la premitre apparition de ’homme ici-bas.” 

This is a common but not a very safe argument. If 
the Supernatural—that is to say, the Superhuman and 
the Supermaterial—cannot be found nearer to us than 
this, it will not be securely found at all. It is very diffi- 
cult to free ourselves from this notion that by going far 
enough back, we can “find out God” in some sense in 
which we cannot find Him now. The certainty not 
merely of one, but of many successive Creations in the 
history of our Planet, and especially. of a time compara- 
tively recent, when Man did not exist, is indeed an 
effectual answer to the notion, if it be now ever enter- 
tained, of ‘all things having continued as they are 
since the Beginning.” But those who believe that the 
existing processes of Nature can be accounted for by 
“Law,” may believe that those processes were also 
commenced by the same vague and mysterious agency, 
To accept the primeval narrative of the Jewish Scrip. 





aa? 


THE SUPERNATURAL. 29 





tures as coming from authority, and as bringing before 
us the personal agency of the Creator, but without pur- 
porting to reveal the method of His work,—this is one 
thing. To argue that no other origin for the first parents 
of the human race is conceivable than that they were 
moulded perfect, without the instrumentality of any 
means,—this is quite another thing. ‘The various hypo- 
theses of Development, of which Darwin’s theory is only 
a new and special version, whether they are probable or 
not, are at least advanced as affording a possible escape 
from the puzzle which M. Guizot puts. These hypotheses 
are indeed destitute of proof; and in the form which 
they have as yet assumed, it may justly be said that 
they involve such violations of, or departures from, 
all that we know of the existing order of things, as 
to deprive them of all scientific basis. But the close 
and mysterious relations between the mere animal frame 
of Man, and that of the lower animals, does render the 
idea of a common relationship by descent at least con- 
ceivable. Indeed, in proportion as it seems to approach 
nearer to processes of which we have some knowledge, it 
is, in a degree, more conceivable than Creation without 
any process,—of which we have no knowledge and can 
have no conception. 

' But whatever may have been the method or process 
of Creation, it is Creation still. If it were proved 
to-morrow that the first man was “born” from some 


30 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





pre-existing Form of Life, it would still be true that such 
a birth must have been, in every sense of the word, a new 
Creation. It would still be as true that God formed him 
* out of the dust of the earth,” as it is true that He has 
so formed every child who is now called to answer the 
first question of all theologies. And we must remember 
that the language of Scripture nowhere draws, or seems 
even conscious of, the distinction which modern philo- 
_sophy draws so sharply between the Natural and the 
Supernatural. All the operations of Nature are spoken 
of as operations of the Divine Mind. Creation is the 
outward embodiment of a Divine idea. It is in this 
sense, apparently, that the narrative of Genesis speaks of 
every plant being formed “before it grew.” But the 
same language is held, not less decidedly, of every ordi- 
nary birth. ‘“ Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being 
imperfect. In Thy book all my members were written, 
which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there 
were none of them.” And these words, spoken of the 
individual birth, have been applied not less truly to the 
modern idea of the Genesis of all Organic Life. What- 
ever may have been the physical or material relation 
between its successive forms, the ideal relation has 
been now clearly recognised, and reduced to scientific 
definition. All the members of that frame which has 
received its highest interpretation in Man, had existed, 
with lower offices assigned to them, in the animals 


THE SUPERNATURA!. 31 





which flourished before Man was born. All theories of 
Development have been simply attempts to suggest the 
manner in which, or the physical process by means of 
which, this ideal continuity of type and pattern has been 
preserved. But whilst all these suggestions have been 
in the highest degree uncertain, some of them violently 
absurd, the one thing which is certain is the fact for 
which they endeavour to account. And what is that 
fact? It is one which belongs to the world of Mind, 
not to the world of Matter. When Professor Owen tells 
us, for example, that certain jointed bones in the Whale’s 
paddle are the same bones which in the Mole enable it 
to burrow, which in the Bat enable it to fly, and in Man 
constitute his hand with all its wealth of functions, he 
does not mean that physically and actually they are the 
same bones, nor that they have the same uses, nor that 
they ever have been, or ever can be, transferable from 
one kind of animal to another. He means that in a 
purely ideal or mental conception of the plan of all Ver- 
tebrate skeletons, these bones occupy the same relative 
place—relative, that is, not to origin or use, but to the 
Plan or conception of that skeleton as a whole. 

Here the Supermaterial, and in this sense the Super- 
natural, element,—that is to say, the ideal conformity and 
unity of conception, is the one unquestionable fact, in 
which we recognise directly the working of a Mind with 
which our own has very near relations. Here, as else- 


32 THE REIGN OF LAW. " 
where, we see the Natural, in the largest sense, including 
and embodying the Supernatural ; the Material, including 
+he Supermaterial. No possible theory, whether true or 
false, in respect to the physical means employed to pre- 
serve the correspondence of parts which runs through all 
Creation, can affect the certainty of that mental plan and 
purpose which alone makes such correspondence intelli- — 
gible to us, and in which alone it may be said to exist. 

It must always be remembered that the two ideas,— 
that of a Physica! Cause and that of a Mental Purpose,— 
are not antagonistic ; only the one is larger and more: 
comprehensive than the other, Let us take a case. In 
many animal frames there are what have been called 
“silent members ”—members which have no reference 
to the life or use of the animal, but only to the general 
pattern on which all vertebrate skeletons have been 
formed. Mr. Darwin, when he sees such a member in 
any animal, concludes with certainty that this animal is” 
the lineal descendant by ordinary generation of some 
other animal in which that member was not silent but 
turned to use. Professor Owen, taking a larger and 
wider view, would say, without pretending to explain Zow 
its presence is to be accounted for physically, that the 
silent member has relation to a general purpose or plan 
which can be traced from the dawn of Life, but which 
did not receive its full accomplishment until Man was 
born, This is certain: the other is a theory. The 








THE SUPERNATURAL, 33 





_ 


assumed physical cause may be true or false. But in any 
case the mental purpose and design—the conformity to 
an abstract idea—this is certain. The relation in which 
created Forms stand to our own mind and to our under- 
standing of their Purpose, is the one thing which we 
can surely know, because it belongs to our own con- 
sciousness. It is entirely independent of any belief 
we may entertain, or any knowledge we may acquire, 
of the processes employed for the fulfilment of that 
Purpose. 

And yet scientific men sometimes tell us that “we 
must be very cautious how we ascribe intention to 
Nature. Things do fit into each other, no doubt, as if 
they were designed; but all we know about them is 
that these correspondences exist, and that they seem to 
be the result of physical laws of development and 
growth.” Very likely; but how these correspondences 
have arisen, and are daily arising, is not the question, and 
it is immaterial how that question may be answered, 
Do those correspondences exist, or do they not? The 
perception of them by our mind is as much a fact as the 
sight or touch of the things in which they appear. They 
may have been produced by growth—they may have been 
the result of a process of development,—but it is not the 
less the development of a mental purpose. It is the end 
subserved that we absolutely know. What alone is 

D 





i 


34 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


Do  ————————— 


doubtful and obscure is precisely that which we are told 
is the only legitimate object of our research,—viz., the 
means by which that end has been attained. Take one 
instance out of millions. ‘The poison of a deadly snake 
—let us for a moment consider what this is. It is a 
secretion of definite chemical properties which have re- 
ference, not only—not even mainly—to the organism of 
the animal in which it is developed, but specially to the 
organism of another animal which it is intended to de- 
stroy. Some naturalists have a vague sort of notion 
that, as regards merely mechanical weapons, or organs of 
attack, they may be developed by use,—that legs may 
become longer by fast running, teeth sharper and longer 
by much biting. Be it so: this law of growth, if it 
exist, is but itself an instrument whereby purpose is ful- 
filled. But how will this law of growth adjust a poison 
in one animal with such subtle knowledge of the 
organisation of another that the deadly virus shall in 
a few minutes curdle the blood, benumb the nerves, 
and rush in upon the citadel of life? There is but 
one explanation—-a Mind, having minute and perfect 
knowledge of the structure of both, has designed the 
one to be capable of inflicting death upon the other. 
This mental purpose and resolve is the one thing which — 
our intelligence perceives with direct and intuitive 
recognition. The method of creation, by means of which 





THE SUPERNATURAL ~ 35 





this purpose has been carried into effect, is utterly 
unknown. 

It is no answer or objection to this view that poisons 
exist also in plants and minerals where no similar adjust- 
ment to function is perceived.!” Even in these cases there 
are wonderful relations between our own human frame 
and many poisons of the mineral and vegetable world 
which render them invaluable agents in the mitigation 
of suffering and the prevention or removal of disease. 
It is impossible to believe that these complicated re- 
lations of action and reaction between things separated 
apparently from each other by the whole width of being, 
have been the result of forces with which Mind and 
Prevision have had no concern. But even if the use 
of such poisons were absolutely unknown—even if that 
use lay, which it does not, beyond tue possibility of our 
conception,—this would not deduct by the value of a 
fraction from the certainty of a conclusion which is 
founded on different conditions. ‘The relations of ad- 
justment between a given-number of elements are none 
the less a certain fact because similar elements may be 
_ found elsewhere without any such adjustment being 
visible to us. It is the very fact of their not being 


1 ‘To what intention are we to ascribe the poisons liberally dis- 
tributed through plants and minerals?” asks Mr. G. H. Lewes in 
his review of this work.—fertnightiy Review, July 1867, p. 100, 


D2 


a 


36 - THE REIGN OF LAW. 





a Eee 
separate but combined in the one case which justifies — 
and compels a conclusion different from that which 
arises in the other case. This is the law of evidence 
on which we act and judge in other matters with con- 
viction which is both intuitive, and capable of being 
confirmed by the rules of reason. And this reply is 
applicable to all objections of the same kind. Those 
portions of the system of Nature which are wholly dark 
to us do not necessarily cast any shadow on those 
other portions of that system which are luminous with 
inherent light. Rather the other way. The shining 
tracts which thus reflect the light of Reason and of 
Mind send abundant rays into all the dark places round 
them. . The new discoveries which Science is ever 
making of adjustments and combinations, of which 
we had no previous conception, impress us with an 
irresistible conviction that the same relations to Mind 
prevail throughout. It matters not in what department 
of investigation inquiry is conducted, it matters not what 
may be the Philosophy or Theology of the inquirer. 
Every step he takes he finds himself face to face with 
facts which he cannot describe intelligibly either to him- 
self or others, except by referring them to that function 
and power of Mind which we know as Purpose and 
Design. 

Perhaps no illustration more striking of this principle. 








THE SUPERNATURAL, 37 





was ever presented than in the curious volume published 
by Mr. Darwin on the “ Fertilisation of Orchids.”! — It 
appears that the fertilisation of almost all Orchids is de- 
pendent on the transport of the pollen from one flower 
to another by means of insects, It appears, further, that 
the structure of these flowers is elaborately contrived, so 
as to secure the certainty and effectiveness of this opera- 
tion. Mr. Darwin’s work is devoted to tracing in detail 
what these contrivances are. ‘To a large extent they are 
purely mechanical, and can be traced with as much 
clearness and certainty as the different parts of which 
a steam-engine is composed. ‘The complication and 
ingenuity of these contrivances almost exceed belief. 
**Moth-traps and spring-guns set on these grounds,” 
might be the motto of the Orchids. ‘There are baits to 
tempt the nectar-loving Lepidoptera, with rich odours 
exhaled at night, and lustrous colours to shine by day; 
there are channels of approach along which they are 
surely guided, so as to compel them to pass by certain. 
spots; there are adhesive plasters nicely adjusted to fit 
their probosces, or to catch their brows ; theie are hair 
triggers carefully set in their necessary path, communi- 


cating with explosive shells, which project the pollen- 


1 **On the various Contrivances by which British and Foreign 
Orchids are fertilised by Insects,” By Charles Darwin, F.R S. 
London, 1862, 


gece: ee SS eee 
38 THE REIGN OF LAW. 

Neen a a een enna San SRST 
stalks with unerring aim upon their bodies. There are, 
in short, an infinitude of adjustments, for an idea of 
which I must refer my readers to Mr. Darwin’s inimi- 
table powers of observation and description—adjust- 
ments all contrived so as to secure the accurate convey- 
ance of the pollen of the one flower to its precise 
destination in the structure of another. 

Now there are two questions which present them- 
selves when we examine such a mechanism as this. 
The first is, What is the use of the various parts, or their 
relation to each other with reference to the purpose of 
the whole? The second question is, How were those 
parts made, and out of what materials? It is the first of . 
these questions—that is to say, the use, object, inten- 
tion, or purpose of the different parts of the plant— 
which Darwin sets himself instinctively to answer first ; 
and it is this which he does answer with precision and 
success. ‘The second question,—that is to say, how 
those parts came to be developed, and out of what 
“‘ primordial elements” they have been derived in their 
present shapes, and converted to their present uses— 
this is a question which Darwin does also attempt to 
solve, but the solution of which is in the highest degree 
d.fficult and uncertain. It is curious to observe the 
language which this most advanced disciple of pure 
naturalism instinctively uses when he has to describe the 


s 





a ee ee res eee 





THE SUPERNATURAL, 39 





complicated structure of this curious order of plants. 
“Caution in ascribing intentions to nature,” does not 
seem to occur to’ him as possible. Intention is the one 
thing which he does see, and which, when he does not 
see, he seeks for diligently until he finds it. He exhausts 
every form of words and of illustration by which intention 
or mental purpose can be described. ‘ Contrivance ”— 
“‘ curious contrivance ”’—“ beautiful contrivance,”—these 
are expressions which recur over and over again. Here 
is one sentence describing the parts of a particular 
species: “the Labellum is developed into a long nec- 
tary, 2 order to attract Lepidoptera, and we shall pre- 
sently give reasons for suspecting that the nectar is 
purposely so lodged that it can be sucked only slowly, zz 
order to give time for the curious chemical quality of the 
viscid matter setting hard and dry.”! Nor are these 
words used in any sense different from that in which 
they are applicable to the works of Man’s contrivance— 
to the instruments we use or invent for carrying into 
effect our own preconceived designs. On the contrary, 
human instruments are often selected as the aptest illus- 
trations both of the object in view, and of the means 
taken to effect it. Of one particular structure, Mr. 
Darwin says: “ This contrivance of the guiding ridges 
may be compared to the little instrument sometimes 


a P, 29. 


40 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





used for guiding a thread into the eye of a needle.” 
Again, referring to the precautions taken to compel the 
insects to come to the proper spot, in order to have the 
“ pollinia” attached to their bodies, Mr. Darwin says: 
“ Thus we have the rostellum partially closing the mouth 
of the nectary, dike a trap placed in a run for game,—and 
the trap so complex and perfect !"1 But this is not all. 
The idea of special use, as the controlling principle of 
construction, is so impressed on Mr. Darwin’s mind, 
that, in every detail of structure, however singular or 
obscure, he has absolute faith that in this lies the ulti- 
mate explanation. If an organ is largely developed, it 
is because some special purpose is to be fulfilled. If it 
is aborted or rudimentary, it is because that purpose is 
no longer to be subserved. In the case of another 
species whose structure is very singular, Mr. Darwin had 
great difficulty in discovering how the mechanism was 
meant to work, so as to effect the purpose. At last he 
made it out, and of the clue which led to the discovery 
he says: ‘The strange position of the Labellum perched 
on the summit of the column, ought to have shown me 
that here was the place for experiment. I ought to have 
scorned the notion that the Labellum was thus placed for 
v0 good purpose. I neglected this plain guide, and for a 
Icng time completely failed to understand the flower.” # 


4 1) 30. 2 YP, 252% 





THE SUPERNATURAL. 4t 





An attempt has, indeed, been made to explain away 
Mr. Darwin’s language in such cases as “ metaphorical.” + 
But this explanation is powerless to expel from that 
language the inference it involves. Indeed, it is an 
explanation which only repeats the same idea in another 
form. ‘The very essence of a metaphor is that it ex- 
presses the resemblances of things. But it is in seeing 
the resemblances, and in seeing the correlative differences 
of things, that all knowledge consists. This perception 
is the raw material of Thought—it is the foundation of 
all intellectual apprehension. In proportion as resem- 
blances are complete, the language which expresses those 
resemblances is the language of truth. Such language 
very often carries within it the most certain conclusions 
which are accessible to reason. One mind looking at 
the workings of another mind can see likeness of 
agency enly by recognising likeness in the processes of 
thought. ‘That likeness can only be expressed in words 
which convey the idea of it to other minds. But in 
this sense all language is metaphorical. ‘The commonest 
words we use to indicate ideas are essentially meta- 
phorical, bringing home into the world of Mind images 

1 Quarterly Fournal of Scicnce, Oct. 1867. ** Creation by Law,” 
by Alfred Wallace. ‘‘ Mr. Darwin has laid himself open to much 
misconception, and has given to his opponents a powerful weapon 


by his continual use of metaphor in describing the wonderful co 
adaptations of organic beings.”—P, 473. 


eee a a e 


42 TIIE REIGN OF LAW. 








derived from material force, and carrying forth again 
into the outward world conceptions born of that mental 
power which alone is capable of conceiving. In one 
aspect, all human speech is what the Poet calls it, 
“ Matter-moulded forms of speech.” ! In another aspect 
it is all spirit-moulded, since we can only think of 
_ Matter in the light of those impressions which it has 
power to make on Mind. All language is thus but a 
system of signs whereby we express the analogies—the 
differences and resemblances perceived by us in those 
two great departments of Nature of which the union and 
the separation are both imaged in ourselves—that is, in 
the union and in the difference of the Body and the 
Mind. ‘The most absolute certainties we can ever know 
are only known by the translation of ideas or conceptions 
from one of these departments to the other, and the 
language in which these certainties are expressed carries, 
and must carry, signs of this origin in itself, The ques- 
tion, therefore, in respect to Mr. Darwin’s language, is 
not whether it is “metaphorical”—that is, whether it 
applies to material phenomena conceptions derived 
from the world of Mind. This, of course, it does, and 
in the nature of the case it must do. But the question 
is. whether the correspondence it expresses between the 
order of these material phenomena and-a known order 


3 In Memoriam,” xciv. 





THE SUPERNATURAL, 43 





of Thought is or is not a real correspondence, and 
one, therefore, indicating the known effects of a known 
originating cause. 

And here it is well worthy of observation, . that 
although Purpose and Intention are, of course, involved 
in all mental operations, yet the conception of con- 
trivance is not the only mental conception which, in 
like manner, is recognised as constituting the order of 
natural phenomena. Other conceptions equally familiar 
to the mind of Man are instinctively recognised by all 
Naturalists who bring high intellectual powers into that 
contact with Nature which consists in close and thought- 
ful observation of her facts. Other mental conceptions, 
such as those of Number and Proportion, are then found 
to emerge, and make an ineffaceable impression on the 
mind which sees them. 

Thus, when we come to the second part of Mr. Darwin’s — 
work, viz. the Homology of the Orchids, we find that the 
inquiry divides itself into two separate questions,—first, 
the question what all these complicated organs are in 
their primitive relation to each other; and, secondly, 
how these successive modifications have arisen, so as to 
fit them for new and changing uses. Now, it is very 
remarkable that of these two questions, that which may. 
be called the most abstract and transcendental—the 
most nearly related to the Supernatural and the Super 





44 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


= 





material—is again precisely the one which Darwin is 
able to solve most clearly. We have already seen how 
well he solves the first question—What is the use and 
intention of these various parts? ‘The next question is, 
What are these parts in their primal order and con- 
ception? The answer is, that they are members of a 
numerical group, having a definite and still traceable 
order of symmetrical arrangement. They are expres- 
sions of a numerical idea, as so many other things— 
perhaps as all things—of beauty are. Mr. Darwin gives 
a diagram, showing the primordial or archetypal arrange- 
ment of Threes within Threes, out of which all the strange 
and marvellous forms of the Orchids have been deve- 
loped, and to which, by careful counting and dissection, 
they can still be ideally reduced. But when we come 
to the last question—By what process of natural con- 
sequence have these elementary organs of Three within 
Three been developed into SO many various forms of 
beauty, and made to subserve so many curious and 
ingenious designs ?>—we find nothing but the vaguest and 
most unsatisfactory conjectures. Let us take one in- 
stance as an example. There is a Madagascar Orchis— 
the “‘ Angrzecum sesquipedale ”—with an immensely long 
and deep nectary. How did such an extraordinary organ 
come to be developed? Mr. Darwin’s explanation is 
this: The pollen of this flower can only be remoyed by 


cerns =) 





THE SUPERNATURAL, 45 


the proboscis of some very large Moth trying to get at 
the nectar at the bottom of the vessel. The Moths with 
the longest probosces would do this most effectually ; 
they would be rewarded for their long noses by getting 
the most nectar; whilst, on the other hand, the flowers 
with the deepest nectaries would be the best fertilised by 
the largest Moths preferring them. Consequently, the 
deepest-nectaried Orchids, and the longest-nosed Moths, 
would each confer on the other a great advantage in the 
“battle of life.’ This would tend to their respective 
perpetuation, and to the constant lengthening of nec- 
taries and of noses. But the passage is so curious and 
characteristic, that it is well to give Mr. Darwin’s own 
words :— 

“As certain Moths of Madagascar became larger, : 
through natural selection in relation to their genera 
conditions of life, either in the larval or mature state, 
or as the proboscis alone was lengthened to obtain 
honey from the Angreecum, those individual plants of 
the Angrecum which had the longest nectaries, (and 
the nectary varies mucii in length in some Orchids.) 
and which, consequently, compelled the Moths to insert 
their probosces up to the very base, would be the best 
fertilised. These plants would yield most seed, and the 
seedlings would generally inherit longer nectaries ; and 


So it would be in successive generations of the plant and 


ed 


46 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





Moth. Thus it would appear that there has been a race 
in gaining length between the nectary of the Angreecum 
and the proboscis of certain Moths ; but the Angraecum 
has triumphed, for it flourishes and abounds in the 
forests of Madagascar, and still troubles each Moth to 
insert its proboscis as far as possible in order to drain 
the last drop of. nectar. . . . . We can thus,” says Mr. 
Darwin, “Zartially understand how the astonishing — 
length of the nectary may have been acquired by suc- 
cessive modifications.” . 

It is indeed but a “partial” understanding. How 
came this Orchis to require any exact adjustment -be- 
tween the length of its nectary and the proboscis of an 
insect? This is not a general necessity even among the 
Orchids. ‘In the British species, such as Orchis Pyra- 
midalis, it is not necessary that any such adjustment 
should exist, and thus a number of insects of various 
sizes are found to carry away the pollinia, and aid in 
the fertilisation.” This would obviously be the most 
favourable condition for all Orchids in the battle of life. 
Does not the hypothesis, then, begin by assuming the very 

1 The passage which follows I have added to meet the objection 
taken by Mr. Wallace, that I have ‘‘not shown what point the 
explanation fails to meet.” A sample only of such points can be 
given here. See also Note A. 


2 “Creation by Law.” G. A, R. Wallace, Journal of Science, 
October 1867, p. 475. 








THE SUPERNATURAL : Aq 








condition of things for which it professes to account ? 
We must start with this Madagascar Orchis already in 
possession of a larger nectary than other species, and 
with a structure already depending on particular Moths 
also already existing, and already provided with pro- 
bosces of nicely adjusted length. If the nectaries began 
first to lengthen, how came the Moths not to leave 
them for other flowers? And if, on the contrary, they 
began to shorten, how came they not to be favoured ° 
and resorted to by other Moths of a smaller size? Can 
we assume that somehow there were always ready some 
Moths still larger to favour the longer variety, and that 
somehow also there were no smaller Moths to favour the 
shorter?! Why should the race 7 this particular species 
be always in the direction of nectaries getting longer, 
and not rather in the direction of nectaries getting 
shorter? Obviously the same hypothesis might be so 
turned as to account for either result with equal ease, 
and therefore it does not account at all for one of 


those results as against the other. And then there is 


1 Mr. Wallace sees no difficulty whatever in making any supposi- 
tion of this kind which the Theory may require. ‘‘Now let us 
start,” he says, ‘‘from the time when the nectary was only half its 
present length, or about six inches, and was chiefly fertilized by a 
species of Moth which appeared at the time of the plants flowering, 
and whose proboscis was of the same length,” —Ibid, p. 475, 











48 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





a larger question than any of these which remains 
behind. How came Orchids to be dependent at all 
upon insects for fertilisation? It cannot be argued 
that this is a necessity arising mechanically from the 
nature of things, because, as we are truly told by an 
eminent naturalist who warmly supports the Darwinian 
hypothesis, “exactly the same end is attained in ten 
thousand other flowers” which do not possess the same 
‘structure? But what is the bearing of this fact upon 
the theory? Is it not this—that the origin of such 
curious structures, and complicated relations, cannot be 
accounted for on any principle of mere mechanical 
necessity P Elementary forces may indeed always be 
detected, for they are always present. But the manner 
in which they are worked irresistibly suggests some 
directing power, having as one of its aims mere increase 
and variety in that ocean of enjoyment which con- 
stitutes the sum of Organic Life. Some idea of this 
kind, however unconsciously, however reluctantly con- 
ceded, lurks in every form of words in which the 
facts of science can be generalised to the mind. Thus 
we find Mr. Wallace himself saying, in the same paper 
in which he regrets the language of Mr. Darwin, that the 
conception he prefers is, that the “ contrivances” referred 


to “‘are some of the results of those general laws which 


2 “Creation by Law,” p. 474. 





THE SUPERNATURAL 49 





were so co-ordinated at the first introduction of Life upon 
the earth, as to result necessarily in the utmost possible 


” 


development of varied forms.” Eliminating the word 
“necessarily,” which, if it has any meaning, does not 
apply, as we have seen, to the case of the Orchids, this, 
language presents an intelligible idea. It satisfies the 
mind precisely in proportion as it brings into view, 
however distant, the attributes of Mind, and gives usa 
glimpse of “‘the reason why.” The production of variety 
in beauty and in enjoyment is the purpose which those 
words suggest. In like proportion is Mr. Darwin’s 
language the truest and the best. His explanations 
of the mechanical methods by which a wonderful 
Orchis has come to be are indeed, as he hiinself says, 
with great candour, “partial” and partial only. How 
different from the clearness and the certainty with 
which Mr. Darwin is able to explain to us the use and 
intention of the various organs! or the primal idea of 
numerical order and arrangement which governs the 
whole structure of the flower! It is the same through 
all Nature. Purpose and intention, or ideas of order 
_ based on numerical relations, are what meet us at every 
turn, and are more or less readily recognised by our 
own intelligence as corresponding to conceptions familiar 
to our own minds. We know, too, that these purposes 
and ideas are not our own, but the ideas and purposes 


of Another—of One whose manifestations are indeed 
E 





a 


59 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


eam a asa aim CRITI RIE TRIS: ETCDERSRTVISISE DSSTAISE NSIT 


superhuman and supermaterial, but are not “super- 
natural,” in the sense of being strange to Nature, or in 
violation of it. 

The truth is, that there ts no such distinction be- 
tween what we find in Nature, and what we are called 
upon to believe in Religion, as that which men pretend 
to draw between the Natural and the Supernatural. It 
is a distinction purely artificial, arbitrary, unreal. Nature 
presents to our intelligence, the more clearly the more we 


search her, the designs, ideas, and intentions of some 


* Living Will that shall endure, 
When all that seems shall suffer shock.” 


Religion presents to us that same Will, not only work- 
ing equally through the use of means, but using means 
which are strictly analogous—referable to the same 
general principles—and which are constantly appealed 
to as of a sort which we ought to be able to appreciate, 
because we ourselves are already familiar with the like. 
Religion makes no call on us to reject that idea, which 
is the only idea some men can see in Nature—the idea 
of the universal Reign of Law—the necessity of con- 
forming to it—the limitations which in one aspect it 
seems to place on the exercise of Will,—the essential 
basis, in another aspect, which it supplies for all the 
functions of Volition. On the contrary, the high regions 
into which this idea is found extending, and the matters 


THE SUPERNATURAL. 51 


over which it 1s found prevailing, is one of the deepest 
mysteries both of Religion and of Nature. We feel some- 
times as if we should like to get above this rule—into 
some secret Presence where its bonds are broken. But 
no glimpse is ever given us of anything, but “ Free- 
dom within the bounds of Law.” The Will revealed 
to us in Religion is not—any more than the Will re- 
vealed to us in Nature—a capricious Will, but one with 
which, in this respect, “there is no-variableness, neither 
shadow of turning.” 

We return, then, to the point from which we started. 
M. Guizot’s affirmation that belief in the Supernatural is 
essential to all Religion is true only when it is under- 
stood in a special sense. Belief in the existence of a 
Living Will—of a Personal God—is indeed a requisite 


? 


condition. Conviction “that He is” must precede the 
conviction that “ He is the rewarder of those that dili- 
gently seek Him.” But the intellectual yoke involved 
in the common idea of the Supernatural is a voke which 
men impose upon themselves. Obscure thought and 
confused language are the main source of difficuity. 
Assuredly, whatever may be the difficulties of Chris- 
tianity, 74@zs is not one of them,——that it calls on us to 
believe in any exception to the universal prevalence and 
power of Law. Its leading facts and doctrines are 
directly connected with this belief, and directly sugges- 
tive of it. The Divine mission of Christ on earth— 
E 2 








a 


52 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





does not this imply not only the use of means to an 
end, but some inscrutable necessity that certain means, 
and these only, should be employed in resisting and 
overcoming evil? What else is the import of so many 
passages of Scripture implying that certain conditions 
were required to bring the Saviour of Man into a given 
relation with the race He was sent to save? “It be- 
hoved Him... . to make the Captain of our Salvation 
perfect through suffering.” “It behoved Him in all 
things to be made like unto His brethren, Lat He might 
be,” &c.—with the reason added: “for zz that He Him- 
self hath suffered being tempted, He zs able to succour 
them that are tempted.” Whatever more there may be 
in such passages, they all imply the universal reign of 
Law in the moral and spiritual, as well as in the mate- 
rial world : that those laws had to be—behoved to be— 
obeyed ; and that the results to be obtained are brought 
about by the adaptation of means to an end, or, as it 
were, by way of natural consequence from the instru- 
mentality employed. This, however, is an idea which 
systematic theology generally regards with intense sus- 
picion, though, in fact, all theologies involve it, and 
build upon it. But then they are very apt to give 
explanations of that instrumentality which have no coun- 
terpart in the material or in the moral world. Perhaps 
it is not too much to say that the manifest decay which 


so many creeds and confessions are now suffering, arises 


-_, 


THE SUPERNATURAL. 53 


mainly from the degree in which at least the popular 
expositions of them dissociate the doctrines of Chris- 
tianity from the analogy and course of Nature. There 
is no such severance in Scripture—no shyness of illus- 
trating Divine things by reference to the Natural. On 
the contrary, we are perpetually reminded that the laws 
of the spiritual world are in the highest sense laws of 
Nature, whose obligation, operation, and effect are all 
in the constitution and course of things. Hence it is 
that so much was capable of being conveyed in the ferm 
of parable—the common actions and occurrences of 
daily life being often chosen as the best vehicle and 
illustration of the highest spiritual truths. It is not 
merely, as Jeremy Taylor says, that ‘all things are full 
of such resemblances,’—it is more than this—more 
than resemblance. It is the perpetual recurrence, under 
infinite varieties of application, of the same rules and 
principles of Divine government,—of the same Divine 
thoughts, Divine purposes, Divine affections. Hence it 
is that no verbal definitions or logical forms can convey 
religious truth with the fulness or accuracy which belongs 
to narratives taken from Nature—-Man’s nature-and life 
being, of course, included in the term: 


** And so, the Word had breath, and wrought 
With human hands the Creed of creeds,” 4 


1 Tennyson’s ‘‘In Memoriam,” 





54 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





The same idea is expressed in the passionate exclama- 
tion of Edward Irving :—“ We must speak in parables, 
or we must present a wry and deceptive form of truth ; 
of which choice the first is to be preferred, and our Lord 
adopted it. Because parable is truth veiled, not truth 
dismembered ; and as the eye of the understanding 
grows more piercing, the veil is seen through, and the 
truth stands revealed.” Nature is the great Parable; 
and the truths which she holds within her are veiled, 
but not dismembered. The pretended separation be- 
tween that which lies within Nature and that which lies 
beyond Nature is a dismemberment of the truth. Let 
both those who find it difficult to believe in anything 
which is “above” the Natural, and those who insist on 
that belief, first determine how far the Natural extends. 
Perhaps in going round these marches they will find 
themselves meeting upon common ground. For, indeed, 
long before we have searched out all that the Natural’ 
includes, there will remain little in the so-called Super- 
natural which can seem hard of acceptance or belief— 
nothing which is not rather essential to our understand- 
ing of this otherwise “ unintelligible world” 


“ 


CHAPTER If. 


LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS, 


HE Reign of Law—is this, then, the reign under 
which we live? Yes, in a sense it is. There 

is no denying it. The whole world around us, and 
the whole world within us, are ruled by Law. Our 
very spirits are subject to it—those spirits which yet 
seem so spiritual, so subtle, so free. How often in 
the darkness do they feel the restraining walls—bounds 
within which they move—conditions out of which they 
cannot think! The perception of this is growing in 
the consciousness of men. It grows with the growth 
of knowledge; it is the delight, the reward, the goal 


_ of Science. From Science it passes into every domain 


of thought, and invades, amongst others, the Theology 
of the Church. And so we see the men of Theology 
coming out to parley with the men of Science,—a white 
flag in their hands, and saying, “ If you will let us alone 
we will do the same by you. Keep to your own pro- 


vince, do not enter ours. The Reign of Law which 


eS  —— _——__—ee 


56 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





you proclaim, we admit—outside these walls, but not 
within them :—let there be peace between us.” But 
this will never do. There can be no such treaty divid- 
ing the domain of Truth. Every one Truth is con- 
nected with every other Truth in this great Universe 
of God. The connexion may be one of infinite sub- 
tlety, and apparent distance—running, as it were, under- 
ground for a long way, but always asserting itself at 
last, somewhere, and at some time. No bargaining, no 
fencing off the ground—no form of process, will avail 
to bar this right of way. Blessed nght, enforced by 
blessed power! Every truth, which is truth indeed, is 
charged with its own consequences, its own analogies, 
its own suggestions. These will not be kept outside 
any artificial boundary ; they will range over the whole 
Field of Thought, nor is there any corner of it from 
which they can be warned away. : 

And therefore we must east a sharp eye indeed on 
every form of words which professes to represent a 
scientific truth. If it be really true in one department 
of thought, the chances are that it will have its bearing 
on every other. And if it be not true, but erroneous, its 
effect will be of a corresponding character; for there 
is a brotherhood of Error as close as the brotherhood 
of Truth. Therefore, to accept as a truth that which 
is not a truth, or to fail in distinguishing the sense in 


LAW 3;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 57 


which a proposition may be true, from other senses in 
which it is not true, is an evil having consequences 
which are indeed incalculable. There are subjects on 
which one mistake of this kind will poison all the wells 
of truth, and affect with fatal error the whole circle of 
our thoughts. 

It is against this danger that some men would erect 
a feeble barrier by defending the position, that Science 
and Religion may be, and ought to be, kept entirely 
separate ;—that they belong to wholly different spheres 
of thought, and that the ideas which prevail in the one 
province have no relation to those which prevail in the 
other. This is a doctrine offering many temptations to 
many minds. It is grateful to scientific men who are 
afraid of being thought hostile to Religion. It is grate- 
ful to religious men who are afraid of being thought to 
be afraid of Science. To these, and to all who are 
troubled to reconcile what they have been taught to 
believe with what they have come to know, this doc- 
trine affords a natural and convenient escape. There 
is but one objection to it—but that is the fatal objec- 
tion—that it is not true. The spiritual world and. the 
intellectual world are not separated after this fashion: 
and the notion that they are so separated does but 
encourage men to accept in each, ideas which will at 


last be found to be false in both. The truth is, that 


58 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


there is no branch of human inquiry, however purely 
physical, which is more than the word “ branch” im- 
plies ;—none which is not connected through endless 
ramifications with every other,—and especially that 
which is the root and centre of them ail. If He who 
formed the mind be one with Him who is the Orderer 
of all things concerning which that mind is occupied, 
there can be no end to the points of contact between 
our different conceptions of them, of Him, and of 
ourselves. 

The instinct which impels us to seek for harmony 
in the truths of Science and the truths of Religion, is 
a higher instinct and a truer one than the disposition 
which leads us to evade the difficulty by pretending 
that there is no relation between them. For, after all, 
it 1s a pretence and nothing more. No man who 
thoroughly accepts a principle in the philosophy of 
Nature which he feels to be inconsistent with a doc- 
trine of Religion, can help having his belief in that 
doctrine shaken and undermined. We may believe, 
and we must believe, both in Nature and Religion, 
many things which we cannot understand ; but we can- 
not really believe two propositions which are felt to be 
contradictory. It helps us nothing in such a difficulty, 
to say that the one proposition belongs to Reason and 
the other proposition belongs to Faith, The endeavour 





Se 


LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS, 55 





to reconcile them is a necessity of the mind. We are 
right in thinking that, if they are both indeed true, they 
can be reconciled, and if they really are fundamentally 
opposed, they cannot both be true. That is to say, 
there must be some error in our manner of conception 
in one or in the other, or in both. At the very best, 
each can represent only some partial and imperfect 
aspect of the truth. The error may lie in our Theo- 
logy, or it may lie in what we are pleased to call our 
Science. It may be that some dogma, derived by 
tradition from our fathers, is having its hollowness be- 
trayed by that light which sometimes shines upon the 
ways of God out of a better knowledge of His works. 
It may be that some proud and rash generalisation of 
the schools is having its falsehood proved by the vio- 
lence it does to the deepest instincts of our spiritual 
nature,—to 
*¢ Truths which wake to perish never } 
Which neither man nor boy, 


Nor all that is at enmity with joy, 
Can utterly abolish or destroy.’ } 


Such, for example, is the conclusion to which the 
language of some scientific men is evidently pointing, 


that great general Laws inexorable in their operation, 


1 ‘*Ode to Immortality, from the Recollections of early Child: 
hood.”-~ Wordsworth. 





—_— 


60 THE REIGN OF LAW. 








and Causes in endless chain of invariable sequence, 


are the governing powers in Nature, and that they leave 


no room for any special direction or providential order- 


ing of events. If this be true, it is vain to deny its 
bearing on Religion. What then can be the use of 
prayer? Can Laws hear us? Can they change, or can 
they suspend themselves? These questions cannot but 
arise, and they require an answer. It is said of a 
late eminent Professor and clergyman of the English 
Church, who was deeply imbued with these opinions 


on the place occupied by Law in the economy of 


Nature, that he went on, nevertheless, preaching high 
doctrinal sermons. from the pulpit until his death. He 
did so on the ground that propositions which were con- 
trary to his reason were not necessarily beyond his faith. 
The inconsistencies of the human mind are indeed un- 
fathomable ; and there are men so constituted as honestly 
to suppose that they can divide themselves into two 
spiritual beings, one of whom is sceptical, and the 
other is believing. But such men are rare—happily 
for Religion, and not less happily for Science. No 
healthy intellect, no earnest spirit, can rest in such self- 
betrayal. Accordingly we find many men now facing 
the consequences to which they have given their intellec- 
tual assent, and taking their stand upon the ground that 
prayer to God has no other value or effect than so far 


LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 61 





as it may be a good way of preaching to ourselves. It 
is a useful and helpful exercise for our own spirits, but 
it is nothing more. But how can they pray who have 
come to this? Can it ever be useful or helpful to be- 
lieve a lie? That which has been threatened as the 
worst of all spiritual evils, would then become the con- 
scious attitude of our “ religion,” the habitual condition 
of our worship. This must be as bad science, as it 
is bad religion. It is in violation of a Law the highest 
known to Man—the Law which inseparably connects 
earnest conviction of the truth in what we do or say, 
with the very fountains of all intellectual and moral 
strength. No accession of force can come to us from 
doing anything in which we disbelieve. Such a doc- 


trine will be indeed 


‘© The little rift within the lute 
That by and by will make the music mute, 
And ever widening slowly silence all.” 2 


If there is any helpfulness in Prayer even to the 
Mind itself, that helpfulness can only be preserved by 
showing that the belief on which this virtue depends is 
‘a rational belief. The very essence of that belief is 
this—that the Divine Mind is accessible to supplication, 
and that the Divine Will is capable of being moved 


4 “Tdylis of the King—~Vivien.”—Tennyson, 





62 THE REIGN OF LAW. 








= 


thereby. No question is, or indeed can be, raised as 
to the powerful effect exerted by this belief on Man’s 
nature. ‘That effect is recognised as a fact. Its value 
is admitted ; and in order that it may not be lost, the 
compromise now offered by some philosophers~is this— 
that although the course of external nature is unaltera- 
ble, yet possibly the phenomena of Mind and character 
may be changed by the Divine Agency. But will this 
reasoning bear analysis ? Can the distinction it assumes 
be maintained? Whatever difficulties there may be in 
reconciling the ideas of Law and of Volition, they are 
difficulties which apply equally to the Worlds of Matter 
and of Mind. The Mind is as much subject to Law 
as the Body is. The Reign of Law is over all; and if 
its dominion be really incompatible with the agency of 
Volition, Human or Divine, then the Mind is as inacces- 
sible to that agency as material things. It would indeed 
be absurd to affirm that all Prayers are equally rational 
or equally legitimate. Most true it is that “‘we know 
not what we should pray for as we ought.” Prayer 
does not require us to believe that anything can be done 
without the use of means; neither does it require us 
to believe that anything will be done in violation of 
the Universal Order. “If it be possible,” was the 
qualification used in the most solemn Prayer ever 


uttered upon Earth What are and what are not legi- 


— 


LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 63 





timate objects of supplication, is a question which may 
well be open. But the question now raised is a wider 
one than this—even the question whether the very idea 
of Prayer be not in itself absurd—whether the Reign 
of Law does not preclude the -possibility of Will affect- 
ing the successive phenomena either of Matter or of 
Mind. This is a question lying at the root of our 
whole conceptions of the Universe, and of all our own 
powers, both of thinking and of acting. The freedom 
which is denied to God is not likely to: be left to Man. 
We shall see, accordingly, that precisely the same denials 
are applied to both. | 

The conception of Natural Laws—of their place, of 
their nature, and of their office—which involves tus in 
such questions, and which points to such conclusions, 
demands surely a very careful examination at our 
hands. 

What, then, is this Reign of Law? What is Law, and 
in what sense can it be said to reign? 

Words, which should be the servants of Thought, are 
too often its masters; and there are very few words 
which are used more ambiguously, and therefore more 
injuriously, than the word “Law.” It may indeed be 
legitimately used in several different senses, because in 
all cases as applied in Science it is a metaphor, and one 


which has relation to many different kinds and degrees 


64 >: THE REIGN OF LAW. 

of likeness in the ideas which are compared. It matters 
little in which of these senses it is used, provided the 
distinctions between them are kept clearly in view, and 
provided we watch against the fallacies which must arise 
when we pass insensibly from one meaning to another. 
And here it may be observed, in passing, that the meta- 
phors which are empioyed in Language are generally 
founded on analogies instinctively, and often uncon- 
sciously, perceived, and which would not be so perceived 
if they were not both deep and true. In this case the 
idea which lies at the root of Law in all its applications 
is evident enough. In its primary signification, a “law” 
is the authoritative expression of human Will enforced by 
Power. The instincts of mankind finding utterance in 
their language, have not failed to see that the phenomena 
of Nature are only really conceivable to us as in like 
manner the expressions of a Will enforcing itself with 
Power. But, as in many other cases, the secondary or 
derivative senses of the word have supplanted the 
primary signification ; and Law is now habitually used 
by men who deny the analogy on which that use is 
founded, and to the truth of which it is an abiding wit- 
ness. It becomes therefore all the more necessary to 
define the secondary senses with precision. There are 
at least Five different senses in which Law is habitually 


used, and these must be carefully distinguished :— 


— 


LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 65 





First, We have Law as applied simply to an observed 
Order of facts. 

Secondly, To that Order as involving the action of 
some Force or Forces of which nothing more may be 
known. | . 

Thirdly, As applied to individual Forces the measure 
of whose operation has been more or less defined or 
ascertained. 

Fourthly, As applied to those combinations of Force 
which have reference to the fulfilment of Purpose, or the 
discharge of Function. 

Fifthly, As applied to Abstract Conceptions of the 
mind—not corresponding with any actual phenomena, 
but deduced therefrom as axioms of thought necessary 
to our understanding of them. Law, in this sense, is a 
reduction of the phenomena, not merely to an Order 
of facts, but to an Order of ‘Thought. 

These great leading significations of the word Law all 
circle round the three great questions which Science asks 
of Nature, the What, the How, and the Why :— 

(rt) What are the facts in their established Order ? 

(2) How—that is, from what physical causes,—does 
that Order come to be? 

(3) Why have these causes been so combined? What 
relation do they bear to Purpose, to the fulfilment of 
intention, to the discharge of Function ? 

F 





66 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


It is so important that these different senses of the 
word Law should be clearly distinguished, that each of 
them must be more fully considered by itself. 

The First and, so to speak, the lowest sense in which 
Law is applied to natural phenomena is that m which it 
is used to express simply “an observed Order of facts ”— 
that is to say, facts which under the same conditions 
always follow each other in the same order. In this 


sense the laws of Nature are simply those facts of © 


Nature which recur according to a rule. It is not 
necessary to the legitimate application of Law in this 
sense, that the cause of any observed Order of facts 
should be at all known, or even guessed at. The Force 
or Forces to which that Order is due may be hid in total 
darkness. It is sufficient that the Order or sequence of 
phenomena be uniform and constant. ‘The neatest and 
simplest illustration of this, as well as of the other senses 
in which Law is used, is to be found in the exact 
sciences, and especially in the history of Astronomy. It 
is nearly 250 years since Kepler discovered, in respect to 
the distances, velocities, and orbits of the Planets, three 
facts, or rather three series of facts, which, during many 
years! of intense application to physical inquiry, re- 
mained the highest truths known to Man on the pheno- 


1 The ‘‘ Third Law” of Kepler was made known to the world 
in 1619. Newton's '‘Principia” appeared in 1687, 


wo 


i i ce EE, | en I 


LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS 67 





mena of the Solar System. They were known as the 
Three Laws of Kepler. It is not necessary to describe 
in detail here what these laws were. Suffice it to say, 
that the most remarkable among them were facts of 
constant numerical relation between the distances of the 
different Planets from the Sun, and the length of their 
periodic times ; and again, between the velocity of their 
motion and the space enclosed within certain corre- 
sponding sections of their orbit. These Laws were 
simply and purely an ‘‘Order of facts” established by 
observation, and not connected with any known cause. 
The Force of which that Order is a necessary result had 
not then been ascertained. A very large proportion of 
the laws of every science are laws of this kind and in 
this sense. For example, in Chemistry the behaviour of 
different substances towards each other, in respect to 
_ combination and affinity, is reduced to system under laws 
of this kind, and of this kind only. Because, although 
there is a probability that Electric or Galvanic Force is 
the cause, or one of the causes, of the series of facts 
exhibited in chemical phenomena, this is as yet no better 
than a probability, and the laws of Chemistry stand no 
higher than facts which by observation and experiment 
are found to follow certain rules. 

But the ascertainment of a law in this First and 
lower sense leads immediately and instinctively to the 

FE 2 


i 


68 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





search after Law in another sense which is higher. An 
observed Order of facts, to be entitled to the rank of 


a Law, must be an Order so constant and uniform as 


to indicate necessity, and necessity can only arise out 


of the action of some compelling Force. Law, there- 
fore, comes to indicate not merely an observed Order of 
facts, but that Order as involving the action of some 
Force or Forces, of which nothing more may be known 
than these visible effects. Every observed Order in 
physical phenomena suggests irresistibly to the mind 
the operation of some physical cause. We say of an 
observed Order of facts that it must be due to some 
‘laws’ meaning simply that all Order involves t*e idea 
of some arranging cause, the working of some Force or 
Forces (whether they be such as we can further trace 
and define or not) of which that Order is the index and 


the resuit. This is the Second of the five senses speci- 


fied above. 

And so we pass on, by an easy and natural transi- 
tion, to the Third sense in which the word Law is used. 
This is the most exact and definite of all. The mere 
general idea that some Force is at the bottom of all 
phenomena, which are invariably consecutive, is a very 
different thing from knowing what that Force is in respect 
to the rule or measure of its operation. Of Law in 


this sense the one great example, before and above all 


ws 





LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. | 63 


others, is the Law of Gravitation, for this is a Law in 
the sense not merely of a rule, but of a cause—that 1s, 
of a Force accurately defined and ascertained accord- 
ing to the measure of its operation, from which Force 
other phenomena arise by way of necessary conse- 
quence. Force is the root-idea of Law in its scientific 
sense. And so the Law of Gravitation is not merely 
the “observed order” in which the heavenly bodies 
move; neither is it only the abstract idea of some 
Force to which such movements must be due, but it 
is that Force the exact measure of whose operation was 
numerically ascertained or defined by Newton— the 
Force which compels those movements and (in a sense) 
explains them. Now the difference between Law in 
the narrower and Law in the larger sense cannot be 
better illustrated than in the difference between the 
Three special Laws discovered by Kepler, and the One 
universal Law discovered by Newton. ‘The Three Laws 
of Kepler were, as we have seen, simply and purely 
an observed Order of facts. They stood by themselves 
—disconnected,—their cause unknown. The _ higher 
Law, discovered by Newton, revealed their connexion 
and their cause. The “observed Order” which Kepler 
had discovered, was simply a necessary consequence of 
the Force of Gravitation. In the light of this great Law 
the ‘“‘ Three Laws of Kepler” have been merged and lost, 


eee 
qo ‘THE REIGN OF LAW. 
Co a eee 
When the operations of any material Force can be 
reduced to rules so definite as those which have been dis- 
covered in respect to the Force of Gravitation, and when 
these rules are capable of mathematical expression and 
of mathematical proof, they are, so far as they go, in. 
the nature of pure truth. Mr. Lewes, in his very | 
curious and interesting work on the “ Philosophy of Aris- 
totle,” has maintained that the knowledge of Measure 
—or what he calls the “verifiable element” in our 
knowledge—is the element which determines whether 
any theory belongs to Science, strictly so called,. or to 
Metaphysics; and that any theory may be transferred 
from Metaphysics to Science, or from Science to Meta- 
physics, simply by the addition or withdrawal of its 
“verifiable element.” In illustration of this, he says 
that if we withdraw, from the Law of Universal Attrac- 
tion, the formula, “inversely as the square of the dis- 
tance, and directly as the mass,” it becomes pure Meta- 
physics. If this means that, apart from ascertained 
numerical relations, our conception of Law, or our 
knowledge of natural phenomena, loses all reality and 
distinctness, I do not agree in the position. The idea 
of natural Forces is quite separate from any ascertained — 
measure of their energy. The knowledge, for example, 
that all the particles of matter exert an attractive force 


upon each other, is, so far as it goes, true physical 





a | 


LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS, V1 


knowledge, even though we did not know the further 
truth, that this force acts according to the numerical 
rule ascertained by Newton. To banish from phy- 
sical Science, properly so called, and to relegate to 
Metaphysics, all knowledge which cannot be reduced 
to numerical expression, is a dangerous abuse of lan- 
guage. 

Force, ascertained according to some measure of its 
operation—this is indeed one of the definitions, but 
only one, of a scientific Law. The discovery of laws 
in this sense is the great quest of Science, and the 
finding of them is one of her great rewards. Such 
Jaws yield to the human mind a peculiar delight, from 
the satisfaction they afford to those special faculties 
whose function it is to recognise the beauty of numerical 
relations. ‘This satisfaction is so great, and in its own 
measure 1s so complete, that the mind reposes on an 
ascertained law of this kind as on an ultimate truth. 
And ultimate it is as regards the particular faculties 
which are concerned in this kind of search. When we 
have observed our facts, and when we have summed 
up our figures, when we have recognised the constant 
numbers,—then our eyes, our ears, and our calculating 
faculties have done their work. But other faculties are 
called into simultaneous operation, and these have other 


work to do. For let it be observed that laws, in the 


ord 








"2 THE REIGN OF LAW. 








first three senses we have now examined, cannot be said 
to explain anything except the Order of subordinate 
phenomena. ‘They set forth that order as due to Force. 
They do nothing more. Least of all do laws, in any 
of these three senses, explain themselves. They sug- 
gest a thousand questions much more curious than the 
questions which they solve. ‘The very beauty and sim- 
plicity of some laws is their deepest mystery. What 
can their source be? How is their uniformity main- 
tained? Every law implies a Force, and all that we 
ever know is some numerical rule or measure accord- 
ing to which some unknown Forces operate. But 
whence come those measures—those exact relations to 
number, which never vary? Or, if there are variations, 
how comes it that these are always found to follow 
some other rules as exact and as invariable as the first? 
And as there can be no better example of what Law 
is, so also there can be no better example of what it is 
not—than the Law of Gravitation. The discovery of 
it was probably the highest exercise of pure intellect 
through which the human mind has found its way. It 
is the most universal physical law which is known to 
us, for it prevails, apparently, through all Space. Yet 
of the Force of Gravitation all we know is, that it is 
a force of attraction operating between all the particles 


of matter in the exact measure which was ascertained by 








LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 73 


_ Newton,—that is—“ directly as the mass, and inversely 
as the square of the distance.” This is the Law. But 
it affords no sort of explanation of itself, What is the 
cause of this Force—what is its source—what are the 
media of its operation—how is- the exact uniformity of 
its proportions maintained ?—these are questions which 
it is impossible not to ask, but which it is quite as impos- 
sible to answer. Sir John Herschel, in speaking of this 
Force, has indicated in a passing sentence a few ques- 
tions out of the many which arise :—‘‘No matter,” he 
says, “from what ultimate causes the power cailed gravi- 
tation originates—be it a virtue lodged in the sun as its 
‘receptacle, or be it pressure from without, or the resultant 
of many pressures, or solicitations of unknown kinds, 
magnetic or electric, ethers or impulses,”! &c. &e. 
How little we have ascertained in this Law, after all! 
Yet there is an immense and an instinctive pleasure in 
the contemplation of it. To analyse this pleasure is as 
difficult as to analyse the pleasure which the eye takes 
in beauty of form, or the pleasure which the ear takes in 
the harmonies of sound. And this pleasure is inex- 
haustible, for these laws of number and proportion 
pervade ail Nature, and the intellectual organs which 


have been fitted to the knowledge of them have eyes 


1 Herschel’s “ Outlines of Astronomy,” fifth edition, p. 323. 





74 TUE REIGN OF LAW. 





which are never satisfied with seeing, and ears which are 
never full of hearing. The agitation which overpowered 
Sir Isaac Newton as the Law of Gravitation was rising 
to his view in the light of rigorous demonstration, was 
the homage rendered by the great faculties of his nature 
to a harmony which was as new as it was immense and 


wonderful. The same pleasure in its own degree is felt 


by every man of science who, in any branch of physical — 


inquiry, traces and detects any lesser law. And it is 
perfectly true that such laws are being detected every- 
where. Forces which are in their essence and their 
source utterly mysterious, are always being found to 
operate under rules which have strict reference to 
measures of number,—to relations of Space and Time. 
The Forces which determine chemical combination all 
work under rules as sharp and definite as the Force of 
Gravitation. So do the Forces which operate in Light, 
and Heat, and Sound. So do those which exert their 
energies in Magnetism and Electricity. All the opera- 
tions of Nature—the smallest and the greatest—are per- 
formed under similar measures and restraints. Not even 
a drop of water can be formed except under rules which 
determine its weight, its volume, and its shape, with 
exact reference to the density of the fluid, to the struc- 
ture of the surface on which it may be formed, and te 


the pressure of the surrounding atmosphere, Then that 


= (ee af 








LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 75 


pressure is itself exercised under rigorous rules again. 
Not one of the countless varieties of form which prevail 
in clouds, and which give to the face of heaven such 
infinite expression, not one of them but is ruled by 
Law,—woven, or braided, or torn, or scattered, or 
gathered up again and folded, —by Forces which are free 
only ‘within the bounds of Law.” 

And equally in those subjects of inquiry in which 
rules of number and of proportion are not applicable, 
rules are discernible which belong to another class, but 
which are as certain and as prevailing. All events, 
however casual or disconnected they may at first appear 
to be, are found in the course of time to arrange them- 
selves in some certain Order, the index and exponent of 
Forces, of which we know nothing except their existence 
as evidenced in these effects. It is indeed wonderful to 
find that in such a matter, for example, as the develop- 
ment of our Human Speech, the unconscious changes 
which arise from time to time among the rudest utter- 
ances of the rudest tribes and races of Mankind, are all 
found to follow rules of progress as regular as those 
which preside over any of the material growths of 
Nature. Yet so it is; and it is upon this fact alone that 
the science of Language rests—a science in which all 
the facts are not yet observed, and many of those which 


have been observed are not yet reduced to order; but 





76 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


in which enough has been ascertained to show that 
languages grow, and change from generation to gene- 
ration, according to rules of which the men who speak 
them are wholly unconscious. It is the same with all 
other things. And as it is now, so apparently has it 
been in all past time of which we have any record. 
Even the work of Creation has been and is being car- 
ried on under rules of adherence to Typical Forms, and 
under limits of variation from them, which can be dimly 
seen and traced, although they cannot be defined or 
understood. The universal prevalence of laws of this 
kind cannot therefore be denied. The discovery of 
them is one of the first results of all physical inquiry. 
In this sense it is true that we, and the world around us, 
are under the Reign of Law. 

It is true, but only a bit and fragment of the truth. 
For there is another fact quite as prominent as the 
universal presence and prevalence of laws—and that is, 
the number of them which are concerned in each single 
operation in Nature. No one Law—that is to say, no 
one Force—determines anything that we see happening 
or done around us. It is always the result of different 
and opposing Forces nicely balanced against each other. 
The least disturbance of the proportion in which any 
one of them is allowed to tell, produces a total change 
in the effect. The more we know of Nature, the more 


a 


<_— 





LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. "9 
intricate do such combinations appear to be. They can 
be traced very near to the fountains of Life itself, even 
close up to the confines of the last secret of all—how 
the Will acts upon its organs in the Body. Recent 
investigations in Physiology seem to favour the hypo- 
thesis that our muscles are the seat of two opposing 
Forces, each so adjusted as to counteract the other; and 
that this antagonism is itself so arranged as to enable 
us by acting on one of these Forces, to regulate the 
action of the other. One Force—an elastic or con- 
tractile Force—is supposed to be inherent in the mus- 
cular fibre: another Force—that of Animal Electricity 
in statical condition—holds the contractile Force in 
check ; and the relaxed, or rather the restful, condition 
of the muscle when not in use, is due to the balance so 
maintained. When, through the motor nerves the Will 
orders the muscles into action, that order is enforced 
by a discharge of the Electrical Force, and upon this 
discharge the contractile Force is set free to act, and 
does accordingly produce the contraction which is 
desired.* 

Such is, at least, one suggestion as to the means 


employed to place human action under the control of 


1 This theory of muscular and nervous action is set forth with 
much ingenuity and force of illustration in “ Lectures on Epilepsy,” 
&ce., by Charles Bland Radcliffe, M.D, 


=e. 


YS THE REIGN OF LAW. 


human Will, in that material frame which is so wonder- 


fully and fearfully made. And whether this hypothesis 
be accurate or not, it is certain that some such adjust- 
ment of Force to Mechanism is involved in every bodily 
movement which is subject to the Will. Even in this 
high region, therefore, we see that the existence of 
individual laws is not the end of our physical know- 
ledge. What we always reach at last in the course of 
every physical inquiry, is the recognition, not of indi- 
vidual laws, but of some definite relation to each other, 
in which different laws are placed, so as to bring about 
a particular result. But this is, in other words, the 
principle of Adjustment, and adjustment has no meaning 
except as the instrument and the result of Purpose. 
Force so combined with Force as to produce certain 
definite and orderly results,—this is the ultimate fact of 
all discovery. 

And so we come upon another sense—the Fourth 


sense, in which Law is habitually used in Science, and 


this is perhaps the commonest and most important of 
all. It is used to designate not merely an observed 
Order of facts—not merely the bare abstract idea of 
Force—not merely individual Forces according to ascer- 


tained measures of operation—but a number of Forces in 


the condition of mutual adjustment, that is to say, as com- 
bined with each other, and fitted to each other for the 





LAW ;—-ITS DEFINITIONS, 73 


attainment of special ends. The whole science of Animal 
Mechanics, for example, deals with Law in this sense— 
with natural Forces as related to Purpose and subservient 
to the discharge of Function. And this is the highest | 
sense of all—-Law in this sense being more perfectly 
intelligible to us than in any other; because, although 
we know nothing of the real nature of Force, even of 
that Force which is resident in ourselves, we do know 
for what ends we exert it, and the principle that governs 
our devices for its use. That principle is, Combination 
for the accomplishment of Purpose. — 

Accordingly it is, when natural phenomena can be 
reduced to Law, in this last sense, that we reach some- 
thing which alone is really in the nature of an explana- 
tion. For what do we mean by an explanation? It is | 
an unfolding or a “making plain.” But as the human 
mind has many faculties, so each of these seeks a satis- 
faction of its own. ‘That which is made plain to one 
faculty is not necessarily made plain to another. That 
which is a complete answer to the question What, or to 
the question How, is no answer at all to the question 
Why. There are some philosophers who tell us that 
this last is a question which had better never be asked, 
because it is one to which Nature gives no reply. If 
this be so, it is strange that Nature should have giver us 
the faculties which impel us to ask this question—ay, 





So ’ THE REIGN OF LAW. 


and to ask it more eagerly than any other. It is, indeed, 
true that there is a point beyond which we need not ask 
it, because the answer is inaccessible. But this is equally 
true of the questions What, and How. We cannot reach 
Final Causes any more than Final Purposes. For every 
cause which we can detect, there is another cause which 
lies behind; and for every purpose which we can see, 
there are other purposes which lie beyond. 

And so it is true that all things in Nature may either 
be regarded as means. or as ends—for they are always 
both—only that Final Ends we can never see. For, as 
Bishop Butler truly says in his “ Analogy,” ? “We know 
what we ourselves aim at as final ends, and what courses 
we take merely as means conducing to these ends. But 
we are greatly ignorant how far things are considered by 
the Author of Nature under the simple notion of means 
and ends,—so as that it may be said this is merely an 
end, and that merely means, in His regard. And whether 
there be.not some peculiar absurdity m our very manner 
of conception concerning this matter, somewhat con- 
tradictory, arising from an extremely imperfect view of 
things, it is impossible to say.” This is indeed a wise 
caution, and one which has been much needed te check 
the abuse of that method of reasoning which has been 


% Butler’s “Analogy,” chap. iv. 


ans 





LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS, 81 
called the doctrine of Final Causes. When Man makes 
an implement, he knows the purpose for which he makes 
it—he knows the function assigned to it in his own inten- 
tion. But as in making it there are a thousand chips 
and fragments of material which he casts aside, so in its 
final use it often produces consequences and _ results 
which he did not contemplate or foresee. But in Nature 
all this is different. Nature has no chips or fragments 
which she does not put to use; and as on the way to 
her apparent ends there are no incidents which she did 
not foresee, so beyond those ends there are no ulterior 
results which do not open out into new firmaments of 
Design. Of nothing, therefore, can we say with even 
the probability of truth that we see its Final Cause; that 
is to say, its ultimate purpose. All that we can ever see 
are the facts of Adjustment and of Function, and these 
constitute not Final, but Immediate Purpose. But a 
purpose is not less a purpose, because other purposes 
may lie beyond it. And not only can we detect Purpose 
in natural phenomena, but, as we have already seen, it is 
very often the only thing about them which is intelligible 
to us. The How is very often incomprehensible, where 
the Why is apparent at a glance. And be this observed, 
that when Purpose is perceived, it is a ‘‘ making plain ” 
to a higher faculty of the mind than the mere sense of 
Order. It is a making plain to Reason, It is the reduc- 

G 


ne 
82 THE REIGN OF LAW. - | 


——— 





tion of phenomena to that Order of ‘Thought which is 
the basis of all other Order in the works of Man, and 
which, he instinctively concludes, is the basis also of all 
Order in the works of Nature. 

And here it is important to observe, that although 
this general conclusion, like all other general conclu- 
sions, belongs to the category of mental inferences, and 
not to the category of physical facts, yet each particu- 
lar instance of Purpose on which the general inference 
is founded, is not an inference merely, but a fact. ‘The 
function of-an organ, for example, is a matter of purely 
physical investigation. But the function of an organ 
is not merely that which it does, but it is that which 
some special construction enables it to do. It is, not 
merely its work, but it is the work assigned to it as an 
Apparatus, and as fitted to other organs having other 
functions related to its own. The nature of that Appa- 
ratus, as being in itself an adjustment for a particular 
purpose, is not an inference from the facts, but it is 
part of the facts themselves. The very idea of Func- 
tion is inseparable from the idea of Purpose. The 
Function of an organ is its Purpose ; and the relation 
of its parts, and of the whole to that Purpose, is as 
much and as definitely a scientific fact as the relation 


of any other phenomenon to Space, or Time, or 
Number, 


LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS, ck 

This distinction between Purpose as a general in- 
ference and Purpose as a particular fact, has not been 
sufficiently observed. The just condemnation pro- 
“nounced by Bacon on the pursuit of Final Causes as 
distorting the true Method of Physical Investigation, 
has been applied without discrimination to two very 
different conceptions. Even Philosophers who believe 
in the Supremacy of Purpose in Nature have been will- 
ing to banish this conception from the Domain of 
Science, and to classify it as belonging altogether to 
Metaphysics or Theology. Thus in the very able Hai- 
veian Oration for 1865 by Dr. H. W. Acland, he says, 
-—“ Whether there be any Purpose, is the object of 
Theological and Metaphysical, but not of Physical in- 
quiry.”1 And again, “The evidence of intention is 
metaphysical, and depends on probabilities. It is not 
positive. It is inferential from many considerations.” * 
I venture to dissent from these conclusions. They 
involve, I think. a confounding of two separate ques- 
tions. The nature and character of the intending 
Mind—this is indeed a question of Theology ; but not 
the existence of intention. Neither in any restrictive 
sense of the word can it be called Metaphysical. Even 


as a general doctrine, the doctrine of Contrivance and 


2 P, 61. 2 P. 63. 
G2 








THE REIGN OF LAW. . 


Ps 


84 





Adjustment is not so metaphysical as the Doctrine of 
Homologies; and when we come to particular cases 
there can be no question whatever that the relation of 
a given Structure to its Purpose and Function comes 
more unequivocally under the class of physical faets 
than the relation of that same Structure to some cor: 
responding part in another animal. It is less ideal, 
for example,—less theoretical—less metaphysical—to 
assert of the little hooked claw which is attached to 
the (apparent) elbow of a Bat’s wing, that it was placed 
there to enable the Bat to climb and erawl, than to 
affirm of that same claw that it is the “homologue” of 


the human thumb. Yet who can deny that this doc- 


trine of Homologies has been established as a strictly 


scientific truth? There is a sense, of course, in which 
ail Knowledge and all Science belongs to Metaphysics. 
Mere classification, which is the basis of all Science, 
what is it but the marshalling of physical facts im an 
Ideal Order—an arrangement of them according to the 
relation which they bear to the laws of Thought? But 
this does not constitute as a branch of Metaphysics, 
the division of animals into Genera, and Families, and 
Orders. And what relation can physical facts ever have 
to Thought so directly cognisable or so susceptible of 
Demonstration as the relation of an animal organ to 


its purpose and function in the animal economy? 








LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. $5 





Whether Purpose be the basis of all natural Order or 
not is a separate question. It is at least one of the 
facts of that Order. Combination for the accomplish- - 
ment of Purpose therefore in. particular cases, such as 
the relation between the structure of an Organ and its 
function, is not merely a safe conclusion of Philosophy, 
but an ascertained fact of Science. : 
This question has acquired additional importance 
since the revival in our own day, and with new re- 
sources, of that old philosophy which assumes to banish 
from the domain of Knowledge no small part of the 
richest and surest acquisitions of Reason, That Phi- 
losophy must: be tested by a rigid analysis of thought 
and language. This is the weapon with which the assault 
is made, and it is by the same weapon better handled 
that it can alone be met. An arbitrary limitation of 
the word “knowledge,” to a particular kind of know- 
ledge, can only be tolerated on condition that the 
arbitrary nature of the limitation be constantly kept in 
view. In lke manner the word “verification” may be 
confined to a particular kind of proof applicable only 
toa particular class of truths. So again, in regard 
to “Metaphysics,” it may be considered with reference 


to its subject-matter as denoting a particular branch of 


4 See Note B, 





— as asian memati 


8600 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





inquiry—such as Psychology—or as a method of in- 
vestigation which may be applied equally to all subjects 
which furnish the mind with the materials of thought. 
But we must watch against the substitution of one of 
these meanings for another; and against the jugglery by 
which men first use Metaphysical Analysis to pull down 
conceptions which they dislike, and then denounce 
- Metaphysics as incapable of establishing any conclu- 
~sions on which we can rely. The fact to which I have 
previously referred,! is a fact of immense significance, 
that one of the most able supporters of the Positive 
Philosophy in England relegates to Metaphysics the great 
scientific fact of Physical Attraction, when it is considered 
apart from its numerical relations. But if this be con- 
sidered Metaphysics, then let it be remembered that 
many of the most certain truths we know belong to the 
same category. From a similar point of view, it might 
be argued, and it has actually been argued, that Number 
and all numerical relations are purely abstract con- 
ceptions of the mind, having no other reality than as 
there conceived.? The same reasoning may be applied 
to all our most fundamental conceptions—without which 
Science could not even begin her work. The existence 
of Force under any form, of which the existence of Matter 


1 P. 70. ® See Note C, 


SYS SY EE 


LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS, 87 





_1s only a special case, may be regarded as a purely 
metaphysical conception. It is surely a comfort to 
find that, if all ideas of Plan and of Design in the 
Adjustments of Organic Life are to be condemned as 
Metaphysical, they stand at least in goodly company 
among the necessities of Thought. Mr. Lewes, indeed, 
himself confesses that “Science finds it indispensable 
to co-ordinate all the facts in a general concept, such 
as a Plan.”! But he pronounces it one of the “ Infirmi- 
ties of Thought” to “realize the concept.” But no 
accurate thinker ever “realized” such an idea as a 
‘Plan ”—that is to say, no one ever conceived it as 
existing by itself, separate from an intending Mind. 
Mr. Lewes complains that “ Matter and Force are 
mysterious enough” without a “new mystery of Archi- 
tectural Plan, shaping Matter and directing Force.” ? 
But, substituting here “Mind” for Plan, it may surely 
be argued that, if Science finds it “indispensable” to 
co-ordinate all the facts in some such general concept, 
this is of itself a proof that the element so introduced 
does not add to the mystery, but helps to remove it. 
Even if it be an “artifice of thought,” it can only be 
resorted to as rendering the facts not less but more 


conceivable. And this it plainly does by appealing to 


1 ‘* History of Philosophy,” Prologue, p, Ixxxvi, 2 Ibid. 


Sane Te aes ena nme 


838 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





an agency having known power in the production of 
analogous phenomena. ‘The instinctive wisdom which 
lies in this “infirmity” of the mind becomes more 
apparent when we turn to the efforts of an acute in- 
tellect to cast such infirmities away. The most abstract 
metaphysical conceptions are substituted for those which 
are denounced: the only difference being that, whilst 
the old conceptions are intelligible as connecting the 
Phenomena by a link of thought which the mind can 
feel and follow, the new conceptions are unintelligible 
because they try to describe. facts without any reference 
to the ideas they involve. No new light—nothing but 
denser darkness—is cast on the phenomena of Organic 
Life by calling “Life the connexus of the organic 
activities.” 2 Yet meaningless words are heaped on each 
other in the desperate effort to dispense with those con- 
ceptions which can alone render the order of Nature 
intelligible to us. Thus we are told again, that ‘The 
Organism is the synthesis of diverse parts, and Life is 
the synthesis of their properties;”?—and again, that 
“Vitality is the abstract designation of certain special 
properties manifested by Matter under certain special 
conditions.” Surely there is more light in the old 


reading :—“ Finding,” says Mr. Lewes, “in an organism 


1 “ Flistory of Philosophy,” p. Ixxx. 2 Ibid. p, lxxxiil, 
8 Ibid. p. Ixxxiv, 


NR 


LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 89 





a certain adjustment of parts, which may be reduced to 
a plan, we are easzly led to conceive that this plan was 
made before the parts, and that the adjustment was 
determined by the plan.” .No doubt! This is the 
easiest conception,.and it is the easiest because it is 
most conformable to the !aws of Thought; and that 
which is the most conformable to the laws of Thought 
is that which makes the nearest approach to absolute 
Truth attainable by the Mind. 

The universal prevalence of this idea of Purpose in 
Nature is indicated by the irresistible tendency which 
we observe in the language of Science to personify the 
Forces, and the combinations of Force by which all 
natural phenomena are produced. It is a great injustice 
to scientific men—too often committed—to suspect them 
of unwillingness to accept the idea of a Personal Creator 
merely because they try to keep separate the language 
of Science from the language of Theology.! But it is 


1 A remarkable instance of this injustice has been lately brought 
to light. Professor Huxley, in an article in the Fortnightly Review, 
had used one of those vague phrases, so common with scientific men, 
about the ‘‘unknown and the unknowable” being the goal of all 
scientific thought, which not unnaturally suggest the notion that all 
idea of a God is unattainable. A writer in the Spectator accord- 
ingly dealt with Professor Huxley as avowing Atheism, and was 
rebuked by the Professor in a letter published in the Spectator of 
Feb. 10, 1866. Professor Huxley says: ‘‘I do not know that f 
care very much about popular odium, so that there is no great merit 








go THE REIGN OF LAW. 





curious to observe how this endeavour constantly breaks 
down—how impossible it is in describing physical 
phenomena to avoid the phraseology which identifies 
them with the phenomena of Mind, and is moulded 
on our own conscious Personality and Will. It is 
impossible to avoid this language simply because no 
other language conveys the impression which innumer- 
able structures leave upon the-mind. Take, for ex- 
ample, the word “ contrivance.” How could Science 
do without it? How could the great subject of Animal 
Mechanics be dealt with scientifically without continual 
reference to Law as that by which, and through which, 
special organs are formed for the doing of special 
work? What is the very definition of a machine? 
Machines do not increase Force, they only adjust it. 
The very idea and essence of a machine is that it is 


a contrivance for the distribution of Force with a view 


in saying that if I really saw fit to deny the existence of a God, 
I should certainly do so, for the sake of my own intellectual free- 
dom, and be the honest Atheist you are pleased to say Iam. As 
it happens, however, I cannot take this position with honesty, in- 
asmuch as it is, and always has been, a favourite tenet of mine, 
that Atheism is as absurd, logically speaking, as Polytheism.” On 
the subject of miracles, in the same letter, Professor Huxley says, 
that “denying the possibility of miracles seems to me-quite as 
unjustifiable as speculative Atheism.” The question of miracles 
seems now to be admitted on all hands to be simply a question 
of evidence, 





LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. go 


to its bearing on special purposes. A man’s arm is a 
machine in which the law of leverage is supplied to 
the vital force for the purposes of prehension. We 
-shall see presently that a bird’s wing is a machine in 
which the same law is applied, under the most com- 
plicated conditions, for the purpose of flight. Anatomy 
supplies an infinite number of similar examples. It is 
impossible to describe or explain the facts we meet 
with in this or in any other branch of Science without 
investing the “laws” of Nature with something of that 
Personality which they do actually reflect, or without 
conceiving of them as partaking of those attributes of 
Mind which we everywhere recognise in their working 
and results. 

We may, again, take the Forces which determine the 
Planetary motions as the grandest and the simplest illus- 
trations of this truth of Science. Gravitation, as already 
said, is a Force which prevails apparently through all 
Space. But it does not prevail alone. It is a Force 
whose function it is to balance other Forces, of which 
we know nothing, except this,—that these, again, are 
needed to balance the Force of Gravitation. Each 
Foree, if left to itself, would be destructive of the 
Universe. Were it not for the Force of Gravitation, the 
centrifugal Forces which impel the Planets would fling 
them off into Space. Were it not for these centrifugal 
Forces, the Force of Gravitation would dash them 





g2 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





against the Sun. The orbits, therefore, of the Planets, 
with all that depends upon them, are determined by the 
nice and perfect balance which is maintained between 
these two Forces ; and the ultimate fact of astronomical 
science is not the Law of Gravitation, but the Adjust- 
ment between this law and others which are less known, 
so as to produce and maintain the existing Solar System. 

This is one example of the principle of Adjustment ; 
but no one example, however grand the scale may be on 
which it is exhibited, can give any idea of the extent to 
which the principle of Adjustment is required, and is 
adopted in the works of Nature. The revolution of the 
seasons, for example—seed-time and harvest—depend on 
the Law of Gravitation in this sense, that if that law 
were disturbed, or if it were inconstant, they would be 
disturbed and inconstant also. But the seasons equally 
depend on a multitude of other laws,—laws of heat, laws 
of light, laws relating to fluids, and to solids, and to 
gases, and to magnetic attractions and repulsions, each 
one of which laws is invariable in itself, but each of 
which would produce utter confusion if it were allowed 
to operate alone, or if it were not balanced against. 
others in the nght proportion. It is very difficult to form 
any adequate idea of the vast number of laws which are 
concerned in producing the most ordinary operations’ of 
Nature. Looking only at the combinations with which 
Astronomy is concerned, the adjustments are almost . 





LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 03 


infinite. Each minutest circumstance in the position, 
or size, or shape of the Earth, the direction of its axis, 
the velocity of its motion and of its rotation, has its 
own definite effect, and the slightest change in any one 
of these relations would wholly alter the world we live in. 
And then it is to be remembered that the seasons, as they 
are now fitted to us, and as we are fitted to them, do not 
depend only on the facts or the laws which Astronomy 
reveals. ‘They depend quite as much on other sets of 
facts, and other sets of laws, revealed by other sciences, 
.—such, for example, as Chemistry, Electricity, and 
Geology. The motion of the Earth might be exactly 
what it is, every fact in respect to our Planetary position 
might remain unchanged, yet the seasons would return 
in vain if our own atmosphere were altered in any one 
of the elements of its composition, or if any one of the 
laws regulating the action were other than it is. Under 
a thinner air even the torrid zone might be wrapped in 
eternal snow. Under a denser air, and one with dif- 
ferent refracting powers, the Earth and all that is therein 
might be burnt up. And so it is through the whole 
of Nature: laws everywhere—laws in themselves in- 
variable, but so worked as to produce effects of 
inexhaustible variety by being pitched against each 
other, and made to hold each other in restraint. 

I have-already referred to Chemistry as a science full 
of illustrations of Law in the First and simplest sense— 








94 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





that is, of facts in observed orders of recurrence. But 
Chemistry is a science not less rich in illustration of Law 
in the Fourth sense—that is, of Forces in mutual adjust- 
ment. Indeed, in Chemistry, this system of adjustment 
among the different properties of matter is especially: in- 
tricate and observable. Some of the laws which regulate 
Chemical Combination were discovered in our own 


time, and are amongst the most wonderful and the most 


beautiful which have been revealed by any science. | 


They are laws of great exactness, having invariable re- 


lations to number and proportion. Each elementary ~ 


substance has its own combining proportions with other 
elements, so that, except in these proportions, no 
chemical union can take place at all. And when 
chemical union does take place, the compounds which 
result have different and even opposite powers, according 
to the different proportions employed. Then, the rela- 
tions in which those inorganic compounds stand to the 
chemistry of Life, constitute another vast series in which 
the principle of adjustment has applications, infinite in 
number, and as infinite in beauty. How delicate these 
relations are, and how tremendous are the issues de- 
pending on their management, may be conceived from 
this single fact,—that the same elements combined in one 
proportion are sometimes a nutritious food or a grateful 
‘stimulant, soothing and sustaining the powers of life; 


whilst, combined in another proportion, they may be a 








LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 95 





deadly poison, paralysing the heart and carrying agony 
along every nerve and fibre of the animal frame. This is 
no mere theoretical possibility. It is actually the re- 
lation, for example, in which two well-known substances 
stand to each other—Tea and Strychnia. The active 
principles of these two substances, “ Theine” and 
“ Strychnine,” are identical so far as their elements are 
concerned, and differ from each other only in the pro- 
portions in which they are combined. Such is the power 
of numbers in the Laboratory of Nature! What havoc 
in this world, so full of Life, would be made by blind 
chance gambling with such powers as these! What 
confusion, unless they were governed by laws whose 
certainty makes them capable of fine adjustment, and 
therefore subject to accurate control! How fine these 
adjustments are, and how absolute is that control, is 
indicated in another fact—and that is the few elements 
out of which all things are made. The number of 
substances deemed elementary has varied with the 
advance of Science ; but as compared with the variety 
of their products, that number may be considered as in- 
.finitesimally small; whilst the progress of analysis, with 
glimpses of laws as yet unknown, renders it almost 
certain that this number will be found to be smaller still. 
Yet out of that small number of elementary substances, 
having fixed rules, too, limiting their combination, all the 
infinite varieties of organic and inorganic matter are built 





oe 


96 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


up by means of nice adjustment. As all the faculties of 
a powerful mind can utter their voice in language whose 
elements are reducible to twenty-four letters, so all the 
forms of Nature, with all the ideas they express, are 
worked out from a few simple elements having a few 
simple properties. 

Simple! can we call them’so? Yes, simple by com- 
parison with the exceeding complication of the uses they 
are made to serve: simple also, in this sense, that they 
follow some simple rule of numbers. But in themselves 
these laws, these forces are incomprehensible. ‘That 
which is most remarkable about them is their unchange- 
ableness. The whole mind and imagination of scientific 
men is often so impressed.with this character of material 
laws, that no room is left for the perception of other 
aspects of their nature and of their work. We hear of 
rigid and universal sequence—necessary—invariable ;— 
of unbroken chains of cause and effect, no link of which 
can, in the nature of things, be ever broken. And this 
idea grows upon the mind, until in some confused 
manner it is held as casting out the idea of Purpose 
in creation, and inconsistent with the element of Will. 
If it be so, the difficulty cannot be evaded by denying 
the uniformity, any more than the universality, of Law. 
It is perfectly true that every law is, in its own nature, 
invariable, producing always precisely and necessarily 
the same effects,—that is, provided it is worked under 





LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. Q7' 


od 





the same conditions. But then, if the conditions are not 
the same, the invariableness of effect gives place to 
capacities of change which are almost infinite. It is by 
altering the conditions under which any given law is 
brought to bear, and by bringing other laws to operate 
upon the same subject, that our own Wills exercise a 
large and increasing power over the material world. 
And be it observed—to this end the uniformity of laws 
is no impediment, but, on the contrary, it is an indis- 
pensable condition. Laws are in themselves—if not 
unchangeable—at least unchanging, and if they were not 
unchanging, they could not be used as the instruments 
of Will. If they were less rigorous they would be less 
certain, and the least uncertainty would render them 
incapable of any service. No adjustment, however nice, 
could secure its purpose if the implements employed were 
of uncertain temper. ° : 

The notion therefore that the uniformity or invariable- 
ness of the Laws of Nature cannot be reconciled with 
their subordination to the exercise of Will, is a notion 
contrary to our own experience. It is a confusion of 
| thought arising very much out of the ambiguity of lan- 
guage. For let it be observed that, of all the senses in 
which the word Law is used, there is only one in which 
it is true that laws are immutable or invariable; and 
that is the sense in which Law is used to designate an 

H 


¢ 





98 THE REIGN OF LAW, 





individual Force. Gravitation, for example, is immu- 
table in this respect—that (so far as we know) it never 
operates according to any other measure than “ directly 
as the mass, and inversely as the square of the distance.” 
But in all the other senses in which the word Law is 
used, laws are not immutable; but, on the contrary, they 
are the great instruments, the unceasing agencies, of 
change. When, therefore, scientific men speak, as they 
often do, of all phenomena being governed by invariable 
laws, they use language which is ambiguous, and in most 
cases they use it in a sense which covers an erroneous 
idea of the facts. There are no phenomena visible to 
Man of which it is true to say that they are governed by 
any invariable Force. That which does govern them is 
always some variable combinations of invariable forces. 
But this makes all the difference in reasoning on the 
relation of Will to Law,—this is the one essential dis- 
tinction to be admitted and observed. There is no 
observed Order of facts which is not due to a com- 
bination of Forces; and there is no combination of 
Forces which is invariable—none which are not capable 
of change in infinite degrees.. In these senses—and 
these are the common senses in which Law is used to 
express the phenomena of Nature—Law is not rigid, it 
is not immutable, it is not invariable, but it is, on the 
contrary, pliable, subtle, various. In the only sense in 








LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS, 99 
rare eee ee 
which laws are immutable, this immutability is the very 
characteristic which makes them subject to guidance 
through endless cycles of design. We know this in our 
‘own case. It is the very certainty and invariableness of. 
the laws of Nature which alone enables us to use them, 
and to yoke them to our service. 
| Now, the laws of Nature appear to be employed in 
‘the system of Nature in a manner precisely analogous 
to that in which we ourselves employ them. The 
‘difficulties and obstructions which are presented by one 
law in the way of accomplishing a given purpose, are 
met and overcome exactly on the same principle on 
which they are met and overcome by Man—viz., by 
knowledge of other laws, and by resource in applying 
them,—that is, by ingenuity in mechanical contrivance. 
It cannot be too much insisted on, that this is a con- 
clusion of pure Science. The relation which an organic 
structure bears to its purpose in Nature can be recog- 
nised as certainly as the same relation between a ma- 
chine and its purpose in human art. It is absurd to 
maintain, for example, that the purpose of the cellular 
arrangement of material in combining lightness with 
strength, is a purpose legitimately cognisable by Science 
in the Menai Bridge, but is not as legitimately cognisable 
when it is seen in Nature, actually serving the same use. 
The little Barnacles which crust the: rocks at low tide, 


H 2 





LOO THE REIGN OF LAW. 


aaa 





and which to live there at all must be able to resist the. 
surf, have the building of their shells constructed strictly 
with reference to this necessity. It is a structure all 
hollowed and chambered on the plan which engineers 

have so lately discovered as an arrangement of material 
| by which the power of resisting strain or pressure is 
multiplied in an extraordinary degree. That shell is as 
pure a bit of mechanics as the bridge, both being struc- 
tures in which the same arrangement is adapted to the 
same end. : 


*¢ Small, but a work divine ; 
Frail, but of force to withstand, 
Year upon year, the shock = 
Of cataract seas that snap 
The three-decker’s oaken spine.” 1 


This is but one instance out of a number which no 
man can count. So far as we know, no Law—that is, 
no elementary Force—of Nature is liable to change. 
But every Law of Nature is liable to counteraction ; and 
the rule is, that laws are habitually made to counteract 
each other in precisely the manner and degree which 
some definite result requires. 

Nor is it less remarkable that the converse of this is 
true: no Purpose is ever attained in Nature, except by 
the enlistment of Laws as the means and instruments of 


1 “Maud,” 








LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. Lor 
attainment. When an extraordinary result is aimed at, 
it often happens that some common law is yoked to 
extraordinary conditions, and its action is intensified by 
some special machinery. For‘example, the Forces of 
Electricity are in action, probably, in all living Orga- 
nisms, but certainly in the muscular and nervous system 
of the higher animals. In a very few (so far as yet 
known, in only a very few animals among the millions 
which exist, and these all belonging to the Class of 
Fishes), the electrical action has been so stored and 
concentrated as to render it serviceable as a weapon of 
offence. Creatures which grovel at the bottom of the 
sea, or in the slime of rivers, have been gifted with the 
astonishing faculty of wielding at their will the most 
subtle of all the powers of Nature. They have the 
faculty of “ shooting out lightning” against their enemies 
or their prey. But this gift has not been given without 
an exact fulfilment of all the laws which govern Elec- 
tricity, and which especially govern its concentration and 
destructive force. The Electric Ray, or Torpedo, has 
been provided with a Battery closely resembling, but 
greatly exceeding in the beauty and compactness of its 
structure, the Batteries whereby Man has now learned 
to make the laws of Electricity subservient to his will. 
There are no less than 940 hexagonal columns in this 


Battery like those of a bees’ comb, and each of these is 





102 THE REIGN OF LAW. ‘i 
subdivided by a series of horizontal plates, whiceanpneat 
to be analogous to the plates of the Voltaic Pile. The 
whole is supplied with an enormous amount of nervous 
matter, four great branches of which are as large as the 
animal’s spinal cord, and these spread out in a multitude 
of thread-like filaments round the prismatic columns, 
and finally pass into all the cells.1 This, again, seems 
to suggest an analogy with the arrangement by which 
an electric current, passing through a coil and round a 
magnet, is used to intensify the magnetic force. A com. 
plete knowledge of all the mysteries which have been 
gradually unfolded from the days of Galvani to those of 
Faraday, and of many others which are still inscrutable 
to us, is exhibited in this structure. The laws which are 
appealed to in the accomplishment of this purpose are 
many and very complicated ; because the conditions to 
be satisfied refer not merely to the generation of Electric 
force in the animal to which it is given, but to its effect 
on the nervous system of the animals against which it is 
to be employed, and to the conducting medium in which 
both are moving. 

When we contemplate such a structure as this, the 
idea is borne in with force upon the mind, that the need 


of conforming to definite conditions seems as absolute a 


1 Owen’s ‘Lectures on Comp. Anat.” vol. ii. (Fishes), 





ai LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 103 





‘, 
wit Ant SL . c : : 
necessity in making an Electric Fish as in making an 


Electric Telegraph. But the fact of these conditions 
existing, and requiring to be satisfied,—or, in other 
words, the fact of so many natural laws demanding a 
first obedience,—is net the ultimate fact, it is not even’ 
the main fact, which Science apprehends in such pheno-- 
mena as these. On the contrary, that which is most 
observable and most certain, is the manner in which 
these conditions are met, complied with, and, by being 
complied with, are overcome. But this is, in other 
words, the subordination of many laws to a difficult and 
curious Purpose,—a subordination which is effected 
through the instrumentality of a purely mechanical con- 
trivance. 

It is no objection to this universal truth, that the 
machines thus employed in Nature are themselves con- 
structed through the agency of Law. They grow—or, in 
modern phraseology, they are developed. But this makes 
no difference in the case—or, rather, it only carries. us 
farther back to other and yet other illustrations of the 
same truth. ‘This is precisely one of those cases already 
referred to, in which Causes are unknown, whilst Pur- 
poses are clear and certain. The Battery of an Electric 
Fish is both a means and an end. As respects the 
electric laws which it puts in motion—that is, as respects 
the Force which it concentrates—it must be regarded 





104. THE REIGN OF LAW. 





as a means. As respects the organic laws by which it is 
itself developed, it is an end. 

What we do know in this case is why the apparatus was 

made; that is to say, what we do know is the Purpose. 
- What we do not know, and have no idea of, is ow it 
was made; that is to say, what we do not know is the 
Law, the Force or Forces, which have been used as the 
instrument of that Purpose. When Man makes a voltaic 
Battery, he selects materials which have properties and 
relations with each other previously ascertained—-metals 
worked out of natural ores, acids distilled out of other 
natural substances; and he puts these together in such 
fashion as he knows will generate the mysterious Force 
which he desires to evoke and to employ. But how can 
such a machine be made out of the tissues of a fish? 
Well may Mr. Darwin say, “ It is impossible to conceive 
by what steps these wondrous organs have been pro- 
duced.”! We see the Purpose—that a special appara- 
tus should be prepared, and we see that it is effected 
by the production of the machine required ; but we have 
not the remotest notion of the means.employed. Yet we 
can see so much as this, that here again other laws, 
belonging altogether to another department of Nature— 


laws of organic growth—are made subservient to a very. 


definite and very peculiar Purpose. The paramount facts 


4 “Origin of Species,” p. 192, Ist edition, 





LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. ea LOS 





disclosed by Science, however, in this case, are these :— 
first, the adaptation of the animal tissues to form a 
battery ; and, secondly, the Purpose or function of the 
apparatus, when made, to discharge electric shocks. 
There is indeed one objectioh to this method of 
conception, which would be a fatal objection if it 
could be consistently maintained. But all the strength 
of this objection lies in the obscure terrors which a very 
long word is sometimes capable of inspiring. This 
word is ‘ Anthropomorphism.” Purpose and Design, it 
is said, is a human conception. Unquestionably it is, 
and so is all knowledge in every form. We can never 
stand outside ourselves. We can never get behind or 
above our own methods of conception. The human 
mind can know nothing, and can think of nothing ex- 
cept in terms of its own capacities of thought. But 
if this be fatal to our knowledge of any of the mean- 
ings in creation, it must be equally fatal to our having 
; any knowledge of the very existence of a Creator. Once 
grant it to be true, “ that if we are to apply our human 
standard to the Creator in one direction, we must apply 
it in all,” 4—then it will follow that we cannot conceive 
any Creator unless it be one as weak, and as corrupt, 
and as ignorant as ourselves. If this be not bad logic, 
as on the face of it it clearly is, then it is not ‘‘ Theo- 
logy” alone which goes by the board. ‘The purest and 
1 Mr. G. H. Lewes, Fortnightly Review, July 1867, p. 109. 


106 THE REIGN OF LAW. 








most naked Theism is equally destroyed. If it can be 
said with truth that “the Universal Mind is essentially 
other than the Human Mind,”?! so that no recognisable 
relations can exist between them, then that Universal 
Mind is to us as if it were not. But those who take 
objection to Anthropomorphism, are not generally pre- 
pared to follow it to this extreme conclusion. Mr. 
Lewes speaks of the sceptical philosophy he supports as 
“rejecting Atheism ”—of Atheism being “ an error which 
it has not maintained,”—of Atheism being not only 
rash, but “contradictory.”?. But every conception of a 
“ Mind,” even though it be described as “ Universal,” ~ 
must be in some degree Anthropomorphic. Our minds 
can think of another mind only as having some powers 
and properties which in kind are common with our own. 
Nor is this objection avoided by any of the other 
methods of conception which are devised to eliminate 
from the Order of Nature one of the most patent of its 
facts. The idea of natural forces working “by them- 
selves” is pre-eminently Anthropomorphic. This ts un- 
doubtedly the way in which they seem to us to work when 
we employ them. The idea of those forces having been 
so co-ordinated at the first as to produce “ necessarily” 
and “by themselves” all the phenomena of Nature— 
this is an idea essentially formed on those higher efforts 


‘1 Mr.G. H. Lewes, Fortnightly Review, July 1867, p. 109. 
2 Ibid. p. 107, 








LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS, 107 





of human: ingenuity in virtue of which “self-acting” 
machines are made. It is quite true, no doubt, that 
this is one aspect in which the adjustments and con- 
trivances in Nature present themselves to us. But it 
does not render this idea more Anthropomorphic, but 
rather less when we add to it other conceptions— such 
as the idea of a Mind which is the source of all power, 
and a Will which is present in all effects. There may 
be other difficulties in the way of this conception, but 
not the difficulty of Anthropomorphism. From neither 
of these conceptions, however, can we eliminate the 
- idea of Purpose and Design. 

It is very difficult to divest ourselves of the notion, 
that whatever happens by way of natural consequence 
is thereby removed, at least by one degree, from being 
the expression of Will and the effect of Purpose. We 
forget that all our own works, not less than the works of 
Nature, are works done through the means and instru- 
mentality of Law. All that we can effect is brought 
about by way of natural consequence. All our machines 
are simply contrivances for bringing natural Forces into 
operation ; and these machines themselves we are able 
to construct only out of the materials and by appli- 
cation of the laws of Nature. The Steam-engine works 
by way of natural consequence ; so does Mr. Babbage’s 
Calculating Machine; so does the Electric Telegraph ; 


108 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


- so does the Solar System. It is true, indeed, that in 
all human machinery we know by the evidence of sight 
the ultimate agency to which the machinery is due, 
whereas in the machinery of Nature the ultimate agency 
is concealed from sight. But it is the very business — 
and work of Science to rise from the Visible to the 
Invisible—from what we observe by Sense to what we 
know by Reason. 

And this brings us to the Fifth meaning in which the 
word Law is habitually used in Science,—a meaning 
which is indeed well deserving of attention. In this 
sense, Law is used to designate, not any observed Order 
of facts,—not any Force tu which such Order may be 
due,—neither yet any combination of Force adjusted 
~ to the discharge of function, but—some purely Abstract 
Idea, which carries up to a higher point our conception 
of what the phenomena are and of what they do. There 
may be no phenomena actually corresponding to such 
Idea, and yet a clear conception of it may be essential 
to a right understanding of all the phenomena around 
us. A good example of Law in this sense is to be found 
in the law which, in the Science of Mechanics, is called 
the First Law of Motion. The law is, that all Motion is 
in itself (that is to say, except as affected by extraneous 
Forces) uniform in velocity, and rectilinear in direction. 


Thus according to this law a body moving, and not 








LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS, 109g 





subject to any extraneous Force, would go on moving 
_ for ever at the same rate of velocity, and in an exactly 
straight line. 

Now, there is no such motion as this existing on the 
earth or in the heavens. It is an Abstract Idea of 
Motion which no man has ever, or can ever, see exem- 
plified. Yet a clear apprehension of this Abstract Idea 
was necessary to a right understanding and to the true 
explanation of all the motions which are actually seen. 
It was long before this idea was arrived at ; and for want 
of it, the efforts of Science to explain the visible pheno- 
mena of Motion were always taking a wrong direction. 
There was a real difficulty in conceiving it, because 
not only is there no such motion in Nature, but there 
is no possibility by artificial means of producing it. 
It is impossible to release any moving body from the ~ 
impulses of extraneous Force. The First Law of Motion 
is therefore a purely Abstract Idea. It represents a 
Rule which never operates as we conceive it, by itself, 
but is always complicated with other Rules which pro- 
duce a corresponding complication in result. Like many 
other laws of the same class, it was discovered, not by 
looking outwards, but by looking inwards; not by 
observing, but by thinking. The human mind, in the 
exercise of its own faculties and powers, sometimes by 


careful reasoning, sometimes by the intuitions of genius 





r1o THE REIGN OF LAW. 





unconscious of any process, is able, from time to time, 
to reach now one, now another, of those purely Intel- 
lectual Conceptions which are the basis of all that is in- 
telligible to us in the Order of the Material World. We 
look for an ideal order or simplicity in material Law ; and 
the very possibility of exact Science depends upon the 
fact that such ideal order-does actually prevail, and is 
related to the abstract conceptions of our own intellectual 
nature. It is in this way that many of the greatest dis- 
coveries of Science have been made. Especially have 
the great pioneers in new paths of discovery been led to 
the opening of those paths by that fine sense for abstract 
truths which is the noblest gift of genius. Copernicus, 
Kepler, and Galileo were all guided in their profound 
interpretations of visible phenomena by those intuitions 
which arise in minds finely organised, brought into close 
relations with the mind of Nature, and highly trained in 
the exercise of speculative thought. They guessed the 
truth before they proved it to be true ; and those guesses 
had their origin in Abstract Ideas of the mind which 
turned out to be ideas really embodied in the Order of - 
the Universe. So constantly has this recurred in the 
history of Science, that, as Dr. Whewell says, it is not 


to be considered as an exception, but as the rule.’ 


1 Whewell’s ‘‘ History of the Inductive Sciences,” 2nd edition, 
vol i, p. 434. Speaking of Copernicus, Dr. Whewell says, in 





LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. Til 





Here again it is very instructive to observe how “Law” 
in this last sense is dealt with by the Positive Philosophy. 
Scientific men are accustomed to reckon such Laws as 
the First Law of Motion among the surest possessions of 
pure Intellect, and the faculty by which they are con- 
ceived among the noblest proofs of its energy and power. 
Positivism, on the contrary, regards such laws as mere 
“artifices” of thought, and the Power by which they are 
conceived not as a Strength, but as an “ Infirmity” of 
Mind.! I do not deny that the process by which these 
Abstractions are attained is a metaphysical process,—that 
is to say, they are purely mental conceptions. But the 
process which denies “reality” to these conceptions is 
also purely a metaphysical process, with this only differ- 
ence, that it is bad metaphysics instead of good. The 
analysis which evolves these abstract Laws out of the 
phenomena of Nature is an analysis which truly co- 
ordinates the order of those phenomena with an Order 


another place: ‘**It is manifest that in this, as in other cases of 
discovery, a clear and steady possession of abstract Ideas, and an 
aptitude in comprehending real Facts under these general concep- 
tions, must have been leading characters in the Discoverer’s mind.” 
/ —Vol. i. p. 389. 

1 ‘*Science is distinguished from common knowledge by its con- 
scious employment of artifices which our infirmity renders indispen- 
sable.” Again, ‘* Abstraction is one of the necessary (from infirmity) 
attifices of research.”—Lewes’ ‘‘ Prologue,” p, Ixxxix. 





ITZ THE REIGN OF LAW. Sy 


. 4 t 
SS 





of Thought. The counter Analysis which pronounces 
them to be mere artifices of Thought, and “ preliminary 
falsifications of fact,” is an attempt to make Reason 
disbelieve herself, and immerses us at once in the worst 
kind of Metaphysics—that which has made the name 
almost opprobrious—even the old Scholastic subtleties 
of the Nominalistic and the Realistic controversy. 

And now having traced the various senses in which 
Law is used, we can form some estimate on the value of 
those conclusions of which some men are so boastful and 
of which other men are so much afraid. We can sve 
how much and how little is really meant when it is said 
that Law can be traced in all things, and all things can be 
traced to Law. It is a great mistake to suppose that, in 
establishing this conclusion, the progress of modern in- 
vestigation is in a direction tending to Materialism. This 
may be and always has been the tendency of individual 
minds. ‘There are men who would stare into the very 
Burning Bush without a thought that the ground on 
which they stand must be Holy Ground. It is not now 
of wood or stone that men make their Idols, but of their 
own abstract conceptions. Before these, borrowing for 
them the attributes of Personality, they bow down and. 
worship. Nothing is more common than to find men 
who may be trusted thoroughly on the facts of their own 
Science, who cannot be trusted for a moment on the 


LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 113 


place which those facts assume in the general system of 
truth. Philosophy must include Science; but Science 
does not necessarily include Philosophy. There are, and 
there always have been, some special misconceptions 
connected with the prosecution of physical research. It 
is, however, on the surface of things, rather than below 
it, that the suggestions of Materialism lie thickest to the 
eye. They abound among the commonest facts which 
obtrude themselves on our attention in Nature and in 
human life. When the bursting of some small duct of 
blood upon the Brain is seen to destroy in a moment the 
Mind of Man, and to break down all the vowers of his 
Intellect and his”Will, we are in presence of a fact whose 


significance cannot be increased by a million of other 


facts analogous in kind. 


Yet on every fresh discovery of a few more such facts, 
there is generally some fresh outbreak of old delusions 
respecting the forms and the Laws of Matter as the 
supreme realities of the world. But when the new facts 
have been looked at a little longer, it is always seen that 
they take their: place with others which have been long 
familiar, and the eternal problems which he behind all 
natural phenomena are seen to be unaffected and un- 
changed. Like the most distant of the Fixed Stars, they 
have no parallax, The whole orbit of human knowledge 
shows in them no apparent change of place. No 

I 


i 


Ii4 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





amount of knowledge of the kind which alone physical 
Science can impart can do more than widen the founda- 
tion of intelligent spiritual beliefs. We think that 
Astronomy and Geology have given to us in these latter 
days ideas wholly new in respect to Space and Time. 
Yet, after all, can we express those ideas, or can we in- 
dicate the questions they suggest, in any language which 
approaches in power to the majestic utterances of David 
and of Job? We know more than they knew of the 
magnitude of the Heavenly Bodies ; but what more can 
we say than they said of the wonder of them,—of 
Orion, of Arcturus, and the Pleiades?! We know that 
the earth moves, which they did not know ; and we know 
that the rapid rotation of a globe on its own axis is a 
means of maintaining the steadiness of that axis in its 
course through Space. But what effect, except that of 
increasing its significance, has this knowledge upon the 
praise which David ascribes to that ultimate Agency 
which has made the round world so sure “that it cannot 
be moved ?”2 ~ 

And so of other departments of Science. Even the 
modern idea of Law, of the constancy and therefore the. 
trustworthiness of Natural Forces, has been known, not 


indeed scientifically but instinctively, to Man since first 


4 Job ix. 9, 2 Ps. xciii. 1, 





LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 115 





he made a Tool, and used it as the instrument of Pur- 
pose. What has Science added to this idea, except that 
the same rule prevails as widely as the Universe, and is 
made subservient in a like manner to Knowledge and to 
Will? In the enthusiasm awakened by the discovery of 
some new facts, or of some new forces, and in the 
freshness with which they impress the idea of: such 
agencies on our minds, we sometimes very naturally 
exaggerate the length of way along which they carry us 
towards the great ultimate objects of intellectual desire. 
We forget altogether that the knowledge they convey is 
in quality and in kind identical with knowledge already 
long in our possession, and places us in no new relation 
whatever to the vast background of the Eternal and 
the Unseen. / Thus it is that the notions of Materialism 
are perpetually reviving, and are again being perpetually 
swept away—swept away partly before the Intuitions of 
the Mind, partly before the Conclusions of the Reason. 
For there are two great enemies to Materialism,—one 
rooted in the Affections, the other in the Intellect. One 
is the power of THINGS HOPED FOR—a power which 
never dies: the other is the evidence of THINGS NoT 
SEEN—and this evidence abounds in all we sec. } In 
reinforcing this evidence, and in adding to it, Science is 
doing boundless work in the present day. It is not the 
extent of our knowledge, but rather the limits of it, that 
12 





116 THE REIGN OF LAW. 








physical research teaches us to see and feel the most. 
Of course, in so far as its discoveries are really true, its 
influence must be for good. To doubt this were to doubt 
that all truth is true, and that all truth is God’s. 

There are eddies in every stream—eddies where rub- 
bish will collect, and circle for a time. But the ultimate 
bearing of scientific truth cannot be mistaken. Nothing 
is more remarkable in the present state of physical 
research than what may be called the transcendental 
character of its results. And what is transcendentalism 
but the tendency to trace up all things to the relation in 
which they stand to abstract Ideas? And what is this 
but to bring all physical phenomena nearer and nearer 
into relation with the phenomena of Mind? ‘The old 
speculations of Philosophy which cut the ground from 
Materialism by showing how little we know of Matter, 
are now being daily reinforced by the subtle analysis 
of the Physiologist, the Chemist, and the Electrician. 
Under that analysis Matter dissolves and disappears, 
surviving only as the phenomena of Force; which again 
is seen converging along all its-lines to some common 
centre—“ sloping through darkness up to God.”?- 

Even the writers who have incurred most reasonable 


suspicion as to the drift of their teaching, give neverthe- 


3 Tennyson’s ‘‘In Memoriam,” 








LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 117 
less constant witness to what may be called the purely 
mental quality of the ultimate results of physical inquiry. 
It has been said with perfect truth that “the fundamental - 
ideas of modern Science are as transcendental as any of 
the axioms in ancient philosophy.!' We have seen that 
one of the senses in which Law is habitually used is to 
designate abstract ideas and doctrines of this kind. So . 
far from these doctrines and ideas having a tendency to 
Materialism, they serve rather to bring inside the strict 
domain of Science ideas which in the earlier stages of 
human knowledge lay wholly within the region .of Faith 
or of Belief. For example, the writer of the Epistle to 
the Hebrews specially declares that it is by Faith that 
we understand “that the things which are seen were not 
made of the things which do appear.” Yet this is now 
one of the most assured doctrines of Science,—that 
invisible Forces are behind and above all visible pheno- 
mena, moulding them in forms of infinite variety, of all 
which forms the only real knowledge we possess lies in 
our perception of the Ideas they express—of their beauty, 
or of their fitness,—in short, of their being all the work 
of ‘Toil co-operant to an End.” 

Every natural Force which we call a law is itself 


invisible—the idea of it in the mind arising by way of 


3 Lewes's “ Philosophy of Aristotle,” p. 66, 


i nn a A a 


118 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





‘necessary inference out of an observed Order of facts. 
And very often, if not always, in our conception of these 
Forces, we are investing them with the attributes of 
Intelligence and of Will at the very moment, perhaps, 
when we are stumbling over the difficulty of seeing in 
_ them the exponents of a Mind which is intelligent and 
of a Will which is Supreme. The deeper we go in 
Science, the more certain it becomes that all the realities 
of Nature are in the region of the Invisible, so that the 
saying is literally, and not merely figuratively true, that 
the things which are seen are temporal, and it is only 
the things which are not seen that are eternal. For 
example, we never see the phenomena of Life dis- 
sociated from Organisation. Yet the profoundest physi- 
ologists have come to the conclusion that Organisation 
is not the cause of Life, but, on the contrary, that Life 
is the cause of Organisation,—Life being something—a 
Force of some kind, by whatever name we may call 
it—which precedes Organisation, and fashions it, and 
builds it up. This was the conclusion come to by the 
great anatomist Hunter, and it is the conclusion en- 
dorsed in our own day by such men as Dr. Carpenter 
and Professor Huxley,—men neither of whom have 
exhibited in their philosophy any undue bias towards 
either theological or metaphysical explanations. One 
illustration referred to by these writers is derived from 





LAW ;—ITS. DEFINITIONS, Tig 


—— eS 





the shells-—the beautiful shells—of the animals called 
the “ Foraminifera.”1_ No Forms in Nature are more 
exquisite. Yet they are the work and the abode of 
animals which are mere blobs of jelly—without parts, 
without organs—absolutely without visible structure of 
any kind. In this jelly, nevertheless, there works a 
“vital Force” capable of building up an Organism of 
most complicated and perfect symmetry. 

But what is a vital Force? It is something which we 
cannot see, but of whose existence we are as certain 
as we are of its visible effects—nay, which our reason 
tells us precedes and is superior to these. We often 
speak of Material Forces as if we could identify any 
kind of Force with Matter. Lut this is only one of 
the many ambiguities of language. All that we mean 
by a Material Force is a force which acts upon Matter, 
and produces in Matter its own appropriate effects. We 
must go a step further therefore and ask ourselves, What 
is Force ? What is our conception of it? What idea 
can we form, for example, of the real nature of that 
Force, the measure of whose operation has been so 
exactly ascertained—the Force of Gravitation? It is 
invisible—imponderable—all our words for it are but 
circumlocutions to express its phenomena or effects. 


1 “The Elements of Comparative Anatomy,” (Huxley,) pp. 
JO), 1k 





tr oe 





120 | THE REIGN OF LAW. 





There are many kinds of force in Nature—which 
we distinguish after the same fashion—according to 
their effects or according to the forms of Matter in 
which they become cognisable to us. But if we trace 
all our conceptions on the nature of Force to their 
fountain-head, we shall find that they are formed on 
our own consciousness of Living Effort—of that force 
which has its seat in our own vitality, and especially 
on that kind of it which can be called forth at the 
bidding of the Will. In saying this I do not mean to 
borrow from that false philosophy which pretends by the 
exercise of reason to get behind all the intuitive convic- 
tions on which reason rests. Itis in this way that men 
have come to argue on what they call the “ reality of 
an external world.” Even if there were no process of 
reasoning capable of defending that reality, this would 
not lend a reasonable character to doubts regarding it. 
Reason must start from some postulate—some primary 
truths which cannot be denied. But we need not assume 
the reality of an external’ world to be one of these. 
Yet if it be not a first step, it is a second step hardly 
distinguishable from the first. . Self-existence is of course 
the truth which may be regarded as the first of all, but 
in the very idea of Self the existence of that which is 
Not-Self is necessarily involved. In connecting, how- 


ever, our conceptions of Force with the consciousness 











LAW 5;—ITS DEFINITIONS, I2I 








cf Living Effort in ourselves, we must guard against mis- 
taking analogy for identity, and against confounding 
together two items of knowledge which are quite distinct. 
Correlative with the consciousness. of Living Effort in 
ourselves, and inseparable from it, there is the con- 
sciousness of Force acting on us, as well as acting 
in us. And this argument applies equally whether 
Self be regarded as a perceiving Mind, or as a physical 
Organism through which Mind perceives. Thus the 
knowledge of an external world—that is to say, the 
knowledge of external Force—stands side by side with 
the knowledge of Self. Nothing can be known except 
as distinguished from other things; and all things which 
are distinguishable from each other, are, in a sense, and 
in the measure of that distinction, known. And so we 
know the existence both of internal and of external 
Force. But if we come to ask ourselves farther ques- 
tions, as to the nature and seat of Material Force, we can 
only think of it in the terms of the Vital Force exerted 
by ourselves. If we can ever know anything of the 
nature of any Force, it ought to be of this one. And 
yet the fact is that we know nothing. If then, we 
know nothing of that kind of Force which is so near 
to us, and with which our own Intelligence is in such 
close alliance, much less can we know the ultimate 
nature of Force in its other forms, 


122 | THE REIGN OF LAW, 

It is important to dwell on this, because both the 
aversion with which some men regard the idea of the 
Reign of Law, and the triumph with which somé others 
hail it, are founded on a notion that, when we have 
traced any given phenomena to what are called Natural - 
Forces, we have traced them farther than we really have. 
We know nothing of the ultimate nature, or of the ulti- 
mate seat of Force. Science, in the modern doctrine of 
the Conservation of Energy, and the Convertibility of 
Forces, is already getting something like a firm hold of 
the idea that all kinds of Force are but forms or mant- 
festations of some one Central Force issuing from some 
one Fountain-head of Power. Sir John Herschel has 
not hesitated to say, that “it is but reasonable to regard 
the Force of Gravitation as the direct or indirect result 
of a Consciousness or a Will existing somewhere.” ? 
And even if we cannot certainly identify Force in all its 
forms with the direct energies of One Omnipresent and 
all pervading Will, it is at least in the highest degree 
unphilosophical to assume the contrary—to speak or to 
think as if the Forces of Nature were either independent 
of, or even separate from, the Creator’s Power. 

It follows, then, from these considerations, that what- 
ever difficulty there may be in conceiving of a Will 
not exercised by a visible Person, it is a difficulty which 


t Outlines of Astronomy,” 5th edition, p. 291. 





LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS, 523 
cannot be evaded by arresting our conceptions at the 
point at which they have arrived in forming the idea 
of Laws or Forces. -That idea is itself made up out 
of elements derived from our own consciousness of 
Personality. This fact is seen by men who do not 
see the interpretation of it. ‘They denounce as a super- 
stition the idea of any Personal Will separable from 
the Forces which work in Nature. They say that this 
idea is a mere projection of our own Personality into 
the world beyond—the shadow of our own Form cast 
upon the ground on which we look. And indeed this, 
in a sense, is true. It is perfectly true that the Mind 
does recognise in Nature a reflection of itself. But if 
this be a deception, it is a deception which is not 
avoided by transferring the idea of Personality to the 
abstract Idea of Force, or by investing combinations of 
Force with the attributes of Mind. 

We need not be jealous, then, when new domains 
are claimed as under the Reign of Law—an agency 
through which we see working everywhere some Pur- 
pose of the Everlasting Will. There are many things 
in Nature of which we do not see the reason; and 
many other things of which we cannot find out the 
cause ; but there are none from which we exclude the 
idea of Purpose by success in discovering the cause. It 
has been said, with perfect truth, by a living naturalist 





124 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





who is of all others most opposed to what he calls 
Theological explanations in Scieuce, that we may just 
as well speak of a watch as the abode of a “ watch- 
force,” as speak of the organisation of en animal as 
the abode of a “vital Force.”! The analogy is precise 
and accurate. The Forces by which a watch moves are 
natural Forces. It is the relation of interdependence 
in ‘which those Forces are placed to each other, or, 
in other words, the adjustment of them to a par- 
ticular Purpose, which constitutes the ‘‘ watch-force ;”’ 
and the seat of this Force—which is in fact no one 
Force, but a combination of many Forces—is in the 
Intelligence which conceived that combination, and in 
the Will which gave it effect. ‘The mechanisms devised 
by Man are in this respect only an image of the more 
perfect mechanism of Nature, in which the same prin 
ciple of Adjustment is always the highest result which 
Science can ascertain or recognise. ‘There is this differ- 
ence, indeed,—that in regard to our works we see that 
our knowledge of natural laws is very imperfect, and 
our control over them is very feeble; whereas in the 
machinery of Nature there is evidence of complete 
knowledge and of absolute control. . The universal rule 


is, that everything is brought about by way of Naural 


2 Lewes’s ‘‘ Philosophy of Aristotle,” p. 87. 





ae 


LAW ;—ITS DEFINITIONS. 125 


Consequence. But another rule is, that all natural 
consequences meet and fit into each other in endless 
circles of Harmony and of Purpose. And this can only 
be explained by the fact that what we call Natural 
Consequence is always the conjoint effect of an infinite 
number of elementary Forces, whose action and re- 
action are under direction of the Will which we see 
obeyed, and of the Purposes which we see actually 
attained. 

It is, indeed, the completeness of the analogy between 
our own works on a small scale, and the works of the 
Creator on an infinitely large scale, which is the greatest 
mystery of all. Man is under constraint to adopt the 
principle of Adjustment, because the Forces of Nature 
are external to and independent of his Will. They 
may be managed, but they cannot be disobeyed. It 
is impossible to suppose that they stand in the same 
relation to the Will of the Supreme; yet it seems as 
if He took the same method of dealing with them 
—never violating them, never breaking them, but 
always ruling them by that which we call Adjustment 
or Contrivance. Nothing gives us such an idea of 
the immutability of I.aws as this! nor does anything 
give us such an idea of their pliability to use. How 
imperious they are, yet how submissive! How they 


reign, yet how they serve] 


CHAPTER II. 


CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY ARISING OUT OF THE REIGN 
OF LAW—EXAMPLE IN THE MACHINERY OF FLIGHT. 


THE necessity of Contrivance for the accomplish- 
ment of Purpose arises out of the immutability 

of Natural Forces. They must be conformed to, and 
obeyed. Therefore, where they do not serve our purpose 
; directly, they can only be made to serve it by ingenuity 
and contrivance. This necessity, then, may be said to 
be the index and the measure of the power of Law. 
And so, on the other hand, the certainty with which 
Purpose can be accomplished by Contrivance, is the 
index and the measure of mental knowledge and re- 
source. It is by wisdom and knowledge that the Forces 
of Nature—even those which may seem most adverse— 
are yoked to service. This idea of the relation in which 
Law stands to Will, and in which Will stands to Law, is 
familiar to us in the works of Man: but it is less familiar 
to us as equally holding good in the works of Nature. 


We feel, sometimes, as if it were an unworthy notion of 





CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 127 


the Will which works in Nature, to suppose that it 
should never act except through-the use of means, But 
our notions of unworthiness are themselves often the 
unworthiest of all. They must be ruled and disciplined 
by observation of that which is,;—not founded on @ 
priorvt conceptions of what ought to be. Nothing is 
more certain than that the whole Order of Nature is one 
vast system of Contrivance. And what is Contrivance 
but that kind of arrangement by which the unchangeable 
demands of Law are met and satisfied? It may be that 
all natural Forces are resolvable into some One Force; 
and indeed in the modern doctrine of the Correlation of 
Forces, an idea which is a near approach to this, has 
already entered the domain of Science. It may also be 
that this One Force, into which all others return again, is 
itself but a mode of action of the Divine Will. But we 
have no instruments whereby to reach this last analysis. 
Whatever.toe ultimate relation may be between mental 
and material Force, we can at least see clearly this,—that 
in Nature there is the most elaborate machinery to 
accomplish Purpose through the instrumentality of 
means. It seems as if all that is done in Nature as well 
as all that is done in art, were done dy knowing how to 
dow. It is curious how the language of the great Seerg 
of the Old Testament corresponds with this idea. They . 
uniformly ascribe all the operations of Nature—the 


< 


a a ee an en ae 


128 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





greatest and the smallest—to the working of Divine 
Power. But they never revolt—as so many do in these 
weaker days—from the idea of this Power working by 
wisdom and knowledge in the use of means; nor, in this 
point of view, do they ever separate between the work 
of first Creation, and the work which is going on daily in 
the existing world. Exactly the same language is applied 
to the rarest exertions of power, and to the gentlest and 
most constant of all natural operations. Thus the saying 
that “ The Lord by wisdom hath founded the Earth ; by 
understanding hath He established the Heavens,’—is 
coupled in the same breath with this other saying, “ By 
His knowledge the depths are broken up, and the clouds 
drop down the dew.”? 

Every instance of Contrivance which we can thoroughly 
follow and understand, has an intense interest—as cast- 
ing light upon this method of the Divine government, 
and upon the analogy between the operations of our 
own minds and the operations of the Creator. Some 
instances will strike us more than others—and those 
wiil strike us most which stand in some near comparison 
with our own human efforts of ingenuity and contrivance. 
There is one such instance which I propose to consider 


in this chapter—the machinery by which a great pur- 


2 Trov. iii, 19, 20, 





CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 129 





pose has been accomplished in Nature—a purpose 
which Man has never been able to accomplish in art, 
and that is the Navigation of the Air. No more beau- 
tiful example can be found;-even in the wide and rich 
domain of Animal Mechanics—none in which we can 
trace more clearly, too, the mode and method in which 
laws the most rigorous and exact are used as the supple 
instruments of Purpose. 3 

“The way of an Eagle in the air” was one of the 
things of which Solomon said, that “he knew it not.” 
No wonder that the Wise King reckoned it among the 
great mysteries of Nature! The Force of Gravitation, 
though its exact measure was not ascertained till the 
days of Newton, has been the most familiar of all Forces 
in all ages of Mankind. How, then, in violation of its 
known effects, could heavy bodies be supported upon 
the thin air—and be gifted with the power of sustaining 
and directing movements more easy, more rapid, and 
more certain than the movements of other animals upon 
the firm and solid earth? No animal motion in Nature 
is so striking or so beautiful as the 


‘¢ Scythe-like sweep of wings, that dare 
The headlong plunge through eddying gulfs of air.” ? 


Nor will the wonder cease when, so far as the 


2 Longfellow’s ‘‘ Wayside Inn—Ser Federigo,” 


K 





130 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


pi 





mechanical problem is concerned, the mystery of flight 
is solved. If we wish to see how material laws can 
be bent to purpose, we shall study this problem. 
In the first place, it is remarkable that the Force which 
seems so adverse—the Force of Gravitation drawing 
down all bodies to the earth—is the very Force which - 
is the principal one concerned in flight, and without 
which flight would be impossible. It is curious how 
completely this has been forgotten in almost all human 
attempts to navigate the air. Birds are not lighter than 
the air, but immensely heavier. If they were lighter 
than the air they might float, but they could not fly. 
This is the difference between a Bird and a Balloon. A 
Balloon rises because it is lighter than the air, and floats 
upon it. Consequently, it is incapable of being directed, 
because it possesses in itself no active Force enabling 
it to resist the currents cf the air in which it is im- 
mersed, and because, if it had such a force, it would have 
no fulcrum, or resisting medium against which to exert 
it. It becomes, as it were, part of the atmosphere, anc 
must go with it where it goes. No Bird is ever for an 
instant of time lighter than the air in which it flies; but 
being, on the.contrary, always greatly heavier, it keeps 
possession of a Force capable of supplying momentum, 
and therefore capable of overcoming any lesser Force, 


such as the ordinary resistance of the atmosphere, and 





Wis ait eal 


CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 131 





even of heavy gales of wind. The Law of Gravitation, 
therefore, is used in the flight of Birds as one of the 
most essential of the Forces which are available for the 
accomplishment of the end in view. 

The next law appealed to, and pressed into the ser- 
vice, is again a law which would seem an impediment in 
the way. ‘This is the resisting force of the atmosphere 
in opposing any body moving through it. In this 
force an agent is sought and found for supplying the 
requisite balance to the Force of Gravity. But in order 
that the resisting force of air should be effectual for this 
purpose, it must be used under very peculiar conditions. 
The resisting force of fluids, and of airs or gases, is a 
force acting equally in all directions, unless special 
means are taken to give it predominant action in some 
special direction. If it is a force strong enough to pre- 
vent a body from falling, it is also a force strong enough 
to prevent it from advancing. In order, therefore, to 
solve the problem of flight, the resisting power of the 
air must be called into action as strongly as possible 
in the direction opposite to the Force of Gravity, and 
as little as possible in any other. Consequently a body 
capable of flight must present its maximum of surface to 
the resistance of the air in the perpendicular direction, 
and its minimum of surface in the horizontal direction. 
Now, both these conditions are satisfied (1) by the great 

K 2 


132 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





breadth or length of surface presented to the air perpen- 
dicularly in a Bird’s expanded wings, and by (2) the 
narrow lines presented in its shape horizontally, when 
in the act of forward motion through the air. But some- 
thing more yet is required for flight. Great as the resist-_ 
ing force of air is, it is not strong enough to balance 
the Force of Gravity by its mere pressure on an ex- 
panded wing—unless that pressure is increased by an 
appeal to yet other laws—-and other properties of its 
nature. Every sportsman must-have seen cases in which . 
a flying Bird has been so wounded as to produce a rigid 
expansion of the wings. ‘This does not prevent the Bird 
from falling, although it breaks the fall, and makes it 
come more or less gently to the ground. 

Yet further, therefore, to accomplish flight, another 
law must be appealed to, and that is the immense elas- 
ticity of the air, and the reacting force it exerts against 
compression. ‘To enable an animal heavier than the air 
to support itself against the Force of Gravity, it must be 
enabled to strike the air downwards with such force as 
to occasion a rebound upwards of corresponding power. 
The wing of a flying animal must, therefore, do some: 
thing more than barely balance Gravity. It must be able 
to strike the air with such violence as to call forth a 
reaction equally violent, and in the opposite direction. 
This is the function assigned to the powerful muscles by 





ee Se eee 

CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 33 
i 
which the wings of Birds are flapped with such velocity 
and strength. We need not follow this part of the pro- 
blem further, because it does not differ in kind from the 
muscular action of other animals. The connexion, in- 
deed, between the Wills of animals and the mechanism 
of their frame, is the last and highest problem of all in 
the mechanics of Nature; but it is merged and hid for 
ever in the one great mystery of Life. But so far as this 
difficulty is concerned, the action of an Eagle’s wing is 
not more mysterious than the action of a Man’s arm. 
There is a greater concentration of muscular power in 
the organism of Birds than in most other animal frames ; 
because it is an essential part of the problem to be 
solved in flight, that the engine which works the wings 
should be very strong, very compact, of a special form, 
and that, though heavier than the air, it should not have 
an excessive weight. These conditions are all met in 
the power, in the outline, and in the bulk of the pectoral 
muscles which move the wings of Birds. Few persons 
have any idea of the force expended in the action of 
ordinary flight. The pulsations of the wing in most Birds 
are so rapid that they cannot be counted. Even the 
Heron seldom flaps its wings at a rate of less than from 
120 to 150 strokes in a minute. This is counting only 
the downward strokes, preparatory to each one of which 
there must be an upward stroke also; so that there are 








134 _ ‘THE REIGN OF LAW. 





from 240 to 300 separate movements per minute. Yet 
the Heron is remarkable for its slow and heavy flight, 
and it is difficult to believe, until one has timed the 
pulsations with a watch, that they have a rapidity ap- 
proaching to two in a second. But this difficulty is an 
index to the enormous comparative rapidity of the faster- 
flying Birds. Let any one try to count the pulsations of 
the wing in ordinary flight of a Pigeon, or of a Blackcock, 
or of a Partridge, or, still more, of any of the diving sea- 
fowl. He will find that though, in the case of most of 
these Birds, the quickness of sight enables him to see the 
strokes separate from each other, it is utterly impossible 
to count them ; whilst in some Birds, especially in the 
Divers, as well as in the Pheasant and Partridge tribe, 
the velocity is so great that the eye cannot follow it at 
, all, and the vibration of the wings leaves only a blurred 
impression on the eye. 

Our subject here, however, is not so much the amount 
of vital force bestowed on Birds, as the mechanical laws 
which are appealed to in order to make that force efiec- 
tive in the accomplishment of flight. ‘The elasticity of 
the air is the law which offers itself for the counteraction 
of gravity. But, in order to make it available for this 
purpose, there must be some great force of downward 
blow in order to evoke a corresponding rebound in the 
opposite, or upward direction. Now, what is the nature 


~ 








CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. - 135 
of the implement required for striking this downward. 
blow? There are many conditions it must fulfil. First, 
it must be large enough in area to compress an adequate 
volume of air; next, it must be light enough in sub- 
stance not to add an excess of weight to the already 
heavy body of the Bird; next, it must be strong enough 
in frame to withstand the pressure which its own action 
on the air creates. The first of these conditions is met 
by an exact adjustment of the size or area of the wing to 
the size and weight of the Bird which it is to lift. The 
second and the third conditions are both met by the 
provision of a peculiar substance, feathers, which are 
very light and very strong ; whilst the only heavy parts of 
the framework, namely, the bones in which the feathers 
are inserted, are limited to a very small part of the area 
required. | 

But there is another difficulty to be overcome—a 
difficulty opposed by natural laws, and which can only 
be met by another adjustment, if possible more inge- 
nious and beautiful than the rest. It is obvious that if 
a Bird is to support itseif by the downward blow of its 
wings upon the air, it must at the end of each downward 
stroke lift the wing upwards again, so as to be ready for 
the next. But each upward stroke is in danger of neu- 
tralising the effect of the downward stroke. It must be 


made with equal velocity, and if it required equal force, 











136 THE REIGN OF LAW. | 





it must produce equal resistance,—an equal rebound 
from the elasticity of the air. If this difficulty were not 
evaded somehow, flight would be impossible. But it 
is evaded by two mechanical contrivances, which, as it 
were, triumph over the laws of aérial resistance by con- 
forming to them. One of these contrivances is, that 
the upper surface of the wing is made convex, whilst. 
the under surface is concave. The enormous difference 
which this makes in atmospheric resistance is familiarly 
known to us by the difference between the effect of the 
wind on an umbrella which is exposed to it on the 
under or the upper side. The air which is struck bya 
concave or hollow surface is gathered up, and prevented 
from escaping ; whereas the air struck by a convex or 
bulging surface escapes readily on all sides, and com- 
paratively little pressure or resistance is produced. And 
so, from the convexity of the upper surface of a Bird’s 
wing, the upward stroke may be made with compara- 
tively trifling injury to the force gained in the downward 
blow. ‘ 
But this is only half of the provision made against 
a consequence which would be so fatal to the end in 
view. The other half consists in this—that the feathers 
of a Bird’s wing are made to uwazderlap each other, so that 
in the downward stroke the pressure of the air closes 


them upwards against each other, and converts the 





ep es 





CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 137 


whole series of them into one connected membrane, 
through which there is no escape; whilst in the upward 
stroke the same pressure has precisely the reverse effect 
—it opens the feathers, separates them from each other, 
and converts each pair of feathers into a self-acting 
valve, through which the air rushes at every point. 
Thus the same implement is changed in the fraction 
of a second from a close and continuous membrane 
_ which is impervious to the air, into a series of discon- 
nected joints through which the air passes without the 
least resistance—the machine being so adjusted that 
when pressure is required the maximum of pressure is 
produced, and, when pressure is to be avoided, it is 
avoided in spite of rapid and violent action. 

This, however, exhausts but a small part of the means 
by which Law is made to do the work of Will in the 
machinery of flight. It might easily be that violent and 
rapid blows, struck downwards against the elastic air, 
might enable animals possessed of such power to lift 
themselves from the ground and nothing more. There 
is a common toy which lifts itself in this manner from 
the force exerted by the air in resisting, and reacting 
upon little vanes which are set spinning by the hand. 
But the toy mounts straight up, and is incapable of 
horizontal motion. So, there are many structures of 


wing which might enable animals to mount into the air, 





138 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





but which would not enable them to advance or to 
direct their flight. How, then, is this essential purpose 
gained? Again we find an appeal made to natural 
laws, and advantage taken of their certainty and 
unchangeableness. | 

The power of forward motion is given to Birds, first 
by the direction in which the whole wing feathers are 
set, and next by the structure given to each feather in 
itself The wing feathers are all set backwards,—that 
is, in the direction opposite to that in which the Bird 
moves; whilst each feather is at the same time so con- 
structed as to be strong and rigid toward its base, and 
extremely flexible and elastic towards its end. On the 
other hand, the front of the wing, along the greater part 
of its length, is a stiff hard edge, wholly unelastic and 
unyielding to the air. The anterior and posterior webs 
of each feather are adjusted on the same principle. The 
consequence of this disposition of the parts as a whole, 
and of this construction of each of the parts, is, that the 
air which is struck and compressed in the hollow of the 
wing, being unable to escape through the wing, owing to 
the closing upwards of the feathers against each other, 
and being also unable to escape forwards owing to the 
rigidity of the bones and of the quills in that direction, 
finds its easiest escape Jackwards. In passing back- 


wards it lifts by its force the elastic ends of the feathers ; 


a 





=e 


CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 139 
and thus whilst eifecting this escape, in obedience to the. 
aw of action and reaction, it communicates, in its pass. 
sage along the whole line of both wings, a corresponding 
push forwards to the body of the Bird. By this elaborate 
mechanical contrivance the same volume of air is made 
to perform the double duty of yielding pressure enough 
to sustain the Bird’s weight against the Force of Gravity, 
and also of communicating to it a forward impulse. 
The Bird, therefore, has nothing to do but to repeat with 
the requisite velocity and strength its perpendicular 
blows upon the air, and by virtue of the structure of its 
wings the same blow both sustains and propels it 

The truth of this explanation of the mechanical theory 
of flight may be tested in various ways. In the first 
place it is quite visible to the eye. In many birds flying 
straight to us, or straight from us, the effect of aérial 
resistance in bending upwards the ends of the quill 
feathers is very conspicuous. The flight of the common 
Rook affords an excellent example—where the Bird is 
seen foreshortened. In Eagles the same effect is very 


x 


1 The upward stroke has no sustaining power, but has con- 
siderable propelling power; because some air, failing to escape 
between the feathers, must always pass along the convex surface of 
the wing, and, escaping backwards, must exert upon the ends of the 
quills a similar reactive force to that which is exerted in the down 
ward stroke, | 





140 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


marked—the wing tips forming a sharp upward curve. 
I have seen it equally obvious in that splendid Bird the 
Gannet, or Solan Goose; and when we recollect the 
great weight which those few quill feathers are thus seen 
Sustaining, we begin to appreciate the degree in which 
lightness, strength, and imperviousness to the passage of 
air are combined in this wonderful implement of flight. 

But perhaps the simplest test of the action and re- 
action of the air and the wing feathers in producing 
forward motion is an actual experiment. If we take 
in the hand the stretched wing of a Heron, which has 
been dried in that position, and strike it quickly down- 
wards in the air, we shall find that it is very difficult 
indeed to maintain the perpendicular direction of the 
stroke, requiring, in fact, much force to do so; and 
that if we do not apply this force, the hand is carried 
irresistibly forward, from the impetus in that direction 
which the air communicates to the wing in its escape 
backwards from the blow. 

Another test is one of reasoning and observation. If 
the explanation now given be correct, it must follow 
that since no Bird can flap its wings in any other 
direction than the vertical—z.e. perpendicular to its 
own axis (which is ordinarily horizontal)—and as this 
motion has been shown to produce necessarily a forward 


motion, #0 Bird can ever tly backwards, Accordingly no 





CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. r4r 


Bird ever does so—no man ever saw a Bird, even for an 
instant, fly tail foremost. A Bird can, of course, allow 
itself to fall backwards by merely slowing the action 
of its wings so as to alléw its weight to overcome 
their sustaining power; and this motion may some- 
times give the appearance of flying backwards,—as 
when a Swift drops backwards from the eaves of a 
house, or when a Humming Bird allows itself to drop 
in like manner from out of the large tubular: petals of 
a flower. But this backward motion is due to the action 
of gravity, and not to the action of the Bird’s wing. 
In short, it is falling downwards, not flying backwards, 
Nay, more, if the theory of flight here given be correct, 
it must equally follow that even standing still, which 
is the’ easiest of all things to other animals, must be 
very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to a Bird 
when flying. ‘This also is true in fact. To stand still 
in the air is not indeed impossible to a flying Bird, 
for reasons to be presently explained, but it is one of 
the most difficult feats of zingmanshif,—a feat which 
many Birds, not otherwise clumsy, can never perform 
at all, and which is performed only by special exertion, 
and generally for a very short time, by those Birds 
whose structure enables tnem to be adepts in their 
glorious art. 


It cannot be too often repeated—because miscons 


ER RR Rnmeemeememmeemeemmmmmmemenmeeenee eee nee eee 





142 THE REIGN OF LAW. 

ception on this point has been the cardinal error in 
human attempts to navigate the air—that in all the 
beautiful evolutions of birds upon the wing, it is weight, 
and not buoyancy, which makes those evolutions pos- 
sible. It supplies them, so to speak, with a store of 
Force which is constant, inexhaustible, inherent in the 
very substance of themselves, and entirely independent 
of any muscular exertion. All they have to do is to 
give direction to that internal Force, by acting on the 
external Force of aérial currents, through the contrac- 
tion and expansion of the implements which have been 
given them for that purpose. ‘Those who have watched 
the flight of Birds with any care, must have observed 
that when once they have attained a certain initial 
velocity and a certain elevation, by rapid and repeated 
strokes upon the air, they are then able to fly with 
comparatively little exertion, and very often to pursue 
their course for long distances without any flapping 
whatever of the wings. The contrast between the 
violent etforts required for the first acquisition of the 
initial velocity, and the perfect ease with which flight is 
performed after it has been acquired, is a contrast 
described by Virgil in lines of incomparable beauty :— 


*¢ Qualis spelunca subito commota columba, 
Cui domus et dlulces latebroso in pumice nidi, 
Fertur in arva volans, plausumque exterrita pennis 


4, 
i7 sa >. 











CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. I43 





Dat tecto ingentem ; mox, aére lapsa quieto, 
Kadit iter liquidum, celeres neque commovet alas.” 
Min, lib. v. 213-17. 


Still more remarkable, as showing the power and the 
value of weight in flight, is the fact that Birds are able 
to resume rapid and easy motion not only as the result 
of a previously-acquired momentum, but after “ soaring” 
in an almost perfectly stationary position. Nothing, for 
example, is more common than to see Sea Gulls, and some 
large species of Hawks, “ soaring” one moment (that is, 
all the forces bearing on the Bird brought to an equi- 
librium, and all motion brought consequently to nearly 
a perfect standstill), and the next moment sailing 
onwards in rapid and apparently effortless progression. 
Now, how is this effect produced? If we only think 
of it, the question ought rather to be, How is it- 
ever prevented? ‘The soaring is a much more diffi- 
cult thing to do than the going onwards. It cannot 
be done at all in a perfectly still atmosphere. It. can 
only be done when there is a breeze of sufficient 
strength. Gravity is ceaselessly acting on the Bird to 
- pull it downwards: and downwards it must go, unless 
there is a countervailing Force to keep it up. This 
force is the force of the breeze striking against the 
vanes of the wings. But in order to bring these two 
forces to nearly a perfect balance, and so to “soar,” 





T44 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





the Bird must expand or contract its wings exactly 
to the right size, and hold them exactly at the right 
angle. The slightest alteration in either of these 
adjustments produces instantly an ups¢etting of the 
balance, and of course a resulting motion. ‘Fhe exact 
direction of that motion will depend on the degree in 
which the wing is contracted, and the degree in which 
its angle to the wind is changed. If the wing is very 
much contracted, and at the same time held off from 
the wind, that motion will be steeply downwards. Ac- 
cordingly this is the action of a Hawk when it 
swoops upon its prey from a great height above it. I 
have seen a Merlin dash down from a great distance 
with its wings so closed as to seem almost wholly 
folded. The Gannet in diving for fish does not close 
its wings at all, but turning them and the whole axis 
of its body into the perpendicular, and thus allowing 
its great weight to act without any counteraction, dashes 
itself into the sea with foam. But every variety of 
forward motion is attained by different degrees of con- 
traction and exposure, according to the strength of the 
breeze with which the Bird has to deal. The limit of 
its velocity is the limit of its momentum, and the limit 
of its momentum is the limit of its weight. _ The light. 
ness of a Bird is therefore a limit to its velocity. The 
heavier a Bird is, the greater is its possible velocity 





CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 145 


of flight—because the greater is the store of Force—or 
to use the language of modern physics, the greater is 
the quantity of “potential energy” which, with proper 
implements to act upon aérial resistance, it can always 
convert into upward, or horizontal, or downward motion, 
according to its own management and desires. 

It will be at once seen from this view of the forces 
concerned in flight, that the common explanation of 
Birds being assisted by air-cells for the inhalation and 
storage of heated air, must not only be erroneous, but 
founded on wholly false conceptions of the fundamental 
mechanical principles on which flight depends. If a 
Bird could inhale enough warm air to make it buoyant, 
its power of flight would be effectually destroyed. It 
would become as light as a Balloon, and consequently- 
as helpless. If, on the other hand, it were merely to 
inflate itself with a small quantity of hot air insufficient 
to produce buoyancy, but sufficient to increase its bulk, 
the only effect would be to expose.it to increased resist- 
ance in cleaving the air. It is true, indeed, that the 
bones of Birds are made more hollow and lighter than 
the bones of Mammals, because Birds, though requiring 
weight, must not have too much of it. It is true, also, 
that the air must have access to these’ hollows, else they 
would be unable to resist atmospheric pressure. But it is 
no part whatever of the plan or intention of the structure 

L 





146 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





of Birds, or of any part of that structure, to afford balloon-. 
space for heated air with a view to buoyancy. 

And here, indeed, we open up a new branch of the 
same inquiry, showing, in new aspects, how the univer- 
_sality and unchangeableness of all natural laws are 
essential to the use of them as the instruments of Will; 
and how by being played off against each other they are 
made to express every shade of thought, and the nicest 
change of purpose. The movement of all flying animals 
in the air is governed and determined by Forces of mus- 
cular power, and of aérial resistance and elasticity, being 
brought to bear upon the Force of Gravity, whereby, 
according to the universal laws of motion, a direction is 
given to the animal which is the resultant, or compromise, 
between all the Forces so employed. Weight, as we 
have seen, is one of these Forces—absolutely essential to 
that result, and no flying animal can ever for a moment 
of time be buoyant, or lighter than the air in which it is _ 
designed to move. But it is obvious that, within certain 
limits, the proportion in which these different Forces are 
balanced against each other admits of immense variety. 
The limits of variation can easily be specified. Every 
flying animal must have muscular power great enough to 
work its own size of wing: that size of wing must be 
large enough to act upon a volume of air sufficient to lift 


the animal’s whole weight: lastly, and consequently, the 


Z 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































YHE SWIFT. 









Jc das 


mses 


ms 


pueiodes 


al 





CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 147 


weight must not be too great, or dispersed over too large 
a bulk. But within these limits there is room for great 
varieties of adjustments, having reference to correspond- 
ing varieties of purpose. To some Birds the air is almost 
their perpetual home—the only region in which they find 
their food—a region which they never leave, whether in 
storm or sunshine, except during the hours of darkness, 
and the yearly days which are devoted to their nests. 
Other Birds are mainly terrestrial, and never betake 
themselves to flight except to escape an enemy, or to 
follow the seasons and the sun. Between these ex- 
tremes there is every possible variety of habit.. And all : 
these have corresponding varieties of structure. The 
Birds which seek their food in the air have long and 
powerful wings, and so nice an adjustment of their 
weight to that power and to that length, that the faculty 
of self-command in them is perfect, and their power of 
direction so accurate that they can pick up a flying gnat 
whilst they are passing through the air at the rate of 
more than a hundred miles an hour. Such especially are 
the powers of some species of the Swallow tribe, one of 
which, the common Swift, is a creature whose wonderful 
and unceasing evolutions seem part of the happiness 
of summer and of serene and lofty skies.? 

1 Tor the form of the wing in this remarkable bird, see the beau. 
tiful drawing here engraved from the pencil of Mr. Wolf. 

L 2 


148 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





There are other Birds in which the wing has to be 
adapted to the double purpose of swimming, or rather of 
diving, and of flight. In this case, a large area of wing 
must be dispensed with, because it would be incapable 
of being worked under water. Consequently in all 
diving Birds the wings are reduced to the smallest pos- 
sible size which is consistent with retaining the power 
of flight at all; and in a few extreme Forms, the power 
of flight is sacrificed altogether, and the wing is reduced 
to the size, and adapted to the function, of a powerful 
fin. This is the condition of the Penguins. But in most 
genera of swimming Birds, both purposes are combined, 
and the wing is just so far reduced in size and stiffened in 
texture as to make it workable as a fin under water, 
whilst it is still just large enough to sustain the weight of 
the Bird in flight. And here again we have a wonderful 
example of the skill with which inexorable mechanical 
laws are subordinated to special purpose. It is a neces- 
sary consequence of the area of the wing being so re- 
duced, in proportion to the size of the Bird, that great 
muscular power must be used in working it, otherwise 
the Force of Gravity could not be overcome at all. It 
is a farther consequence of this proportion of weight to 
working power, that there must be great momentum and 
therefore great velocity of flight. Accordingly this is the 


fact with all the ocearic diving Birds, They have vast 





CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 149 


distances to go, following shoals of fish, and moving 
from their summer to their winter haunts. They all fly 
with immense velocity, and the wing-strokes are ex- 
tremely rapid. But there is ‘one quality which their 
flight does not possess—because it is incompatible with 
their structure, and because it is not required by their 
habits—they have no facility in evolutions, no delicate 

power of steering; they cannot stop with ease, nor can 3 
they resume their onward motion in a moment. They 
do not want it: the trackless fields of ocean over which 
they roam are broad, and there are no obstructions in 
the way. They fly in straight lines, changing their direc- 
tion only in long curves, and lighting in the sea almost 
with a tumble anda splash. Their rising again is a work - 
of great effort, and generally they have to eke out the 
resisting power of their small wings, not only by the 
most violent exertion, but by rising against the wind, 
so as to collect its force as a help and addition to 
their own. 

And now, again, we may see all these conditions 
changed where there is a change in the purpose to be 
served. There is another large class of oceanic Birds 
whose feeding ground is not under water, but on the 
surface of the sea. Jn this class all those powers of 
flight which would be useless to the Divers are abso- . 
lutely required, and are given in the highest perfection, by 





150 THE REIGN OF LAW, 


the enlistment of the same mechanical laws under dif 
ferent conditions. In the Gulls, the Terns, the Petrels, 
and in the Fulmars, with the Albatross as their typical 
Form, the mechanism of flight is carried through an 
ascending scale, to the highest degrees of power, both as 
respects endurance and facility of evolution. © 

The mechanical laws which are appealed to in all 
these modifications of structure require adjustments of 
the finest kind; and some of them are so curious and 
so beautiful that it is well worth following them a little 
further in detail. 

There are two facts observable in all Birds of great 
and long-sustained powers of flight:—the first is, that 
they are always provided with wings which are rather 
long than broad, sometimes extremely narrow in pro- 
portion to their length ; the second is, that the wings are 
always sharply pointed at the ends. Let us look at the 
mechanical laws which absolutely require this structure 
for the purpose of powerful flight, and to meet which 
it has accordingly been devised and provided. 

One law appealed to in making wings rather long 
than broad is simply the law of leverage. But this 
law has to be applied under conditions of difficulty 
and complexity, which are not apparent at first sight. 
The body to be lifted is the very body that must 
exert the lifting power. The Force of Gravity, which 








CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 15f 





has to be resisted, may be said to be sitting side 
by side, occupying the same particles of matter, with 
the Vital Force which is to give it battle. Nay, more, 
the one is connected with the Other in some mysterious 
manner which we cannot trace or understand. A dead 
Bird weighs as much as a living one. Nothing which 
our scales can measure is lost when the Vital Force 
is gone. It is The Great Imponderable. Nevertheless, 
vital forces of unusual power are always coupled with 
unusual mass and volume in the matter through which 
they work. And so it is that a powerful Bird must 
always also be comparatively a heavy Bird. And then 
it is to be remembered that the action of gravity is 
constant and untiring. The Vital Force, on the contrary, 
however intense it may be, is intermitting and capable 
of exhaustion. If, then, this Force is to be set against 
the Force of Gravity, it has much need of some imple- 
ment through which it may exert itself with mechanical 
advantage as regards the particular purpose to be at- 
tained. Such an implement is the lever—and a long 
wing is nothing but a long lever. The mechanical prin- 
ciple, or law, as is well known, is this,—that a very smail 
amount of motion, or motion through a very small space, 
at the short end of a lever, produces a great amount of 
motion, or motion thraugh a long space, at the opposite 


or longer end. This action requires indeed a very intense 





152 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





force to be applied at the shorter end, but it applies that 
foree with immense advantage for the purpose in view: 
because the motion which is transmitted to the end 
of a long wing is a motion acting at that point through 
a. long space, and is therefore equivalent to a very heavy 
weight lifted through a short space at the end which is 
attached to the body of the Bird. Now this is precisely 
what is required for the purpose of flight. The body of 
a Bird does not require to be much lifted by each stroke 
of the wing. It only requires to be sustained ; and when 
more than this is needed—as when a Bird first rises 
from the ground, or from the sea, or when it ascends 
rapidly in the air—greatly mcreased exertion—in many 
cases, very violent exertion—is required. And then 
it is to be remembered that long wings economise the 
vital force m another way. When a strong current 
of air strikes against the wings of a Bird, the same 
sustaining effect is produced as when the wing strikes 


1 The Albatross, when rising from tne sea, is described (‘* Ibis,” 
July 1865) as ‘‘stretching out his neck, and with great exertion of 
his wings, running aleng the top of the water for seventy or eighty 
yards, until at last having got sufficient impetus, he tucks up his 
legs, and is once-more fairly launched into the air.” The contrast 
here described between the violent exertion required in first rising, 
and the perfect ease of flight after this first momentum has been 
acquired, is a striking illustration of the true mechanical principles 
of flight. | 








CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 153 


against the air. Consequently Birds with very long 
wings have this great advantage, that with pre-acquired 
~momentum, they can often for a long time fly without 
flapping their wings at all. Under these circumstances, 
a Bird is sustained very much as a boy’s kite is sustained 
in the air. The string which the boy holds, and by 
which he pulls the kite downwards with a certain force, 
performs for the kite the same offices which its own 
weight and balance and momentum perform for the 
Bird. The great long-winged oceanic Birds often appear 
to float rather than to fly. The stronger is the gale, 
their flight, though less rapid, is all the more easy-—so 
easy indeed as to appear buoyant; because the blasts 
which stri::e against their wings are enough to sustain 
the bird with comparatively little exertion of its own, 
except that of holding the wing vanes stretched and 
exposed at proper angles to the wind. And whenever 
the onward force previously acquired by flapping  be- 
comes at length exhausted, and the ceaseless inexorable 
Force of Gravity is beginning to overcome it, the Bird 
again rises by a few easy and gentle half-strokes of the 
wing. Very often the same effect is produced by allow- 
ing the Force of Gravity to act, and when the downward 
momentum has brought the Bird close to the ground 
or to the sea, that force is again converted into an 


ascending impetus by a change in the angle at which 





154 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


the wing is exposed to the wind. This is a constant 
action with all the oceanic Birds. Those who have seen 
the Albatross have described themselves as never tired 


of watching its glorious and triumphant motion :— 


** Tranquil its spirit seemed, and floated slow $ 
Even in its very motion there was rest.” 2 


Rest—where there is nothing else at rest in the tre- 
mendous turmoil of its own stormy seas! Sometimes 
for a whole hour-together this splendid Bird will sail or 
wheel round a ship in every possible variety of direction 
without requiring to give a single stroke to its pinions. 
Now, the Albatross has the extreme form of this kind of . 
wing. Its wings are immensely long—about fourteen or 
fifteen feet from tip to tip—and almost as narrow in pro- 


portion as a riband.2, Our common Gannet is an excel- 


1 Professor Wilson’s Sonnet, ‘A Cloud,” &c. 

2 The mechanical principle involved in the sufficiency of very 
narrow wings has, I believe, been adequately explained. in a very 
ingenious paper read before the Aéronautical Society, by Mr. F. H. 
Wenham, C.E. It is the same mechanical principle which accounts 
for the narrow blades of a Screw Propeller having a resisting force 
as great as would be exerted upon the whole area of rotation by a 
solid Disc. Inthe case of a flat body, such as the wing of a bird, 
being propelled edgeways through the air, nearly the whole re- 
sisting and sustaining force is exerted upon the first few incheg 
of the advancing surface, ‘ 






S&s 
S 
~ 


=< 


WAS 





Primaries 


WING OF GANNET, 








ee 


CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 155 


lent, though a more modified, example of the same kind 
of structure. On the other hand, Birds of short wings, 
though their flight is sometimes very fast, are never able 
to sustain it very long. The muscular exertion they 
require is greater, because it does not work to the same 
advantage. Most of the Gallinaceous Birds (such as the 
common Fowl, Pheasants, Partridges, &c.) have wings of 
this kind; and some of them never fly except to escape 
an enemy, or to change their feeding-ground. 

The second fact observable in reference to Birds of 
easy and powerful flight—namely, that their wings are 
all sharply pointed at the end—will lead us still further 
into the niceties of adjustment which are so signally dis- 
played in the machinery of flight. 

The feathers of a Bird’s wing have a natural threefold 
division, according to the different wing-bones to which 
they are attached. The quills which form the end of the 
wing are called the Primaries; those which form the 
middle of the vane are called the Secondaries ; and 
those which are next the body of the Bird are called the 
Tertiaries. The motion of a Bird’s wing increases from 
its minimum at the shoulder-joint to its maximum at the 
tip. The primary quills which form the termination of 
the wing are those on which the chief burden of flight is 
cast. Each feather has less and less weight to bear, and 


less and less force to exert, in proportion as it lies nearer 


\ 


- 





156 _ ‘THE REIGN OF LAW. 





SS 





the body of the Bird; and there is nothing more beau- 
tiful in the structure of a wing than the perfect gradation 
in strength and stiffness, as well as in modification of 
form, which marks the series from the first of the Primary 
quills to che last and feeblest of the Tertiaries.1 Now, the 
sharpness or roundness of a wing at the tip depends on 
the position which is given to the 4mges¢t Primary quill. 
If the first, or even the second, primary is the longest, 
and all that follow are considerably shorter, the wing is 
necessarily a pointed wing, because the tip of a single 
quill forms the end ; but if the third or fourth Primary 
quills are the longest, and the next again on both sides 
are only a little shorter, the wing becomes a round-ended 
wing. Round-ended wings are also almost always open- 
ended—that is to say, the tips of the quills do not touch 
each other, but leave interspaces at the end of the wing, 
through which, of course, a good deal of air escapes. 
Since each single quill is formed on the same principle 
as the whole wing—th_t is, with the anterior margin stiff 


and the posterior margin yielding—this escape is not 


1 T owe to the accurate pencil of Mr. J. Wolf the accompanying 
engraving of the wing of the Golden Plover, a Bird of powerful flight. 
In this wing the gradation of the feathers is very perfect. It will be 
observed that the first of the Secondaries, the eleventh feather from 
the tip of the wing, is marked by a slight variation in the form 
of the margin, | 


a 










A 
a 
————a =} 


WING OF GOLDEN PLOVER, 













4 

as 

hee ei 
4el- Ge Ay AQ \N K 
ae Ze ASte my) dN 
Ne} a SX we Te x 
ers =—_ < : 
JS ESN \Y \ vy 

Sw \- 





4 ioe 


Boas! nna 
pee = ge yc een i 





: . 
* 
‘} - 
‘ 
i 
. 
i 

F t 

; 





CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 157 


useless for progression ; but the air acts less favourably 
for this purpose than when struck by a more com- 
pact set of feathers. The common Rook and all the 
Crows are examples of this. The Peregrine Falcon, 
the common Swallow, and all Birds of very powerful 
flight, have been provided with the sharp-pointed 
structure.! 

The object of this structure, and the mechanical laws 
to which it appeals, will be apparent when we recollect 
what it is on which the propelling power, as distinct 
from the sustaining power, of a Bird’s wing depends. It 
depends on the reaction of the air escaping backwards— 
that is, in the direction exactly opposite to that of the 
intended motion of the Bird. Any air which escapes 
from under the wing, in any other direction, will of 
course react with less advantage upon that motion. But 
from under a round wing a good deal of air must neces- 
sarily escape along the rounded end—that is, in a direction 
at right angles to the line of mtended flight. All the 
reaction produced by this escape is.a reaction which is 
useless for propulsion. Accordingly, in all Birds to 
which great velocity of flight is essential, this structure, 
which is common in other Birds, is: carefully avoided. 

' The aerators of Mr. Wolf will here again be the best ex- 


planation to the reader of the difference between the sharp and the 
yound structure, p. 156, 


158 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


The Hawks have been classified as “noble” or ‘ ig- 
noble,” according to the length and sharpness of their 
wings: those which catch their prey by velocity of flight 
having been uniformly provided with the long-pointed 
structure. The Sparrow-Hawk and the Merlin are 
excellent examples of the difference. The Sparrow- 
Hawk, with its comparatively short and blunt wings, 
steals along the hedgerows and pounces on its prey by 
surprise ; seldom chasing it, except for a short distance, 
and when the victim is at a disadvantage. And well do 
the smaller Birds know this habit, and the limit of his 
powers. Many of them chase and “ chaff” the Sparrow- 
Hawk, when he is seen flying in the open, perfectly 
aware that he cannot catch them by fast flying. But 
they never play these tricks with the Merlin. This beau- 
tiful little Falcon hunts the open ground, giving fair 
chase to its quarry by power and speed of flight. The 
Merlin delights in flying at some of the fastest Birds, such 
as the Snipe. The longest and most beautiful trial of 
wingmanship I have ever secn was the chase of a Merlin 
after a Snipe in one of the Hebrides. It lasted as far 
as the eye could reach, and seemed to continue far out 
to sea. In the Merlin, as in all the fastest Falcons, the 
second quill feather is the longest in the -wing; the 
others rapidly diminish ; and the point of the wing looks 


as sharp as a needle in the air. 


ee ep 


CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. I59 


There is yet one other power which it is absolutely 
necessary to some Birds that their wings should enable 
them to exert: and that is, the power of standing still, 
or remaining suspended in the air without any forward 
motion. One familiar example of this is the common 
Kestrel, which, from the frequent exercise of this power, 
is called in some counties the “Windhover.” The 
mechanical principles on which the machinery of flight 
is adapted to this purpose, are very simple. No Bird 
can exercise this power which is not provided with wings 
large enough, long enough, and powerful enough to sus- 
tain its weight with ease, and without violent exertion. 
Large wings can always be diminished at the pleasure of 
the Bird, by being partially folded inwards; and this 
contraction of the area is constantly resorted to. But a 
Bird which has wings so small and scanty as to compel 
it to strike them always at full stretch, and with great 
velocity in order to fly at all, is incapable of standing 

still in the air, No man ever saw a Diver or a Duck 
| performing the evolution which the Kestrel may be seen 
performing every hour over so many English fields. The 
cause of this is obvious, if we refer to the principles 
which have already been explained. We have seen that 
the perpendicular stroke of a Bird’s wing has the double 
effect of both propelling and sustaining. The reaction 
from such a stroke brings two different forces to bear 








160 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


upon the Bird—one whose direction is upwards, and 
another whose direction is forwards. How can these 
two effects be separated from each other? How can 
the wing be so moved as-to keep up just enough of the 
sustaining force without allowing the propelling force to 
come into play? ‘The answer to this,-although it involves 
some very complicated laws connected with what mecha- 
nicians call the “ parallelogram of forces,” is practically 
asimple one. It can only be done by shortening the — 
stroke, and altering the perpendicularity of its direction. 
Of course, if a Bird, by altering the axis of its own body, 
can direct its wing-stroke in some degree forwards, it 
will have the effect of stopping instead of promoting 
progression. But in order to do this, it must have a 
superabundance of sustaining force, because some of this 
force is sacrificed when the stroke is off the perpen- 
dicular. Hence it follows that Birds so. heavy as to 
require the whole action of their wings to sustain them 
at all, can never afford this sacrifice of the sustaining 
force, and, except for the purpose of arresting their flight, 
can never strike except directly downwards,—that is, 
directly against the opposing force of gravity. But Birds 
with superabundant sustaining power, and long sharp 
wings, have nothing to do but to diminish the length of 
stroke, and direct it off the perpendicular at such an 
angle as will bring all the forces bearing upon their body 











C. SPARROW HAWK—ROUND 








B. MERLIN—SHARP WING. 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SS 
















































































Ss 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A. KESTREL HOVERING. 





CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 161% 


to an exact balance, and they will then remain stationary 
at a fixed point in the air.? 

They are greatly assisted in this beautiful evolution 
by an adverse current of air; and it will always be 
observed that the Kestrel, when hovering, turns Azs head 
to wind, and hangs his whole body at a greater or less 
angle to the plane of the horizon. When there is no 
wind, or very little, the sustaining force is kept up by 
a short rapid action of the pinions, and the long tail 
is spread out like a fan/to assist in stopping any ten- 
dency to onward motion. When there is a strong 

reeze, no flapping is required at all—the force of the 
wind supplying the whole force necessary to counteract 
the force of gravity; and in proportion to the increasing 
strength of the wind, the amount of vane which must be 
exposed to it becomes less and less. I have seen a 
Kestrel stand suspended in a half gale with the wings 
folded close to the body, and with no visible muscular 
motion whatever. And so nice is the adjustment of 
position which is requisite to produce this exact balance 
of all the forces bearing on the Bird, that the change 
in that position which again instantly results in a for- 


ward motion is very often almost insensible to the eye, 


1 Mr. Wolf’s illustration of a Kestrel hovering shows accurately 
the position of the bird when the action is performed in still air, 


M 





162 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





It is generally a slight expansion of the wings, and a 
very slight change in the axis of the body. 

And here it may be observed that the tails of Birds 
have not, as is often supposed, any function analogous 
to the rudder of a ship. Birds which have lost the tail 
are not thereby rendered incapable of turning. If the 
steering function had been assigned to Birds’ tails, the 
vane of the tail must have been set, not, as-it is, hori- 
zontally, but perpendicularly to the line of flight. But 
a Bird’s tail has in flight no lateral motion whatever. 
It does, indeed, materially assist the Bird in turning, 
because it serves to stop the way of a Bird when it 
rises or turns in the air to take a new direction. The 
feathers of the tail are also capable of being depressed 
unequally,—that is, more at one side than at the other; 
and when the whole are spread out like the leaves of 
a fan, this depression at one side is a means whereby 
the Bird can exert against the air which is passing under 
it greater muscular pressure upon one side than upon the 
other, and can thus help the turning action of the wings. 
With a telescope I have seen this action of the tail very 
marked in the soaring flight of the Buzzard, when the 
Bird is wheeling round in spiral circles. The tail con- 
tributes also largely to the general balance of the body, 
which in itself is an important element in the facility 


of flight. Accordingly, almost all Birds which depend 








CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 163 





on great ease of evolution in flight—or on the power 
of stopping suddenly, have largely developed tails. 
This is the case with all the Birds of prey—with the 
Kestrel in a conspicuous degree. But there are some 
exceptions which show that great powers of flight are 
not always dependent on the possession of a large tail 
—as, for example, the Swift. | 

Another explanation has been given of the means 
by which Birds are able to turn in flight, which is a 
curious example how preconceived theories founded 
on false analogies will vitiate our observation of the 
“commonest facts in nature. I do not know of any 
modern work that gives any account of the theory of 
flight, which is even tolerably correct. But in most 
points an admirable account is to be found in the cele- 
brated work of Borelli, “ De Motu Animalium.” On 
the question, however, of steerage in flight, he gives a 
solution which the most ordinary observation is sufficient 
to contradict. Borelli is quite aware that the tail in Birds 
has no such function as that which is usually assigned to 
it, and he points out the true theoretical objection to 
the possibility of its having any guiding power—viz., 
its horizontal position, and its immobility in the lateral 
direction. But the theory which he himself propounds 
is equally erroneous. It is this,—that Birds deflect their 
course to the right or to the left, as rowers turn a row= 

M 2 








164 ' THE REIGN OF LAW. 





boat—by striking more quickly and more strongly 
with one wing than with the other.! To this theory 
there are two objections—first, that as matter of fact 
Birds can turn, and do turn, even to the extent of 
describing complete circles in the air, without any flap- 
ping either of one wing or the other: and secondly, 
that when Birds do flap and turn at the same time, not 
the slightest difference in time between the two wing- 
strokes can ever be detected. The beats of a Bird’s 
two wings are always exactly synchronous. But the 
first of these two objections is of itself quite sufficient 
to disprove the theory. No man can have watched 
‘even for a moment the flight of the common Swallow, 
and especially the flight of the Swift, without seeing it 
perform complete gyrations in the air without any 
strokes of either wing. The only change which can ever 
be -detected by the eye is a slight elevation on one side 


1 Referring to a boat, he says :—‘‘ Si remi dexteri lateris celerius 
quam sinistri aquam retrorsum impellant—semper prora revolvetur 
versus sinistrum latus ; ergo eodem modo dum avis in medio fluido 
aeris innatat, volando xquilibrata in centro gravitatis ejus, si sola 
dextra ala deorsum sed oblique flectatur, aerem subjectum impel- 
lando versus caudam necessario ad instar navis mox memoratee, per- - 
movetur latus ejus dextrum, quiescente aut tardius moto sinistro 
latera, Ex quo fit, ut avis pars anterior circa centrum gravitatis 
ejus revoluta, flectatur versum sinistrum latus.” —Borellus, “De 
Motu Animalium,” Pars Prima, Propositio excix, 








CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 165 





of the whole body, and a slight depression of the other. 
The depression is always on that side towards which the 
bird is turning. On the opposite side, that from which 
the Bird is turning, there is of course a corresponding ele- 
vation, Sometimes this is very obvious; but in general 
it is so slight as to require close observation to detect it. 
In the Albatross, when sweeping round, the wings are 
often pointed in a direction nearly perpendicular to 
the sea.! The effect of this, of course, is to expose the 
two vanes at different angles to the aérial currents— 
and it must be remembered that in flight the balance 
of all the forces employed is so extremely fine that the 
most minute alteration in the degree in which they 
bear upon each other will produce an immense change 
in the result. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
muscular movements which serve to turn the axis of 


a flying Bird from one direction to another, are very 


1 See a very interesting account of the flight of the Albatross by 
Captain T. W. Hutton, in the “Ibis” for July 1864. Captain 
Hutton says: ‘‘If he wishes to turn Zo the right, he bends his head 
and tail slightly upwards, at the same time rezsizg his left side and 
lowering the right, in proportion to the sharpness of the curve he 
wishes to make, the wings being kept rigid the whole time.” This 
js the only paper I have seen on the flight of birds in which obser- 
* vation of the facts is not vitiated by some false preconceived theory 
on their cause. Captain Hutton has thoroughly seized the true 
mechanical principles of flight. 


£ 





166 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





often so extremely minute as generally altogether to 
elude the sight. But in general terms, it may be said 
that a Bird turns in flying essentially on the same prin- 
ciple as that on which a Man turns-in walking. It is 
done in both cases by change in the direction of mus- 
cular pressure upon a resisting medium. By an ex- 
quisite combination of different laws, and by mecha- 
nical contrivance in the adjustment of them, it has been 
given to a Bird to find in the thin and yielding air a 
medium of resistance against which its own muscular 
force may act, as firm and as effective as that which 
Man finds in the solid earth. 

The Humming Birds are perhaps the most remark- 
able examples in the world of the machinery of flight. 
The power of poising themselves in the air,—remain- 
ing absolutely stationary whilst they search the blossoms 
for insects,—is a power essential to their life. It is 
a power accordingly which is enjoyed by them in the 
highest perfection. When they intend progressive flight, 
it is effected with such velocity as to elude the eye. 
The action of the wing in all these cases is far too 
rapid to enable the observer to detect the exact differ- 
ence between that kind of motion which keeps the Bird 
at absolute rest in the air, and that which carries it 
along with such immense velocity. But there can be 
no doubt that the change is one from a short quick 








rt 
® 


CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 167 


stroke delivered obliquely forward, to a full stroke, 
more slow, but delivered perpendicularly This corre- 
sponds with the account given by that most accurate 
ornithological observer, Mr. Gould. He says: “ When 
poised before any object, this action of the wing is 
so rapidly performed that it is impossible for the eye 
to follow each stroke, and a hazy semicircle of indis- 
tinctness on each side of the Bird is all that is per- 
ceptible.” There is another fact mentioned by those 
who have watched their movements most closely which 
corresponds with the explanation already given—viz., 
the fact that the axis of the Humming Bird’s body 
when hovering is always Aighly inclined,-so much so as 
to appear almost perpendicular in the air. In other 
words the wing-stroke, instead of being delivered per- 
pendicularly downwards, which would infallibly carry 
the body onwards, is delivered at such an angle for- 
wards as to bring to an exact balance the upward, the 
downward, and the forward forces which bear upon the 
body of the Bird. Mr. Darwin says, ‘When hovering 
by a flower, the tail is constantly shut and expanded like 
a fan, the body beng kept in a nearly vertical postition.” 
Mr. Wallace, another accurate observer, describes the 
Humming Birds as “ balancing themselves vertically 
in the air.” 


These are a few, and a few only, of the adjustments 





wee 


168 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





required in order to the giving of the power of flight ;-— 
adjustments of organic growth to intensity of vital force 
—of external structure to external work—of shape in 
each separate feather to definite shape in the series as a 
whole-—of material to resistance—of mass and form to 
required velocities ; adjustments, in short, of law to law, 
of force to force, and of all to Purpose. So many are 
these contrivances, so various, so fine, so intricate, that a 
volume might be written without exhausting the beauty 
of the method in which this one mechanical problem has 
been solved. It is by knowledge of unchanging laws 
that these victories over them seem to be achieved: yet 
- not by knowledge only, except as the guide of Power. 
For here as everywhere else in Nature, we see the same 
mysterious need of conforming to imperative conditions, 
side by side with absolute control over the forces through 
which this conformity is secured. When any given pur- 
pose cannot be attained without the violation of some 
law, unless by some new power, and some new ma- 
chinery—the requisite power and mechanism are evolved 
generally out of old materials, and by modifications of 
pre-existing forms. There can be no: better example of 
this than a wing-feather. It is a production wholly 
unlike any other animal growth—an implement specially 
formed to combine strength with lightness, elasticity, and 


imperviousness to air, Again, the bones of a Bird’s wing 


{\ 





CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 16g 


are the bones of the Mammalian arm and hand, specially 
modified to support the feathers. The same purpose is 
effected by other means in connexion with precisely the 
same bones in the flying Mamnialia—the Bats. In these 
animals the finger-bones instead of being compressed or 
soldered together to support feathers, are separated, 
attenuated, and greatly lengthened to afford attachment 
to a web or flying membrane which is stretched between 
them. In other ages of the world there were also flying 
Lizards. But in all these cases the mechanical principle 


is the same, and there has been the same ingenious 


¥ adaptation of material and of force to the universal laws 


of motion. 

On the earth and on the sea Man has attained to 
powers of locomotion with which, in strength, endur- 
ance, and in velocity, no animal movement can compare. 
But the air is an element on which he cannot travel—an 
ocean which he cannot navigate. The Birds of heaven 
are still his envy, and on the paths they tread he cannot 
follow. As yet! for it is not certain that this exclusion is 
to be perpetual. His failure has resulted quite as much 
from his ignorance of natural laws, as from his inability 
to meet the conditions which they demand. All at- 
tempts to guide bodies buoyant in the air must be fruit- 
less, Balloons are mere toys. No flying animal has 


ever been formed on the principle of buoyancy. Birds 





170 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





and Bats, and Dragons, have been all immensely heavier 
than the air, and their weight is one of the forces most 
essential to their flight. Yet there is a real impediment 
in the way of Man navigating the air—and that is the 
excessive weight ot the only great mechanical moving 
powers hitherto placed at his disposal. When Science 
shall have discovered some moving power greatly lighter 
than any we yet know, in all probability the problem will 
be solved. But of one thing we may be sure—that if 
Man is ever destined to navigate the air, it will be in 
machines formed in strict obedience to the mechanical 
laws which have been employed by the Creator for the 


same purpose in flying animals.? 


1 The men of Science in France are ahead of the men of Science 
in England upon this subject. There is a society established in 
Paris which announces in its very title the true fundamental prin- 
ciple of flight—‘‘ Société d’Encouragement pour la Locomotion 
aérienne au moyen d’Appareils PLUS LoURDS que l’Air.” The 
false principle of Buoyancy is thus eliminated and banished from 
the question. ; 

2 I owe to my father (John, 7th Duke of Argyll) my knowledge 
of the Theory of Flight which is expounded in this chapter. The 
retired life he led, and the dislike he had of the work of literary 
composition, confined the knowledge of his views within a com- 
paratively narrow circle. But his love of mechanical science, and 
his study of the problem during many years of investigation and 
experiment, made him thoroughly master of the subject. In his 
devices for testing and illustrating the truth of his Theory, he was 
chiefly assisted by two very ingenious men, the late Mr. John Hart, 





CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY, 171 





of Glasgow, and the late Mr. Robert Bryson, of Edinburgh. The 
result of his investigations led him to the opinion that until a iighter 
moving power than steam is discovered, it will be impossible ta 
construct successfully machines for the navigation of the air. I 
shall only add, that having made ornithology a favourite_pursuit, 
_I have been led during many years to test this theory by close 
observation of the flight of Birds; and that from the manner in 
which it fits into, and explains all the facts, I have been always 
more and more satisfied of its truth, 


CHAPTER IV, 


APPARENT EXCEPTIONS ‘TO THE SUPREMACY OF 
PURPOSE. 


ET, as we look at Nature, the fact will force itself 
upon us that there are structures in which we 
cannot recognise any use; that there are contrivances 
which often fail of their effect ; and that there are othevs 
which appear to be separated from the conditions they 
were intended to meet, and under which alone their 
usefulness could arise. Such instances occur in many 
branches of inquiry; and although in the great mass of 
natural phenomena the supremacy of Purpose is evident 
enough, such cases do frequently come across our path 
as cases of exception—cases in which Law does not 
seem to be subservient to Will, but to be asserting a 
‘ower and an endurance of its own. 

The degree of importance which may be attached to 
such cases as a source of real difficulty, will vary with 
the character of the individual mind, and its capacity of 
holding by the great lines of evidence which run through 
the whole Order of Nature. It is with these-cases as 








APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 173 


with the local currents which sometimes obscure the 
rising and falling of the tides. When watched from 
hour to hour, the greater law is clearly discernible by 
well-marked effects: but when watched from minute to 
minute, that law is not distinct, and there are waves 
which seem like a rebellion of the sea against the force 
which is dragging it from the land. The Order of 
Nature is very complicated, and very partially understood. 
It is to be expected therefore that there should be a vast 
variety of subordinate facts, whose relation to each other 
and to the whole must be a matter of perplexity to us. 
It is so-with the relation in which different known laws 
of Nature stand to each other; much more must it be so 
with the far deeper subject of the relation which these 
laws bear to the Will and the intentions of the Supreme. 
But as cases of intention frustrated, of structure without 
apparent purpose, of organs dissociated from function 
and from the opportunities of use, are sometimes sources 
of difficulty, it may be well to consider this subject a 
little nearer. Let us look at it both in the light of 
abstract reasoning, and also in the light of particular 
iliustration. 

In the first place, then, we must remember that results 
which may appear as exceptions to the attainment of one 
Purpose may be nothing more than fulfilments of an-— 
other. ‘This follows from the truth which has been dealt 





174 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


with in a former page,! that we are “ greatly ignorant,” 
as Bishop Butler says, how far anything in Nature is to 
be regarded as a means or as an end, and that ultimate 
or final purposes we can never see. The difficulty hence 
arising has often been represented as a fundamental ob- 
jection to the whole doctrine of Intention. But this view 
is founded on a very great, although a very natural con- 
fusion of thought. The perception of Purpose and In- 
tention is inseparable from the perception of Adjustment 
and Function as these are exhibited in Nature. As such 
it belongs to Knowledge. It is the perception of a re- 
lation between those phenomena and certain well known 
phenomena of Mind. But to perceive a relation is not 
necessarily to perceive all that this relation involves. To 
perceive intention is a very different thing from per- 
ceiving all that is intended. Our own human experience 
snculd make this distinction familiar to us. Many things 
we do and many things we contrive are done and con- 
trived with more than one intention. In the light of this 
experience it is altogether irrational to regard as an ex- 
ception to the attainment of Purpose in Nature the fact, 
for example, “ that of fifty seeds she often brings but one 
to bear.” It throws no doubt or difficulty in the way of 
our conviction, for example, that one purpose of seed- 


4 Ante, p. 80, 


~ 


RR A SE, 


APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 175 


bearing in Plants is the reproduction of their kind, 
because it appears that another purpose to which that 
seed-bearing is applied is the support of animal life. 
The intention with which a grain of wheat is so con- 
stituted as to be capable of producing another wheat 
plant, is not the less in the nature of Purpose because 
it co-exists with another intention, that the same grain © 
should be capable of sustaining the powers and the en- 

joyments of Life in the Body and in the Mind of Man. 
Qn the contrary, the power possessed by most plants, 
and by this plant especially, of producing seed in a 
ratio far beyond that which would be required for 
one purpose, is the sure indication and the proof that 
another purpose larger and wider was in view. Yet the 
seeds of corn which, as seeds, are destroyed when they 
-are converted into bread, may in that aspect be re- 
presented and regarded as “ failures.” In reference to 
this kind of failure, it has Been actually argued that in | 
Nature “the prodigality of waste is far more con- 
spicuous than the wise economy of which so much is 
said.”! When applied to the case of the wheat plant 
the fallacy is apparent, and would probably be admitted. 
But this is only one example of a class to which an 


infinite number of other examples in Nature may be 


3 Mr, G. H. Lewes, Fortnightly Review, July 1867, p. 100, 





176 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





referred. There may be, indeed, and there are, in- 
numerable examples where the meaning of like “ failures ” 
is not equally evident to us—some whieh may be 
involved in utter and hopeless darkness—some which 
may run up into the great master difficulty—that which 
we are accustomed to call the “ Origin of Evil.” But 
the same argument applies to all. It is not that Purpose 
and Intention solve all difficulties. But it is that no 
difficulty in perceiving what may be the purpose and 
intention of a particular fact can affect the reality and 
‘uuth of that perception in other cases where no such 
difficulty exists. Let us now look at the same subject 
in the light of particular examples. 

There is one explanation which, it cannot be doubted, 
applies to many cases ; and this is, the simple explana- 
tion that we often mistake the purpose of particular 
structures in Nature, and connect them with intentions 
which are not, and never wére, the intentions really in 
view. The best naturalists are hable to such mistakes. A 
very curious illustration is afforded by an observation of 
Mr. Darwin, in his “ Origin of Species.” He says that 
“if green Woodpeckers alone had existed, and we did 
not know that there were any black and pied kinds, 
I daresay we should have thought that the green colour 
was a beautiful adaptation to hide this tree-frequenting 
bird from its enemies.” Now, this introduces us to a: 








APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 177 
very curious subject, and one as well adapted as any 
other to illustrate the relation in which Law stands to 
Purpose in the economy of Nature. 

There can be no doubt thatthe principle of adapted 
colouring with the effect and for the purpose of conceal- 
ment, prevails extensively in various branches of the 
Animal Kingdom. It arises, probably, like all other 
phenomena, by way of Natural Consequence, out of 
some combination of forces which are the instruments 
employed. We have no /knowledge what these forces 
are; but we can imagine them to be worked into a law 
of assimilation, founded on some such principle as that 
which photography has revealed. It is true that Man 
has not yet discovered any process by which the tints of 
Nature can be transferred, as the most delicate shades 
of light can be transferred, to surfaces artificially pre- 
pared to receive them. Such a process is, however, very 
probably within the reach even of human chemistry, and 
it is one which is certainly known in the laboratory of 
Nature. The Chameleon is the extreme case in which 
the effect of such a process*is proverbially known. 
Many Fish exhibit it in a remarkable degree, changing 
colour rapidly in harmony with the colour of the water in 
which they swim, or of the bottom on which they lie. The 
law on which such changes depend is very obscure: but 
it appears to be a natural process, as constant as all other 

N 





178 THE RFIGN OF LAW. 





laws are—that is, constant whenever given conditions 
are brought together. It is possible that the effect may 
be due to a cause which is well known to be capable of 
producing somewhat analogous results. Even before the 
days of Jacob and of Laban, it seems to have been 
known that through the eyes of the female parent colour 
can be determined in her young ; and although this is 
certainly not the law which commonly determines colour 
—operating as it does, so far as we know, seldom, and 
only in a small degree—it is quite conceivable that, 
under special conditions, it is capable of being worked 
as a great power in Nature. But, then, these conditions 
are not brought together except with a view to purpose. 
For now let us see how this law, whatever it may be, is 
regulated and applied. 

One thing is certain: assimilated colouring is not 
applied universally ; on the contrary, it is applied very 
partially. Is it, therefore, applied arbitrarily—at hap- 
hazard, or without reference to conditions in which we . 
can trace a reason and arule? Far fromit. The rule 
appears to be this :—adaptive colouring, as a means of 
concealment, is never applied (1) to any animal whose 
habits do not expose it to special danger, or (2) to any 
animal which is sufficiently endowed with other more 
effective means of escape. | 

This is the higher Law of Purpose which governs the 








APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 179 





lesser law, whatever it may be, by which assimilative 
colouring is produced. Now, no man who had observed 
this higher law could ever fall into the error of supposing 
that the colour of the Green Woodpecker was given to it 
as a means of concealment. Few Birds are so invisible 
as Woodpeckers, because their structure and habits give 
them other methods of escaping observation, which are 
most curious and effective.. They have few natural 
enemies but Man; and when in danger of being seen by 
him, they slip and glide round the bole of a tree or 
bough on which they may be climbing, with a swift, 
silent, and cunning motion, and from behind that shelter, 
with nothing visible but their head, they keep a close 
watch upon the movements of the enemy. With such 
sleight of feet, there is no need of lazier methods of 
concealment. 

Accordingly, in this family of Birds, the law of assimi- 
lation is withheld from application, and the most violent 
and strongly contrasted colouring prevails. Jet black, 
side by side with pure white, and the most brilliant 
crimsons, are common in the plumage of the Wood- 
peckers. No birds are more conspicuous in colouring, 
yet none are more seldom seen. The Green Woodpecker 
itself, with its yellow tints and crimson hood, contrasts 
strongly with the bark on which it climbs. The purpose 
of concealment being effected by other means, gives 

N 2 





180 ~— “THE REIGN OF LAW, 








way to the purpose of beauty or of adornment in the dis- 
position of colours. And in general the same rule ap- 
plies to all Birds whose life is led among woods and 
forests. Comparatively inaccessible to Birds of prey, they 
exhibit every variety of tint, and the principle of invisi- 
bility from assimilated colouring is almost unknown. 

It must always be remembered, that animals of prey 
are as much intended to capture their food, as their 
victims are intended to have some chances and facilities 
of escape. The purpose here is a double purpose—a 
purpose not in all eases to preserve life, but to maintain 
its balance and due proportion. In order to effect this 
purpose, the means of aggression, and of defence, or of 
escape, must bear a definite relation to each other both 
in kind and in degree. When arboreal Birds leave their 
sheltering trees, they are exposed to the attacks of 
Hawks, but they have fair opportunities of retreating 
to their coverts again; and the upward spring of the 
disappointed Falcon in the air, when his quarry reaches 
the shelter of trees, tells how effective such a retreat is, 
and how completely it ends the chase. On the other 
hand, there is a great variety of Birds whose habitat 
is the open plain—the desert—the unprotected shore— 
the treeless moor—the stony mountain-top. These are 
the favourite hunting-grounds of the Eagles, and the 


Falcons, and the Hawks, There they have free scope 








APPARENT EXCEPTIONS, 181 





for their great powers of wing, and uninterrupted range 
for their piercing powers of sight. And it must be re- 
membered, that even the slowest of the Hawks can 
on such ground capture with ease Birds which, when 
once on the wing, could distance their pursuer by supe- 
rior speed, because the Hawk, sweeping over the ground, 
takes the prey at a disadvantage, pouncing on it before 
it can get fairly into the air. Birds whose habitat is thus 
exposed could not maintain their existence at all without 
special means of concealment or escape. Accordingly it 
is among such Birds almost.exclusively that the law of 
assimilative colouring prevails. And among them it is 
carried to a perfection which is wonderful indeed. 
Every ornithologist will recognise the truth of the 
observation, that this law prevails chiefly among the 
Grouse, the Partridges, the Plovers, the Snipes, Wood- 
cocks, Sandpipers, and other kindred families, all of 
which inhabit open ground. There can be no better 
examples than the Grouse and the Ptarmigan of our 
Scottish mountains. The close imitation in the plumage 
of these Birds of the general tinting and mottling of tlie 
ground on which they lie and feed is apparent at a 
glance, and is best known to those who have tried to 
see Grouse or Ptarmigan when sitting, and when their 
position is indicated within a few feet or a few inches 


by the trembling nostrils and dilated eyeballs of a steady 








182 THE REIGN OF LAW. 








Pointer-Dog. In the ‘case of the common Grouse, as 
the ground is nearly uniform in colour throughout the 
year, the colouring of the Bird is constant also. But 
in the case of the Ptarmigan, it changes with the chang- 
ing seasons. The pearly grays which in summer match 
so exactly with the lichens of the mountain peaks, give 
place in winter to the pure white which matches not 
less perfectly with the wreaths of snow. 

This is indeed a change which requires for its pro- 
duction the agency of other laws than those merely 
of reflected light, because the substitution of one entire 
set of feathers for another of a different colour, twice 
in every year, implies arrangements which lie deep in 
the organic chemistry of the Bird. The various genera 
of Sand-Grouse and Sand-Partridges which frequent the 
deserts and naked plains of the Asiatic continent, are 
coloured in exquisite harmony with the ground. Our 
common Woodcock is another excellent example, and 
is all the more remarkable as there is one very peculiar. 
colour introduced into the plumage of this Bird which 
exactly corresponds with a particular stage in the decay 
of fallen leaves—I mean that in which the browns and 
yellows of the Autumn rot away into the pale ashy 
skeletons which lie in thousands under every wood in 
winter. This colour is exactly reproduced in the feathers 


of the Woodcock, and so mingled with the dark browns 





APPARENT EXCEPTIONS, 183 


and warm yellows of fresher leaves, that the general 
imitation of effect is perfect. And so curiously is the 
purpose of concealment worked out in the plumage 
of the Woodcock, that one conspicuous ornament of 
the bird is covered by a special provision from the 
too curious gaze of those for whose admiration it was 
not intended. The tail-feathers of the Woodcock can 
be erected and spread out at pleasure like a fan, 
and, being tipped on their under surface with white 
of a brilliant and silvery lustre, set off by contrast with. 
an adjacent patch of velvety black, they then produce a 
most conspicuous effect. But the same web which on its 
under surface bears this beautiful but dangerous orna- 
ment, is on its upper surface dulled down to a sombre 
ashy-gray, and becomes as invisible as the rest of the 
plumage. These are all provisions of Nature, which 
stand in clear and intelligible relation to the habits of 
the Bird. It rests all day upon the ground, under trees ; 
and were it not for its ingeniously adapted colouring, it 
would be peculiarly exposed to destruction. Man is 
an enemy whose cunning inventions overcome all such 
methods of protection, and the Woodcock, when in his 
most rapid flight, is now an easier prey than in older 
times when sitting on the ground. But before fire-arms 
‘had reached the perfection which has enabled us to 
shoot flying Birds, the colouring of the Woodcock served 


184 TI-E REIGN OF LAW. 





it in good stead, even against the Lords of the Creation. 
In old times it required special skill and practice to see 
Woodcocks on the ground, and the large lustrous black 
eye which is adapted for night-vision was the one spot 
of colour which enabled the fowler of a century and 
a half years ago to detect the bird. Vhus Hudibras 
has it :— 
** For fools are known by looking wise, 7 
As men find woodcocks by their eyes,” 4 


In Snipes, again, there is a remarkable series of straw- 
coloured feathers introduced along the back and shoul- 
ders, which perfectly imitate the general effect of the 
bleached vegetab!e stalks common on the ground which 
the Bird frequents. 

There are other animals in which the principle of 
imitation with a view to concealment is carried very 
much farther than the mere imitation of colour, and 
extends also to form and structure. There are some 
examples of this in the Class of Insects, so remarkable 
that it is impossible to look at them without ever fresh 
astonishment. I refer to some families of the Orthop- 
terous order, and especially to some genera of the 
Mantide and Phasmide. Many species of the genus 
Mantis are wholly modelled in the form of vegetable - 


1 “ Fudibras to Sidrophel,” 79, 80. 





a NS 


APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 185 





growths. The legs are made to imitate leaf-stalks, the 
body is elongated and notched so as to simulate a twig; 
the segment of the shoulders is spread out and flattened 
in the likeness of a seed-vessel ; and the large wings are 
exact imitations of a full-blown leaf, with all its veins and 
skeleton complete, and all its colour and apparent tex- 
ture. There is something startling and almost horrible 
in the completeness of the deception—very horrible it 
must be to its hapless victims. For in this case the 
purpose of the imitation is a purpose of destruction, the 
Mantis being a predacious insect, armed with the most 
terrible weapons, hid under the peaceful forms of the 
vegetable world. It is the habit of these creatures to 
sit upon the leaves which they so closely resemble, ap- 
parently motionless, but really advancing on their prey 
with a slow and insensible approach. ‘Their structure 
disarms suspicion. Wonderful as this structure is, it 
would be none the less, but all the more wonderful,. if 
it should arise by way of Natural Consequence from 
some law of development or of growth. It must be a 
law of which at present we have no knowledge, and 
can hardly form any conception. But certain it is that 
here, as in all other cases, the purpose which is actually 
attained, is attained by a special adaptation of ordinary 
structure to a special and extraordinary purpose. No 


new members are given to the Mantis; there is no 


a 


186 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


departure from the plan on which all other Insects of © 
the same Order are designed. ‘The body has the same 
number of segments, the legs are the same in number, 
and are composed of the same joints ; every part of this 
strange creature which seems like a bit of foliage ani- 
mated with insect life, can be referred to its correspond- 
ing part in the ordinary anatomy of its Class. The 
whole effect is produced by a little elongation here, a 
little swelling there, a little dwarfing of one part, a little 
development of another. The most striking part of the 
whole imitation—that of the “nervation” of the leaf— 
is produced by a modification, not very violent, of a 
structure which belongs to all flying Insects.. Their 
wings are constructed of a thin filmy material stretched 
upon a framework of stronger substance, as the sails of 
a windmill are stretched upon a trellis-work of spars. 
This framework is designed in a great variety of patterns 
—more elaborate and more beautiful than the tracery 
of Gothic windows. In the AZanftis this tracery, instead 
of being drawn in a mere pattern, is drawn in imitation 
of the nervature of a leaf. And imitative colouring is 
added to imitative structure—so that nothing should be 
wanting to its completeness and success. 

It must always be remembered, however, that Con- 
trivance in Nature can never be reduced to a single 


purpose, and to that alone. Almost every example of 





a 


APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 187 





it is connected with a number of effects which fit into 
each other in endless ramifications of adjustment. For 
example, this imitative structure of the MJantide serves 
as well for their own protection from insectivorous birds 
as for the: procuring of their food in the capture of other 
Insects. And this, which is perhaps the subordinate 
purpose in the case of the A/antide, emerges as the 
main purpose in another family of imitative Insects, the 
Phasmide. ‘These last are vegetable feeders, and their 
imitative structure is, if possible, even more wonderful, 
as it certainly.is more beautiful. In some species the 
wings are not only made like leaves in form, in struc- 
ture, and in general colour, but they are tinted at 
different seasons of the year with the varying colours | 
of spring, of summer, or of autumn. ‘The fundamental 
green is shaded off into browns, and reds, and yellows, 
with a few of those crimson touches which are so com- 
~mon in the “ Pageant of the year.” ‘There is one speci- 
men in the British Museum where the imitative effect is 
pursued, as it were, into a region of still more minute 
and curious observation. ‘The general aspect of sum- 
mer vegetation is much affected by the ravages: of insect 
life. Minute larvee eat into the cuticle of leaves, and 
mark them with various spots of bleached or faded 
colour. Now the specimen of Pzasma I refer to has 


its wing covered with spots which exactly imitate this 





188 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





appearance of a larva-eaten leaf. Can it be that this 
effect is itself produced by a really similar cause—the 
eating of some larval parasite into the tissue of the 
wing? If so, the combination of means to the pro- 
duction of so wonderful an effect becomes ‘only the 
more bewildering in the endless vistas of adjustment 
which are opened out. And ‘there is another fact con- 
nected with these Insects which is as astonishing as any 
other. It is this—that the idea and purpose of imitation 
is carried into effect consistently and perseveringly 
through all the stages of the creature’s metamorphoses. 
The eggs are as perfect imitations of vegetable seeds as 
the adult insect is of the expanded leaf. In the larval 
form they are like bits of stalk, or chips or cuttings of 
leaves. ‘ 

But although the laws which determine both form 
and colouring are here seen to be subservient to use, 
we shall never understand the phenomena of Nature 
unless we admit that mere ornament or beauty is in 
itself a purpose, an object, and an end. Mr. Darwin 
denies this; but he denies it under the strange impres- 
sion, that to admit it would be absolutely fatal to his 
own theory on the Origin of Species. So much the 
worse for his theory, if this incompatibility be true. 
There is indeed a difference, at least in words, between 


the doctrine now asserted and the doctrine which Mr. 





APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 189 





~ 


Darwin denies. What he denies as a purpose in nature 
is beauty ‘in the eyes of Man.” But this evades the 
real point at issue. The relation in which natural 
beauty stands to Man’s appreciation of it, is quite, a 
separate question. It is certain enough that the gift 
of orriament in natural things has not been lavished, 
as it is lavished, for the mere admiration of mankind. 
Ornament was as universal—applied upon a scale at 
once as grand and as minute as now—during the long 
ages before Man was born. Some of the most beau- 
tiful forms in Nature are the shells of the marine Mol- 
lusca, and many of them are the richest, too, in surface 
ornament. But, prodigal of beauty as the Ocean now 
is in the creatures which it holds, its wealth was even 
ereater and more abounding in times when there was no 
man to gather them. The shells and corals of the old 
Silurian Sea were as elaborate and as richly carved as 
those which we now admire: and the noble Ammonites 
of the Secondary ages must have been glorious things 
indeed. Even now there is abundant evidence that 
although Man was intended to admire beauty, beauty 
was not intended only for Man’s admiration. Nowhere 
is ornament more richly given, nowhere is it seen more 
separate from use, than in those organisms of whose 
countless millions the microscope alone enables a few 


men for a few moments to see.a few examples. There 





igo THE REIGN OF LAW. 





is no better illustration of this than a class of forms 
belonging to the border-land of animal and vegetable life 
called the Déatomacee, which, though invisible to the 
naked eye, play an important part in the economy of 
Nature. They exist almost everywhere, and of their 
remains whole strata, and even mountains, are in great part 
composed. They have shells of pure silex, and these, 
each after its own kind, are all covered with the most 
elaborate ornament—-striated, or fluted, or punctured, or 
dotted in patterns which are mere patterns, but patterns 
of perfect, and sometimes of most complex, beauty. 
No graving done with the graver’s tool can equal that 
work in gracefulness of design, or in delicacy and 
strength of touch. Yet it is impossible to look at 
these forms—in all the variety which is often crowded 
under a single lens—without recognising instinctively 
that the work of the graver is work strictly analogous, 
—addressed to the same perceptions,—founded on the 
_ same idea,—having for its object the same end and aim. 
And as the work of the graver varies for the mere sake 
of varying, so does the work on these microscopic 
shells. In the same drop of moisture there may be 
some dozen or twenty forms, each with its own dis- 
tinctive pattern, all as constant as they are distinctive, 
yet having all apaenenEs the same habits, and without 
any perceptible difference of function. 








APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. Igor 





—— 


It would be to doubt the evidence of our senses 
and of our reason, or else to assume hypotheses of. 
which there is no proof whatever, if we were to doubt 
that mere ornament, mere variety, are as much an end 
and aim in the workshop of Nature as they are known 
to be in the workshop of the goldsmith and the jeweller. 
Why should they not? The love and desire of these 
is universal in the mind of Man. It is seen not more 
distinctly in the highest forms of civilized art than 
in the habits of the rudest savage, who covers with 
elaborate carving the handle of his war-club, or the 
prow of his canoe. Is it likely that this universal aim 
and purpose of the mind of Man should be wholly 
without relation to the aims and purposes of his Creator ? 
He that formed the eye to see beauty, shall He not see 
it? He that gave the human hand its cunning to work 
for beauty, shall His hand never work for it? How, 
then, shall we account for all the beauty of the world—for 
the careful provision made for it where it is only the 
secondary object, not the ‘first? Even in those cases, 
for example, where concealment is the main object in 
view, ornament is never forgotten, but les as it were 
underneath, carried into effect under the conditions 
and limitations imposed by the higher law and the 
‘more special purpose. Thus the feathers of the Ptar- 
migan, though confined by the law of assimilative 


—~ 





192 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





colouring to a mixture of black and white or gray, 
have those simple colours disposed in crescent bars 
and mottlings of beautiful form, even as the lichens 
which they imitate spread in radiating lines and semi- 
circular ripples over the weather-beaten stones. It is 
the same with all other Birds whose colour is the colour 
of their home. For the purpose of concealment, their 
colouring would be equally effective if it were laid on 
without order or regularity of form. But this is never 
done. ‘The required tints are always disposed in pat- 
terns, each varying with the genus and the species; 
varying for the mere sake of variation, and for the 
beauty which belongs to ornament. And where this 
purpose is not under the restraint of any other purpose 
controlling it and keeping it down as it were within com- 
paratively narrow limits, how gorgeous are the results 
attained ! What shall we say of flowers—those banners 
of the vegetable world, which march in such various 
and splendid triumph before the coming of its fruits P 
What shall we say of the Humming Birds—whose 
feathers are made to return the light ‘which falls upon 
them, as if rekindled from intenser fires, and coloured 
with more than all the colours of all the gems? 

There is one instance in Nature (and, as far as I 
know, only one) in which ornament takes the form of 


pictorial representation, The secondary feathers in the 








APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 193 








wing of the Argus Pheasant are developed into lcng 
plumes, which the bird can erect and spread out like a 
fan, as a Peacock spreads his train. These feathers 
are decorated with a series of conspicuous spots or 
“eyes,” which are so coloured as to imitate the effect of 
balls. The shadows and the “high light” are placed 
exactly where an artist would place them in order to 
Pepresent a sphere. The “eyes” of the Peacock’s 
train are wonderful examples of ornament ; but they 
do not represent anything except their own harmonies 
of colour. The “eyes” of the Argus Pheasant are like 
the “ball and socket” ornament which is common in 
the decorations of human art. It is no answer to this 
argument in respect to beauty, that we are constantly 
discovering the use of beautiful structures in which the 
beauty only, and not the usefulness, had been hitherto 
perceived. The harmonies on which all beauty pro- 
bably depends are so minutely connected in Nature that ~ 
“use” and ornament may often both arise out of the 
same conditions. Thus, some of the most beautiful 
lines on the surface of shells are simply the lines of 
their annual growth, which growth has followed definite 


curves, and it is the “law” of these curves that is beau- 


1 I owe the observation of this curious fact to my friend Mr. 
James Nasmyth, so well known as the inventor of the Steam 
Hammer, and as a distinguished astronomer, 


) 





194 THE REIGN OF LAW, 


tiful in our eyes. Again, the forms of many Fish which 
are so beautiful, are also forms founded on the lines 
of least resistance. The same observation applies to 
the form of the bodies and of the wings of Birds. 
Throughout Nature, ornament is perpetually the result 
of conditions and arrangements fitted to use and con- 
trived for the discharge of function. But the same 
principle applies to human art, and few persons are 
probably aware how many of the mere ornaments of 
architecture are the traditional representation of parts 
which had their origin in essential structure. Yet who 
would argue from this fact that ornament is not a special 
aim in the works of Man? When the savage carves the 
handle of his war-club, the immediate purpose of his 
carving is to give his own hand a firmer hold. But any 
shapeless scratches would be enough for this. When he 
carves it in an elaborate pattern, he does so for the love 
of ornament, and to satisfy the sense of beauty. 

There is, however, another: department of natural 
phenomena which, much more than the one we have 
been now considering, does at first sight suggest to the 
mind the subordination of Purpose and the supremacy 
of Law. It is the department of Comparative Anatomy. 
It is a fact now well known and universally accepted, 
that in many animal structures, perhaps in all except 


one, there are parts the presence of which cannot be 





a I RS CO RC ane So 
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 195 


explained, from their serving any immediate use, or 
discharging any actual function. For example, the limbs 
of all the Mammalia, and even of all the Lizards, termi- 
nate in five jointed bones or fingers. But in many 
animals the whole five are not needed, but only some one, 
or two, or three. In such cases the remainder” are indeed 
dwarfed, sometimes almost extinguished ; but the curious 
fact is that rudimentally the whole number are always to 
be traced. Even in the Horse, where one only of the 
five is directly used, and where this one is enlarged and 
developed into a hoof, parts corresponding to the remain- 
ing four fingers can be detected in the anatomy of the 
limb. Other examples of the same principle might be 
given without number. ‘Thus there are Monkeys which 
have no thumbs for use, but only thumb-bones hid 
beneath the skin: the wingless Bird of New Zealand, the 
“ Apteryx,” has useless wing-bones similarly placed: snakes 
destined always to creep “upon their belly” have never- 
theless rudiments of legs, and the common “ Slowworm”’ 
has even the “blade bone” and “collar bone” of rudi- 
mentary or aborted limbs: the Narwhal has only one 
tusk, on the left side, developed for use, like the horn of 
an heraldic Unicorn, but the other tusk, on the night 
side, is present as a useless germ: the female Narwhal 
has both tusks reduced to the same unserviceable con- 
dition: young whalebone Whales are born with teeth 
02 


eS SD 


196 - THE REIGN OF LAW. 





which never cut the gum, and which are afterwards 
absorbed .as entirely useless to the creature’s life. 

At first sight it may appear as if these were facts not 
to be reconciled with the supremacy of Purpose :—at 
first sight, but at first sight only. For as we look at 
them and wonder at them, and set ourselves to discover 
how many of a like nature can be found, our eye catches 
sight of an Order which had not been at first perceived. 
Exceptions to one narrow rule such as we might have 
laid down and followed for ourselves, they are now seen 
to be in strict subordination to a larger rule which it — 
would never have entered into our imagination to con- 
ceive. These useless members, these rudimentary or 
aborted limbs which puzzled us so much, are parts of an 
universal Plan. On this plan the bony skeletons of 
all living animals have beén put together. The forces 
which have been combined for the moulding of Or- 
ganic Forms have been so combined as to mould them 
after certain types or patterns. And when Comparative 
Anatomy has revealed this fact as affecting all the 
animals of the existing world, another branch of the 
same science comes in to conform the generalisation, 
and extend it over the innumerable creatures which 
have existed and have passed away. This one Plan of 
Organic Life has never been departed from since Time 
began, 





APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 197 


When we have grasped this great fact, all the lesser 
facts which are subordinate to it assume a new signi- 
ficance. In the first place a. Plan of this kind is in| 
itself a Purpose. An Order so vast as this, including 
within itself such variety of detail,; and maintained 
through such periods of Time, implies combination 
and adjustment founded upon, and carrying into effect, 
one vast conception. It is only as an Order of Thought 
that the doctrine of Animal Homologies is intelligible 
at all. Itis a Menta] Order, and can only be mentally 
perceived. For what do we mean when we say that 
this bone in one kind of animal corresponds to such 
another bone in another kind of animal? Corresponds 
—in what sense? Not in the method of using it—for 
very often limbs which are homologically the same are 
put to the most diverse and opposite uses. To what 
standard, then, are we referring when we say that~such 
and such two limbs are homologically the same? It is 
to the standard of an Ideal Order—a Plan—a Type—a 
Pattern mentally conceived. This sounds very recon- 
dite and’ metaphysical; and yet the habit of referring 
physical facts to some ideal standard and order of 
thought is a universal instinct in the human mind. It 
is one of the earliest of our efforts in endeavouring to 
understand the phenomena around us. The science of 
Homologies, as developed by Cuvier and Hunter and 


% 


- 
———— 


198 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


Owen and Huxley, is indeed an intricate, almost a 
transcendental science. Yet Dr. Livingstone found the 
natives of Africa debating a question which belongs 
essentially to that science and involves the whole prin- 
ciple of the mental process by which it is pursued. 
The debate was on the question “whether the two toes | 
of the Ostrich represent the thumb and forefinger in 
Man, or the little and ring-finger.”! This is purely a 
question of Comparative Anatomy. It is founded on 
the instinctive perception that even between two frames 
so widely separated as those of an Ostrich and a Man, 
there is a common Plan of structure, with reference to 
which plan, parts wholly dissimilar in appearance and in 
use, can nevertheless be identified as ‘“ representative ” 
of each other :—that is, as holding the same relative 
place in one Ideal Order of arrangement. 

The recognition of this idea in minds so rude is not 
the less remarkable from the fact that both sides in this 
African debate were wrong in their practical application 
of the idea to the particular case before them. Unity 
of design amidst variety of form is so conspicuous and 
universal in the works of Nature that the perception 
of it could not possibly escape recognition even by the 
rudest human mind, formed as that Mind is to see 


4 “The Zambesi and its Tributaries,” p. 424, 


APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. © 199 
Order, and to work for it, and to admire it. But though 
instinct is enough to give us the general idea, and to 
trace it in a thousand instances where it can hardly be 
overlooked, yet it needs close and laborious study, and 
high powers of analysis and of thought, to trace cor- 
rectly the true Order and Plan through the fine and 
subtle passages of Nature. It would have astonished 
those poor natives of Africa to be told, as is the truth, 
that if they wished to find in the Ostrich the parts 
corresponding to their own middle finger, or ring-finger, 
or any other finger, they must look, not to the toes of 
the Ostrich, but to her little aborted wings, which, though 
useless for the purposes of flight, are still retained as 
representing the wings of other Birds, and the forearms 
of all the Mammals. 

For here we come upon the interchange and crossing 
as it were of two distinct ideas, which seem to stand the 
one as the warp and the other as the woof in the fabrics 
of Organic Life. There is the idea of Homology in 
Structure and the idea of Analogy in Use. The one 
represents the Unity of Design, the other represents 
Variety of Function. It might have been supposed that 
these could not easily be reconciled—that where great 
differences in use and application are essential, ngid 
adherence to one pattern of structure would be an im- 


pediment in the way. But it is not so, The same 





200 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





bones in different animals are made subservient to the 
widest possible diversity of function. The same limbs 
are converted into paddles, and wings, and legs, and 
arms. And so it is with every other part of the skeleton 
and every other organ of the body. Indeed it is diffi- 
cult to say whether the law of unity in design, or the 
law of variety in adaptation, is pushed to the greatest 
length. There are some cases in which the adaptation 
of form to special function is carried so far that all 
appearance of common structure is entirely lost. It 
is very difficult, for example, to persuade persons igno- 
rant of the principles of anatomy that the Whale and 
the Porpoise are not Fish, that they breathe with lungs 
as Man breathes, that they would be drowned if kept 
long under water, and that, <3 they suckle their young, 
they belong to the same great Class, Mammalia. Living 
in the same element as Fish, and feeding very much as 
fishes feed, a similar outward form has been given to 
them, because that form is the best adapted for pro- 
gression through the water. But that form has been, 
so to speak, ut on round the Mammalian skeleton, and 
covers all the organs proper to the Mammalian Class. 
Whales and Porpoises, notwithstanding their form, and 
their habitat, and their food, are as ‘separate from 
Fishes as the Elephant, or the Hippopotamus, er the 
Giraffe. 


coe 





APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 201 








And when we remember that the immense variety 
of Organic Forms in the existing world does not exhaust 

the adaptability of their Plan, but that the still vaster 
varieties of all the extinct creations have circled round 
the same central Types, it becomes evident that these 
Types have had from the first a Purpose which has been 
well and wonderfully fulfilled. As a matter of fact, we 
see that the original conception of the framework of 
Organic Life has included in itself provisions for apply- 
ing the principle of adaptation in infinite degrees. Its 
last development is in Man. In his frame there is no 
aborted member. Every part is put to its highest use :— ~ 
highest, that is, in reference to the supremacy of Mind.! 
There are stronger arms, there are swifter limbs, there 
are more powerful teeth, there are finer ears, there are 
sharper eyes. There are creatures which go where he 
cannot go, and can live where he would die. But all 
his members are co-ordinated with one power—the 
power of Thought. ‘Through this he has the dominion 
over all other created things—whilst yet as regards the 
type arid pattern of his frame he has not a single bone 
or joint or organ which he does not share with some one 
or other of the Beasts that perish. It is not in any of 


1 “Quid reliqua descriptione omnium corporis partium, in qua 
nihil inane, nihil sine causa, nihil supervacaneum est ?”—Cicero, 
Pave ivat, Leor,,” lib, 1; Cap. 32. 





202 THE REIGN OF LAW. . 
the parts of his structure, but in their combination and 
adjustment, that he stands alone. 

All these facts must convince us that we must enlarge 
our ideas as to what is meant by Use in the Economy of 
Nature. In the first place, it must be so interpreted as to 
include ornament ; and in the second place, it must in- 
clude also not merely Actual Use, but Potential Use, or 
the capacity of being turned to use in new creations. 
OF course this is one of the ideas which Philosophers of 
the Positive School denounce as “ Metaphysical.” But 
here again their opposition is itself based upon meta- 
physics, only upon metaphysics which are bad. “ Po- 
tential existence,” says Mr. Lewes,! “is ideal not real.” . 
“A fact is not a fact until it is accomplished. Nothing 
exists before it exists. This truism is disregarded by those 
who talk of potential existence.” So it is, and it ought to 
be disregarded, because it has no bearing on the question. 
May not the formation of a plan or conspiracy to murder 
be “a fact” although the murder is not “ accomplished?” 
Is not the capacity in the different pieces of a puzzle 
of being fitted together, a fact—even when the"pieces 
are all huddled confusedly in a box? Is there no poten- 
tial use in the udder of a cow-calf before it can have 
had any calves of its own? Is the idea of Potential 


a * History of Philosophy,” Prologue, p lxxxviii, 


a weer 


APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 203 


use in all these cases an idea which has no “reality?” 
Are they mere “‘artifices of thought,” or “preliminary 
falsifications of fact?” If the metaphysics of Positivism 
are available to establish this conclusion, they must be 
equally available to condemn knowledge in all its forms 
as‘“Ideal” and not “real.” Bad metaphysics of this 
kind are indeed, what Dr. Newman dreads the human 
mind may be, a “universal solvent,” casting doubt on 
the most certain of its own conclusions, and landing 
itself in universal scepticism. 

We have not far to go to find the same kind of reason- 
ing, and the same methods of analysis, employed to 
establish the converse proposition, that so far from 
Potentiality having no existence, it is the only form 
under which the existence of anything’ beyond ourselves 
can be known to us. No less eminent a thinker than 
Mr. J. S. Mill reduces Matter itself, and the very idea 
of the existence of an external world, to a “ Permanent 
Possibility of Sensation.”! Nay, he is not sure—he only 
sees some “intrinsic difficulties” in the way—whether 
our knowledge of Self-existence may not be brought under 
the same “ Potential” category—as a mere “ Possibility 
of Sensation.”? In regard to Matter, Mr. Mill distinctly 
says that so far from a mere Possibility having no real 


3 “ Mill on Hamilton,” chap. xi, *Tbid, chap. xii. 





ss 


204 THE REIGN OF LAW. © ‘ 


* 








existence, it is the only reality—the one thing which is 
constant and abiding behind the flux and uncertainty 
of actual sensations. My own opinion is that the meta- 
physical process by which these opposite paradoxes are 
arrived at is nearly as worthless in the one case as in 
the other. Of the two I prefer the paradox of Mr. Mill 


to the paradox of Mr. Lewes—so far at least as the 


reality of Potential Existences is concerned. But I prefer 
it only in the very case to which Mr. Mill shrinks from 
applying it. I cam think of my own mind or existence 
as a “Possibility of Sensation” (whether “ permanent ” 
or not). It is a method of conception indeed which 
casts no light on anything, and it is highly artificial ; but 
at least it is not false. It involves no confounding of 
two different elements of thought. But I cannot transfer 
the word or the idea of sensation from myself to the 
external things which cause sensation in me. This 
transfer involves a fundamental confusion of thought 
and of language as the instrument of thought.! But 
such paradoxes are the natural result of one great error 
—the endeavour to get rid of, or to explain away, or to 
dissolve by analysis, such simple and elementary con- 
ceptions of the Mind as the idea of External Force and 
of Causation, or the idea of Purpose and Intention. 


1 Sce Note D, 


—_ 


APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 205 





Matter may very well be conceived as “That which 
produces, or has a Possibility of producing, Sensation in 
Sentient beings.” But this is a definition which involves 
the idea of Causation. And if this be rejected as an 
elementary conception, (or as a distinct conception, 
whether elementary or not,) then the paradox of Mr. Mill 
is the natural result. In lke manner, if the idea of 
Purpose and Intention be repudiated, as representing no 
“reality” in Nature, then the opposite paradox of Mr. 
Lewes is reached along the same slippery and deceptive 
ways. We know at least, as a matter of experience, that 
we are capable of forming plans which exist as such 
before they are carried into effect. We know too that 
one plan may be large enough to include another, and 
that even within the fractional limits of our foresight 
we can provide for contingent as well as for actual 
use. We can -therefore easily conceive the existence of 
the same kind of prevision in the Mind which works 
in Nature, and we can easily understand how the 
apparent difference between actual and contingent use 
should be greater in proportion as the Plan is larger, 
and is designed to operate during vaster periods of 
Time. 

In this point of view rudimentary or aborted organs 
need no longer puzzle us, for in respect to Purpose they 
may be read either in the light of History, or in the light 





206 ‘THE REIGN OF LAW. 


of Prophecy. They may be regarded as indicating always 
either what had already been, or what was yet to be. 

Why new creations should never have been made wholly : 
new ;—why they should have been always moulded 
on some pre-existing Forms ;—why one fundamental 
ground-plan should have been adhered to for all Verte- 
brate Animals, we cannot understand. But as a matter 
of fact itis so. For it appears that Creative Purpose 
has been effected through the instrumentality of Forces — 
so combined as to arrange the particles of organic matter 
in definite forms: which forms include many separate 
parts having a constant relation to each other and to 
the whole, but capable of arrestment or development 
according as special organs are required for the discharge 
of special functions. Each new creation seems to have 

been a new application of these old materials. Each | 
new House of Life has been built on these old founda- 
tions. Among the many wonders of Nature there is 
nothing more wonderful than this—the adaptability of 
the one Vertebrate Type to the infinite variety of Life to 
which it serves as an organ and a home. Its basement 
has been so laid that every possible change or addition 
of superstructure could be built upon it. Creatures 
destined to live on the earth or in the earth, on the sea 
or in the sea, under every variety of condition of exist- 
ence, have all been made after that one pattern; and 





APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. 207 


each of them with as close an adaptation to special 
function as if the pattern had been designed for itself 
alone. It is true that there are particular parts of it 
which are of no use to particular animals. But there is 
no part of it which is not of indispensable use to some 
member of the group ; and there is one Supreme Form 
in which all its elements receive their highest interpreta- 
tion and fulfilment. It is indeed wonderful to think that 
the feeble and sprawling paddles of a Newt, the ungainly 
flippers of a Seal, and the long leathery wings of a Bat, 
have all the same elements, bone for bone, with that 
human hand which is the supple instrument of Man’s con- 
trivance, and is alive, even to the finger-tips, with the 
power of expressing his Intellect and his Will. Here ~ 
again the Laws of Nature are seen to be nothing but 
combinations of Force with a view to Purpose: com- 
binations which indicate complete knowledge. not only 
of what is, but of what is to be, and which foresees the 
End from the Beginning, 


CHAPTER V. 
CREATION BY LAW. 


E see, then, how the existence of Organs sepa- 
rated from Function, and of structures without 
immediate use, find their natural place among all the 
other phenomena of the world. They do not ‘show that 
“Law” is ever superior to Will, or can ever assert, even for 
a moment, an independence of its own. On the contrary, 
they show, as nothing else can show, the patient move- 
ments, and the incalculable years, through which material 
laws have been made to follow the steps of Purpose. 
But, then, let us remember this: these discoveries in 
Physiology, though they are helpless to prove that Law 
has ever been present as a Master, are eminently sug- 
gestive of the idea that Law has never been absent as a | 
Servant ;—that as, In governing the world, so in forming 
it, Material Forces have been always used as the instru- 
ments of Will. 
Tt is no mere theory, but a fact as certain as any other 
fact of Science, that Creation has had a History. It has 
not been a single act, done and finished once for all, 





CREATION BY LAW. 209 


but a long series of acts—a work continuously pursued 
through an inconceivable lapse of time. It is another 
fact, equally certain, respecting this work, that as it 
has been pursued in Time, so also it has been pursued 
by Method. There is an “observed Order of facts” 
in the history of Creation, both in the organic and 
in the inorganic world. I speak here, however, of the 
organic world alone, and chiefly of those higher Forms 
which are the seat of Animal Life. In these, there is 
an observed Order in the most rigid scientific sense— 
that is, phenomena in uniform connexion, and mutual 
relations which can be made, and are made, the basis of 
systematic classification. These classifications are imper- 
fect, not because they are founded on ideal connexions 
where none exist, but only because they fail in repre- 
senting adequately the subtle and pervading Order which 
binds together all living things. But the Order which 
prevails in the existing world is not the only Order 
which has been recognised by science. A like Order has 
prevailed through all the past history of Creation. Nay, 
more ; it has, I think, been clearly ascertained, not only 
that relations similar to those which now exist have 
existed always among all the animals of each contem- 
porary Creation, but that Order of a like kind ‘has con- 
nected with each other all the different Creations which 
were successively introduced. In almost all the leading 

P 


& 





210 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





Types of Life which have existed in the different geolo- 
gical ages, there is an orderly gradation connecting the 
Forms which were becoming extinct with the Forms 
which were for the first time appearing in the world. It 
is still disputed by some geologists, whether we have 
certain evidence that this gradation has been the grada- 
tion of a rising scale—of progressive Creations from 
lower to higher Types. But this dispute is maintained 
only on the ground that we cannot safely trust to nega. 
tive evidence. It is an unquestionable fact, that so far 
as this kind of evidence can go, it does testify to the 
successive introduction of higher and higher Forms of 
Life. Very recently a discovery has been made, to which 
Mr. Darwin only a few years ago referred as “a dis- 
covery of which the chance is very small”—viz. of fossil 
Organisms in beds far beneath the lowest Silurian strata. 
This discovery has been made in Canada—in beds far 
down, near the bottom even, of the rocks hitherto termed 
** Azoic.” But what are the Forms of Life which have 
been found here? They belong to the very lowest of 
living types—to the ‘ Rhizopods.” So far as this dis- 
covery goes, therefore, it is in strict accordance with all 
the facts previously known—that, as we go back in time, 
we lose, one after another, the higher and more complex 
organisms: first, the Mammalia; then the Vertebrata’; 


and now, lastly, even the Mollusca. It is in accordance, 


CREATION BY LAW. 211 
too, with another fact which has been observed before, 
viz. that particular Forms of Life have attained, at par- 
ticular epochs, a maximum development, both in respect 
to size and distribution—the favourites, as it were, of 
Creation fora time. These earliest Rhizopods seem to 
have been of enormous size, and developed on an enor- 
mous scale; since there is good reason to believe that 
beds of immense thickness are composed of their re- 
mains. All that is new in this discovery is the vast 
extension which it gives in Time to the same rules which 
had been already traced through ages which we cannot 
number. 

Then, there is another observed Order. For each 
Class of animal some definite Type or pattern has been 
adhered to; and the modifications of that Type have 
been gradual and successive. In many cases the science 
of fossil remains enables us to trace the intermediate 
Forms through which existing animals can be connected 
with animals long since extinct. It must be remem- 
bered that the fact of this connexion is quite a separate 
thing from any theory as to its physical cause. Professor 
Owen pointed out some years before the publication of 
Mr. Darwin’s theory, the existence of fossil animals 
which showed an increasing approximation to the forms 
of the Horse and of the Ox: and he showed that this 
approximation was related in Time, as it seemed to be 

P 2 


212 ae THE REIGN OF LAW. 





in Purpose, with the coming need oi them for the service 
and use of Man. ‘These are the facts on which the idea 
of “Creation by Law” is founded. Let us look a little 
nearer what this idea is, and what it involves. It is” 
an idea much vaunted by some men, much feared by 
others. Perhaps it may be found, on closer investi- 
gation, that they are fearing or worshipping, as the case 
may be, an idol of the imagination. 

It being certain that Creation exhibits an Ordet of 
facts which can be so clearly defined and traced, it 
follows, that at least in this first sense of the word, 
Creation has been by Law. We are, therefore, led on 
to the farther question, whether Law in any other sense 
can be traced or detected in.the work of Creation? Is 
the observed Order which prevails in the organic world 
an Order of which we can even guess the physical 
cause? Is it an Order which contains within itself any 
indications of the Force or combination of Forces which 
have been concerned: in producing it ? 

In considering this question, there is one thing to 
be observed at the outset. It is certain that nothing 
is known, or has been even guessed at, in respect to 
the history and Origin of Life, which corresponds with 
Law in its strictest and most definite sense. We have 
no knowledge of any one or more Forces—such as the 
Force of Gravitation, or of magnetic attraction and 





CREATION BY LAW. 213 





repulsion—to which any one of the phenomena of Life 
can be traced. .Far less have we any knowledge of any 
laws of the like kind which-can be connected with the 
successive creation or development of new Organisms. 
Professor Huxley, in a recent work,! has indeed spoken of 
“‘that combination of natural forces which we term Life.” 
But this language is purely rhetorical. I de not mean to 
say that Life may not be defined to be a kind of Force, 
or a combination of Forces. All I mean is, that we 
know nothing of any of these Forces in the same sense 
in which we do know something of the Force of Gravity, 
or of Magnetism, or of Electricity, or of Chemical 
Affinity. These are all more or less known, not, in- 
deed, in respect to their ultimate nature, but in respect 
to certain methods and measures of their operation. 
No such knowledge exists in respect to any of the 
Forces which have been concerned in the development 
of Life. No man has ever pretended to get such a view 
of any of these as to enable him to apply to them 
the instruments of . his analysis, or to trace in their 
working any definite relations to Space, or Time, or 
Number. 

Since, then, laws, in this most definite sense of the 
word, have not been discovered in the existing pheno- 


> 


1 **Elements of Comparative Anatomy,” p. 2. 








214 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





mena, or in the past history of Organic Life, let us look 
a little closer at the ideas which these phenomena have 
suggested to the mind of those who have speculated 
on the Origin and Development of Species. 

There is one idea which has been common to all 
theories of Development, and that is, the idea that ordi- 
nary generation has somehow been producing, from time 
to time, extraordinary effects, and that a new Species is, 
in fact, simply an unusual birth. It is worthy of ob- 
servation, that the earlier forms in which the theory 
of Development appeared, did suggest something more 
ne--ly approaching to a Law of Creation than is con- 
tained in the later form which that theory has assumed 
in the hands of Mr. Darwin. The essential idea of the 
theory of Development, in its earlier forms, was, that 
modifications of structure arose somehow by way of 
natural consequence from the outward circumstances 
or physical conditions which required them, and from 
the living effort of Organism sensible in some degree of 
that requirement. Now, inadequate and even grotesque 
though this idea may be as explaining the Origin of new 
Species, it cannot be denied, that it makes its appeal to a 
process which, at least to a limited extent, does operate 
in producing modifications of organic structure. For 
example, the same species of Mollusc has often a shell 


comparatively weak and thin, or a shell comparatively 





CREATION BY LAW. 215 


robust and strong, according as it lies in tranquil or 
in stormy water. The shell which is much exposed 
needs to be stronger than the shell which is less ex- 
posed. But it is obvious that the mere fact of the need 
cannot supply the thing needed, unless by the adjust- 
ment of some machinery for the purpose. How the 
vital forces of the Mollusc can thus be made to work 
to order, under a change of external conditions, we do 
not know. But we do know, as a matter of fact, that 
the shell is thickened and strengthened, according as 
it needs resisting power. This result does not appear 
to arise from any difference in the amount of lime held 
in solution in the water, but from some power in the 
secreting organs of the animal to appropriate more or 
less of it, according to its own need. The effects of this 
power are seen where there is no difference of condition 


except difference of exposure. It is said that they are 


_ observable, for example, in the shells which lie on the 


different sides of Plymouth Breakwater,—the sheltered 
side and the exposed side. The same power of adapta. 
tion is seen in many other forms. Trees which are 
most exposed to the blast are the most strongly anchored 
in the soil. Limbs which are the most used are the 
most developed. Organs which are in constant use, are 
strengthened, whilst organs in habitual disuse have a 
tendency to become weaker. rads 





216 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


All these results arise by way of natural consequence. 
How shall we describe them? Shall we say that they 
are the result-of Law? We may safely do so, remem- 
bering only that by Law, in this sense, we mean nothing 
but the co-operation of different natural Forces, which, 
under certain conditions, work together for the fulfil- 
ment of an obvious intention. Of the nature of those 
Forces we know nothing; nor is it easy to conceive 
‘how they have been so co-ordinated as to produce 
effects fitting with such exactness into the conditions 
requisite for the preservation of Organic Life. If there 
were any evidence that by the same means new Forms 
of Life could be developed from the old, I cannot see 
why there should be any reluctance to admit the fact. 
It would be different from anything that we see; but 
I do not know that it would be at all less wonderful, 
or that it would bring us much nearer than we now 
stand to the great mystery of Creation. The adaptation 
and arrangement of natural forces, which can compass 
these modifications of animal structure, in exact propor- 
tion to the heed of them, is an adaptation and arrange- 
ment which is in the nature of Creation. It can only 
be due to the working of a power which is in the nature 
of Creative power. 

We are so accustomed to these and other similar phe- 
nomena, and so apt to hide our own ignorance of their 


af 








CREATION BY LAW. 217 





cause, by describing them as the result of “ Law,” that 
we forget what a multitude of natural Forces must be 
concerned in their production, and what complicated 
adjustments of these amongst each other for the ac- 
complishment of Purpose. It is purely, therefore, in 
my view, a question of evidence, whether this particular 
law of adaptation has or has not been the means of 
introducing new Forms of Life. There is no evidence 
that it has. So far as we know, this power of self- 
adaptation, wonderful as it is, has a comparatively limited 
application ; when that limit is outrun by changes in 
outward conditions, which are too great or too rapid, 
whole Species die and disappear. Nevertheless, the 
introduction of new Species to take the place of those 
which have passed away, is a work which has been 
not only so often, but so continuously repeated, that 
it does suggest the idea of having been brought about 
through the instrumentality of some natural process. 
But we may say with confidence, that it must have 
been a process different from any that we yet know—a 
process not the same as that (obscure as that is) which 
produces the lesser modifications of Organic Forms. 

It has not, I think, been sufficiently observed, tnat 
the theory of Mr. Darwin does not address itself to 
the same question, and does not even profess to trace 
the Origin of new Forms to any definite law. His 








=e 


218 - THE REIGN OF LAW. 





theory gives an explanation, not of the processes by 
which new Forms first appear, but only of the pro- 
cesses by which, when they have appeared, they acquire 
a preference over others, and thus become established 
in the world. A new Species is, indeed, according to 
his theory, as well as with the older theories of Develop- 
ment, simply an unusual birth. The bond of connexion ~ 
between allied specific and generic Forms, is in his 
view simply the bond of Inheritance. But Mr. Darwin 
does not pretend to have discovered any law or rule 
according to which new Forms have been born from 
old Forms. He does not hold that outward conditions, 
however changed, are sufficient to account for them. 
Still less does he connect them with the effort or aspira- 
tions of any Organism after new faculties and. powers. 
He frankly confesses that “ our ignorance of the laws 
of variation is profound ;” and says, that in speaking of 
them as due to chance, he means only “to acknowledge 
plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular 
variation.”! Again he says—“I believe in no law of 
necessary development.” 2 

This distinction between Mr. Darwin’s theory and 
other theorics of Development, has not, I think, been 


sufficiently observed. His theory seems to be far better 


? “Origin of Species,” p. 131 (first edition), 2 Ibid. p. 351. 





— 





CREATION BY LAW. 21g 





than a mere theory—to be an established scientific 
truth—in so far as it accounts, in part at least, for the 
success and establishment and spread of new Forms 
when they have arisen. But it does not even suggest 
the law under which, or by which, or according to which, 
such new Forms are introduced. Natural Selection can 
do nothing except with the materials presented to its 
hands. It cannot select except among the things: open 
to selection. Natural Sélection can originate nothing ; 
it can only pick out and choose among the things 
which are originated by some other law. Strictly speak- 
ing, therefore, Mr. Darwin’s theory is not a theory on 

, . the Origin of Species at all, but only a theory on the 
causes which lead to the relative success or failure of 
such new Forms as may be born into the world. It 
is the more important to remember this distinction, 
because it seems to me that Mr. Darwin himself fre- 
quently forgets it. Not only does he speak of Natural 
Selection “ producing” this and that modification of 
structure, but he undertakes to affirm of one class of 
changes that they can be produced, and of another 
class of changes that they cannot be produced by this 
process.} 


Now, what are the changes for the preservation of 


2 * Origin of Species,” p. 200 (first edition), 








220 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


which Natural Selection does, in some sense, account? 
They are such changes, and these only, as are of some 
direct use to the Organism in the “struggle for exist- 
ence.” Any change which has not this direct value, is 
not provided for in the theory. All structures, there- 
fore, are unaccounted for—not only as respects their 
origin, but even as respects their preservation—in which 
the variations have no other value than mere beauty 
or variety. Accordingly, Mr. Darwin is tempted, as. 
I have already had occasion to observe, to deny that 
any such structures xist in Nature. Any theory of 
which this denial is really a necessary part, is _ self- 
condemned. Yet a theory may be good as accounting 
for the preservation of some structures, although it fails 
to account for the preservation of others. And so the 
fact that Natural Selection cannot have operated on 
structures of mere beauty and variety is no proof that 
the theory of Natural Selection is false, but only that it 
is incomplete. It does not account for the origin of any 
structure ; and it accounts for the preservation of only a 
certain number. Surely, then, Mr. Darwin assigns to 
his “law” of Natural Selection a range far wider than 
really belongs to it, when, on the strength of it, he 
denies that beauty for its own sake can be an end or 
object in Organic Forms. He says—‘ This doctrine, if 
true, would be absolutely fatal to my theory.” Why 


CREATION BY LAW. 221 


should this be fatal to his theory, except on the sup- 
position: that Natural Selection gives a complete account 
both of the Origin of new Forms, (of which, in reality, 
it gives no account at all,) and of their preservation, 
of which it does give some account, but one which is 
only partial? I dwell on this, because it lies at the 
very root of the question, how far Mr. Darwin’s theory 
can be said to suggest anything in the nature of a Crea- 
tive Law of a kind to explain the Method which lis 
been followed in the introduction of new Forms. 

We may test this question by bringing to bear upon it 
some particular example of specific variation. I select 
for this purpose one example, which will illustrate the 
subject better than any abstract discussion. It is the 
case of the Humming Birds. 

This group of Birds seems to exhibit, in the most 
striking form, not a few of those mysteries of Creation 
which at once tempt us to speculate on the Origin of 
Species, and at the same time confound every endeavour 
to bring it into relation with any process which we know 
or can conceive. In the first place, they are sharply 
defined from all other forms in that Class of the animal 
kingdom to which they belong. It is most difficult to 
say what is their nearest affinity, and the nearest, when 
it is found, is very distant. Secondly, they are abso- 
lutely confined to one Continent of the Globe. In the, 





222 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





third place, the various Species as amongst themselves 
are very closely united, ranging, indeed, over a great 
variety of forms, but for the most part connected with 
each other by very nice gradations. In the fourth place, 
there are, so to speak, some gaps in the scale, which 
suggest that some Species have either been lost, or have 
not- yet been discovered. In the fifth place, each of 
these Species, however nearly allied to some other, 
appears to be absolutely fixed and constant, there being 
not the slightest indication of any mixture—of any 
hybrid forms. In the sixth place, there is the most 
wonderful adaptation of special organs for the per- 
formance of special functions, and for the relation of 
these organs to particular structures in the vegetable 
kingdom. In the seventh place, there is a development, 
for which, in extent and variety, there is no parallel in 
the world, of structures designed apparently for mere 
ornament, and entirely separate from any other known 
or conceivable use. 

A few words on some of these characters will show 
their separate and joint bearing on the idea of Creation 
by Law. ‘ 

In the first place, then, the absolute distinctiveness 
from all others of this Family of Birds, coupled with its 
immense extent, gives the idea of some common bond, 


some physical cause, to which such an identity in 





CREATION BY LAW. 223 








physical characters must be due. This identity prevails 
not only in such essential matters as the structure of the 
bill and tongue, in the form of-the feet. and of the wings, 
in the habits of flight, and in the nature of the food, but 
runs also into some very curious details, as, for example, 
in the number of feathers in the tail and in the wings, 
which are constant numbers—adhered to even when 
some of the feathers, not being used even for ornament, 
are reduced almost to rudiments. But under degrees of 
evelopment which are very variable, the number is 
invariable. This identity of structure is the more 
remarkable from the immense extent of the group which 
it characterises. There are now known to science no 
less than about 430 different species of Humming Bird; 
and it cannot be doubted that many more remain to be 
discovered among the immense forests and mountain 
ranges of Central America. j yee TT 

Now, what is the bond that unites so closely, in a 
common structure, all the forms of this great Family of 
birds? We think it a sufficient explanation sometimes 
of the likeness of things, that they. are made for a 
common purpose. And so it is an explanation in one 
sense, but not in another. It gives the reason why 
likeness should be aimed at, but not the cause or the 
means through which it has been. brought about. Same- 


ness in the purpose for which things are intended, is 








224 _ THE REIGN OF LAW. 


a, reason why those things should be made alike; but it 
is no explanation of the process to which the common 
aspect is due. It is an explanation of the “why ;” but 
it is no explanation of the “how.” Purpose is attained 
in Nature through the instrumentality of means; and 
community of aspect in created things suggests the idea 
of some common process in the creative work. Thus, © 
the likeness which is due to common parentage serves 
the most important purposes; but it is not the less the 
result of a physical cause, out of which it arises by way 
of natural consequence. ‘The likeness of the Humming 
Birds to each other suggests this kind of cause. It is 
true that the organs which it principally affects are 
specially adapted for a special habit of life. ‘They are 
fitted to enable the Bird to feed on the ncctar, and the 
insects which frequent the nectar of flowers, or the 
leaves or bark of trees. But there are flowers and insects 
in abundance in other quarters of the globe where there 
are no Humming Birds. : 

And here we come on the curious facts of geogra- 
phical distribution,—a class of facts which, as much as 
any other, suggest some specific methods as having been 
followed in the work of Creation. Humming Birds are 
absolutely confined to the great Continent of America with 
its adjacent islands. Within those limits there is every 


range of climate, and there are particular species of 


a 2 


‘CREATION BY LAW. 225 





Humming Bird adapted to every region where a flowering 
vegetation can subsist. ‘It is therefore neither climate 
nor food which confines the Humming Birds to the 
New World. What is it, then? The idea of “ centres 
of Creation” is at once suggested to the mind. It 
seems as if the Humming Birds were introduced at one 
spot, and as if they had spread over the whole Con 
tinent which was accessible to them from that spot. 
They are absent elsewhere, simply because from that 
spot the other Continents of the world were inaccessible 
to them. JBut if these ideas are suggested to the mind 
by the general aspect of this family as a whole, they 
are strengthened by some of the facts which we dis- 
cover when we examine and compare with each other 
the genera and species of which it is composed. There 
is a beautiful gradation between the different genera 
and the different species,—so much so, that it has 
been found impossible to divide the Humming Birds 
into more than two sub-families, from the absence of 
sufficiently well-marked divisions. And yet on the other 
hand, they cannot be arranged in anything like a con- 
tinuous series, because some links appear to be missing 
in the chain. | 

But these general facts terminate in nothing more 
definite than a vague surmise. When we enter farther 


into details, we feel at once how little they agrce with 


Q 


226 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





any physical law which is known or even conceivable 
by us. If the likeness. which prevails in the whole 
group reminds us of the likeness which is due to com- 
munity of blood, it is equally true that the differences 
between the species are totally distinct, both in kind 
and degree, from the variation which we ever sce 
arising aniong the offspring of the same parents. Let 
us look at what these differences are. The generic 
and specific distinctions between the Humming Birds 
are mainly of two kinds,—x1s¢, Differences in the form 
of essential organs, such as the bill and the wings; 22, 
Differences in those parts of the plumage which are 
purely ornamental. Now, of these two kinds of varia- 
tion, the only one on which the law of Natural Selec- 
tion has any bearing at all is the first. And on that 
kind of variation, the only bearing which Natural Selec- 
tion has is this—that if any Humming Bird were born 
with a new form of bill, or a new form of wing, which 
enabled it to feed better and to range farther, then that 
improved bill and wing would naturally tend to be per- 
petuated by ordinary generation. This is unquestion- 
ably true ; but it really does not touch the facts of the case. 
The bills and wings of the different genera do not differ 
from each other in respect of any comparative advan- 
tage of this kind, but simply in respect to variety cor- 
responding with the variety of certain vegetable Forms, 





CREATION BY LAW. 229 


One form of bill is as good as another, but some forms 
are adapted to some special class of flower. Some 
bills, for example, are formed of enormous length, 
specially adapted to obtain access to the nectar cham- 
bers of long tubular flowers, such as the Brugmansia. 
Some, on the other hand, as if to show that the same 
end may be attained by different means, obtain access 
to the same flowers by a shorter process, and pierce the 
bases of the corolla instead of seeking access by the 
mouth. Some have bills bent downwards like a sickle, 
adapted to searching the bark of Palm-trees for the 
insects hid under. the scaly covering ; others have bills 
curved in the opposite direction, fitted, apparently, to 
the curious construction of some of the great family of 
Orchids so immensely developed in the forests of Central 
America. Some have bills equally well adapted for 
searching a vast variety of flowers and blossoms, and 
these, accordingly, migrate with the flowering season, 
and, issuing from the great stronghold of the family 
in tropical America, spread like our own summer Birds 
of passage, northwards to Canada, and southwards to 
Cape Horn, in the corresponding seasons of the year. 
In contrast with these species of extended range, there 
are many species whose habitat is confined, perhaps to 
a single mountain, and there are a few which never have 


been seen beyond the edges of some extinct volcano, 
Q2 3 








228 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





whose crater is now filled with a special flora. Many of 
the great mountains of the Andes have each of them 
species peculiar to themselves. On Chimborazo and 
Cotopaxi, and other summits, special forms of Hum- 
ming Birds are found in special zones of vegetation 
even close up to the limits of perpetual snow. Again, 
many of the Islands have species peculiar to themselves. 
The little island of Juan Fernandez, 300 miles from the 
mainland, has three species peculiar to itself, of which 
two are so distinct from all others known, that they 
cannot for a moment be confounded with any of them.! 

It is impossible not to see, in such complicated facts 
as these, that the creation of new Species has followed 
some plan in which mere variety has been in itself an 
object and an aim. ‘The divergence of form is not a 
divergence which can have arisen by way of natural con- 
sequence, merely from comparative advantage and dis- 
advantage in the struggle for existence. Bills highly 
specialised in form are certainly not those which would 
give the greatest advantage to birds which have equal 
access to the abundant Flora of an immense Continent. 
Some form ot bill adapted to the probing or piercing of 
all flowers with almost equal ease, would seem to be the 
form most favourable to the multiplication and spread of 


2 Gould’s “ Trochilida.” 








CREATION BY LAW. 229 


Humming Birds. . Continued approximation to some 
common type would seem to be quite as natural a 
change, and a much more advantageous kind of change 
as regards advantage in the struggle for existence, than 
endless divergence and special adaptation to limited 
'spheres of enjoyment. At all events, we may safely say 
that mere advantage, in Mr. Darwin’s sense, is not the 
rule which has chiefly guided Creative Power in the Origin 
of these new Species. It seems rather to have been a 
rule having for its object the mere multiplying of Life, 
and the fitting of new Forms for new spheres of enjoy- 
ment, according as these might arise out of corresponding 
changes in other departments of the organic world. 

If, now, we turn to the other kind of specific distinc- 
tion between Humming Birds, viz., that which consists 
in differences in the mere colouring and disposition 
of the plumage, we shall find the same phenomena still 
more remarkable. In the first place, it is to be observed 
of the whole group that there is no connexion which 
can be traced or conceived between the splendour of 
the Humming Birds and any function essential to their 
life. If there were any such connexion, that splendour 
could not be confined, as it almost exclusively is, to one 
sex. ‘The female Birds are of course not placed at any 
disadvantage in the struggle for existence by their more 
sombre colouring. Mere utility in this sense, therefore, 





Rae 


en eee 





230 THE REIGN OF LAW. 








can have had no share in determining one of the most 
remarkable of all the characteristics of this family of 
Birds. It is obviously beside the question to account, 
as Mr. Wallace and Mr. Darwin do, for the beauty - 
of the Humming Birds upon the ground that the 
males are thus rendered more attractive to the females. 
This attractiveness can only operate as between different 
individuals of the same species, since no one ever heard 
of the females of a dull-coloured species wandering in 
their affection from their rightful lords to the more 
brilliant males of some other species. Every animal, 
however little beautiful it may be in our eyes, has 
sufficient attractiveness as between the sexes to secure 
the great object of the continuation of its race. Utility, 
indeed, in a different sense, can be quoted with pro- 
bability, as accounting for the comparative plain colour- 
ing of females in this and in almost all other genera of 
Birds. But then it is Utility conceived as operating by 
way of motive in a Creative Mind, and not operating as 
a physical cause in the production of a mechanical 
result. And here we find Mr. Wallace instinctively 
testifying to this great distinction, and employing lan- 
guage which indicates the passage from one order of 
ideas to another. He says, “The REASON way female 
birds are not adorned with equally brilliant. plumes is 
sufficiently clear ; they would be injurious by rendering 





| 2 | 


CREATION BY LAW. 231 





their possessors too conspicuous during incubation.”! 
This is, no doubt, the true explanation of the purpose 
which the plain colouring of female Birds is intended 
to serve ; but it is no explanation at all of the physical 
causes by which this special protection is secured. | 

Those who, by special study, have laid their minds 
alongside the Mind of Nature in any of her Pro. 
vinces, have generally imparted to them a true sense, 
so far as it goes, in the interpretation of her mys- 
teries. Let us then hear what Mr. Gould says on the. 
beauty of the Humming Birds :—“ The members of 
most of the genera have certain parts of their plumage 
fantastically decorated; and in many instances most 
resplendent in colour. My own opinion is, that this. 
gorgeous colouring of the Humming Birds has been 
given for the mere purpose of ornament, and for no 
other purpose of special adaptation in their mode of 
life ; in other words, that ornament and beauty, merely 
as such, was the end proposed.” 2 Different parts of the 
plumage have been selected in different genera as the 
principal subject of ornament. In some, it is the 
feathers of the crown worked into different forms of 
crest ; in some, it is the feathers of the throat, forming 
gorgets and beards of many shapes and hues; in some, 
i: is a special development of neck plumes, elongated 


1 Quarterly Fournal of Science, Oct. 1867, p. 431. 
2 Gould’s *‘ Trochilide,” Introduction, 


— 


SS i e 
232 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


<" 








into frills and tippets of extraordinary form and beauty. 
In a great number of genera the feathers of the tail are 
the special subjects of decoration, and this on every 
variety of plan and principle of ornament. In some, 
the two central feathers are most elongated, the others 
decreasing in length on either side, so as to give the 
whole the wedge form. In others, the converse plan is 
pursued, the two lateral feathers being most developed, 
so that the whole is forked after the manner of the 
common Swallow. In others, again, they are radiated 
or pointed and sharpened like thorns. In some genera 
there is an extraordinary development of one or two 
feathers into plumes of enormous length, with flat or 
spatulose terminations. Mere ornament and variety of 
form, and these for their own sake, is the only principle 
or rule with reference to which Creative Power seems to 
have worked in these wonderful and beautiful Birds. 
And if we cannot account for~the differences in the 
general style and plan of ornament followed in the 
whole group, by referring them to any sort of use in the 
struggle for existence, still less is it possible to account, 
on this principle, for the kind of difference which 
separates from each other the different species in each 
of the genera. These differences are often little more 
than a mere difference of colour. The radiance of the 
ruby or topaz in one species, is replaced perhaps by 
the radiance of the emerald or the sapphire in another, 


a 





CREATION BY LAW. 233 





In all other respects the different species are some- 
times almost exact counterparts of each other. Asan 
example, let me refer to the two species figured by Mr. 
Gould as the Blue-tailed and the Green-tailed Sylphs ; 


2? 


and also to two species of the ‘ Comets,” in which two 
different kinds of luminous reds or crimsons are nearly 
all that serve to distinguish the species. 

A similar principle of variation applies in other genera, 
where the amount of difference is greater. For example, 
one of the most singular and beautiful of all the tribe is 
comprised within the genus Lophoriis, or the “Co- 
quettes.” The principle of ornament in this genus is, 
that the different species are all provided both with 
brilliant crests, and with frills or tippets on the neck. 
The feathers of these parts are generally of one colour, 
ending in spots or spangles of another; the spangles 
being generally of metallic lustre. There seems to be a 
rule of inverse proportion between the two kinds of 
ornament. ‘The species which have the neck plumes 
longest have the shortest crests, and wzce versé. In the 
shape and structure of all essential organs there is hardly 
any difference between the species. 

One very curious example of variety for the sake of 
ornament may be mentioned in connexion with this 

| wonderful family of Birds. It is a law—in the sense of 
| an observed order of facts—regulating the ornament of 
: Humming Birds, that where white is introduced into the 


—_ 





ag 





234 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





colouring of the tail feathers, it is not applied to the 
central feathers, but is confined to the marginal feathers. 
on either side. There is, however, one species (Uvos-- 
ticte Bengamini), recently discovered, which affords the 
only example yet known of a departure from this rule. 
It is a species In which white is one of the principal 
ornaments of the Bird, and is used in places where it 
can be placed in conspicuous contrast with the darkest 
tints. Tufts and lines of purest white shine among the 
greens and violets of the neck and head; whilst, in 
exquisite harmony with this, the four central feathers of 
the tail are alone dipped, as it were, in a solid glaze of 
the same white, and the marginal feathers on either side 
are kept wholly dark. Then, as if to mark with em- 
phasis the meaning of this departure from the ordinary 
rule, it is a departure confined to the ornamented sex; 
and the Female Form of the same species follows the 
ordinary law-—white being introduced in the marginal 
feathers, and in these alone. 

Now, what explanation does the law of Natural 
Selection give—I will not say of the origin, but even of 
the continuance and preservation — of such specifie 
varieties as these? None whatever. A crest of topaz is 
no better in the struggle for existence than a crest of 
sapphire. A frill ending in spangles of the emerald is 
no better in the battle of life than a frill ending in 


the spangles of the ruby. A tail is not affected for the 








CREATION BY LAW. a5 





purposes of flight, whether its marginal or its central 
feathers are decorated with white. It is impossible to 
bring such varieties into relation with any physical law 
known to us. It has relation, however, to a Purpose, 
which ‘stands in close analogy with our own knowledge 
of Purpose in the works of Man. Mere beauty and 
mere variety, for their own sake, are objects which we 
ourselves seek when we can make the Forces of Nature 
subordinate to the attainment of them. There seems to 
be no conceivable reason why we should doubt or ques- 
tion, that these are ends and aims also in the Forms given 
to living Organisms, when the facts correspond with this 
view, and with no other. In this sense, we can trace a 
creative law,—that is, we can see that these Forms of 
Life do fulfil a purpose and intention, which we can 
appreciate and understand. 

But then it may be asked, has this purpose and inten- 
tion been attained without the use of means? Have no 
physical laws been used, whereby these new forms of 
beauty have been evolved, the one from the other, in a 
series so wonderful for its variety in unity, and its unity 
in variety? Iam not now seeking to answer this ques- 
tion in the negative. All I say is, that the physical laws 
which are made subservient to this purpose are entirely 
unknown tous. That particular combination of a great 


many natural laws, which Mr. Darwin groups under the 





236 " THE REIGN OF LAW. 

name of Natural Selection, does not in the least answer 
the conditions which we seek in a law to account for 
either the origin or the spread of such creatures as the 
various kinds of Humming Birds. On the other hand, if 
I am asked whether I believe that every separate Species 
has been a separate creation—not born, but separately 
made—I must answer, that I do not believe it. I think 
the facts do suggest to the mind the idea of the working 
of some creative Law, almost as certainly as they con- 
vince us that we know nothing of its nature, or of the 
conditions under which it does its glorious work. Our 
experience of the existing Order of Nature is, that the 
young of each species repeat the form and the colours of 
their parent, and that even where variations occur, they 
are inconstant, and tend to disappear. We have na 
knowledge, for example, that from the eggs of the Blue- 
tailed Sylph a pair of Green-tailed Sylphs can ever be 
produced. We have no reason to believe that a species 
of Lophornis with a tippet of emerald spangles, can ever 
hatch out a pair of young adorned with spangles of some 
other gem. And yet we cannot assert that such pheno- 
mena are impossible, nor can it be denied that, as a 
matter of speculation, this process is natural and easy of 
conception, as compared with the idea of each Species 
being separately called into existence, out of the in- 


organic elements of which its body is composed. 





CREATION BY LAW. 237. 


Such new births—if they do take -place—would per- 
fectly fulfil, I think, the only idea we can ever form of 
new creations. For example,*it would appear that every 
variety which is to take its place as a new Species must 
be born male and female ; because it is one of the facts 
of specific variation in the Humming Birds, that although 
the male and female plumage is generally entirely dif- 
ferent, yet the female of each Species is as distinct from 
the female of every other, as the male is from the male 
of every other. If, therefore, each new variety were not 
born in couples, and if the divergence of Form were not 
thus secured in the organisation of both the sexes, it 
would fail to be established, or would exhibit for a time 
the phenomena of mixture, and terminate in reversion 
to the original type. Now here again we have the 
emphatic declaration of Mr. Gould, that among the 
thousands of specimens which have passed through: his 
hands, from all the genera of this great family, he has 
never seen one case-of mixture or hybridism between 
any two Species, however nearly allied. But this pas- 
sage is so important, that I quote it entire. “It might 
be thought by some persons that four hundred species of 
birds so diminutive in size, and of one tamily, could 
scarcely be distinguished from each other; but any one 
who studies the subject, will soon perceive that such is 


not the case. Even the females, which assimilate more 


i a 


238 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


closely to each other than the males, can be separated 
with perfect certainty; nay, even a tail-feather will be 
sufficient for a person well versed in the subject to say to 
what genus and species the Bird from which it has been 
taken belongs. I mention this fact to show that what 
we designate a Species has really distinctive and con- 
stant characters; and in the whole of my experience, — 
with many thousands of Humming Birds passing through 
my hands, I have never observed an instance of any 
variation which would lead me to suppose that it was 
the result of a union of two species. I write this with- ~ 
out bias, one way or the other, as to the question of the 
Origin of Species. I am desirous of representing Nature 
in her wonderful ways as she presents herself to my 
attention at the close of my work, after a period of - 
twelve years of incessant labour, and not less than 
twenty years of interesting study.” 

If, therefore, new Species are born from the old, it 
is not by accidental mixture; it is not by the mere 
_nursing of changes advantageous in the battle of life; 
it must be from the birth of some one couple, male and 
female, whose organisation is subjected to new con- 
ditions corresponding with each other, and having such 


force of self-continuance as to secure it against rever- 


2 Gould’s “ Trochilidz,” Intr; Inction, 





. CREATION BY LAW. 239 


—— 





sion. It matters not how small the difference may be 
from the parent Form; if that difference be constant, 
and if it be associated with some difference equally 
constant in the female Form, it becomes at once a new 
Species. There are some cases mentioned by Mr. Gould 
which may possibly be examples of the first founding of 
anew Species. In the beautiful genus Cynanthus, he tells 
us that there are some local varieties near Bogota, in 
which the ornament is partially changing from blue to 
green ; and it is a curious fact that this variation appears 
to be taking effect under the direction of some definite 
tule or “ law,”—inasmuch as it is only the eight central 
feathers of the tail which are tipped with the new colour. 
Mr. Gould expressly says of one such variety from 
Ecuador, that it possesses characters so distinctive as 
to entitle it, in his opinion, to the rank of a separate 
Species. The very discussion of such a question shows 
the possibility of new births being the means of intro- 
ducing new Species.. But my object here is simply to 
point out that Mr. Darwin’s theory offers no explanation 
of such births, either as respects their origin or their 
preservation, neither does it even approach to tracing 
these births to any physical law whatever. It fails 
also to recognise, even if it does not exclude, the rela- 
tion which the birth of new Species has to the mental 


purpose of producing mere beauty and mere variety. 








240 : THE REIGN OF LAW. 

Nevertheless it may be true that ordinary generation 
has been the instrument employed ; but if so, it must be 
employed under extraordinary conditions, and directed 
to extraordinary results. 

It will be seen, then, that the principle of Natural 
Selection has no bearing whatever on the Origin of 
Species, but only on the preservation and distribution 
of Species when they have arisen. I have already 
pointed out that Mr. Darwin does not always keep 
this distinction clearly in view, because he speaks of 
Natural Selection “producing” organs, or “adapting” 
them. It cannot be too often repeated that Natural 
Selection can produce nothing whatever, except the, 
Conservation or preservation of some variation other- 
wise originated. The true Origin of Species does not 
consist in the adjustments which help varieties to live 
and to prevail, but in those previous adjustments which 
cause those varieties to be born at all. Now what are 
these? Can they be traced or even guessed at? Mr. 
Darwin has a whole chapter on the Laws of Variation ;4 
and it is here, if anywhere, that we look for any sug- 
gestion as to the physical causes which account for 
the Origin as distinguished from the mere Preservation 
of Species. He candidly admits that his doctrine of 


’ 


1 “Origin of Species,” chap, v. 








CREATION BY LAW, 241 





Natural Selection takes cognisance of variations only — 
after they have arisen, and that it regards those varia- 
tions as purely accidental in -their origin, or, in other 
words, as due to chance. This, of course, he adds, is a 
supposition wholly incorrect, and only serves “to indi- 
cate plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular 
variation.” Accordingly, the Laws of Variation which 
he proceeds to indicate are merely, for the most part, 
certain observed facts in respect to Variation, and do 
not at all come under the category of Laws, in that 
higher sense in which the word Law indicates a dis- 
covered method under which Natural Forces are made 
to work. There is, however, in this chapter, one Law 
which approaches to a Law in the higher sense. Mr. 
Darwin, whilst candidly confessing our profound igno- 
rance of the cause or origin of varieties, yet groups 
together a great class of facts as connected by a tie 
which he calls the “‘ Correlation of Growth.” Now what 
is this law—this observed Order of facts? It is, that 
variation in one part of an organism is, as a rule, ac- 
companied with corresponding variations in other parts, 
and especially in those parts which are “homologous,” 
that is to say, which occupy the same relative place 
in the general Plan. 

This, however, is but a very imperfect definition of 
the vast Order of mysterious facts which are covered 

R 





242 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





by the words, “Correlation of Growth.” The funda- 
mental idea which these words express is an Idea of 
wider and deeper significance in Nature, than Mr. 
Darwin seems to have perceived. There is a corre- 
lation between all natural organic growths; that is to 
say, that any variation of form in a single part has a 
constant relation to other variations of form in some 
other part or parts of the same organism. But “rela- 
tion” is a vague word. There are many kinds of “re- 
lation”—there are indeed an infinite variety of kinds. 
What is the kind of relation that we detect in Cor- 
related Growths? It is not until we ask ourselves this 
question that we discover what a deep question it is— 
how endless are the avenues of thought and of inquiry 
which it opens up. 

First, one relation which we detect in all variations of 
organic growth, is simply the relation of symmetry. This 
kind and degree of Correlation of Growth prevails even 
in the world which we call Inorganic. The correspond- 
ing sides and angles of a crystal, for example, may be 
said to be correlated together. The nature of this rela- 
tion is geometrical and numerical. It isa relation having 
reference to invariable rules of number. As regards its 
physical cause, all we can say is, that it is the result of 
forces whose property it is to aggregate the particles of 
matter in definite forms, which forms are symmetrical— 








ee 


CREATION BY LAW. 243 
that is to say, they are forms having an axis with equal. 
developments on either side. Correlation of Growth, 
therefore, in this sense points to the work of Forces, one 
of whose essential properties is Polarity—that is, equal 
and similar action in opposite directions. Now, this 
kind of Correlation of Growth may be traced upwards 
from simple Minerals through all the infinite compli- 
cations of the organic world. It is unquestionably the 
basis of many of the Correlations of: Growth prevailing 
in Plants and Animals, It is seen in the symmetrical 
arrangement of all vegetable and of all animal Forms. 
A central axis is traceable in them all; and the Bilateral 
or Radiated arrangement of their subordinate parts is 
one of the most fundamental and universal of all the 
Correlations of Growth. | 

This is one, but it is one only, of the Correlations of 
Growth which are constantly observed. It would lead 
us to expect that any change of form on one side of an 
animal would be accompanied by an exactly correspond- 
ing change on the other side: so that limbs on one side 
of the central axis, if changed at all, would change in 
exact and symmetrical accordance with the limbs on 
the opposite and corresponding side. This, accordingly, 
is one of the Correlations of Growth most constantly 
observed. 

Now, it will be seen that Correlation of Growth, in 

R2 








244 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


this first and simplest sense, runs alongside, as it were, 
of Correlation in another and higher sense. The relation 
between two equal and opposite growths, which is a 
relation, in the first place, of simple symmetry as between 
themselves, is always accompanied by another relation, 
in the second place, of correspondence or fitness as 
between these growths and external conditions. An 
organism which is developed unsymmetrically, unequally, 
would be not only ugly in its form, but it would be 
maimed and imperfect in its functions. Here, then, we 
see one kind and one idea of Correlation rising above 
another. Two growths might be correlated as regards 
each other, and might yet be wanting in any correspond- 
ing correlation of fitness and of function towards out- 
ward things. But the first of these two kinds of cor- 
relation would be useless without the last. And this last 
is obviously the higher and more complex Correlation of 
the two. It is higher, not only in the sense of being 
“more complex, but as involving an idea which lifts us 
at once from a lower to a higher region of thought. 
Growths correlated as between each other according to 
mere symmetry of arrangement suggest nothing, except 
the work of Forces with inherent Polarity of action. But 
growths correlated with things outside the organism in 
which those growths occur,—and which can exert no 
physical effect upon it,—suggest at once the operation 


ee 





CREATION BY LAW. 245 


of Forces working under Adjustment with a view to - 


Purpose. 

When we see a Mineral ‘salt crystallising under the 
power of a Voltaic Current, we see Correlation of Growth 
in its simplest form, and in visible connexion with its 
Immediate cause. The particles of salt are marshalled 
in a constant Order-——an Order, the principle of which is 
some central axis, with branches and branchlets grouped 
around it in equal and exquisite arrangement. Won- 
derful as this arrangement is, it suggests no other ques- 
tion to the mind than that which may be asked in respect 
to the ultimate nature and source of Polarity in Magnetic 
Force. But when we see two growths in an organism which 
not only are correlated to each other with reference to a 
centre, but are correlated also to external things with 
reference to Function, we see something which raises 
questions altogether different in kind. We have passed 


at once from the region of the What, and the How, into 


the region of the Why. The one kind of Correlation - 


has reference to Physical Causes, the other kind of cor- 
relation has reference to those Mental Purposes which 
Physical Causes are made to serve. These two kinds of 
Correlation are perfectly distinct. They are as distinct 
as the correlation of equal pressures which a given 
volume of steam exerts upon the opposite sides of a 


boiler is distinct from the correlation between that pres: 


+ 


t 


1 
1 


a 


246 THE REIGN OF LAW. 








sure and its conversion into the driving-force of cranks 
and wheels, with all their adaptations for running on the 
rails, or for paddling in the sea. ‘They are as distinct as 
the correlations of force developed in a Voltaic Battery 
are distinct from the adjustments which convert those 
forces into the means of communicating Thought. ° 

Mr. Darwin has not pointed out this distinction 
clearly. Indeed, he does not seem to have had it in 
his view. He groups under one name,—the Correlation 
of Growth,—two classes of Phenomena, which are in- 
deed always combined in fact, but which are entirely 
separate in idea. Correlation of Growth, in one sense, 
is that law of vital force which secures that any change 
in the shape of one limb in an animal shall be accom- 
panied by a corresponding change in all the other limbs. 
Correlation of Growth in the other sense, is that adjust- 
ment of vital forces to the contingencies of external 
circumstance, which secures that all the changes which 
do take place shall be changes adapted to the discharge 
of new functions—to the fulfilment of new conditions of 
life—to command over new sources of enjoyment. 

Keeping, then, clearly in our view the distinction 
between these two different kinds of Correlation of 
Growth, let us look at the phenomena actually presented 
in the aspect and history of Organi: Forms, as respects 


both these kinds of Correlation. 


Bee 


CREATION BY LAW. 247 





As regards the first kind of Correlation, I have re-- 
ferred to the law of Bilateral Symmetry as the simplest 
and most obvious illustration. It is a law which at 
once connects itself with the idea of Polarity of Force. 
But though this be one kind of Correlation, almost 
universal, and may very probably be the foundation of 
“every other, there are many Correlations of Growth 
between’ which and mere Polarity there is no visible 
_connexion, The truth is that all the parts of an or- 
ganism are bound together as one whole by a pervading 
system of correlations as intricate as they are obscure. 
When the organism is in health, and all its parts are 
working in harmony, the wonder of these correlatione 
is not perceived. But they are brought out in a marked 
degree ‘by the phenomena of disease, and also by the 
phenomena of monstrosity or malformation. The “sym- 
pathy” which the most distant and apparently uncon- 
nected parts of an organism show with each other, when 
one of them is_affected by disease, is the index of cor- 
relations whose nature is utterly beyond the reach of 
our anatomy. Itis the same with malformations. Mr, 
Darwin mentions one case of curious unintelligible cor- 
relation—viz., that a blue iris is associated in Cats 
with deafness ; and, again, that the tortoise-shell colour 
of the fur is associated with the female sex in the same 


animal. In like manner the bright colours, and tie 





248 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





more conspicuous ornaments of plumage in Birds, are cor- 
related with the male sex. So likewise are vocal organs 
with the wonderful gift of song. In many insects the : 
differences of form which are correlated with the differ- 
ences of sex, are far greater than the differences which 
separate species and even genera. ‘There are insects of 
which the male is a fly, whilst the female is a worm. 
There are many other cases of correlation between 
different growths m respect to which the nature and 
source of the connexion is equally unknown. For 
example, the coraplex stomachs of the Ruminant Order 
are uniformly associated with a particular form of hoof. 
Sometimes correlations the most constant and invariable 
are at the same time the most subtle and the most 
secret, because they are hid under other growths which 
are not so correlated, and which produee total diversi- 
ties of outward aspect. One very curious class of cor- 
relations is the correlation between the internal struc- 
ture of the teeth in animals, and the structure of other 
very distant portions of their frame. There lately was, 
for example, in the Zoological Gardens, a little animal, 
the Hyrax, not unlike a Rabbit in general appearance, 
and very like it in habit- It is the “Cony” of Scrip- 
ture. Now this little animal will be found on exami- 
nation to have limbs which do not terminate in a foot 
like a Rabbit, but in a divided hoof of peculiar form. » 








CREATION BY LAW. 249 





This hoof is in miniature like the hoof a Rhinoceros. 
If next we examine the teeth of the Hyrax we shall 
find that the materials of these teeth are also combined 
in the same manner, and after the same pattern as the 
teeth of the Rhinoceros. So it is with other parts of 
the same two animals. Along with the teeth and the 
hoofs there are certain other shapes of bones which 
seem to be under the same bond of likeness. Now 
these are Correlations of Growth between different 
parts of the same animal, and between the correspond- 
ing parts in two different species. 

The conception, then, which we are led to form by 
this kind of Correlation between organic growths, is 
more complex than we had at first supposed. Mere 
Polarity of Force, leading to equal and opposite arrange- 
ment of subordinate parts, is not enough to satisfy the 
facts. This, indeed, may continue to be the type 
to which our thoughts refer, and by which we are 
helped to some more adequate idea of the facts. But 
the general impression left on the mind is this—that 
some One Force directs the form and structure of 
every organism, so that any change in one part of it 
is but the index of changes which run visibly or in- 
visibly throughout the whole. The growths between 
which we detect a correlation, are not really separate 
things connected only by the few correspondences which 





250 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





— 


we may be able to detect, but are part and parcel of 
one operation, the result of one Force, exerting its 
energies through channels which we cannot see, and 
according to laws of which we can form but a distant 
and faint conception. The truth is that Correlation in 
this sense is involved in the very word “ Growth.” 
Each part of every structure which is the result of 
growth must be correlated to every other part. This 
is essential to the very idea of growth, and to the very 
idea of an organism due to growth. When, therefore, 
Mr. Darwin says that one of the laws on which varia- 
tion of form depends is Correlation of Growth, he 
simply says that variations of Growth depend on growth 
—for all growths must be correlated. 

But Correlation in this sense helps but a little way 
indeed in conceiving the origin of a new Species. 
There might be the most minute and perfect harmony 
between the changes effected in an animal newly born 
without those changes tending even in the most remote 
degree towards the establishment of a new- Form of 
Life. In order. to that establishment there must be 
another correlation, and a correlation of a higher kind. 
There must be a correlation between those changes 
and all the outward conditions amidst which the new 
Form is to be placed and live. If this correlation fails 
the new Form will die. Yet, so far as we can see, this 





= = 


CREATION BY LAW. ot 





kind of correlation is without any physical cause. It 
is not necessarily involved, as the other kind of corre 
lation is, in the very idea of Growth. On the contrary, 
it is not only entirely separable in thought, but, as we 
see in monstrosities, it is sometimes separated in. fact. 
We have no conception of any Force emanating from 
external things which shall mould the structure of an 
organism in harmony with themselves. Mr. Darwin 
freely confesses this, and says that many considerations 
“incline him to lay very little weight on the direct 
action of the conditions of life” in producing variety 
of Form. We can conceive, dimly indeed, but still we 
can conceive, how in the Humming Birds a special 
form of Wing shall be correlated with a special form 
of Bill, But we have no conception whatever how a 
special form of Bill should be correlated with a special 
form of Flower from which the Bill is to extract its 
food. Mr. Darwin has shown how an improved Bill, 
when once produced, will be preserved by finding 
external conditions to which it is adapted. But he 
has not shown, and he frankly confesses he has no 
idea, how the adapted variation of Bill comes to be 
born at all. 

Yet it is this higher and more complex Correlation 
which is the most constant and the most obvious of all 


the facts of Nature. In these facts we see that the 





252 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





forces of Organic Growth are worked under rules of close 
adjustment to external conditions; and that particular 
shapes which might seem inseparably associated, if we 
looked at one Genus or one Family alone, are at once 
disjoined where different adaptations to Function are 
required. Let us take another example from the great 
Class of Birds. If we were to look only to the family 
of the Avatide (Ducks and Geese), we might suppose 
that there is a constant Correlation of Growth between 
webbed feet and spoon-shaped bills. But the real and 
efficient Correlation of Growth in this ease is not be- 
tween the spoon-bill and the web-foot, but between both 
of these and certain external conditions of life. The 
web-foot is correlated to an aquatic habitat: and the 
spoon-bill is correlated to spoon-food. And: accordingly 
this association of form in foot and bill: is at once dis- 
solved where different external functions require a sepa- 
ration. In the Gulls, the Fulmars, and the Petrels, the 
web-foot is retained, because action upon the element of 
water is still required ; but the correlated form of bill 
vanishes, and shapes altogether different are given,— 
shapes adapted, that is correlated, to different kinds of 
food, and to different methods of capture. 

Again, there is another great family of Birds where 
some of the same forms are correlated with other forms 


entirely different, because of the different external Cor- 





Pee 





CREATION BY LAW. 253 





relations which are required by Function. In the Divers 
the web-foot is mounted upon a flattened leg-bone, with 
the sharp edge set “fore and aft.” Now what is this 
Correlation of Growth? It is, first, the Internal Corre- 
lation of those ‘parts to each other, but secondly and 
principally, it is the External Correlation of both to their 
function of propelling under water. The form of the 
foot is correlated to the function of opposing the largest 
possible area of resistance to that medium, exactly 
where, for the purpose of swimming, the maximum of 
resistance is required; the knife-shaped leg-bone is 
correlated to the function of opposing the least possible 
resistance, precisely where, for the same purpose, the 
minimum of resistance is required. In Australia we 
have, in the Ornithorynchus paradoxus, the webbed ieet 
correlated with the Duck-shaped Bill in an animal which 
does not belong to the Class of Birds at all. 

There is another case of what may be called Corre- 
lated Correlations, which brings out very clearly the dis- 
tinction which is so important in the philosophy of this 
great subject. Feathers are a kind of covering peculiar 
to the Class of Birds, Under every variety of modifica- 
tion they have one fundamental plan—a central shaft or 
quill to which lateral filaments are attached. Now there 
is a vast range of correlations between the different — 
kinds of feather and the different Families or Species, 





254 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


and between different parts of the body in the same 
Species. But there are two Correlations of Growth in 
respect to feathers which are constant. In all cases, 
(excepting, of course, the Wingless Birds,) the feathers 
which grow from the fore-arm and finger-bones, consti- 
tuting the Wings, are comparatively long, strong, taper- 
ing, elastic, and-with thin lateral filaments, which fila- 
ments are closely hooked together by means of minute 
teeth fitting into each other, so that the whole shall form 
one continuous surface or.web. ‘This is a Correlation of 
Growth between one particular kind of feather, and one 
particular member of the body, which, in all Birds 
capable of flight, is constant, and amounts to a universal 
Law. Now let us contrast this with another Correlation 
of Growth which is equally constant. On the side of 
the head of all Birds, there is a patch of feathers of 
peculiar structure, with fine and slender shafts, and with 
the lateral filaments not hooked together as in the other 
case, but, on the contrary, always separated from each 
other—the whole series forming a fine and open network 
spread over the surface which they cover and protect. 
These feathers cover the orifice of the ear, and are called 
the auriculars. They are correlated with the curious 
passages, the finely hung clapper-bones, and all the 
_ elaborate mechanism of that organ. Such are the In- 
ternal Correlations. But they are intelligible only when . 








CREATION BY LAW. 255 
considered in the light shed by other correlations which 
are external. The wing feathers with close continuous 
webs are correlated to the laws. by which the passage of 
air may be prevented—the auricular feathers, with open 
unconnected webs, are correlated to the laws by which 
the passage of sound may be rendered easy. The one 
set of feathers are adapted to the active function of 
evoking and resisting atmospheric pressure by striking 
strong, yet light and elastic blows, upon the air—the 
other set of feathers are adapted to the passive function 
of allowing the free access of the waves of sound into 
the passages of the ear. ‘These are but a few examples 
out of millions. Throughout the whole range of Nature 
the system of Internal Correlation is entirely subordinate 
to the system of External Correlation. Forms or 
growths which are inseparably joined with each other in 
one group of animals, are wholly divorced from each 
other in another group; whereas Forms which have 
correlations adapted to external conditions, are repeated 
over and over again across the widest gaps in the scale 
of Natural affinity. 

If, then, it be true that New Species are created out of 
small variations in the form of Old Species, and this by 
way of Natural Generation, there must be some bond 
of connexion which determines those variations in a 3 
definite direction, and keeps up the External Correla. 





256 - '. THE REIGN OF LAW. 





tions pari passu with the Internal Correlations. Natural 
Selection can have no part in this. Natural Selection 
seizes on these External Correlations when they have 
come to be. But Natural Selection cannot enter the 
secret chambers of the womb, and there shape the new 
Form in harmony with modified conditions of external — 
life. How, then, are these external correlations provided 
for beforehand? ‘There can be but one reply. It is by 
Utility, not acting as a Physical Cause upon organs 
already in existence, but acting through Motive as a 
Mental Purpose in contriving organs before they have 
begun to be. And where obvious utility does result, 
the only connecting Bond which can be conceived as 
capable of maintaining the Internal Correlations in 
harmony with the External Correlations, is the Bond of 
Creative Will giving to Organic Forces a foreseen direc- 
tion. It is, in short, precisely the same bond which 
in all mechanism produces Structure in harmony with 
intended Function. 

Hence it is that scientific men, in seeking expression 
for the ultimate ideas arrived at in the course of Physical 
research, find themselves compelled to borrow the lan- 
guage of Mechanical Invention. There is no other lan- 
guage which conveys an impression of the facts, or of 
the tie by which the facts are connected with each 
other. In the first chapter of this work I have had 





- 





CKEATION BY LAW. 257 





occasion to point out how true this is of Mr. Darwin’s 
description of the Orchids, and of the curious functions 
of their structure. The correlations there are all ex- 


ternal. But the same result appears in every other 


‘department of Science. In a remarkable paper on the 


“Constitution of the Universe,’ Professor Tyndall has 
occasion to speak of the non-luminous rays of heat 
emitted by all incandescent bodies,—rays which, though _ 
intensely hot, are altogether insensible to the eye. Now 
the Retina of the eye is a piece of mechanism whose 
Correlations are essentially External. It is the expan- 
sion of a special nerve whose function it is to be sensitive 
to certain particular vibrations, and to no other vibra- 
tions whatever. ‘Light itself, therefore, is discovered to 
be merely a relative term—a word, in short, denotirg 
nothing but an external Correlation between the Retina 
and vibrations of a certain kind and quality. Now what 
is the language which Professor Tyndall is constrained 
to use in explanation of facts so difficult of conception ? 
It is the language cf Mechanism, of mental Purpose and 
Design. ‘It is not,” he says, “the size of a wave which 
determines its power of producing light; it is, broadly 
speaking, the jilness of the wave to the Retina. . The 
ethereal pulses must follow each other with a certain 
rapidity of succession before they can produce light, and 
if their rapidity exceed a certain limit, they also fail to 
“ ) 





258 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


-_——. 








produce light. Zhe Retina is attuned, if 1 may use the 
term, to a certain range of vibrations, beyond which, in 
both directions, it ceases to be of use.” These are 
indeed wonderful Correlations which reveal to us fit- 
tings and adjustments of which we had no previous 
conception: but they give us no glimmering even, of 
knowledge as to the physical causes which have “at- 
tuned” a material organ so as to catch certain ethereal 
pulsations in the external world, and to make these the 
means of conveying to Man’s Intelligence the enjoyment 
and the power of sight. ag 

It will be seen, then, that when Mr. Darwin speaks of 
the Law of Correlation of Growth as a Law which deter- 
ines variation in organic growths, he is really present- 
ing to us under one phase two separate ideas which are 
radically distinct. One is the idea of different growths 
in the same organism, corresponding with each other 
in respect to arrangement,—or in respect to texture, 
or in respect to form,—cr to some other point of com- 
parison. The other idea is that these growths (each and 
all) correspond with the conditions of external nature in 
such a way as to fit them for the discharge of Function 
with some new adaptation, and consequently with some 
new advantage. In one aspect the Law of Correlation 
of Growth is (cr at least may probably be) a Law in the 
strictest sense of the word; that is to say, the resuit 











CREATION BY LAW. 259 





of a Force acting according to its own definite modes 
and measures of operation. But the Law of Correlation 
of Growth in the other aspect, is a law only in the 
sense (1) of an observed order of facts; and (2) of 
that: Order depending on Adjustment with a view to 
Purpose. 

Many naturalists have spoken of the facts of organic 
likeness as sufficiently accounted for by referring them to 
Adherence to Type. Mr. Darwin complains that this 
phrase, as an explanation of organic likeness, is no 
explanation at all, but amounts only to a re-statement of 
the facts in another form of language. ‘This is true; but 
it is equally true of his own phrase of Correlation of 
Growth.! ‘Adherence to Type” is not in the nature of 
a Physical Cause, but in the nature of a Mental Purpose. 
It is no explanation, therefcre, to those faculties of the. 
mind which seek for Methods of operation. In like 
manner “ Correlation of Growth,” in the only sense in 
which it is possible to connect it with the Origin of 
Species, is not a Physical Cause, but a Mental Purpose. 


‘The physical means by which that purpose is secured 


1 Mr. Wallace traces the whole Darwinian theory to six ‘* generat 


* he emphatically adds, 


laws of the simplest kind—laws which,’ 
“ave in most cases mere statenients of adnuutted facts.” Again he 
says, “‘ This series of facts or laws are mere statements of what is 


the condition of nature,” —Fournal of Science, No. XVI. p. 472. 
S 2 





260 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





remain as dark as ever; and such of them as are con- 
ceivable by us, are seen, like all other physical forces, 
working to order, .subject to direction, and having that 
direction determined by foresight, forethought, and con- 
trivance. . | 
Correlation of Growth, in the sense of external adapta- 
tions, may be said to be the most universal of all the 
Laws of Nature. But it accounts for the Origin of 
Organic Forms only in the same sense in which it 
accounts for the origin of all other phenomena, which in 
their result exhibit adaptations, or fittings into use and 
service. Let us take, as an example, the origin, nature, 
and capacities of Coal. That substance is correlated in 
a truly wonderful manner with the needs, the powers, . 
and the capacities of Man. It contains within itself, in 
_a form condensed and portable, a store of physical Force 
of incredible amount. The particles of one pound weight 
of it are held together by a Force which, when liberated 
and applied in the form of heat, is capable of lifting one 
million times its own weight to the height of one foot. 
No other substance known to Man is to be compared 
with this as a furnisher of Force. ‘This is its function in 
the world. It is a function relating to Man’s mechanical 


and inventive powers; and coal has been rendered 


3 “The Coal Question.” —W, S. Jevons, 1865. 











ee 


CREATION BY LAW. 261 


capable of discharging this function by processes of pre- 
paration which began millions of ages before Man was 
born. But these External Correlations are a result arising 
by way of natural consequence out of certain physical 
causes working to order, that is to say, out of Internal 
Correlations of Growth between Solar Heat and Vege- 
table Structure, and again between these and the causes 
which occasion interchange between sea and land. No 
explanation so definite as this can be given of the - 
method in which Vital Forces are made to evolve a new 
Form of Life. But even if such explanation could be 
given, it would render no account at all of the fittings of 
that Form into the outward requirements of its life. 
These are Correlations which in their very nature belong 
to Mind, are the work of Mind, and are intelligible only 
in the light of Mind. 

I do not represent this conclusion as one necessarily 
adverse to Mr. Darwin’s Theory on the Origin of Species, 
{t is a conclusion which he would probably be willing to 
accept. I only desire to point out in how very. lmited 
a sense that Theory can be said to trace Creation to a 
“Law” at all, and how entirely inadequate that Theory 
is to account by any physical cause for the Origin of 
Species, 

The only senses, therefore, in which we get any 
glimpse of Creation by Law are these—1,/, That the 








262 THE REIGN OF LAW. : 





close physical connexion between different Specific 
Forms is probably due to the operation of some 
Force or Forces common to them all; 2d, That these 
Forces have been employed and worked, with others 
equally unknown, for the attainment of such ends as 
the multiplication of Life, in Forms fitted for new 
spheres of enjoyment, and for the display of new kinds 
of beauty. 

Is there anything in this conclusion to conflict with 
such knowledge as we have from other sources of the 
nature and working of Creative Power? I do not know 
-_ on what authority it is that we so often speak as if 
Creation were not Creation unless it work from nothing 
as its material, and by nothing as its means. We know 
that out of the “ dust of the ground ”—that is, out of the 
ordinary elements of Nature—are our own bodies formed, 
and the bodies of all living things. Nor is there any- 
thing which should shock us in the idea that the creation 
of new Forms, any more than their propagation, has 
been brought about by the use and instrumentality of 
means. In a theological point of view it matters nothing 
what those means have been. I agree with M. Guizot, 
when _he says that. ‘Those only would be serious 
adversaries of the doctrine of Creation who could affirm 
that the universe—the earth, and Man upon it—have 


been from all eternity, and in all respects, just what they 








iy 
ai 


A LISELI. —— 


- CREATION BY LAW. 263 





are now.”! But this cannot be affirmed except in the 
teeth of facts which Science has clearly ascertained. 
There has been a continual coming-to-be of new Forms 
of Life.? This is Creation, no matter what have been the 
laws or forces employed by Creative Power. 

The truth is, that the theory which fixes upon In- 
heritance as the cause of organic likeness, startles us 
only when it is applied to Forms in which unlikeness 
is more prominent than, resemblance. The idea, for 
example, that the different kinds of Pigeon, or of Hum-’ 
ming Birds, have all descended through successive varia- 
tion from some one ancestral pair, whether it be true 
or. not, would not startle any one. Yet, if this be true, 
we must be prepared for the same surmise extending 
farther. The advocates of Development urge that Time 
is a powerful factor. They say that if changes small, 
but constant enough, and definite enough, to consti- 
tute new Species, can and do arise out of born varieties, 
it is impossible to fix the limits of divergence which 
may be reached in the course of ages. It does not 


follow, on the other hand, that there is no such limit 


2 “ Méditations sur "Essence de la Religion Chrétienne,” p. 49. 

s “We discern no evidence of a pause or intromission in the 
creation or coming-to-be of new plants and animals.”—Jnstances 
of the Power of God as manifested in His Animal -Creation, by 
Professor Owen. 








EEE, SESS 


264 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





because we cannot fix it. It does not necessarily follow 
that because we admit the idea of the Rock-dove, and 
the Turtle-dove, and the Ring-dove being all descended 
from ‘one ancestral Pigeon, we are bound to accept 
the idea of the Whale, and the Antelope, and the 
Monkey being all descended from some one primeval 
Mammal. Mr. Darwin says, truly enough, that Inherit- 
ance “is that cause which alone, as far as we positively 
know, produces organisms quite like, or nearly like, each 
other.” But this is no reason why we should conclude 
that Inheritance is the only cause which can produce 
Organisms quite unlike, or only very partially like each 
other. We are surely not entitled to assume that all 
degrees and kinds of likeness can arise only from this 
single cause. Yet until this extreme proposition be 
proved, or rendered probable, we have a sound scien- 
tific basis for doubting the application of the theory, 
precisely in proportion to the unlikeness of the animals 
to which it is applied. 

And this is the ground of reasoning, besides the 
ground of feeling, on which we revolt from the doc- 
trine as applied to Man. We do so because we are 
‘conscious of an amount and of a kind of difference 
between ourselves and the lower animals, which is, in 
sober truth, immeasurable, in spite of the close affini- 
ties of bodily structure. Yet the closeness of these 


CREATION BY LAW. 205 


affinities is a fact; and it may with truth be said that. 
in contrast with the gulf of separation in all resulting 
characters, these affinities aré among the profoundest 
mysteries of Nature. Professor Huxley, in his work 
on “Man’s Place in Nature,” has endeavoured to 
prove that, so far as mere physical structure is con- 
cerned, “the differences which separate him from the 
Gorilla and the Chimpanzee are not so great as those 
which separate the Gorilla from the lower Apes.” On 
the frontispiece of this work he exhibits in series the 
skeletons of the Anthropoid Apes and of Man. It is 
a grim and grotesque procession. The Form which 
leads it, however like the others in general structural 
plan, is wonderfully different in those lines and shapes 
of Matter which have such mysterious power of express- 
ing the characters of Mind. And significant as those 
differences are in the skeleton, they are as nothing to 
the differences which emerge in the living creatures. 
Huxley himself admits that these differences amount 
to “an enormous gulf,”—to a “‘ divergence immeasurable 
—practically infinite.” What more striking proof could 
we have than this, that Organic Forms are but as clay 
in the hands of the Potter, and that the “Law” of 
Structure is entirely subordinate to the “ Law” of Pur- 
pose and Intention under which the various parts of 


that structure are combined for use? 


— 


266 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





But Science will continue to ask, even if she never 
gets an answer, What is the community of physical 
cause which produces this community of resulting struc- 
‘ture? The fact which it is most difficult to disengage 
from the theory of Development, or, m other words, 
from the theory of Creation by Birth, is the exist- 
ence of rudimentary or aborted organs; the existence 
of teeth, for example, in the jaws of the Whale—teeth 
which never cut the gum, and which are entirely useless 
to the animal. We have an inherent conviction that 
this must have some use in the future,—that is, in some 
‘organism to be born from this one,—or else it must 
have had some use in the past,—that is, in some 
organism from which this one has descended. In either 
case the power of Inheritance is suggested to the mind- 
We think instinctively of the existence of some Derivative 
Form in which these teeth have been, or are to be turned 
to use. It is only fair towards the Theory of Creation 
by Birth, to admit that it does.explain the existence 
of useless organs in a sense in which no other Theory 
explains them, It would be almost a necessary con- 
sequence of Creation by Birth, that there must be 
stages in which the ultimate use of new Forms could 
not be yet apparent. And if mere beauty or variety 
were in themselves objects which Creative Power sets 
before itself, then, also, we might expect to meet with 








CREATION BY LAW. | 267 





—— 


modifications of structure having no other apparent 
use. Both these explanations, however, exclude Mr. 
Darwin’s idea of Natural Selection; because this is a 
process which can never operate, except through the 
agency of actual use and disuse, upon organs already 
existing and capable of discharging function. The only 
theory of Creation by Birth which really does afford 
some explanation of the facts, is a theory which assumes 
modifications of structure. to be entirely independent 
‘of the effect of actual use or disuse. Mr. Darwin him- 
self candidly admits that in flowers, at least, the forces 
of Correlated Growth do ‘modify important structures 
‘independent of Utility, and therefore of Natural Selec- 
tion.” This admission must be extended to all organic 
growths. ‘There must have been a time with all of them 
when they began to be; and, therefore, a time before 
Natural Selection had room to play. ‘These considera- 
tions, however, only serve to put a higher interpretation 
on the Theory of Creation by Birth. They do not con« 
demn it. 

One suggestion, indeed, has been made on this sub- 
ject which I think it is impossible to accept. When 
men were yet unwilling to admit the existence of life 
and death upon the globe so long before the creation of 
Man, it used to be said that fossils were only “sports of 


nature.” So in our own day, I have heard it said that 





268 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


rudimentary organs are merely intended to satisfy that 
condition of our finite minds in virtue of which we are 
unable to conceive Creation, except in connexion with 
some History and Method of growth. And so, as a 
condescension to this weakness, aborted members are 
given to suggest a History which was never true, and a 
Method which was never followed! Now of one thing 
we may be sure, that there are no fictions of this kind 
in Nature, and no bad jokes. Whatever natural things 
really point to, they point to faithfully ; and the con- 
clusions really indicated are never false. Abortive 
organs mean something, and they mean it truly. 

Still, there is no proof that Inheritance is the only 
cause from which-such structures can arise. In the 
inorganic world we know that not mere similarity, but 
absolute identity of form, as in crystals, is the result of 
laws which have nothing to do with Inheritance, but 
of forces whose nature it is to aggregate the particles of 
matter in identic shapes. It is impossible to say how 
far a similar unity of effect may have been impressed on 
the forces through which vital Organisms are first started 
on their way. There are some essential resemblances 
between all Forms of Life which it is impossible even 
in imagination to connect with community of blood by 
descent. For example, the Bilateral arrangement is 


common to all Organisms, down at least to the Radiata, 








oe 


CREATION BY LAW. 26G 





and in this great class we have the same principle of 
Polarity developed in a circle. Again, the general 
mechanism of the digestive organs by which food is 
in part assimilated and part rejected, is also common 
through a range of equal extent. Indeed, it may be 
said with truth, that never in all the changes of Time 
has there been any alteration throughout the whole 
scale of Organic Life, in the fundamental principles 
of chemical and mechanical adjustment, on which the 
great animal functions of Respiration, Circulation, and 
Reproduction, have been provided for.1 These are 
fundamental similarities of plan, depending probably 
on the very nature of Forces which necessitate these 
adjustments in order to the production of the pheno- 
mena of Life—Forces of which we know nothing, but 
which we have not the slightest reason to suppose to 
be due to Inheritance. Other similarities of plan may 
depend on the same laws, equally unconnected with 
Inheritance by descent. ; 

Inheritance, indeed, has been suggested as the cause 
of organic likeness, mainly because there is a difficulty 
in conceiving any other. But there is at least an equal 
difficulty in conceiving the applicability of this cause to 
Man. We have already seen? that M. Guizot lays it 


1 Agassiz’ ‘* Geological Sketches,” p. 41. London, 1860, 
2 Ante, page 28, 











270: THE REIGN OF LAW. 





down as a physical impossibility that Man—the human 
pair—can have been introduced into the world except 
in complete stature—in the full possession of all his 
faculties and powers. He holds it as certain that on no 
other condition could Man, on his first appearance, 
have been able to survive and to found the human 
family. Even those who question whether this argument 
is entitled to the rank of a self-evident physical truth, 
must admit that it is at least quite as good as the 
opposite assertion, that any origin except the origin of 
natural birth is inconceivable. Where our gnorance 
is so profound, no reasoning of this kind is of much 
value. There is undoubtedly much to be said in 
support of M. Guizot’s position. Certainly, Man as a 
mere animal is the most helpless of all animals. His 
whole frame has relation to his mind, and apart from 
that relation, it is feebler than the frame of any of the 
brutes. All its members are Correlated amongst each 
other with the functions of his Brain, so that action may 
follow upon Knowledge—so that embodiment may be 
possible to Thought. Yet in its plan and structure his 
frame is homologically, that is ideally, the same as the 
frame of the brutes—organ answering to organ, and 
bone to bone. 

The words “Adherence to Type” are words expres- 
sive of an Idea, of a Purpose, which we see fulfilled in 


CREATION BY LAW. 27% 





Organic Forms. But this purpose must have sought 
its own accomplishment by the use of means, and the 
question of Science always is, what were these means? 
Love of beauty is equally a Purpose which we see ful- 
filled in Nature, but in the case of the Humming Birds 
this has been accomplished by giving to their plumes the 
structure of “Thin Plates,”—a structure which decom- 
poses light and flings back its prismatic colours to the 
eye. Fitness and special adaptation is another of the 
purposes of Creation, but this also is attained through 
the careful arrangement, and pliability to use, of physical 
laws. In like manner, “ Adherence to Type” is the ex- 
pression of a fact, or the statement of a Purpose, which, 
like all the other purposes fulfilled in Nature, invites to 
an investigation of the insirumentality employed. We 
see the Purpose, but we do not see the Method. We see 
the purpose, for example, in the wonderful adaptability 
of the Vertebrate Type to the infinite varieties of Life 
to which it serves as an organ and a home. Science’ 
should be allowed without suspicion or remonstrance to 
pursue her proper object, which is to detect, if she can, 
what the method of this work has been. There is no 
point, short of the last and highest, at which Science 
can be satisfied. Her curiosity is insatiable. It is a 
curiosity representing man’s desire of knowledge. But . 


that desire extends into regions where the means of 








272 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





investigation cease, and in which the processes of Veri- 
fication are of no avail. Above and behind every 
Detected Method m Nature there lies the same ultimate 
question as before—What is it by which this is done? 

It is the great mystery of our Bemg that we have 
powers impelling us to ask such questions on the history 
of Creation, when we have no powers enabiing us to 
solve them. Ideas and faint suggestions of reply are 
ever passing across the outer limits of the Mind, -as 
meteors pass across the margin of the atmosphere, but 
we endeavour in vain to grasp or understand them. 
The faculties both of reason and of imagination fall back 
with a sense of impotenee upon some favourite phrase— 
some form of words built up out of the materials of 
analogy, and out of the experience of a Mind, which, 
being finite, is not creative. We beat against the bars 
in vain. The only real rest is in the confession of 
ignorance, and the confession, too, that all ultimate 


physical Truth is beyond the reach of Science.! It is 


1 I have slightly altered this passage as it stood in the earlier 
editions, because, although the context clearly indicates its refer- 
ence to Physical truth, it has been quoted by Mr. Lewes as granting 
all that the Positive Philosophy demands. There is a sense, of 
course, in which it may be said that no Truth knowable by map 
can be ‘‘ultimate.” That is to say, there is no Truth even con- 
ceivable, respecting which we might not ask, or desire to ask, far- 
ther questions. - But there is no use in appearmg to egree with those 





CREATION BY LAW. 273 


probable that even the nearest methods of Creation, 
though far short of ultimate truths, lie behind a veil too 
thick for us to penetrate. It is here surely, if it is 
anywhere in the sphere of: natural investigation, that the 
Man of Science may lay down the weapons of his 
analysis, and say, “I do not exercise myself in great 
matters, or in things which are too high for me.”! 

There is at least one conclusion which is certain, 
namely, this—that no theory in respect to the means 
and method employed in the work of Creation—pro- 
vided such theory takes in all the facts—can have the 
slightest effect in removing that work from the relation 
in which it stands to the attributes of Will. All such 
theories are, and can only be ‘‘simply questions of how 
the Creator has worked.” This is the confession made 


in respect to Mr. Darwin’s theory by one of the most 





competent of its supporters.? Creation by Law—Evolu- 
tion by Law—Development by Law, or, as including all 
those kindred ideas, the Reign of Law, is nothing but 
the reign of Creative Force directed by Creative Know- 
ledge, worked under the control of Creative Power, and 
in fulfilment of Creative Purpose. 

- from whom in reality I so widely differ. The definition of Truth 
which Mr. Lewes would consider ‘‘ ultimate,” and therefore unat- 
tainable, is very different from the definition which I should give, 


and have given, 1 Psalm cxxxi, 


2 Mr. Wallave.—?wrnal of Science, No. XVI. p. 473 
T 


CHAPTER VI. 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 


HEN we pass from the phenomena of Matter 
to the phenomena of Mind, we do not pass 
from under the Reign of Law. Here, too, facts do 
range themselves in an observed Order: here, too, there 
is a chain of cause and effect running throughout all 
events: here, too, we see around us, and feel within us, 
the work of Forces which have always a certain definite 
tendency to produce certain definite results: here, too, 
it is by combination and adjustment among these Forces 
that they are mutually held in check: here, too, accord- 
ingly, special ends can only be accomplished by the 
use of special means. 
But then the question immediately occurs to us— 
can we speak of Law, or of Force, or of “cause and 
effect,” as applied to the phenomena of Mind, in the 
same sense in which we speak of them as applied to 
the phenomena of Matter? Is it only by distant ana- 
logy, or as expressing ideas really the same, that we 
use the same terms of both? 





a SS 8 


THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 275 





Undoubtedly the first thought which suggests itself to 
the mind is, that a material Force and a moral or in- 
tellectual Force are essentially different in kind,—not 
subject to conditions the same, or even similar. But 
are we sure of this? Are we sure that the Forces which 
we call Material are not, after all, but manifestations of 
mental energy and Will? We have already seen that 
such evidence as we have is all tending the other way. 
The conclusions forced upon us have been these :—first, 
that the more we know of Nature the more certain it 
appears that a multiplicity of separate forces does not 
exist, but that all her forces pass into each other, and 
are but modifications of some One Force which is the 
source and centre of the rest : secondly, that all of them 
are governed in their mutual relations by principles of 
arrangement which are purely mental: thirdly, that of 
the ultimate seat of Force in any form we know nothing 
directly : and fourthly, that the nearest conception we 
can ever have of Force is derived from our own con- 
sciousness of vital power. 

If these conclusions be true, it follows that, whether 
as regards that in which Force in itself consists, or as re- 
gards the conditions under which Force is used, it need 
not surprise us if in passing from the material world to 
the world of Mind, we see that Law, in the same sense, 
prevails in the phenomena of both. But as this is a 

T 2 


276 THE REIGN OF LAW 

oe eee 
subject of much difficulty, and of much importance, it 
may be well to examine it a little nearer. 

The first and most palpable form in which we see that 
Mind is subject to Law, is in its connexion with the 
Body. Ard this connexion is so close that we know 
neither where it begins nor where it ends. The extent 
and nature of it can be known only by the same kind of 
reasoning and observation by which we attain to any 
knowledge of the external world. For indeed our Bodies 
seem part of the external world to us. We see their 
form as we see the form of other things, but we do not 
see their structure, neither do we feel it, nor can we 
arrive at it, except as a matter of obscure and difficult 
research. It is literally true that some of the most 
distant objects in the Universe are more accessible to 
our observation, and in some respects more intelligible 
to our understanding, than the material frame in which 
we live. Man had discovered much concerning the cir- 
culation of the Planets before he had discovered anything 
concerning the circulation of his own blood.! Yet so near 
is the current of that blood to him, so much is it a part 
of himself, that when it stops, in an instant “all his 
thoughts perish.” Nevertheless, the Mind is not con- 


scious of its own dependence on material organs. Even 


1 Kepler and Harvey were contemporaries ; but Copernicus had 
preceded them by nearly a hundred years, 





IN THE REALM OF MIND. 277 








In respect to those exertions of the Will which are ex- 
pressed in movements of the Body, we are conscious only 
of the Will, and of the Will being exerted with success ; 
but we are entirely unconscious of the machinery which 
intervenes between the intention and the accomplish- 
ment of the act intended. Such movements of the 
Body appear to us as if they were direct acts of Will. 
Yet nothing can be more certain than that the communi- 
cation is not direct but indirect—and even elaborately 
circuitous. It is only when the ropes and pulleys are 
broken that we discover how that which we call our Will 
can only run in appointed channels—which channels are 
material, and are laid down upon a plan, like conducting 
wires, as if for the conveyance of a material Force. 

Nor does it end here—this close connexion between 
Mind and Matter. So far from being less close, it seems 
to be only closer and closer when we pass to mental 
operations in which no apparent movements of the Body 
are concerned. In the exercise of pure Reason, in 
passing from one mental conception to another, when by 
an effort of our Will we turn our attention to a new 
question, and in the twinkling of an eye pursue a fresh 
train of thought,—above all, when our affections go forth 
towards those who are the objects of them—in all these 
operations, if anywhere, we feel as if we were free from 


mechanism— from “ organs ”— from Matter in any form. 








278 THE REIGN OF LAW 





So it seems till we are brought face to face with the 
terrible phenomena oi disease. Then our delusion is 
dispelled, and we know how frail we are. ‘Then we 
find that the same stroke which paralyses the movement 
of a limb, may paralyse, not less effectually, all the 
powers of Reason, of Memory, and of Will. And the 
Affections,—what becomes of them? These too, which 
seem so putely spiritual, we find out to be dependent on 
material structure. Every physician knows that a 
frequent consequence of cerebral disease is a total 
change of character. There is no symptom of insanity 
more common than the growth of dislike and aversion to 
those who, in health, had been the most loved on earth. 
Change of every kind and degree in the character and 
structure of Mind is the immediate result of correspond- 
ing changes in the structure and substance of the Brain. 
The pure may become impure ; the loving may become 
malignant ; the simple-minded may become suspicious ; 
the generous may become engrossed with self; the 
strong-minded may become imbecile,—the whole man 
may be broken down, and may live for years without 
consciousness and without emotion. How painfully 
does the Brain sometimes indicate its functions! What 
is it in the aspect of Idiotcy, in many of its forms, which 
we instantly recognise, and never can mistake? In that 


low, pinched, and retiring brow, we see instinctively that 





IN THE REALM OF MIND. 270 





Reason cannot hold her seat. These facts do not stand 
alone. Not only are there some parallel facts, but all 
the living world is full of them. The whole range of 
animal creation, from Man down to the Reptile and the 
Fish, testifies to the universal law of an ascending scale 
of mental capacity being coincident with an ascending 
degree of cerebral organisation. No series of facts, 
tending to the establishment of any physical truth, is 
- more complete or more conclusive than the chain which 
connects the functions of the Brain with the phenomena 
of Mind. 

But here, again, let us beware of the fallacies which 
may arise from a failure to recognise the exact import of 
the words we use. In the ears of many it sounds hke 
Materialism to say that Thought is a function of the 
Brain. But it has been already shown in a previous 
chapter that Function is merely the word by which we 
describe that work which any given piece of mechanism 
has been adjusted to perform. The Power, or Force, 
which is developed by means of an “ organ,” is not 
identical with that organ, nor with any of its parts, nor 
with the materials of which it is composed, nor even 
with its mechanism as a whole. It does not follow, for 
example, that Electricity is identical with the tissues of a 
fish, because it is developed out of the battery of a Tor- 
pedo ora Gymnotus. Yet it is true that the develop- 


a . 





280 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


ment and discharge of Electricity is the “ function” of 
those Fish-organs :—that is to say, this is the work which 
they have been adjusted to perform. Still less do we 
confound Thought with Brain when we acknowledge the 
fact that Brain in our Organism is inseparably connected 
with the power of thinking, : 

Yet inferences as false as this, and very nearly related 
to it, have actually been drawn by eminent men from the 
facts of cerebral action. Thus it has been declared that — 
a knowledge of Brain, under a name which is in itself a 
fallacy — Phrenology —is the only sure foundation of 
Mental Science. This is a mere confusion of thought, 
even if the phrenological mapping of the Brain were as 
certainly correct as it is really doubtful. That particular 
faculties of the Mind may be connected with particular 
portions of the Brain, is not in itself more difficult to 
understand or to believe than that the Mind, as a whole, 
is connected with the Brain as a whole. Whether it 
' be so or not is a question purely of observation and of 
fact. But this, at least, is certain,—that the different 
faculties and affections of the Mind must be discrimi- 
nated from each other before it is possible to assign to 
them a local habitation. The Mind must be mapped 
first, and then its Organ. No additional knowledge is 
given to us of any one mental faculty, by proving that it 


is connected with some. special bit of the mysterious 





IN THE REALM OF MIND. 281 





substance’ of which that organ is composed. Love is 
Love, and nothing else ; Hatred is Hatred, and nothing 
else; Reverence is Reverence, and nothing else; the 
pure intellectual perception of a Logical Necessity is 
itself, and nothing else ;—however clearly it may be 
proved that each of these is a function of some separate 
region of the Brain. When the Phrenologist, taking in 
his hand a human skull, and lifting its upper cover, tells 
us that the oval of convoluted matter which is thus ex- 
posed to view “manifests the moral sentiments,” what 
light does he throw on these? The moral sentiments !|— 
what do these include? The power of .seeing Moral 
Beauty, and of loving Truth—the sense of Justice, and 
the desire of serving in her cause—Conscience and 
Benevolence, Charity and Faith—all that is best and 
noblest in the human spirit—these are “ manifested” in 
that bit of Matter! What new information does this 
give us on the nature or the office of those glorious attri- 
butes which are the joy of Earth and Heaven? None 
at all. They are just what we knew them before to be. 
Phrenology is no longer popular, as it once was, among 
Physiologists. Its mapping of the Brain is now gene- 
rally admitted to be imaginary. But the fundamental 
error of the Phrenological School did not lie merely, or 
even mainly, in any mistake as to the mapping of the 


Brain, It lay in the idea that a Science of Mind can be. 





282 . THE REIGN OF LAW 


founded in any shape or form upon the discoveries of 
anatomy. ‘Their error lay in the notion that Physiology 
can ever be the basis of Psychology. And this is an 
error, and a confusion of thought, which survives 
Phrenology. A profound interest indeed attaches to 
every new fact which connects together the parallel 
phenomena of Mind and of Organisation. - But it is the 
phenomena of Mind, and it is these alone, of which we 
are directly cognisant, and it is from these that we must 
start as the basis of all Psychological research. This is 
true even of those phenomena of the mind which are 
most purely animal. Sensation, for example, may be 
traced with absolute demonstration to certain nerves. 
This may throw a new light on the method by which 
Sensation is rendered possible; but it throws no new 
light whatever.upon what Sensation is. It is that which 
. we know and feel it to be, and it is neither more nor less 
since the_-knife of the anatomist has laid bare the 
channels along which it comes. Still more is this true 
of the Intellectual Powers. Yet there are Philosophers 
who appear to think that some new light is cast upon 
Sensation when they call it an affection of the “Sensory 
Ganglia ;” that Thought is in some measure explained 
when it 1s called “ Cerebration,” and that the Laws of 
Intellect are reduced to scientific expression when they 
are described as the working of the ‘ Cerebral Ganglia.” 


0 ger 








IN THE REALM OF MIND. 283) 





all this is a mere idle play on words. It is an attempt to 
put that first which must be last, and that last which 
must be first. The general fact of the dependence of 
Mind on a Bodily organisation is a fact which contains 
within itself all the lesser facts of Physiological dis- 
covery. They are not,.and they cannot be, new in 
kind. ‘They do not even help us to conceive how, 
through any mechanism, the power of Thought can be 
evolved. Still less do they give us any new view of that 
which Thought, in itself, is. 

This connexion, therefore, between Mind and Brain, 
although it is a universal “law” of our being, is a law 
recognised by us only in the sense in which Law is 
applied to “an observed Order of facts.” But like 
every other Order of this kind, it implies a Force or an 
arrangement of Forces out of which the Order comes, 
It implies, too, that this arrangement of Forces is neces- 
sary to the evolution and play of mental faculties in the 
form in which they are possessed by us. Consequently 
these faculties are seen taking their place among all the 
other phenomena of the world. They are seen to de 
under the Reign of Law in this largest and highest sense 
of all—that they depend upon Adjustment, and that 
adjustment so delicate that the slightest disturbance of 
it deranges the whole resulting phenomena of Mind, 


Mind, as developed in us, has its very existence and 








284 THE REIGN OF LAW 


working dependent on imperative physical conditions, 
which conditions are met only by elaborate contrivance. 

We have no knowledge what the Forces are which 
demand this obedience, and which call for this con- 
trivance. We have even an insuperable difficulty in 
conceiving what they can be. It almost seems as if 
there were a barrier in the very nature of our minds 
against the possibility of conceiving how any com- 
bination of material forces can either result in Mind, 
or can be necessary to the working of its powers, or 
can be concerned even in giving it an abode.t “We 
cannot conceive,’ says Dr. Andrew Combe, “even in 
the remotest manner, in what way the Brain—a com- 
pound of water, albumen, fat, and phosphate salts— 
operates in the generating of Thought.” And yet there 
is one experience which brings the fact of this close 
connexion within the direct recognition of Conscious- 
ness. We know and feel that the act of severe thinking 
is attended with the expenditure of Force. ‘The close, 
steady, continuous application of the mind to any sub- 
ject requiring the exercise of our higher intellectual 


1 ** Aperta simplexque mens, nulla re adjuncta que sentire possit, 
fugere intelligentiz nostra vim et notionem videtur.”—Cicero, “ De 
Nat. Deor,” lib, x. .c, 44, 

This is true only in one sense. It is very far from being true, 
that the connexion between Mind and Matter is a necessity of 
thought. 





IN THE REALM OF MIND. 285 





faculties, is well known to be “hard work.” Without 
causing any bodily:movement of which we are con- 
scious, it produces, nevertheless, bodily exhaustion. It 
occasions the expenditure of a physical force, or at least 
of a force for which we have no other name. It is not 
uncommon for men of great age to be able to exert 
undiminished powers of mind for one or two hours, and 
then to lapse into comparative imbecility. Thus the 
exertion of the Brain is like the exertion of a muscle, 
and is attended with the same effects. There is fatigue; 
and with excessive fatigue the power of motion stops. 
Yet such facts as these only puzzle us—they do not 
help us to any clear idea of the nature or manner of 
a connexion which is indeed incomprehensible. We 
know of Mind only as itself, and as nothing else. Tite 
difference between it and all other things seems infinite 
and immeasurable. No doubt this difficulty, or at least 
part of it, arises not from any misconception as to what 
Mind is, (for of this our knowledge is direct,) but from 
a misconception as to what Matter is—and what the 
Forces are which we call material. Close analysis of 
the phenomena of Nature, and of our own ideas in 
regard to them, has already prepared us to believe, that 
these Forces which work in Matter and produce in ug 
the impressions from which we derive our conceptions of 


it, are themselves immaterial, and can be traced running 





236 THE REIGN OF LAW 








up into a region where they are lost in the light of Mind. 
The Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body 
sanctions and involves the notion that there is some 
deep connexion between Spirit and Form which is 
essential, and which cannot be finally sundered even in 
the divorce of Death. The affections hold to this idea 
even more firmly than the intellect. Hence the noble 
and passionate exclamation of the Poet— 


6¢ Eternal Form shall still divide 
The Eternal Soul from all beside, 
And I shall know him when we meet.”’? 


But this first sense in which Mind is under the Reign 
of Law—that is, its dependence on the Body, prepares 
us for yet other senses in which it lies under the same 
dominion. The very fact that the Mind is itself uncon- 
scious of its dependence upon Matter, and of the manner 
and conditions of its connexion with “ organs,” teaches 
us that there is a large class of phenomena connected 
with Mind, of which we should be entirely ignorant if we 
trusted to the direct evidence of Consciousness alone. 
This ought not to inspire us with any distrust of Con- 
sciousness in those matters in which it is a competent 
and indeed the only witness. But there is a large class 


of phenomena of which Consciousness properly so 


4 Tennyson’s “In Memoriam,” No. xlvi, 





a: a 


IN THE REALM OF MIND. 287 


called, that is, the direct perception of the Mind of its 
own present workings, does not inform us. The Mind 
looking in upon itself sees itself only, and does not see 
either the mechanism through which it is able to work 
at all, nor many.of the forces which operate in it and 
upon it. These, some of them at least, can only be 
arrived at by the same processes of reasoning and 
observation which we apply to the external world, and 
by which we ascertain the action and reaction of in- 
voluntary agents. | 

There is nothing of which it is so difficult to per- 
suade ourselves as of this. In the apprehension of 
Consciousness the sense of Will is so strong within us 
‘hat it blinds us to the insuperable conditions which 
Emit both what we will and what we do. That our 
Wills, of whose freedom we are conscious, should often 
be determined by influences of which we have no con- 
sciousness at all; that our opinions should as often be 
the result of causes and not of reasons; that our 
actions should follow a course marked out by con- 
ditions which: we fail to recognise as having any deter- 
mining effect upon them—these are conclusions against 
which we are apt to rebel—as depriving us of a part 
of our free and intelligent agency. Hence the indig- 
nation with which men resent being told that they 


have been impelled by motives other than the motives 








288 THE REIGN OF LAW 


which are avowed, and other than the motives which 
are consciously entertained. Yet the fact of their 
being so impelled is often perfectly plain to those 
around them. The reply, however, is always ready: 


“You seem to know my motives, and the causes of 


my conduct better than I know them myself,”—as if 


the proposition so stated were evidently absurd. But 
it is, on the contrary, a proposition which may well 
be true. Bystanders very often see the forces telling 
upon our Will much more clearly than we see them 
ourselves. It is possible, indeed, by a vigorous effort 
of self-analysis to see all that others see, and a great 
deal more. ‘Those who are able really to look in upon 
themselves, can often detect the influences which have 
been acting on their minds, colouring their opinions, 
and determining their conduct in a degree which the 
higher faculties would be glad to disown and disavow. 
There is nothing more wonderful in the constitution of 
our minds than the power we have of standing aside, 
as it were, for a time, from the ordinary channel of our 
own thoughts, and of looking back upon their currents 
coming down from the hills of Memory and Association 
to juin their issues in our present life. But this sort of 
looking in upon ourselves, and treating ourselves as a 
subject of natural history, is to all men a difficult, and 


to most men an impossible, operation. They have 


IN THE REALM OF MIND. 289 


neither time for it nor thought for it. The conscious 
energies of the Will are so near us, and so ever present 
- with us, that they shut out our view of the forces which 
lie behind. Yet there are some facts common in the 
experience of all men which may help us to a concep- 
tion of the truth. One of these is the fact of Mind 
growing with the growth of years—a fact determined 
by the recollection of childhood, of youth, and of 
maturity. By comparing ourselves with ourselves at 
former periods of life—by the memory of feelings, and 
of opinions, and of methods of thought which we have 
outgrown and left behind us, we can detect the action of 
forces which have told upon our minds—traces, in short, 
of the laws to which they have been subject. Some of these 
laws have been nothing more than laws of physical growth 
—the conceptions of the Mind undergoing a develop: 
ment consequent on the growth of our material Organism. 

Another fact bearing on the same question, but which 
is more easily observed in others than in ourselves, is 
the frequent determination of mental qualities by here- 
ditary transmission. The famous question, as to the 
Origin of our Ideas, and how far they are due respec- 
tively to Experience, to Association, or to Intuition, has 
been discussed by Metaphysicians with far too little 
reference to the organic phenomena which are so closely 
related to the phenomena of Mind. It is not true, 

U = 


oF 








290 THE REIGN OF LAW 

indeed, that Psychology is subordinate to. Physiology ; 
but it is true that these two are so intimately connected, 
that neither is independent of the other. Man is not 
a disembodied Spirit, but a Being whose mental powers 
are subject to the laws of a material organisation. And 
so it is that almost every fact in Physiology has an 
intimate bearing on some question or other in the 
Philosophy of Mind. No better illustration could be 
given than one which arises out of this question of 
the Ongin of our Ideas. In one of the many formulz 
of expression to which Mr. J. S. Mill has reduced the 
assertion that Experience is the source and origin of - 
all our thoughts and actions, he is obliged to except 
from the sweep of that assertion the voluntary move- 
ments of the Body. He says, “ We bring about any 
fact, other than our own muscular contractions, by means 
of some other fact which experience has shown to be 
followed by it.”! Now let us observe the immense 
significance which attaches to this exception. Why is 
Mr. Mill compelled to make it? Because he mixes up in 
one assertion two propositions which are totally distinct, 
one being true universally, and the other being true only 
partially. The first proposition is, that all facts which 
we can. “bring about,” must be so brought about by 


_ 4 ** Auguste Comte and Positivism,” by J..S. Mill, p. % 


- 





IN THE REALM OF MIND. 291 
the use of means. This is true universally. The second 
proposition is, that we are guided to the knowledge of 
those means by Experience alone. Now, this last pro- 
position is not true, as Mr. Mill is obligéd to confess, of 
the whole class of facts which are brought about by vital 
effort. But the muscular contractions of the Body are 
no exception whatever to the mere general affirmation 
that all actions must have a cause, or in other words, 
must be brought about by the use of means. Excep- 
tions they are, however, to the affirmation that the 
nature of those means is made known to us by Ex- 
perience. The sentence, in so far as it asserts the 
universal Law of Causation, might have been so framed 
as to require no abatement or exception whatever. 
‘We bring about any fact by means of some other fact 
which we know either by experience or by Lntuition 
to be followed by it.” - In this form the sentence is 
absolutely true, and applies to “our own muscular con- 
tractions,” as well as to every other action. But philo- 
sophers who support the doctrine of. Experience do not 
like the word ‘intuition ;” and though they cannot do 
without it altogether, they use it as seldom as they can. 
They feel very naturally, and very truly, that if Intuition 
be admitted in regard to the ultimate phenomena of 
Volition, the idea will not easily be dispelled that In- 
tuition may extend also to the ultimate phenomena of 





292 THE REIGN OF LAW 


Thought. Now the muscular contractions of the Body 
stand at the very fount and origin of all we do; and it 
is more than probable that analogous movements of the 
Brain stand as near to the origin of all we think. 

The bearing of this question on the Philosophy of 
Mind cannot be mistaken. ‘The muscular contractions 
of the Body are of two kinds—one kind is constant, 
automatic, and lasting with the dtrration of life itself. 
The other kind is intermittent, voluntary, and capable 

of being destroyed whilst the Consciousness, and the 
7 Intelligence, and the Will are still in use. Both these 
kinds of action are rendered_ possible by the use of 
means: but it is only in the case of one of them 
that those means are placed at the bidding of the Will. 
Yet it is not Experience which teaches us how to use 
those means. It is purely Instinct or Intuition. We 
are not even conscious of the very existence of the 
means which we employ, and the profoundest researches 
of Science do not even yet give us the faintest notion 
what their ultimate nature is. No experience whatever 
is required to teach a child how to extend its limbs or 
how to exert its voice. Nevertheless, neither of these 
things can be done except through the use of means. 
The only difference between these actions and actions 
of a more complicated kind is, that the appropriate 
means are resorted to and employed by Intuition, 





ED 


IN THE REALM OF MIND. 293 





The Will which moves the limbs, and moves them 
through the use of a complicated machinery, is born 
with the Organism of which that machinery forms a 
part, and has an instinctive knowledge how to use it. 
Now, it is against the analogy of Nature to suppose 
that this great class of facts respecting the powers of 
the Body are without some corresponding facts respect- 
ing the powers of Mind. Indeed, all vital pheno- 
mena of this kind are in themselves necessarily pheno- 
mena both of Body and of Mind. The close connexion 
which exists between the two, and the inseparable 
analogies which unite all their workings, render it there- 
fore almost certain that the Mind is to be regarded as 
having both kinds of movement which the physical 
Organism possesses—that is, faculties which are auto- 
matic in their action—and other faculties which, though 
subject to direction by the Will, yet work upon the 
materials presented to them in- a manner strictly in- 
tuitive and independent of all experience. 

And as the abnormal phenomena of disease, or of 
malformation, often throw an important light on the 
structure of the body, so do certain abnormal intellectual 
phenomena give us strange glimpses occasionally into 
the powers of Mind. Among those phenomena, none 
are more curious than the intuitive powers of numerical 


computation which a few individuals have possessed. 


enc 


294 THE REIGN OF LAW 





* 


There are well attested cases of this power in virtue of 
which the mind reaches the result of difficult calculations 
by a species of Intuition—that is to say, without any 
consciousness of the process by which that result is 
made apparent to the Mind. This is not a proof that 
there is no process, but only that it is a process gone 
through as a machine goes through a process—that is, 
according to its own pre-adjusted laws of Motion. Per- 
haps, indeed, this process may not be different in kind 
from the process by which the average mind reaches the 
most elementary of arithmetical truths. The product of 
one and one, or of two and two, may be self-evident to 
all of us only in the same way in which the product of a 
long series of figures may be self-evident to minds with 
an abnormal gift of the arithmetical faculty. Thus the 
distinction breaks down between self-evident truths and 
truths which. are not self-evident. A truth may be self- 
evident to one mind which is not self-evident to another, 
but may require, on the contrary, a laborious process of 
verification. And does not this again, lead us to see 
how entirely dependent are the phenomena of Mind 
upon the power of special Faculties, and how this power 
is itself dependent on the Adjustments of. Organisation ? 
In the world of Physics, we know that we are surrounded 
by movements which never make themselves sensible to 


us—-pulsations which excite In our eyes no sense of light 





IN THE REALM OF MIND. 295 





—and others which excite in our ears no sense of sound, 
—and all this for want of adjusted organs. And so it 
would seem as if the Mind of Man were an Instrument 
attuned only to a certain range of knowledge, but as if 
within that range it were capable of finer and finer adjust- 
ments to the harmonies of Truth. These cannot make 
themselves heard where there is no organ to catch the 
sound. Nor could that organ translate them into 
Thought—into that conscious apprehension of which 
an Idea essentially consists,—had it not its own pre- 
adjusted relation to the Verities of the World. 

It must be remembered, however, that in the discussion 
ef such. questions as to the Origin of our Ideas, there 
has been a great want of definition in the use of terms, 
Are fear, and love, and hatred, and anger, and jealousy, 
and remorse, and joy,—are these “ideas,” or are they 
only conditions or powers of mind? If by Ideas we 
mean those imaginings which, as the very word implies, 
involve “images” of external things, it is certain that 
contact with external impressions, and, in this sense, 
Experience, is essential to the formation of them. But 
if by Ideas we mean the elementary passions, or if we 
mean even those peculiarities of thought—those special 
tendencies of mind which lead us to view things in some 
particular light rather than in others, and which con- 


stitute the essential distinction between the ideas of 





296 THE REIGN OF LAW 
' different men—if, in short, we include in the term any- 
thing which belongs to the Thinking Faculty itself, or 
anything of the method according to which it works up 
the raw material of Thought—then it is equally certain 
that Ideas in this sense are born with all of us, and 
that Imitation, and Experience, and Association, do but 
pour their material into moulds already cast for their 
reception. | 

But in reality here, as in many other questions, the 
rival disputants have each had some portion of the truth. 
They have been both right and both wrong. An Idea 
is not a simple, but a composite thing. It has not one 
origin, but a plurality of origins. An Idea is, as it were, 
a fabric of which the threads come from the spinner, and 
the weaving from the loom. Or it is, as it were, an 
organic growth, of which the materials are supplied from 
the external world, and the structure from the world 
within, There are many elements in every Idea which 
come, and can only come, from without. There are 
other elements, and among them the Formative Power, 
which come, and only can come, from within. The 
Mind stands in pre-established relations to the things 
around it—bound to them by the infinite adjustments 
which may be called External Correlations of Growth. 
Out of these relations it is not itself, nor do its powers 


possess the materials whereon to work. We cannot 





— 


IN THE REALM OF MIND. — 297 


conceive a mind having no points of contact with the 
external world. From that world must come all the 
exciting causes of Thought, and of Emotion. But the 
form into which these are cast—the tissue into which 
these are woven—the force by which Ideas become a 
Power—all, in short, that constitutes Thought as distin- 
guished from the things about which we think—all this 
comes from, and belongs to, the Mind itself. 

Among the lower animals, young ones, taken from 
the litter or the nest, and brought up under conditions 
wholly removed from the teaching of their parents, 
whether by imitation or otherwise, will reproduce exactly 
all those habits of their race which belong to their 
natural modes of life. Many of these habits, perhaps it 
may be safely said all of them, imply Ideas—that is to 
say, they imply instincts ; and instincts are in the nature 
of ideas—that is to say, they belong to the phenomena 
of Mind. And of this there is another indication in a — 
fact which at first sight may seem trivial or irrelevant. 
It has been often said tha‘ one great difficulty in reason- 
ing on this subject, is the inaccessibility to observation 
of the mental condition of all infant creatures. But 
even if this were more true than it really is, there are 
some creatures, not low in the scale of creation, of whiciu 
it may be said that, comparatively, they have no infancy 
at all. These are the Gallinaceous Birds in general, 








298 THE REIGN OF LAW 





and some Species in particular. They come forth from: 
the egg perfect miniatures of their parents, and with 
minds as fuily equipped with parental instincts as their 
bodies are provided with feather or their wings with 
quills. Antecedent to all experience of injury, they 
exhibit fear, and not only fear, but fear of the proper 
objects. They will flee when they see a hawk, and they 
will carefully avoid a stinging insect. In Europe the 
young of the Woodgrouse or Gelinotte are able to fly 
from ihe moment they break the shell. In Australia, 
and the great group of islands which connect Australia 
with the Asiatic continent, there is a still more curious 
example of the same fact. There is a Family of Birds 
(AZegapodide) of which the young are hatched, not by 
the incubation of the parents, but by the heat of fermen- 
tation generated in earthen mounds, scraped together 
for the purpose. From the moment the young are 
hatched they feed themselves, and run, and fly, and 
roost on trees, as if the world on which they have just 
opened their eyes had been long familiar. It is said, 
indeed, that the Parent Bird watches the Hatching 
Mound, and is ready to escort the chicks upon their 
first appearance in the surrounding scrub. But the 
recognition of the Parent by the young, and the answe1 
to her call, are the most remarkable of all among these 


. proofs of intuitive ideas. “As a moth emerges from a 


eee 


IN THE REALM OF MIND. 209 
Chrysalis, dries its wings, and flies away, so the young 
Telegallus, when it leaves the egg, is sufficiently perfect 
to be able to act independently.1 Nor is this all; the 
curious instinct by which the Bird prepares an artificial 
Incybator for its young is an instinct born with it—an 
Innate Idea expressing itself in congenital habits of 
body. The chick of another Species of this singular 
family of Birds, the Megapode, was found in confine- 
ment to be incessantly scraping up sand and gravel into 
heaps, and the rapidity and power with which it effected 
this operation is described with astonishment by its 
captor. 

These may seem far-fetched illustrations, and of slight 
value in so dark a subject; but let .us remember that 
there are no solitary facts in Nature. ‘There are indeed 
extreme cases,—extreme examples of universal laws,— 
that is to say, of laws whose operation is ordinarily 
restrained within narrower limits. But there is no fact 
standing really alone—not one which is not bound to 
the whole Order of Nature by deep analogies. That 
any creatures should be ushered into life so completely 
organised and furnished as the young of the Gallinaceous 
Birds and of the Megapodes, is a fact of immense signih- 
cance in the phenomena of Organic Life.? 


1 Gouid’s ‘‘ Birds of Australia.” 2 See Note E, 





300 THE REIGN OF LAW 

In Man analogous facts appear, modified by his 
infinitely wider range of character, and the infinite 
degrees in which the different elements of Mind are 
capable of being mixed in him. But although these 
conditions greatly complicate the result, the general 
phenomena are the same. Orphans, who have never 
had any opportunities of acquiring, by imitation, the 
peculiarities of their parents, will often, nevertheless, 
reproduce these peculiarities with curious exactness. 
This is a familiar fact, and how much this fact im- 
plies! Even when the inheritance is merely some 
congenital habit of body, or some trick of manner, it 
may, probably, imply some resemblance deeper than 
appears. For the Body and the Mind are in such close 
relationship, that congenital habits of Body are sure 
to be connected with congenital habits of Mind. But 
the inheritance is very often, so far as we can see, 
purely mental. How often do we recognise the tone, 
character, and the very turn of thought of dead friends, 
in the conversation and conduct of their children! The 
innate tendency to look at things in the same point of 
view, is evidenced in the reproduction of the same 
mental combinations, of the same images, of the same 
opinions, in short, of the same ideas. Cases, more 
remarkable than others of this kind, attract our atten- 


tion, and we at once recognise ideas as innate which are 


IN THE REALM OF MIND. 30f 


so obviously determined by the forces of hereditary 
transmission. But we forget how often these laws of 
inheritance must be working invisibly where they never 
break ground upon the surface. And thus it is brought 
home to us how the Mind may be subject to laws of 
which it is unconscious—how its whole habit of thought, 
and thé -aspect in which different questions present 
themselves to its apprehension, are in a great measure 
determined by the mysterious forces of congenital con- 
stitution. And what is true in one measure of the indi- 
vidual mind, is true, also, in other measures, of whole 
families and of races of Men. , i 

But the laws of Material Organisation are not the only 
laws to which Mind is subject. Obscure as these laws 
are, there are others which are obscurer still. What we 
cannot see in detail, we can see in the gross. What we 
cannot recognise in ourselves, we are able to recognise 
in others. We can see that the actions and opinions 
of men, which are the phenomena of Mind, do range 
themselves in an observed Order, upon which Order we 
can found, even as we do in the material world, very safe 
conclusions as to the phenomena which will follow upon 
definite conditions. And when we go back to former 
generations—to the history of nations, and the progress 
of the human race—-we can detect still more clearly an 


orderly progress of events. In that order the operation 








302 . THE REIGN OF LAW 
of great general causes becomes at once apparent. On 
the recognition of such causes the Philosophy of History 
depends ; and upon that recognition depends not less the 
possibility of applying to the exigencies of our own time, 
and of our own society, a wise and successful legislation. 
But what are these causes, and what is the nature 
of those “laws” to which voluntary agents are uncon- 
sciously obedient? Is man’s Voluntary agency a de- 
lusion, or is it, on the contrary, just what we feel it 
to be, and is it only from misconception of its nature 
that we puzzle over its relation to Law? W >: speak, and 
speak truly, of our Wills being free ; but free from what? 
Tt seems to be forgotten that Freedom is not an absolute 
but a relative term. There is no such thing existing as 
absolute freedom—that is to say, there is nothing exist- 
ing in the world, or possible even in thought, which is 
absolutely Alone—entirely free from inseparable relation- 
ship to some other thing or things. Freedom, therefore, 
is only intelligible as meaning the being free from some 
particular kind of restraint or of inducement to which 
other beings are subject. From what, then, is it that 
our Wills are free? Are they free from the influence of 
motives? Certainly not. And what are motives? A 
motive is that which moves, or tends to move, the mind 
in a particular direction. Like all other words which 


are used to describe the phenomena of Mind, it is taken 


BR ee «ee 


IN THE REALM OF MIND. 30 


Ww 





from the language applicable to material things, and 
suggests the analogies which exist between them. It 
belongs to the profound but unconscious metaphysics 
of Human Speech. That which moves the Mind in a 
particular direction is best conceived of as something 
which exerts a force upon it, and the aggregate of such 
forces may, in a general sense, be called the laws which 
determine human action and opinions. 

But here we come upon the great difficulty which 
besets every attempt to reduce to system the laws or 
forces whicl. operate on the Mind of Man. It is the 
immense, the almost boundless variety and number of 
them. This variety corresponds with the variety of 
powers with which his Mind is gifted. For pre-established 
relations are necessary to the effect of every force, 
whether in the material or in the moral world. Special 
forces operate upon special forms of matter, and except 
upon these, they exert no action whatever. For no force 
can operate except where there are pre-established rela- 
tions between its energies and the things upon which its 
energies are to work. The Polar Force of. magnetism 
acts on different metals in different degrees, and there is 
a large class of substances which are almost insensible 
to its power. In lke manner there are a thousand 
things that exercise an attractive power on the mind of 


a civilised man, which would exercise no power whatever 





304 THE REIGN OF LAW 





upon the mind of a savage. And in this lies the only 
difference between subjection to Law under which the 
lower animals are placed, and the subjection to Law 
which is equally the condition of Mankind. Free Will, 
in the only sense in which this expression is intelligible, 
has been erroneously represented as the peculiar pre- 
rogative of Man. But the Will of the lower animals 
is, within their narrow spheres of action, as free as ours. 
A man is not more free to go to the right hand or to the 
left than the Eagle, or the Wren, or the Mole, or the 
Bat. The only difference is, that the Will of the lower 
animals is acted upon by fewer and simpler motives. 
And the lower the organisation of the animal, the fewer 


and simpler these motives are. Hence it is that the 


conduct and choice of animals—that is, the decision. 


of their Will under given conditions—can be predicted 
with almost perfect certainty. Their faculties, few in 
number and limited in range, are open only to the small 
number of forces which are related to them ; and in the 


absence of higher faculties accessible to other motives, 


these few attractions exert a determining effect upon 
their Will. 

Accordingly we may see that, in proportion as there is 
an approach among the lower animals to the higher 
faculties of Mind, there is, in corresponding proportion, a 


1 See Note F, 


IN THE REALM OF MIND. 305 





difficulty in predicting their conduct. Perhaps the best 
illustration of this is a very homely one—it is the effect 
of baits and traps. Some animals can be trapped and 
caught with perfect certainty; whilst there are others 
upon which the motive presented by a bait. is counter- 
acted by the stronger motive of caution against danger, 
when a higher degree of intelligence enables the animal 
to detect its presence. Yet the Will of the cunning 
animal is not more free than the Will of the stupid 
animal,—nor is the Will of the stupid animal more sub- 
ject to Law than the Will of the cunning one. The 
Will of the young Rat, which yields to the temptation of 
a bait, and is caught, is not more subject to Law than 
the Will of the old Rat, who suspects stratagem, resists 
the temptation and escapes. They are both subject to 
Law in precisely the same sense and in precisely the 
same degree—that is to say, their actions are alike deter- 
mined by the forces to which their faculties are acces- 
sible. Where these are few and simple, the resulting 
action is simple also; where these are many and compli- 
cated, the resulting action has a corresponding variety. 
Thus the conduct of animals is less capable of being 
predicted in proportion as it is difficult or impossible to 
foresee the nature or number of the motive forces which 
are brought to bear upon the Will. Man’s Will is free in 
the same sense, and in the same sense only. It is sub- 
= 


306 THE REIGN OF LAW 


ject to Law in the same sense, and in the same sense 
alone. ‘That is to say, it is subject to the influence of 
motives, and it can only choose among those which are 
presented to it, or which the mind has been given the 
power of presenting to itself.? 

But in this last power we touch the secret of -that 
boundless difference which separates Man from the 
highest of the animals below him. There is such a gulf 
between the faculties of his mind and those of the lower 
animals, that the forces acting on the human spirit be- 
come, by comparison, innumerable, and involve motives 
belonging to a wholly different class and order. He is 
exposed, indeed, to the lower motives in common with 
the beasts. But there are others which operate largely 
upon him which never can and never do operate upon 
them. Foremost among these are the motives which 
Man has the power of bringing to bear upon himself, 
arising out of his power of forming Abstract Ideas, out 
of his possession of Beliefs, and, above all, out of his 
Sense of Right and Wrong. So strong are these motives 
that they are able constantly to overpower, and some- 
times almost to destroy, the forces which are related to 
his lower faculties. Again, among the motives which 
operate upon him, Man has a selecting power. He can, 
as it were, stand owt from among them,—look down from 


3 See Note G. 





IN THE REALM OF MIND. 307 








above them,— compare them among each other, and 
bring them to the test of Conscience. Nay more, he can 
reason on his own character as he can on the character 
of another Being,—estimating his own weakness with 
reference to this and the other motive, as he is conscious 
how each may be likely to tell upon him. When he 
knows that any given motive will be too strong for him, 
if he allow himself to think of it, he can shut it out from 
his mind by “keeping the door of his thoughts.” He 
can, and he often does, refuse the thing he sees, and hold 
by another thing which he cannot see. He may, and he 
often does, choose the Invisible in preference to the 
Visible. He may, and he often does, walk by Faith and 
not by Sight. Itis true that in doing this he must be 
impelled by something which is itself only another 
motive, and so it is true that our Wills can never be free 
from motives, and in this sense can never be free from 
“Law.” But this is only saying that we can never be 
free from the relations pre-established between the struc- 
ture of our minds, and the system of things in which 
they are formed to move. From these, it is true indeed, 
that we never can be free. But as a matter of fact, we 
know that these relations do net involve compulsion. It is 
from compulsion that our Wills are free, and from nothing 
else: and for this freedom we have the only evidence 
we can ever have for any ultimate truth respecting the 
X 2 


308 . THE REIGN OF LAW 


powers of Mind—the evidence of Consciousness—that 
is, the evidence of observation turned in upon ourselves. — 

The discussions of many centuries seem to have re- 
sulted, at last, in some real progress upon this vexed 
question of Necessity and Free-will. That progress lies 
mainly in a clearer definition of terms. The most emi- 
nent living philosopher who represents the doctrine, 
commonly called the Doctrine of Necessity, repudiates 
that name as incorrect, expressly on the ground that the 
word Necessity, as commonly applied, signifies com- 
pulsion. Undoubtedly it does; and if this meaning be 
repudiated, then the word is not used in its ordinary 
and legitimate sense. ‘This, indeed, Mr. Mill confesses, 
whilst yet he casts upon his opponents the blame of a 
misunderstanding, which assuredly lies with those who 
do not employ ordinary words in the ordinary signifi- 
cation. “ The truth is,” he says, “that the assailants of 
the doctrine (of Necessity) cannot do without the asso- 
ciations engendered by the double meaning of the word 
Necessity, which in this application signifies only in- 
variability, but, 7 tts common employment, compulsion.” 1 
He believes, therefore, in Necessity only in the sense of 
Invariability. But if the doctrine which Mr. Mill favours 
has suffered from one ambiguity, it seeks to shelter itself 


1 **Kxamination of Sir W. Hamilton’s Philosophy,” by J. S, 
Mill, p. 492, note, 





IN THE REALM OF MIND, 309 
under the protection of another ambiguity much more 
deceptive. If there is a double meaning in the word 
Necessity which has exposed the Necessitarian doctrine 
to unjust objections, it-is equally true that there is a 
double meaning in the word Invariability which lends to 
that doctrine an undue advantage. Invariability can be 
predicated of mental action in this vague general sense 
—that all the movements of Mind must invariably arise 
from some motive. But this is a kind of “ Invariability” 
which admits of any amount of variation. For, as 
in the language of this philosophy, Necessity does not 
mean compulsion, so by Invariability, as applied to 
the phenomena of Mind, nothing more is meant than 
that, in respect to mental action, there is an “ abstract 
possibility of its being foreseen.” “If,” says Mr. Mill, 
“ necessity means more than this abstract possibility of 
being foreseen ; if it means any mysterious compulsion, 
apart from simple invariability of sequence, I deny it 
as strenuously as any one.” ! 

But now let us insist, as in such subjects we are 
bound to do, on still clearer definitions. We shall find, 
in the first place, that the “abstract possibility” of 
foreseeing mental action depends on nothing less than 
such absolute knowledge of character and of motive 


1 ‘*Examination of Sir W. Hamilton’s Philosophy,” p. 517. See 
Note H. 





com ne 


310 - THE REIGN OF LAW 





as can belong to God alone. We shall then find, in 
the second place, that this favourite phrase, “ in- 
variability of sequence,” is as ambiguous as others of 
‘ the same class. It does not mean that any particular 
sequences are invariable, but only that there must 
always be some sequence—that it is invariably true 
that everything which happens has proceeded from some- 
thing aS a cause, and leads to something as a conse- 
quence. But this is a proposition which evidently, when 
reduced to its true dimensions, has no adverse bearing 
whatever on the doctrine of Free Will. The “ abstract” 
possibility of foreseeing mental action depends on these 
two propositions: first, that where a the conditions of 
that action are constant, the resulting action will be con- 
stant also; and, secondly, that absolute and perfect 
l:nowledge of the whole of those conditions would carry 


with it sure foreknowledge also of the choice to which 


they lead. But surely this is not only true, but some- 
thing very like a truism. There is nothing to object to 


1 Mr. Mansel, following other philosophers on this point, reduces 
the modified doctrine of Necessity to this identical proposition, 


‘that the prevailing motive prevails.” Mr. Mill’s reply is altogether _ 


unsatisfactory.—Zxamination of Sir W. Lamilton's Philosophy, 
pp. 518, 519. 

I cannot help adding here—although the observation has reference 
to another subject-—that Mr. Mill appears to me to have exposed 
with great force and clearness the verbal fallacies involved in Mr. 
Mansel’s work on the ‘‘ Limits of Religious Thought,” and espe- 


, a 
eae 
Se 





IN THE REALM OF MIND. 8 3E0 


or deny in the doctrine, that if we knew everything that 
determines the conduct of a man, we should be able to 
know what that conduct will he. That is to say, ¢f we 
‘knew a the motives which are brought by external 
agencies to bear upon his mind, and zf we knew all the 
other motives which that mind evolves out of its own 
‘powers, and out of previously acquired materials, to bear 
upon itself; and zf we knew the character and dis- 
position of that mind so perfectly as to estimate exactly 
the weight it will allow to all the different motives 
operating upon it,—zhen we should be able to predict 
with certainty the resulting course of conduct. 

This is true, not only as an abstract conception, but as 
a matter of experience in the little way towards perfect 
knowledge along which we can ever travel. We can pre- 
dict conduct with almost perfect certainty when we know 
character with an equal measure of assurance, and when 
we know the influences to which that character will be 
exposed. In proportion as we are sure of character, in 
the same proportion we are sure of conduct. Yet we 
never think of the Will being the less free, because we 
can predict its course. What we know in such cases is 
simply the use which, under given conditions, will be 


cially in the use he makes of such forms of expression as ‘* The 
Absolute,” ‘*The Infinite,” &c.—See the chapter (vii.) on ‘‘ The 
Philosophy of the Conditioned as applied by Mr. Mansel to Reli- 
gion,” in the same work, 


ee 


312 ; THE REIGN OF LAW 





made of freedom. ‘There is no certainty in the world of 
Physics more absolute than some certainties inthe world _ 
of Mind. We know that a humane man will not do i 
a uselessly cruel action. We know that an honourable 
man will not do a base action. And if in such cases we 
are deceived in the result, we know that it is because we 
were ignorant of some weakness or of some corruption ; 
that is to say, we were ignorant of some elements of 
character. But we never doubt that, if those had been 
known, we could have foreseen the resulting lapse. Per- 
fect knowledge must therefore be perfect foreknowledge. 
To know the present perfectly, is to know the future 
certainly. To know all that is, is to know all that will 
be. To know the heart of Man completely, is to know 
his conduct completely also ; for “ out of the heart are 
the issues of life.” So far from this conclusion being 
dangerous or hostile to any part of the Christian system, 
it is a conclusion which enables us, in a dim way, not 
merely to hold as a Belief, but to see as a necessary 
truth, that there can be no chance in this world,—and 
how it is, and must be, that to the All-seeirg and Ali- 
knowing the Future is as open as the Present and the 
Past, But none of these ideas involve the idea ot com- 
pulsion ; and the absence of compulsion is all that can 
be meant by Freedom. | 

And as by Freedom, we.do not mean freedom from 


ra 
£ 





ee 


IN THE .REALM OF MIND. 313 





: we: . 
motives, so neither do we mean that any of the phe- 


“nomena of Mind, any more than any of the phenomena 
of Matter, can arise without “an antecedent.” In this 
sense there is no contradiction between the doctrine of 
Free. Will and the amended doctrine of Necessity. Man 
is subject to the law of Causation in this sense, “that 
his volitions are not self-caused, but determined by 
spiritual antecedents in such sort that when the ante- 
cedents are the same, the volitions will always be the 
same.”? But this word “antecedent” is one of the 
many vague words in which metaphysicians delight. 
The highest antecedents which we can ever trace as 
determining conduct, are to be found in the constitu- 
tion of mind itself Love is an antecedent, so is Rever- 
ence, so is Gratitude, so is the Hunger after Knowledge, 
so is the Desire of Truth. So also is the action of 
other Spirits upon our own. Higher than these—further 
up the chain of Cause and Effect—we cannot go. And 
yet we need not conceive of these as “ Final Causes,” 
nor does the doctrine of our Free Will assign to the 
human Mind any self-originating power. Man _ has 
‘nothing which he did not receive. Such freedom as 
his Will possesses has been given to him, and given 
him, too, as we have dimly seen, by the employment 


and by the device of means. It is a power belonging 


1 ** Mill on Hamilton,” pp. 492, 493. 





314 THE REIGN OF LAW 





to his structure, and derived from Him by whom that 


structure has been devised. 
**Our Wills are ours, we know not how.” 


The power which in health we possess of preferring 
one motive to all others, whilst yet the influence of 
those others may be strongly felt, is a power which 
like every other, must have its own ‘ antecedent ”— 
that is to say, its own cause, and its own purpose. But 
these are to be found in the Adjustment from which the 
power arises,—in the Mind by which that adjustment 
has been contrived, and in the Purposes which it reveals. 
The freedom of Man’s Will is not more mysterious, 
when it is exerted in directing the Mind to one motive, 
and averting it from another, than when it is exerted in 
turning the Body to the right hand rather than to the left. 

The difficulty of reconciling, in one clear Order ‘of 
Thought, the idea of the Freedom of our own Will 
with the idea of Causation, is not really so great a diffi- 


1 The whole of this passage on Necessity and Free Will has 
been severely criticised in an article in the Dublin Review for April 


1867, as involving a practical abandonment of the very doctrine 


which I profess to defend. The argument there maintained seems 
to me altogether erroneous ; and I have seen no reason to alter the 
text in any material point. The subject, however, is so important 
in itself, and so, interesting as regards the history of Philosophy, 
that I have thought it right to deal with it ina separate note (F) 
already referred to, 





IN THE REALM OF MIND. ore 


culty as the use of ambitious and ambiguous language 
has made it appear to be. ‘There are two sentences 
in Mr. J. S. Mill’s work, on the Philosophy of Comte, | 
which afford the best possible illustration both of the 
true doctrine on the relation in which Will stands to 
Law, and of the false doctrine into which it may be 
merged by the ambiguous use of words. In one pas- 
sage Mr. Mill defines the Positive as distinguished from 
the Theological Mode of Thought to be—“ that all 
phenomena, without exception, are governed by in- 
variable laws, with which no volitions either natural or 
supernatural interfere.” + It is at least satisfactory to 
find in this sentence so clear an avowal that the idea 
of free Divine Volition in the region of the Supernatural, 
and the idea of free Human Volition in the region of 
the Natural, stand on the same ground, are exposed to 
the same intellectual difficulties, and are both equally 
denied by the new Philosophy. But as a definition of 
the Positive mode of thought it stands in curious con- 
trast with another passage of the same work, in which 
Mr. Mill says that “the Theological mode of explain- 
ing phenomena was once universal, zwzth the exception, 
doubtless, of the familiar facts which being even then seen 
to be controllable by human Will belonged already to the 
Positive Mode of Thought.” * 


1“ Aug. Comte and Positivism,” p. 12. 2 Ibid. pp. 31, 3% 





316 THE REIGN OF LAW 





These two sentences involve, on the face of them, 
contradictory positions. The one affirms that no vo- 
.litions can interfere with the laws which govern pheno- 
mena, and that the recognition of this is the very essence 
of the Positive Philosophy. ‘The other affirms that the 


Positive Mode of Thought is involved in tke very idea ' 


of facts being controllable by human Will. 

It is not, perhaps, very important to ask which of 
these two sentences gives the most accurate description 
of the Positive Philosophy; but it is of much impor- 
tance to ask which of these two positions is nearest to 
the truth? Beyond all doubt, it is the last. If the 
Positive Philosophy were content with the assertion that 
the power of Will over facts depends on the invaria- 
bility of Laws—that is, on the constancy of Natural 
Forces—it would be sound enough. And so, the second 
of the two sentences I have quoted sets forth the central 
idea of that Philosophy in its most favourable light. But 
in the first of those two sentences we have a concen- 
tration of all that is erroneous in Positivism, and at the 
same time a typical example of the ambiguities and 
obscurities of language on which the fallacies of that 
Philosophy depend. There is hardly a single word in that 
sentence which is not ambiguously used. “ Phenomena ” 
and “facts,” “govern” and “control,” and “interfere 


with,” are all used in ambiguous sensés; whilst, as usual, 








IN THE REALM OF MIND. 317 





b] 


the words “ Law” and “ Invariable,” are used not only 
ambiguously, but unintelligibly. In order to test these 
ambiguities we have only to compare the two sentences 
together. ‘ Phenomena” in the one sentence seems to 
correspond with “facts” in the other. Yet, we have 
this result,—that “phenomena” are governed by In- 
variable Law, whilst “facts” are controllable by human 
Will. It would appear, then, that the ‘“ phenomena” 
which are governed by Law cannot be the same with the 
“facts,” which are controllable by Will :—or else, if they 
be the same, then there must be some essential dis- 
tinction between “ controlling” and “ governing.” What 
is this distinction? It is not defined, or even suggested. 
Then; again, if no volitions can “interfere with” Laws, 
how can volitions “control” facts? If Will controls 
facts, and yet can’t “interfere with” Laws, how is the 
control over facts exercised? What is the relation be- 
tween the Laws which no volitions can “interfere with,” 
and the “facts” which volitions do actually “control ?” 
Can Will control facts, which again are governed by laws, 
(in some sense or other) either by interfering with those 
laws, or controlling them P 

If it were possible to get any definite meaning out 
of this confusion of words, perhaps it might be said 
that Will can “control” Law, but cannot “ interfere 


with” it. There is at least a glimmering of the truth in 





318 THE REIGN OF LAW 





this. But no man could gather from those two sen- 


tences of Mr. Mill what the truth is, although, after all, 


the truth is plain enough, if only some care be taken | 


to confine definite words to some sort of definite mean- 
ing. If by Laws are meant the elementary Forces of 
Nature, and if by “interfering” with them is meant any 
power of altering their own essential energies—then it 
is true that no volitions of ours can interfere with them. 
But then it cannot be too often repeated that, in this 
sense, phenomena are Nor governed by Invariable Laws ; 
because phenomena are never the result of individual 
Forces, but are always the result of the conditions 
under which several F orces are combined, and these 
conditions are always variable. If, again, “interference” 
means or includes the power of setting Natural Forces 
(Laws) to work under new conditions, then it is the 
reverse of truth to affirm that they cannot be “inter 
fered” with. Man controls facts only because (in this 
sense) he can, and he does, interfere with Laws. His 
volitions can, and do, govern those combinations of 
Force which are the immediate cause of all phenomena. 
There is no fault in philosophical discussion more 
pestilent than that of using common words in some 
technical or artificial sense, without any warning to the 
reader, (often apparently without any consciousness on 


the part of the writer,) that ideas fundamentally involved, 


oe 





IN THE REALM OF MIND. 31G 
in the ordinary use of the word, are eliminated and set 
aside. We have seen one instance of this in the word 
‘necessity,’ emptied of its meaning of compulsion. We 
have another example in the use made of such words as 
“‘changeable,” and others of a like kind. Thus Mr. 
Mill quotes, with approbation, a remark of Comte, that 
“our power of foreseeing phenomena, and our power 
of controlling them, are the two things which. destroy 
the belief of their being governed by changeable Wills.” 
All through this sentence there run the same confusions 
which have been pointed out in the two sentences 
already quoted. But there is, in addition, another con- 
fusion which has a special bearing on the subject of this 
chapter. Phenomena which can be controlled are 
phenomena which can be changed. There is no other 
meaning in the words. ‘The assertion, therefore, is, that 
the changeability of phenomena through human agency 
is a fact which must destroy our belief in the change- 
ability of the human Will itself The sentence thus ren- 
dered is, of course, either pure nonsense, or else must be 
dependent for a rational sense upon some artificial 
meaning being attached to the word “changeable.” A 
Will under the guidance of some settled principle—that 
is to say, following habitually some prevailing motives— 


2 “¢ Auguste Comte and Positivism,” p, 48 





320 THE REIGN OF LAW 


might, by a certain licence of language, be called an 
unchangeable Will. But this has nothing to do with that 
kind of changeability which can alone concerm the 
power of altering and controlling material phenomena. 
Stability of character, whether moral or purely intel- 
lectual, is not only compatible with a variable Will, but 
it is inseparably connected with it. No man can pursue 
one rule of conduct under changing conditions unless he 
himself retains his own capacities of change. He can- 
not control phenomena without changing them, and he 
cannot change phenomena without changing his own 
course of action ; and a change in the course of action 
is a change in the course of Will. 

That which is really at the bottom of all this ambi- 
guity of language, is a constant endeavour to get nd 
altogether of an essential element in the very idea of 
Will,—to reduce it, to something different from that which 
we all know and feel it to be. The word Will is indeed 
retained in the Positive vocabulary, but some other word 
is generally inserted before it, to prejudice the common 
understanding of it, or to impart some element of mean- 


ing which can with more plausibility be denounced. 


Thus the Will which is denied in Nature is often de- 


scribed as an “arbitrary” Will or a “capricious ” Will. 
But surely these qualifying epithets do but add to the 
confusion. It is true, indeed, that the Wiil we see in 


IN THE REALM OF MIND. 321 


Nature is not a capricious Will. But this is not the 
question. The question is, whether there is, or is not, 
such a thing possible as caprice in Will. If there be 
such a thing as caprice, then the existence of it, and the 
power of it “to control phenomena,” cannot be denied. 
If there be n® such thing, then “capricious” is of no 
3 meaning as an epithet applied to Will. Caprice implies 
not only changeableness, but, so to speak, a double 
degree of changeableness—a changeableness which has 
no rule or reason in its shiftings. Itis a fact that there 
are human Wills of this character, and the mischief they 
have done in the world arises from the power they pos- 
sess, In common with all other Wills, of changing 
phenomena after their own unreasonable nature. The 
truth is, that if the human Will can be described as un- 
changeable, then there is no such thing as changeability 
even conceivable in thought. There is no contrast so 
absolute between any two different forms of Matter, as 
there is between two different states of the same Mind. 
There is no transition in Nature from one physical con-. 
dition to another so absolute or so radical as the trans. 
ition to which human character is subject when it 
passes under the power of new convictions. There is 
no change like the change from hatred to affection, from 
vice to virtue, from evil to good. And this change in 
Mind is the efficient cause of a whole cycle of other 
Y 


eee 





322 THE REIGN OF LAW 








changes among the phenomena which the human Will 


can and does alter, regulate, and control. 


There is, then, not much real difficulty after all in dis- 


engaging the great facts of our own Free Will from the 
verbal confusions. of the Positive Philosophy. Nor will 
the same methods of solution. fail us when we apply them 
to the further question,— How far, and in what sense, are 
our own volitions themselves subject to law—that is, to 
the influence of Adjusted Forces? For as one great 
consequence of the Reign of Law over material things 
is the necessity of resorting to the use of appropriate 
means for the accomplishment of Purpose, so does the 
same necessity arise out of the same conditions among 
the phenomena of Mind. If we wish to operate upon 
human action, we must go to work by presenting to the 
Will some motive tending to produce the action we 
desire. Above all, if we seek to operate not merely on 
individual actions, but upon that which mainly deter- 
mines conduct, viz. human character, we must direct our 
efforts to place that character under outward conditions 
which we know to have a favourable effect upon it. In 
the material world we should be powerless to control any 
event if we did-not know it to be subject to laws—that 
is, to Forces which, though not lable to change in 
essence, are subject to endless change in combination and 
in use. The same impotency would affect us, if in the 








IN THE REALM OF MIND. 323 





moral world also definite conditions had not always an 
invariable tendency to produce certain definite results. 
It is a mere confusion of thought and of language which - 
confounds the “ invariability”. of “ Laws,” either moral 
or material, with the denial of the power of Will to vary, 
alter, and modify in infinite degrees the course of things. 
It is the fixedness of all Forces in one sense which con- 
stitutes their infinite pliability in another. It is the un- 
changing relation which they bear to those mental facul- 
ties. by which we discover them and recognise iaem, that 
renders them capable of becoming the supple instruments 
of those other faculties of Will, of Reason, and of Con- 
trivance by which we can work them for altered and 
better purposes. 


¥2 


CHAPTER VIl. 
LAW IN POLITICS. 


T first sight it may be thought that the means 

by which we can operate on the Wills of indi- 
vidual men, and of communities of men, are contained 
within ‘a narrow compass, and are such as to be all, 
if not within easy reach, at least within easy recognition. 
And it is true that some methods of operating on the 
minds of men we do know instinctively, just as in the 
material world we know by the first rudiments of intelli- 
gence how to accomplish a few physical results. But 
experience and observation teach us, although they teach 
us very slowly, that direct appeals to the reason, or direct 
appeals to the feelings of men, are entirely useless, when 
those faculties have not been placed under conditions 
favourable to their exercise in a right direction. And as 
in the material world, the knowledge we have acquired of 
the powers of Nature, and of the methods of turning them | 
to use, has been slowly gained in the lapse of ages, and 
as all we discover does but reveal how much we have yet 
to know; so in the immense world of the Mind and 


4 


-LAW IN POLITICS. 325 
Character. of Man, our knowledge of the methods by 
which it may be well and wisely governed, has advanced 
only by slow degrees. There is a boundless field of dis- 
covery still open to those who investigate the laws which 
govern the development of our nature. When we look 
at the high degrees of excellence which that nature so 
often attains under favourable conditions for the growth 
and exercise of its better powers, and when we contrast 
this with its stunted and distorted growth as exhibited 
- among large portions of Mankind, it becomes a question 
of deep and endless interest to know how far these con- 
ditions are subject to the control of Will through the 
use of means. If such means can ever be devised, 
it must be by knowledge, first of the elementary forces 
which have a constant operation on Human Character, 
and secondly by contrivance in so combining them as to 
make them operate in the direction we desire. And it 
is in this search that we discover the intimate blending 
and inseparable connexion between mental and material 
laws—that is, between the forces which operate on the 
material frame and the forces which operate on the 
Mind and Character of Man. 

And here we come on a great subject—the function 
of Human Law as distinguished from Natural Law. 
Just as the Will of the individual can operate upon 
itself by the use of means, some of which: are known 








326 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





instinctively, whilst others are found out by reason; so 
can the collective Will of Society operate upon the 
conduct of its members in two ways—first, directly by 
authority ; and secondly, indirectly by altering the con- 
ditions out of which the most powerful motives spring. 
This last is a principle of government, which has been 
distinctly recognised only in modern times, and which 
admits of applications not yet foreseen. The idea. of 
founding Human Law upon the Laws of Nature, is an 
idea which, though sometimes instinctively acted upon, 
was never systematically entertained in the ancient world. 
Indeed, the true conception of Natural Law is one 
founded on the progress of pnysical. investigation, and 
growing out of the habits of scientific thought. It was 
long before Man came to apprehend the prevalence of 
Law in the phenomena of Matter; and it was still 
longer before he could even entertain the notion of 
Natural Law as applicable to himself. The ancient 
lawgivers were always aiming at standards of Political 
Society, framed according to some abstract notions of their 
own as to how things ought to be, rather than upon any 
attempt to investigate the constitution of human nature 
as it actually is. It was a mistake in the science of 
Politics analogous to that which Bacon complained of 
so bitterly in the science of Physics. Men were always 


trying to evolve out of their own minds knowledge which — 


LAW IN POLITICS. : ger 
could only be acquired by patient inquiry into facts. 
How worse than useless this method is, received an 
illustration in ancient philosophy still more striking than 
in ancient legislation. Fortunately for mankind, no 
actual legislators have ever been quite so foolish as 
some philosophers. Perhaps, all things considered, the 
most odious conceptions of Human Society which the 
world has ever seen, were the conceptions of an intellect 
certainly among the loftiest which has ever exercised its 
powers in speculative thought. Plato’s Republic is an 
Ideal State, founded on abstract conceptions of the 
mind, and one of its leading ideas is the destruction 
of Family Life, and the annihilation of the family affec- 
tions. And yet this result, odious and irrational as it is, 
was arrived at from reasoning which is: not in itself 
odious, but which is false, chiefly because it takes no 
account of the facts of Nature. The welfare of the 
State was to be the one object of desire in every mind. 
All separate interests and affections were to be sup- 
pressed, and amongst these the very idea of special. 
property in Wife or Child. The highest type of man 
was to be bred by the Republic as the highest type 
of dogs and horses is bred by an intelligent owner.} 
Such are the humiliating results of abstract reasoning, 


1 “The breeding is regulated, like that of noble horses or dogs, 
by an intelligent proprietor.”—Grote’s “ Plato,” vol. iii, p. 203, 











328 ‘ THE REIGN OF LAW. 


pursued in ignorance of the great Law, that no purpose 
can be attained in Nature except by Jegitimate use of the 
means which Nature has supplied. For as in the material 
world, all her Forces must be acknowledged and obeyed 
before they can be made to serve, so in the Realm of Mind 
there can be no success in attaining the highest moral ends 
until due honour has been assigned to those motives 
which arise out of the universal instincts of our race. 
Accordingly it is remarkable that the system of ancient 
philosophy, which for so many ages continued to rule 
the thoughts of men—the philosophy of Aristotle—owes 
almost all the strength it has in Politics as in other 
matters, to occasional and almost unconscious resort 
to the true methods of scientific reasoning and inves- 
tigation. Aristotle founds his adverse criticism on Plato, 
where it is most successful, upon the actual facts of what 
men, under specified conditions, naturally do, and think, 
and feel. From these facts he argues justly as to what 
they would do under the artificial restrictions of a theo- 
retical philosophy. When, for example, he argues against 
communism, and in favour of private property, upon the 
ground of the watchfulness and attention which self- 
interest produces in the conduct of business,’ and when 
he adds, “It is unspeakable how advantageous it is that 


1 uddrddrgov & emiddcovow ws rods Yiv Exdorov spooedpevorTos, 
— ‘* Aristot. Pol.” Bk. ii. c. 5. 











~« 


LAW IN POLITICS. | 329 





a man should think he has something which he may call 
his own, for it is by no means to no purpose that each 
person should. have an affection for himself, for that zs 
natural,’ ! he touches the very root idea of the modern 
science of Political Economy. He touches it, but he 
does not grasp it. It is a line of argument which is 
never consistently maintained; and though there are _ 
perpetual appeals to “nature”—to that which is “na- 
tural”—to that which nature teaches—no definite mean- 
ing can be attached to these expressions; and dogmas 
are laid down as “natural” which are purely abstract 
and metaphysical conceptions. Nature is called as a 
witness, and then the witness she gives is condemned 
and put out of court. Industry is occasionally praised, 
whilst the means and the motives to industry are sys- 
tematically despised. The exercise of any mechanical 
employment, or the following of merchandise, is con- 
-demned in an Ideal Government as ‘‘ignoble and 
destructive to virtue.”? A maritime situation is recom- 
mended, because of its convenience in enabling a city 
to receive from others produce which its own country 

1 %rt 5¢ Kal mpds jdov7y auvOnrov Scov diapéper Td voulCerw tidy Te 
bi} yap od pdrny THY Tpds abrdy avtds Exet pirlay Exactos, GAN ate 
rovTo pvaixov.—Bk. il. c. 5. 

2 ore Bdvavoov Blov od7 dyopaiov Set Civ tods woAlras’ dyevvr)s 


yap 6 rowdros Blos Kal mpds dperiy Umevaytlos.—Bk, vii. c. 9, In 
Mr. Congreve’s edition, Bk- iv. c. 9, 


TT 


339 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





does not afford, and to export those necessaries of life 
of which it has more than plenty. This looks like a 
perception of the soundest maxims of Commerce. But 
in the next breath, the whole richness and blessing of 
Commerce, as an element of civilisation, is repudiated 
and destroyed by the stupid and selfish maxim that a 
city must traffic to supply its own wants only, and not 
the wants of others; “for those who make themselves 
into an open market for every one, do it for the sake of 
revenue ; but if a State ought to have no part in this kind 
of gain, neither ought it to furnish such a mart.” 

It is surely wonderful that such a mind as that of 
Aristotle should have supposed that it was either pos- 
sible, or, if possible, desirable that the benefits of traffic 
should all be on one side; nor is it less wonderful that, 
with his hands, as it were, upon the spot, and touching 
with his very fingers the foundation-facts, he should yet 
have failed to feel and to seize the great secret of modern 
Political Science—the links of Natural Consequence in 
which the blessedness of Commerce lies. But all this 
comes of thinking that we can be wiser than Nature, 


and of failing to see that every natural instinct has: its 


1 adti yap eumopiciy, GAN od Tots KAAOts Set elvan THY WéAw. of 5€ 
rapéxovTes THas abTovs Taow dyopdy mpocddou Xap TATA mpaTTovolw" 
2 


fv && uo) Set wéAW roiatrys ueTéxew wAcovetlas, odd eumdpiov. Set 


KenrjoGa To.odTov.—Bk. vii. c. 6, 


LAW IN POLITICS. 331 





own legitimate field of operation, within which we cannot 
do better than let it alone. It comes from the notion 
that we can arrive at that which ought to be, without 
taking any note of that which actually is. 

| The bondage under which all true Science lies to fact 
—the necessity of groping among the detail of little and 
common things—this is a hard lesson for. the human 
Intellect to learn—conscious as that Intellect is of its 
own great powers—of its own high aims—of its own 
large capacities of intuitive understanding. But it is a 
lesson which must be learnt. There are no short cuts in 
Nature. Her results are always attained by Method. 
Her purposes are.always worked out by Law. So must 
ours be. For our bodies and our spirits are both parts 
of the great Order of Nature; and our Wills can attain 
no end, and can accomplish no design, except through 
knowledge and through use of the appropriate and 
appointed means. Nor can those means be ascertained 
except by careful observation, and as careful reasoning. 
It is a hard thing to know all the forces which operate 
even on our own individual minds; and it is a much 
harder problem to understand the forces which arise out 
of the complicated conditions of human society. But 
the very idea of Natural Law as affecting mankind is 
founded on the possibility of tracing in human nature the 


existence and operation of forces which under given con- 


co Nay ae 
Seo. 
nis 


Ae THE REIGN OF LAW. 

. ditions do actually determine the course of human con- 
duct in particular directions. Amongst these forces there 
are a certain number which are constant, or at least so 
constant that they may be calculated upon as certainly 
affecting the great majority of mankind. ‘These are 
chiefly the motives which arise out of our physical con- 
stitution—the desires and affections which are common 
to the race. To follow these motives—to be actuated 
by them—is, therefore, natural. And yet to follow these 
motives exclusively, may, and generally does, lead to 
great evils, often to calamities, sometimes to destruction. 
How, then, can these motives be controlled? Only by 
appealing to other motives—to forces lying in the higher 
regions of the mind, and placed there like the forces of 
external Nature, to be at the disposal of the Intelligence 
and the Will. 

Are, then, these higher motives not also natural >—are 
they above nature P—are they supernatural? It would 
really seem as if this were the idea involved in the dis- 
tinction which is so vaguely drawn between that which is 
said to be natural and that which is said to be not 
natural—between Natural Law and Positive Institution. 
Yet Reason, and Conscience, and Fancy, and Imagina- 
tion, and Belief, or whatever other faculties may direct, 
wisely or unwisely, the course of legislation, are all 


equally natural to Man. They are all as much parts of 





LAW IN POLITICS. ae 333 


his mental constitution as the desires and instincts to 
which the term natural is usually confined. There is no 
extravagance of the individual Will—there is no folly of 
blind and irrational legislation which has not been the 
fruit of some part or another of Man’s nature. I dwell 
on this only because it is important here, as in other 
cases, to attach a definite meaning to the words we use, 
and especially to a word which plays so important a part 
in the language both of Philosophy and of Politics. 

It appears, then, that, as applied to human conduct, 
we-mean by “natural” conduct that which men are 
prompted to pursue rather by instinct and impulse than 
by calculation of consequences and by reason. Human 
Laws, or Positive Institutions, as being the result of 
deliberation, stand contrasted with Natural Law in this 
sense, and in this sense alone. For as Reason and 
Reflection are natural to Man, and are as important 
"parts of his nature as the highest of his instincts, so Laws 
founded on a right exercise of that Reason are Natural 
Laws in the best and highest sense of all. Laws, how- 
ever, whether in this sense natural or not—that is, whether 
founded on a right or a wrong exercise of reason—are 
always intended to act as restraints on the actions of 
individuals, and to interfere with the motives by which 
their conduct would be otherwise determined. This 


restraint may be said to be artificial as opposed to the 





334° THE REIGN OF LAW. 


natural restraints of <he indi~‘dual reason ; and this, per- 
haps, is the distinction most generally intended when the. 
natural conduct of men is contrasted with their conduct 
under the control of Positive Institution. But as the 
motives which determine individual conduct are not 
always reasonable motives, so it is clear that what men 
naturally do is no sure test either of what they ought to 

do, or of what they ought to be allowed to do. It is 

their nature, under certain conditions, to do all that is 

bad and injurious to themselves and others. Hence it 

is the most difficult of all problems in the Science of 
Government to determine when, where, and how it is 

wise to interfere by the authority of Law with the motives 

which are usually called the natural motives of men. 

The question is no other than this: How far the abuse 

of those motives can be checked and resisted by that 

public authority whose duty and function it is to place 

itself above the influences which, in individual men, over- 
power the voice of reason and of conscience? 

No more signal illustration has been ever given of the 
relation between Natural Law and Human Law—of the 
circumstances in which Natural Law may be trusted, and 
of those in which it absolutely requires to be controlled— 
than the illustration afforded by the history of Legis- 
lation in our own country within the present century. 


During that period two great discoveries have been nade 





LAW IN POLITICS. 335 
in the Science of Government: the one is the immense 
advantage of abolishing restrictions upon Trade; the 
other is the absolute necessity of imposing restrictions 
upon Labour. The rise, the growth, and the final ac- 
ceptance of these two ideas as the basis of practical 
Legislation, is a history so curious, and having such close 
relation to the subject of this chapter, that I propose to 
deal with it somewhat in detail. 

Since the dissolution of the Greek and Roman Com- 
monwealths, no nation has acted on the one great error 
of all the ancient systems of political philosophy—that 
the natural desire of men for the accumulation of wealth 
is an evil to be dreaded and repressed. So far as this 
goes there is a sharp and striking contrast between the 
spirit of ancient and of modern policy. The great object 
of the ancient policy, says Dugald Stewart, “was to 
counteract the love of money and a taste for luxury by 
positive institutions, and to maintain in the great body 
of the people habits of frugality and a severity of man- 
ners. The decline of States is uniformly ascribed by 
philosophers and historians, both of Greece and Rome, 
to the influence of riches on national character; and 
the laws of Lycurgus, which, during a course of ages, 
banished the precious metals from Sparta, are proposed 
by many of them as the most perfect model of legislation 
devised by human wisdom. _ How opposite to this is the. 





330 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





doctrine of modern politicians! Far from considering 
poverty as an advantage to a State, their great aim is to 
open new sources of national opulence, and to animate . 
the activity of all classes of the people by a taste for the 
comforts and accommodations of life.”! This is true, 
and has been true more or less of all the modern nations 
of the world. But although they n-ver held the absurd 
doctrine that Nature was wrong when she taught men to 
desire wealth, they did hold the doctrine, hardly less 
mischievous, that Nature was incompetent to teach them 
how best to acquire it. It would be difficult to say 
whether the law of ancient Sparta, prohibiting gold from 
ever coming into the State, was worse than the law of 
modern Spain, which prohibited gold from ever being 
allowed to leave it. It is certain that the Spanish law 
was at least the more irrational of the two. If a State 
wishes to be poor, it is not absurd to prohibit the making 
of money. But if a State wishes to be rich, it is mere 
stupidity to prohibit the natural use of the medium of 
exchange. Yet this law of Spain is only an extreme 
example of the system and the theories which governed, 
until the other day, the legislation of all the nations of 
Europe, and which still largely prevails amongst them. 


1 ** Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith,” by 
Dugald Stewart.—‘‘ Collected Works of Dugald Stewart,” vol. x. 
P+ 57. 


—_— 


LAW IN POLITICS. 337 


See ee 





It was no oratorical exaggeration, but a strict and 
literal description of the truth, when Mr. Gladstone said! 
of the old commercial policy that it was “a system of 


robbing and plundering ourselves.” And how was it so? 


_ What was the.essence of its error? These questions are 


best answered by another. What was the central idea of 
the new system which has superseded the old one? The . 
essential idea of these new opinions cannot be better 
given than in the words of Dugald Stewart: “The great 
and leading object of Adam Smith’s speculations is to 
illustrate the provision made by Nature in the principles 
of the human mind, and in the circumstances of man’s 
external situation, for a gradual progressive augmentation 
in the means of national wealth ; and to demonstrate that 
the most effectual plan for advancing a people to great- 
ness is to maintain that order of things which Nature has 
pointed out; by allowing every man, as long as he ob- 
serves the rules of justice, to pursue his own interest in 
his own way, and to bring both his industry and his 
capital into the freest competition with those of his 
fellow-citizens.” ? 

Adam Smith found Positive Institutions regulating and 
restricting natural human action in two different diree- 


tions. ‘There were laws restricting free interchange in 


In his Speech at Glasgow, Oct. 1865. 
Account, see p. 72. 





338 THE REIGN OF LAW. 











the products of labour: and there were other laws 
restricting the free employment of labour itself. He 
denounced both. Labour was deprived of its natural 
freedom by laws forbidding men from working at any 
skilled labour, unless they had served an apprenticeship 
of a specified time. It was also deprived of its natural 
. freedom by monopolies, which prevented men from 
working at any trade within certain localities, unless 
allowed to do so by those who had the exclusive 
privilege. The first mode of restriction prevented labour 
from passing freely from one employment to another, even 
in the same place. ‘The second mode of restriction pre- 
vented labour passing freely from place to place, even in 
the same trade. Both of these restrictions were as mis- 
chievous, and as destructive of their own object, as re- 
strictions in the free interchange of goods. They both 
depended on the same vicious principle of attempting to 
obtain by Legislation results which would be more surely 
attained by allowing every man to sell his goods or his 
labour when, where, and how he pleased. The labour of 
a poor man was his capital. He had a natural right to 
employ it as he liked. And as for protecting the com- 
munity from bad or imperfect work, ¢za¢ would be best 
secured by unrestricted competition. The natural in- 
stincts and respective interests of producers and con- 
sumers would secure mutual adaptation. Perfect freedom 


————-— 


LAW IN POLITICS. 339 


of exchange in goods, the products of labour, and perfect 
freedom in the application of labour itself—this was the 
tule to follow. Natural Law was the best regulator of 
both. Such were the doctrines of Adam Smith, then new 
in the world. 

It is not a little remarkable that, during the same years 
in which Adam Smith was working out his memorable 
Inquiry, other minds, working in a very different depart- 
ment of human thought, were preparing events which 
were to bring toa speedy test how far these doctrines of 
Natural Law were true absolutely, or true only under 
limitations, which he did not foresee. When Adam 
Smith was lecturing with applause in Glasgow from the 
chair of Moral Philosophy, James Watt was selling 
mathematical instruments in an obscure shop within the 
precincts of the same University. It may seem as if no 
two departments of human thought are more widely 
separated than those in which these two men were. work- 
ing. One was a region purely mental. The other was a 
region purely physical. The one had reference to the 
Laws of Matter. The other had-reference to the Laws 
of Mind. Yet the work of James Watt and the work of 
Adam Smith were inseparably connected, not only as” 
involving analogous methods of investigation, but as 
showing in their result the blending and co-operation of 


mental and material laws. 


ee ee oO 








340 ' THE REIGN OF LAW. 


————- p= 





It was the labour of Watt to reduce to obedience, 
under the power of Mind, one of the most tremendous 
Forces of Nature, and this he did through many years of 
curious inquiry, and of laborious contrivance. He found 
only a rude and imperfect mechanism through which this 
great Force had been misdirected and dissipated and lost. 
He collected it in fitter vessels ; he led it into smoother 
channels; he opened for it doors of passage, through 
which the rushing of its escape did for him what he 
wanted it to do. Other forces, which before had con- 
spired against it, were so guided as to work along with 
it, not only in perfect harmony, but in close alliance. He 
made, in short, its invariable energies subject to. the 
variable conditions of Adjustment. And so, he governed 
it and controlled it, and handed it over to the Human 
Family as the servant of their Will for ever. é 

The work of Adam Smith was not dissimilar in its 
relation to the Rcign of Law. It was his labour to prove 
that in the rude contrivances of Legislation, due account 
had not been taken of the natural forces with which it 
had to deal. He showed that among the very elements 
of human character there were instincts, and desires, and 
faculties of contrivance, all of which by clumsy ma- 
chinery had Leen impeded, and obstructed, and diverted 
from the channels in which they. ought to work. He 


could not, however, test his reasoning as the Inventor 


z 


‘A &*, “3 
re 





Seal 


LAW IN POLITICS: 341 


could, by continual experiment. He had to rely on ab- 
stract reasoning, and on such verification as could be 
drawn from the complicated phenomena of the Body 
Politic. In this respect the work of Adam Smith was 
harder than the work of Watt. And why it was harder 
is a question which it may be well to ask. It is not sur- 
prising that the methods. of applying to our own use the 
Powers of external Nature, should be matter of difficult 
research. But it may well seem strange that the forces 
which have their seat within ourselves—in the Mind and 
Character of Man—should be so unknown to us as to 
require careful reasoning and observation before we know 
how to use them with success for the attainment of our 
ends. Yetsoitis. The conscious energies of the Will 
are ever tempted to march directly upon objects which 
can only be reached by circuitous methods of approach. 
And so the Wealth of Nations, and the skill of Crafts, 
and the success of Trade, had all been hindered by the 
measures designed for their protection. The promptings 
of individual interest had been checked and thwarted and 
driven into channels less fruitful than those which they 
would have naturally found. 

On the other hand, the discovery of the Steam Engine, 
like every other weapon placed at the disposal of Mind, 
gave a new stimulus to the motives, and a new form to 


the conditions, by which the conduct of thousands was 





342 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





determined. Little did the brilliant Professor know that — 
the discoveries of his humble friend would yet, in their 
results, serve to limit the conclusions of his own Philo- 
sophy. In the meantime, all that he knew of Watt and 
of his personal history seemed to be, and really was, a 
signal illustration of the follies of restriction. For no 
other reason than that he had not been born in Glasgow, 
Watt could not legally sell the products of his ingenuity 
and labour in that City. The spirit and the laws of 
corporate monopoly rigidly excluded him ; and the com- 
pany of “Hammermen” insisted on the exclusion being 
maintained, for fear of “loss and skaith to the Burgesses 
and Craftsmen of Glasgow, by the intrusion of strangers.”! 
The working-classes themselves were among the most 
strenuous supporters of a system which diminished the 
value by restricting the area of their labour. Fortunately 
the University had privileges of its own, which, within 
its own property, excluded the jurisdiction of a Muni- 
cipality and a Craft not more ignorant or more selfish 
than their contemporaries at the time. It may well be 
supposed, that Adam Smith’s opinions on freedom of 
labour must have been influenced by personal observa- 
tion of the working of such laws in the case of a man 
who, though still obscure, was even then appreciated i 
those who knew him for ingenuity and resource. 


4 Smiles’ “Life of Watt,” p. 105. 


ee 


LAW IN POLITICS, 343 


In looking at restrictions such as these, there was 
nothing then to suggest to Adam Smith the consequences 
which might arisé from the entire freedom of labour, 
when that labour was placed under new conditions. He 
had no knowledge, and he could then have no con- 
ception, what these new conditions were to be. Yet 
they were being silently prepared and determined in the 
very years in which he spoke and wrote. His friend Watt 
was a principal agent in the great impending change. 
But Watt was not alone. Other minds were working 
at the same time whose labours were to match with 
a curious fittingness into his. Indeed, the work which 
was going on in those years is only one example of a 
law of which many other examples may be found. It 
is an order of facts observable in the progress of Man- 


kind, that long ages of comparative silence and inaction 


_are broken up, and brought to an end, by shorter periods 


of almost preternatural activity. And that activity is 
generally spent in paths of investigation, which, though 
independent, are converging. Different minds, pursuing 
different lines of thought, find themselves meeting upon 
common ground. Sucl:, in respect to literature, was the 
period of the Revival ef Learning: such, in respect to 
Religion, was the period of the Reformation: such, in 
respect to the abstract sciences, was the period of Tycho 
Brahe, of Galileo, and of Kepler. Hardly less memo« 





eS ee 
« aw 


344 THE KEIGN OF LAW. 








rable than these, certainly not less powerful, as affecting 
the condition of society, were those few years mm the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century, which were marked by 
such an extraordinary burst of Mechanical Invention. 
Hargreaves, and Arkwright, and Watt, and Crompton, 
and Cartwright, were all contemporaries. They were 
all working at the same time, and in the same direction. - 
Out of their inventions there arose for the first time 
what is now known as the Factory system; and out 
-of the Factery system arose a condition of things as 
affecting human labour, which was entirely new in the 
history of the world. The change thus effected is a 
signal illustration of the relation in which Natural Law 
stands to Positive Institution in the realm of Mind. Let 
us look for a moment at its history and results. 

The Common Law of England had placed no restric- 
tions upon labour. The only restrictions which existed 
arose either from the special monopolies of Corporate 
Bodies, or from the General Statute of Apprenticeship. 
This statute had been passed in the reign of Elizabeth. 
It provided that no man should work at any craft on 
his own account until he had served an apprenticeship 
of seven years. But the Statute of Apprenticeship being 
in derogation of common rights, had always been con- 
strued strictly by the Courts of Law ; and so it had come 
to pass that two great rules of limitation had been 


— 


LAW IN POLITICS. 345 
applied to it. First, it was held to apply only to such 
crafts of skill as were known at the time of its being 
passed ; and secondly, it was held not to apply at all to 
rural districts, but only‘to market towns. From these 
two rules of limitation, it resulted, first, that all trades 
. and employments were free which had arisen since the 
commencement of the seventeenth century, and, secondly, 
that even the older crafts were free also if they were pro- 
secuted outside the boundaries of towns. 

Such was the condition of the law when the inven- 
tions of Adam Smith’s contemporaries brought into 
existence employments which were entirely new, and 
opened them to that unrestricted coimpetition, the 
advantage of which he had laid down as a universal 
doctrine. 

Spinning and weaving were not new. .They were as 
old as the memory of Mankind. But the simple me- 
chanism by which these arts were prosecuted were almost 
equally old, and had undergone little change and little 
improvement. In 1760 the Spinning-Wheel, and the 
common Loom, as used by the people of Yorkshire, 
were little in advance of the implements for the same 
purpose which had been in use beyond the reach of 
History. The Spindle which is depicted on the monu, 
ments of Egypt was, until a few years ago, familiar in 


the Highlands. The essential feature of this ancient 





346 THE REIGN OF LAW. 

industry, so far as its effects upon social conditions are 
concerned, was that it was separate and not gregarious. 
It did not interfere with, but rather was congenial to, 
Family Life, for thousands of years, 


** Maids at the Wheel, the Weaver at his Loom, 
Sat blithe and happy.” 2 


But the pressure of new necessities had arisen, and 
these could be met only by new inventions. Towards 
the middle of the eighteenth century, the greatest diffi- 
culty was experienced by weavers and spinners in Eng- 
Jand in maintaining their position in the markets of the 
world. It is curious how each new mechanical invention 
gave rise to the necessities out of which the next arose. 
The invention of the Fly Shuttle in weaving, so early as 
1733, seems to have given the first impulse to all that 
followed. By means of this invention the power of 
weaving overtook the power of spinning. An adequate 
supply of yarn could not be procured under the ancient 
methods of that most ancient industry. New conditions 
gave rise to new motives, and new motives called into 
play the latent energies of Mind. The time and the 
cost of collecting the products of so many scattered 
labourers enhanced unduly the cost of manufacture, and 

2% Wordsworth’s noble sonnet— 


‘‘ Nuns fret not at their convent’s narrow room.” 





LAW IN POLITICS. 347 


even when the remuneration was reduced to the lowest 
point compatible with existence, that cost was still too 
high. Something was imperatively required to econo- 
mise the work of human hands—some more elaborate 
contrivance to make that work go further than before. 
And so Hargreaves’ invention arose, not before the time.! 
And when his Spinning Jenny had been invented, a still 
more elaborate and powerful combination of mechanical 
adjustments was soon perfected in the hands of Ark- 
wright.2, When the Spinning Fraine was invented, and 
when Crompton’s farther invention of the Mule Jenny 
speedily followed,*? the new order of things had been 
fairly inaugurated. The great change had come, and the 
survivance of the ancient domestic industries of so many 
centuries was no longer possible. 

And just as Hargreaves and Arkwright and Crompton 
were inventing the new machines which were to be 
moved, Watt was labouring at the new Power which 
was to move them. But meanwhile before the Steam 
Engine had been made available, the Factory system 
had begun under the old motive-power of Water ; and 
here it is very curious to observe how each stage in the 
progress of discovery bad, by way of natural conse: 
quence, its own special effect on the conduct and the 


Wills of men. Very soon the course of every mouns 


1 1765-7. 2 1969-71. 3 1787, 





348 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


tain stream in Lancashire and Yotkshire, was marked 
by Factories. This again had another consequence. It 
was a necessity of the case that such Factories must 
generally be. situated at a distance from pre-existing 
populations, and, therefore, from a full supply of labour. 
Consequently they had to create communities for them- 
selves. From this necessity, again, it arose that the” 
earlier mills were worked under a system of Apprentice- 
ship. The due attendance of the requisite number of 
“hands” was secured by engagements which bound the 
labourer to his work for a definite period. 

And now for the first time appeared some of the con- 
sequences of gregarious labour under the working of 
Natural Laws, and under no restrictions from Positive 
Institution. The millowners collected as Apprentices 
boys and girls, and youths and men, and women, of all 
ages. In very many cases no provision adequate, or 
even decent, was provided for their accommodation. 
The hours of labour were excessive. The ceaseless 
and untiring agency of machines kept no reckoning of 
the exhaustion of human nerves. ‘The Factory system 
had not been many years in operation when its effects 
were seen. A whole generation were growing up under 
conditions of physical degeneracy, of mental ignorance, 
and of moral corruption. 

The first public man to bring it under the notice of 





LAW IN POLITICS. 349 


Parliament with a view to remedy, was, to his immortal 
honour, a master manufacturer, to whom the new in- 
dustry had brought wealth, and power, and station. In 
1802 the elder Sir Robert-Peel was the first to introduce 
a bill to interfere by law with the natural effects of un- 
restricted competition in human labour. It is charac- 
teristic of the slow progress of new ideas in the English 
mind, and of its strong instinct to adopt no measure 
which does not stand in some clear relation to pre: 
existing laws, that Sir Robert Peel’s bill was limited 
strictly to the regulation of the labour of Apprentices. 
Children and young persons who were not Apprentices 
might be subject to the same evils, but for them no 
remedy was asked or provided. The notion was, that 
as Apprentices were already under Statutory provisions, 
and were subjects of a legal contract, it was permissible 
that their hours of labour should be regulated by positive 
enactment. But the Parliament which was familiar with 
restrictions on the products of labour, and with restric- 
tions of monopoly on labour itself—which restrictions 
were for the purpose of securing supposed economic 
benefits, would not listen to any proposal to regulate 
“free” labour for the purpose of avoiding even the most 
frightful moral evils.. These evils, however great they 


, 


might be, were the result of “natural laws,” and were 


incident to the personal freedom of Employers and 





350 THE REIGN OF LAW. 


Employed. In the case of Apprentices, however, it was 
conceded that restriction might be tolerated. And so 
through this narrow door the first of the Factory Acts 
was passed. It is a history which illustrates, in the 
clearest light, the sense in which human cozduct, both 
individually and collectively, is determined by Natural 
Law. If Watt’s Steam Engine had been invented earlier 
—if mills had not been at first crected away from the 
centres of population, in order to follow the course of 
streams—if consequently the evils of the Factory system 
had not begun to be observable in the labour of Appren- 
tices, there is no saying how much longer those evils 
might have been allowed to fester without even an asser- 
tion of the nght to check them. The Act of 1802,} 
though useless in every other sense, was invaluable at 
least in making this assertion. 

Meanwhile Watt’s great invention had been completed. 
And now anew cycle of events began, arising by way 
of natural consequence out of the Reign of Law. When 
the perfected Steam Engine became applicable to mills, 
it was no longer always cheaper to erect them in rural 
districts ; on the contrary, it was often cheaper to have 
them in the towns, near a full supply of labour, and a cheap 
supply of fuel. With this change came the abandon- 


3 42 and 43 Geo. III, cap. 73. 





LAW IN POLITICS. 3er 


' 





ment of the system of Apprenticeship. It was now “free” 
labour which more and more supplied the mills. But 
this only led to the same evils in an aggravated form. 
Children and women were especially valuable in the 
work of mills. There were parts of the machinery which 
might be fed by almost infant “hands.” The earnings 
of children became an_ irresistible temptation to the 
parents. They were sent to the factory at the earliest 
age, and they worked during the whole hours that the 
machinery was kept at work. The result of this system 
was soon apparent. In 181 5, thirteen years after he 
had obtained the Act of 1802, Sir Robert Peel came 
back to Parliament and told them-that the former Act 
had become useless—that mills were now generally 
worked, not by water, but by steam—that Apprentices 
had been given up, but that the same exhausting and 
demoralising labour, from wh ch Parliament had intended 
to relieve Apprentices, was the lot of thousands and 
thousands of the children of the free poor. In the 
following year, 1816, pressing upon the House of Com- 
mons a new measure of restriction, he added, that 
unless the Legislature extended to these children the 
same protection which it had intended to afford to the 
Apprentice class, it had come to this—that the great 
mechanical inventions which were the glory of the age 
would be a curse rather than a blessing to the country. 


352° THE REIGN OF LAW. 





These were strong words from a master manufacturer ; 
but they were not more strong than true.! 

Thus began that great debate which in principle may 
be said to be not ended yet :—the debate, how far it 
is legitimate or wise in Positive Institution to interfere 
for moral ends with the freedom of the individual Will? 
Cobbett denounced the opposition to restrictive measures 
as a contest of ‘‘Mammon against Mercy.” No doubt 
personal interests were strong in the forming of opinion, 
and some indignation. was natural against those who 
seemed to regard the absolute neglect of a whole gene- 
ration, and the total abandonment of them to the de- 
basing effects of excessive toil, as nothing compared with 
the slightest check on the accumulations of the Ware- 
house. But the opposition was not in the main due 
either to selfishness or indifference. False intellectual 
conceptions—false views both of principle and of fact 
—were its real foundation. Some of the ablest men in 
Parliament, who were wholly unaffected by any bias of | 
personal interest, declared that nothing would induce 
them to interfere with the labour which they called 
“free.” Had not the working classes a right to employ 
their children as they pleased? Who were better able 
to judge than fathers and mothers of the capacities 


1 “Ffansard Parl. Deb.” vols. xxxi. and xxxiiii—Sir Rebert’s 
Speech on Motion for a Committee, April 3, 1816. 





LAW IN POLITICS. 343 


- 





of their children? Why interfere for the protection of 
those who already had the best and most natural of 
all protections? Such were some of the arguments 
against interfering with free labour. | 

Now in what sense was this labour free? It was free 
from legal compulsion—that is to say, it was free from 
that kind of compulsion which arises out of the public ~ 
Will of the whole community imposed by authority upon 
the conduct of individuals. But there was another kind 
of force from which this labour was not free—the force 
of overpowering motive operating on the Will of the 
labourers themselves. If one parent, more careful than 
others. of the welfare of his children, and moved less 
exclusively by the desire of gain, withdrew his children 
‘at an earlier hour than others from Factory Work, his 
children were liable. to be dismissed and not employed 
at allt On the other hand, motives hardly less power- 
ful were in constant operation on the masters. The 
ceaseless, and increasing, and unrestricted competition 
amongst themselves,—the eagerness with which human 
energies rush into new openings for capital, for enter- 
prise, and for skill,—made them, as a class, insensible 
to the frightful evils which were arising from that com- 


1 This was very forcibly explained, both by Sir Robert and by hig 
son, Mr, Peel, in the debate of Feb. 23, 1818, 


AA 


- 











ET NS | 


354 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





petition for the means of subsistence which is the im- 
pelling motive of labour. 

Nor were there wanting arguments, founded on the 
constancy of Natural Laws, against any attempt on 
the part of Legislative authority to interfere with the 
“freedom” of individual Will. The competition be- 
tween the possessors of capital was a competition not 
confined to our own country. It was also an inter- 
national competition. In Belgium especially, and in 
other countries, there was the same ruch along the new 
paths of industry. Ifthe children’s hours of labour were 
curtailed, it would involve of necessity a curtailment also 
of the adult labour, which would not be available when 
left alone. This would be a curtailment of the working 
time of the whole mill; and this would involve a cor- 
responding reduction of the produce. No similar reduc- 
tion of produce would arise in Foreign mills. In com- 
petition with them the margin of profit was already 
small. The diminution of produce from restricted labour 
would destroy that margin. Capital would be driven to 
countries where labour was still free from such restric- 
tions, and the result would be more fatal to the in- 
terest of the working classes of the English towns than 
any of the results arising from the existing hours of work. 


Ail these consequences were represented as inevitable. 


They must arise out of the operation of invariable laws, 


ie See ne 
Pie ee Te, 1, 





LAW IN POLITICS. 355 





Such were the arguments—urged in every variety of 
form, and supported by every kind of statistical detail 
-—by which the first Factory Acts were vehemently 
opposed. ’ 

And, indeed, in looking back at the debates of that 
time, we cannot fail to see that the reasoning of those 
who opposed restriction on Free Labour’ met with no 
adequate reply. Not only were the supporters of restric- 
tion hampered by a desire to keep their conclusions 


within the scope of a very limited measure; not only - 


were they anxious to repudiate consequences which did 


legitimately follow from their own premises; but they 
were themselves really ignorant of the fundamental 
principles which were at issue in the strife. Their con- 
clusions were arrived at through instincts of the heart. 
The pale faces of little children, stunted and outworn, 
carried them to their result across every difficulty of 
argument, and in defiance of the alleged opposition of 
inevitable laws. And yet, if the supporters of the Fac- 
tory Acts had only known it, all true abstract argument 
on the subject was their own. The conclusions to which 
they pointed were as true in the light of Reason, as 
they felt them to be true in the light of Conscience. 

The truth is, that some of the finest distinctions in 
Philosophy were then for the first time emerging on the 
stage of Politics. The newest debates of Parliament 

AAZ 





a 


356 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





were circling unconsciously round one of the oldest 
disputations of the Schools. A question of practical 
legislation had arisen which involved one of the most 
difficult problems in metaphysical analysis. On the one 
hand, Freedom was asserted for the Will under con- 
ditions and in a sense in which it did not exist. On the 
other hand, Freedom was denied to the Will in a sense 
in which the instincts of humanity testified to its pre- 
sence, and to the possibility of its being exerted with 
effect. The true Doctrine of N ecessity was exemplified 
in the conduct of Employers and Employed—that con- 
duct being determined in a wrong direction by the force 
of overpowering motives. ‘The false Doctrine of Neces- 
sity was exemplified in the argument, that this conduct 
could not be changed under the force of higher motives 
asserting themselves through the Will of the Community 
in the form of Law. 

The antagonism which was and still is so often 
assumed between Natural Law and Human Law, or in 
other words between Natural Law and Positive Institu- 
tion, is an antagonism which may indeed exist, and does 
very often exist. But it is also an antagonism which 
may be eliminated, and must be eliminated, if Legislation 
is ever to be attended with permanent success. It is, 
alas, a Natural Law that men should be thoughtless, and 
selfish, and reckless of moral consequences, when they, 





LAW IN POLITICS. 357 


are bent exclusively on material results. But when the 


consequences of this conduct have been brought home to 


. their convictions by the force of imminent danger or of 


actual calamity, it is a law not less natural that- they 
should take alarm, that they should retrace their steps, 
and that by walking in another course they should bring 
about conditions of a better kind. The Laws of Man 
are also Laws of Nature, when founded on a true per- 
ception of natural tendencies and a just appreciation of 
combined results. On ‘the other hand, Human Laws 
are at variance with, or antagonistic to the Laws of 
Nature, when founded either on the desire of attaining 
a wrong end, or on the attempt to reach a night end 
by mistaken means. In either of these cases Positive 
Institution and Natural Law become opposed, and thus 
a bad contrivance in Legislation, like a bad contrivance 
in mechanics, comes always to some dead-lock at last. 
Time and Natural Consequence are great Teachers in 
Politics as in other things. Our sins and our ignorances 
find us out. Both in conduct and in opinion Natural 
Law is ever working to convict error, to reveal and to 
confirm the truth. 

And so it was that the sad phenomena of Factory 
labour were beginning to indicate the great difference 


1 ‘*Opinionum enim commenta delet dies; nature judicia con- 
firmat.”—Cicero, “ De Nat. Deor,”’ lib. ii. c. 3. 


a. 


ei 





358 THE REIGN OF LAW. cae 


between the results of perfect freedom of exchange in. 
the products of labour and the results of perfect freedom 
of competition in Labour itself. Perhaps that difference 
ought to have been foreseen, for the cause of it is plain 
enough. ‘There are certain results for the attainment of 
which the natural instincts of individual men not only 
may be trusted, but must be trusted as’ the best and 
indeed the only guide. There are other results of which 
as a rule those instincts will take no heed whatever, and 
for the attainment of which, if they are to be attained 
at all, the higher faculties of our nature must impose 
their Will in authoritative expressions of Human Law. 
In all that wide circle of operations which haye for their 
immediate result the getting of wealth, there is a sagacity 
and a cunning in the instincts of labour and in the love 
of gain compared with which all legislative wisdom is 
ignorance and folly. But the instincts of labour, having 
for their conscious purpose the acquisition of wealth, are 
instincts which, under the stimulus and necessities of 
modern society, are blind to all other results whatever. 
They override even the love of life; they silence even 
the fear of death. ‘Trades in which the labourers never 
reach beyond middle life—trades in which the work is 
uniformly fatal within a few years—trades in which those 
who follow them are liable to loathsome and torturing 


disease—all are filled by the enlistment of an unfailing 





LAW IN POLITICS. “~~ 359 





series of recruits. If, therefore, there be some things 
desirable or needful for a Community other than the 
acquisition of wealth,—if mental ignorance, and physical 
degeneracy, be evils dangerous to social and political 
prosperity, then these results cannot and must not be 
trusted to the instincts of individual men. And why? 
Because the few motives which bear upon them, and 
which consequently determine their conduct, have be- 
come almost as imperious as the motives which deter- 
mine the conduct of the lower animals. Observers whose 
duties have called them to a close investigation of the 
facts, have never failed to be impressed with those facts 
as the result of Laws against which the individual Will 
is unable to contend. Overpowering motives arise out 
of the conditions of society—out of the force of habit— 
out of the helplessness of poverty—out of the .thought- 
lessness of wealth—out of the eagerness of competition 
—out of the very virtues even of industrial skill. These 
constitute an aggregate of power tending in one direction, 
which make the resulting action of Mind as certain as 
the action of Inanimate Force. ‘ Thus,” says Mr. Baker, 
one of the most experienced of our Factory Inspectors, 


“most of the workshops of this great commercial country 


‘are found to have fallen into ¢he inevitable track of com- 


petitive mdustry, when unrestricted by law,—namely, to 


cheapen prices by the employment of women and chil- 


oe 


360 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





dren in the first instance, and then to increase production 
by protracted hours of work, without much regard to 
age, to sex, or to physical capability.” This is the result 
of Nature—of Nature, at least, such as ours now is. But 
it is the result of that Nature with all its nobler powers 
allowed to sleep. Power to control such evils has been 
given to Man, and he is bound to use it. “‘ Free labour, 
even in a free country,” as Mr. Baker says, “ requires the 
strong arm of the law to protect it from the cupidity 
and ignorance of parents.”4 And by the “strong arm 
of the law” is meant nothing but the law of Conscience 
and of Reason asserting itself over the lower instincts of 
our nature. If under such conditions of society, higher 
motives are ever to prevail, they must be supplied from 
without, and must be imposed in authoritative form 
through the legitimate organs of Positive Institution.” 
And so the Factory Acts instead of being excused as 
exceptional, and pleaded for as justified only under ex- 
traordinary conditions, ought to be recognised as in truth 
the first Legislative recognition of a great Natural Law, 


p- 84. . 

2 Bad as the consequentes were of individual freedom under un- 
restricted competition in the case of labour in factories, the results 
were still more horrible in the case of labour in mines. In 1842 it 
was found absolutely necessary to prohibit altogether the labour of 
women and young children in mines and collieries, 


1 “Reports of the Inspectors of Factories, half-year Oct. 1864,” 


LAW IN POLITICS. 361 


quite as important as Freedom of Trade, and which like 
this last, was yet destined to claim for itself wider and 
wider application, => 0" 
' Accordingly, since the year when the first Sir Robert 
Peel pleaded the cause of Factory Apprentices, there has 
been going on a double movement in Legislation, one a 
movement of retreat, the other a movement of advance. 
Step by step Legislation has retired from a Province once 
considered peculiarly its own: step by step it has ad- 
vanced into another Province within which the Schools 
of Political Economy would have denied it a foot of 
ground. Since 1802, there have been passed a long 
series of laws removing, one after another, all restrictions 
which aimed at guiding the individual Will in its sharp 
and sagacious pursuit of material wealth. During the 
same period there have been passed another long series 
of Acts imposing restrictions more and more stringent on 
the individual Will in its blind and reckless disregard of 


moral ends.! In neither of these movements was Par- 


1 It was not till 1819 that Sir Robert Peel succeeded in passing 
an Act restricting the labour of unapprenticed children. This. Act 
(59 Geo. III. c. 66) is theretore, properly speaking, the first of the 
Factory Acts—the first which affirmed the principle of restriction as 
legitimately applicable to ‘*Free” Labour. But this, as well as a 
subsequent Act passed in 1825, at the instance of Sir J. Hobhouse, 
were practically inoperative from defective enforcing clauses. It 
was thus apparent that the State must charge itself not only with 





362. THE REIGN OF LAW. 

liament impelled by the light of reason, but under the 
blessed teaching which belongs to the Reign of Law. 
False theory and mistaken conduct have been found out 
by the working of Natural Consequence. The abstract 
reasonings of Adam Smith had indeed long before pre- 
pared the minds of a few to perceive the true theory of 
unrestricted competition in the interchange of goods. 
But as it needed the practical results of restriction—dis- 
tress, discontent, and the danger of civil commotion—to 
bring home to the national understanding the economic 
error of the old commercial systems; so also as regards 
the grievous results of unrestricted competition in human 
labour, our only effective teaching has been that of hard 
experience. The doctrines of Adam Smith, when applied 
here, were a hindrance and not a help. The Political 
Economists were, almost to a man, hostile to restrictive 
legislation. ‘They did not see what would be the working 
of Natural Law upon the Human Will, when that Will 
was exposed to overpowering motives under debased 
conditions of understanding and of heart. They did not 


laying down the law, but also with the duty of seeing it obeyed.’ 
It was not till this great question was taken in hand by Lord 
Ashley that any effectual measure was passed. His Bill became 
Law in 1833, as 3 and 4 Will. IV. c. 103. Nothing but a stringent 
system of Government Inspection was of any avail against the 
powerful combination of motives, out of which the evils of the 
Factory system arose, 





ne re 


LAW IN POLITICS. 363 





see the higher Law which Parliament was asserting when 
it was driven by sheer instinctive horror of actual results, 
to prohibit “free” labourers from disposing as they 
pleased of the labour of their children. | 
. To this hour the principle on which this great counter- 
movement rests as regards our ideas of the legitimate 
province of Legislation, has never been philosophically 
treated. The Laws on which it depends, and which it 
does but recognise, have never been scientifically defined. 
We are still in a state of tutelage—advancing with slow 
and reluctant steps! in the path indicated by the teach- 
ings of Natural Consequence. The last Report on the 


i 2 Thesteps here referred to are certainly becoming every year less 
slow and less reluctant. Since this work was published, the ‘‘ Fac- 
tory Acts’ Extension Act” of 1867 has extended the provisions of 
those Acts to all establishments which employ fifty persons ; and the 
“Workshop Regulation Act” of the same year, has carried the pro- 
tection of the law into the precincts of ‘‘any room or place what- 
ever in which any handicraft is carried on.” Nay more, it extends 
that protection even to children who are working, not for wages at 
all, but only “under a parent.” The principle of ‘‘State inter- 
ference” is here carried to its utmost length. It is characteristic of 
the cautious and tentative character of English Legislation that it 
becomes gradually committed to great general principles, not through 
any perception of the truth and value of those principles in the 
abstract, but gradually, and through the compulsion of particular 
necessities. And to the last possible moment the general application 
of such principles is always resisted. But no argument can be used 
in fayour of compulsory education, as regards children in “ works 
which is not equally applicable to all children whatever. 


’ 


shops,’ 





a= 


364 THE REIGN OF LAW. — 


Employment of Children shows that evils as bad as ever 
existed before the passing of the Factory Acts, prevail at 


this moment among large classes of our operative popu- 


lation, and demand again, as imperatively as before, an | 


authoritative interference of Positive Institution with the 
freedom of the individual Will. The fact of such legis- 


lation has indeed gained a sort of silent acquiescence, and 


some of the old opponents have admitted that their fear 
of the results, in an economical point of view, has proved 
erroneous. But there is still no clear and well-grounded 
intellectual perception of the deep foundations of prin- 
ciple on which it rests. Nor is there among a large 
section of Politicians any adequate appreciation of the 
powerful influence it has had in improving the physical 
condition of the people, and securing their contentment 
with the Laws under which they live. 

When, however, we think for a moment of the frightful 
nature of the evils which this Legislation has checked, 
and which to a large extent it has remedied—when we 
recollect the inevitable connexion between suffering and 
political disaffection—when we consider the great moral 
laws which were being trodden under foot from mere 
thoughtlessness and greediness—we shall be convinced 
that if, during the last fifty years, it has been given to this 
country to make any progress in Political Science, that 


progress has been in nothing happier than in the Factory 


» 


LAW IN POLITICS. 365 





Legislation. The names of those who strove for it, and 
through whose faith and perseverance it was ultimately 
carried, are, and ever willbe, in the history of Politics, 
immortal names. No Government and no Minister has 
ever done a greater—perhaps, all things considered, none 
has ever done so great a service. It was altogether a new 
era in Legislation—the adoption of a new principle—the 
establishment of a new idea. Nor is that principle and 
that idea even now thoroughly understood. The 
promptings of individual self-interest are still relied upon 
for the accomplishment of good which it does not belong 
to them even to suggest, and which they can never be 
trusted to pursue. Proposals for legislative interference 
with a view to arrest some of the most frightful evils of 
Society, are still constantly opposed, not by careful 
analysis of their tendency, but by general assertions of 
Natural Law as opposed to all legislation of the kind. : 
“You cannot make men moral by Act of Parliament”— 
such is a common enunciation of Principle, which, like 
many others: . the same kind, is in one sense a truism, 
-and in every other sense a fallacy. It is true that neither 
wealth, nor health, nor knowledge, nor moraltty, can be. 
given by Act of Parliament. But it is also true that the 
acquisition of one and_.of all of these can be impeded 
and prevented by bad laws, as well as aided and encou: 
taged by wise and appropriate legislation. 


366 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





There is no doctrine in Physics more certainly true 


than this doctrine in Politics—that every practice which 
the authority of Society recognises or supports has its own 
train of consequences, which, for evil or for good, can 
be modified or changed in an infinite variety of degrees 
according as that sanction is given or withheld. In- 
numerable illustrations of this truth will arise wherever 
we take the trouble to trace any social or political pheno- 
mena through the sequences of cause and effect from 
which they come. Not unfrequently these illustrations 
are of a melancholy kind, and give us much to think 
of respecting the better understanding and the better 
management of our complicated nature. Thus, ' for 
_example, there seems good reason to believe there 
is a direct relation between the amount of life and pro- 

perty annually sacrificed by shipwreck, and the legislation 
"which recognises and sanctions Insurance to the full 
amount of the value of ship and cargo. The cause of 
thisis obvious. Care for life is less eager and less wake- 


ful than care for property. This is true even when men 


are dealing equally with their own property, and with: 


their own lives. It is still more true when they are 
dealing not only with property which is their own, but 
with lives which belong to others. The inevitable effect 
of such Insurance is therefore to relax the motives of 
self-interest, which are the strongest incitements to pre- 


ae P< 
ie 
_— wi ears 





LAW IN POLITICS. 367 





caution.! Similar results appear in a thousand other 
cases, both of laws still existing, and of laws which have 
been repealed. The conduct of men depends on the 
balance of motives which-are brought to bear upon 
them. In supplying those motives, external conditions 
and mental character act and react upon each other. 
Both of these can be affected, and affected powerfully, 
by Positive Institution. 

The restraints of Positive Institution are not, however, 
the only means,—very often they are not the best means 
by which to lighten the overpowering pressure of par- 
ticular motives upon the individual WilL For as the 
Reason. and the Conscience of the whole Political Com- 
munity can interfere by the exercise of authority, so 
also may adequate remedies be found in the reason and 
the conscience of Voluntary Societies. The external 
conditions which tell upon the individual Will are them- 
selves very often nothing but conditions depending on 
the aggregate Will of those around us; and if upon 
them, by any means, new motives can be brought to 
bear, then the whole of those external conditions may 
be changed. The language which is used in the name 


of Economic Science constantly involves in this matter 


1 A curious and instructive Paper upon this subject has been 
published by Mr. Edwin Chadwick, having been read before a 
recent meeting of the Social Science Association. 





-_ 


368 . THE REIGN OF LAW. 





the same fallacy which has already been pointed’ out 
in the language used in the name of Physical Science. 
It is often said that the conduct and condition of men 
are governed by invariable laws; and the conclusion 
is that the evils which arise by way of natural conse- 
quence out of the action of those laws, are evils against 
which the struggles of the Will are hopeless. But the 
facts on which this conclusion is founded, are, as usual, 
inaccurately stated. The conditions of human life and 
conduct, like the conditions of all natural phenomena, 
are never governed by those separate and individual 
forces which alone are invariable, but always by com- 
binations among those forces—-which combinations are 
of endless variety, and of endless capability of change. 
Different motives arise out of the inborn gifts of charac- 
ter, and out of the conditions of external circumstance. 
It is true, indeed, that there are in the mind of Man, 
as there are in Nature, certain forces originally im- 
planted, which are unchangeable in this sense, that they 
have an invariable tendency to determine conduct in 


a particular direction. But as in Nature we have a 


power of commanding her elementary forces by the 
methods of adjustment, so in the Realm of Mind we 
can operate on the same principle, by setting one motive 
to counteract another: and by combination among many 


Motives, we can influence in a degree, and to an extent 


ith is ouieallans 


LAW IN POLITICS. 369 





as. yet unknown, the conduct and the condition of 
Mankind. » 

Nor are the resources of Contrivance limited to adjust- 
ment among the motives which arise only out of exist- 
ing conditions. New motives can be evoked and put 
in action by the adopting of appropriate means. The 
mere founding, for example, of a Voluntary Society for 
any given purpose, evolves out of the primary elements 
of human character a latent force of the most powerful 
kind ; namely, the motive—the sentiment—the feeling— 
the passion as it often is, of the Spint of Association. 
This is a passion which defies analysis. The cynic may 
reduce it to a form’ of selfishness—and undoubtedly the 
identification of the interests and the desires of Self 
with the Society for which this passion is conceivea, 
lies at its very root and is of its very essence. It is 
true, also, that it is a passion so powerful as to need’ 
strong control—without which control it generates some 
of the very meanest emotions of the heart. Out of it 
there has come, and there comes again and again from 
age to age, a spirit of hatred even against good itself, 
when that good is the work of any one who “followeth 
not us.” It is a force, nevertheless, rooted in the Nature 
of Man, implanted there as part of its constitution, and 
like all others of this character, given him for a purpose, 
and having its own legitimate field of operation. Nor is 

BB 








379. 3 THE REIGN OF LAW. 








that field a narrow one. ‘The spirit of Association is the 
fountain of much that is noblest in human character, and 
of much that is most heroic in human conduct. For all 
the desires and aspirations of Self are not selfish. The 
interests of Self, justly appreciated and rightly under- 
stood, may be, nay indeed must be, the interests also 
of other men—of Society—of Country—of the Church, 
and of the World. 

And so it is that when the aim of any given Asso- 
ciation is a high aim, directed to ends really good, and 
seeking the attainment of them by just methods of pro- 
cedure, the spirit it evokes becomes itself a new “ Law” 
—a special force operating powerfully for good on the 
mind of every individual subject to its influence. Some 
pre-existing motives it modifies—some it neutralises— 
some it suppresses altogether—some it compels to work 
in new directions. But in all cases the Spirit of Asso- 
ciation is in itself a power—a force—a Law in the Realm 
of Mind. What it can do, and what it cannot do, in 
affecting the conditions of Society, is a problem not to 
be solved so easily and so summarily as some dogmiatists 
in political philosophy would have us to believe. It is 
a question which, like so many others, is not likely to 
be solved by adstract reasoning without the help of 
actual experiment. And this experiment is being tried. 
The instincts of men, truer often than the conclusions 





—., 


LAW IN POLITICS. 371 





of philosophy, have rebelled against the doctrine that 

they are the sport of circumstances. Yet finding by 
hard experience that this is often true of the individual 
Will when standing by itself, they have resolved to try 
whether it is equally true of the Collective Will, guided 
by the spirit and strengthened under the discipline of 
Association. Hence the phenomena of Combination as 
a means of affecting the condition of labour—pheno- 
mena so alarming to many minds, and certainly so well 
deserving of attention, Let us look for a moment at 
the important illustrations of the Reign of Law which 
these phenomena afford. 

A moment’s consideration will convince us that the 
same necessities of labour which were found to deter- 
mine so fatally the condition of women and children, are 
necessities which apply without any abatement to the ~ 
labour of adult men. They must be subject to the same 
pressure of inducements. Nay, more, it is only through 
them that this pressure can reach the women who are 
their wives, and the children who are their children. If 
overpowering motives did not equally determine the 
conduct and condition of adult men, no legislation woul« 
have been required for the protection of their families. 
If a man is placed under such conditions that he cen 
not save his wife and child from exhausting labour, it 
is certain that the same conditions will impose a like 

BB2 











372 THE REIGN OF LAW, 


~_—— 





———— 


necessity upon himself. Nevertheless, Parliament has 


resolutely and wisely refused to interfere on his behalf.. 


And why? Because the arguinent is that the adult man 
is able, or ought to be able, to defend himself.- And so 
he can; but how? Only by combination. The “law” 
which results in excessive labour is the law of competi- 
tion—that is, it is the attraction exerted upon the Wills 
of a multitude of individual men by the rewards of 
labour. The pressure of this attraction can only be 
lightened by bringing those Wills under the power of 
-counter motives, which may induce them to postpone, to 
some higher interest, the immediate appetites of gain. 
And this is the work which Combination does. It comes 
in the place of Positive Institution. Those who are under 
it “are a Law unto themselves.” 

Nor is it unimportant to observe that what Combina- 
tion does for the protection of labour, it does better, and 
with better consequences, than Positive Institution can 
ever do. Men are driven to excessive labour, because if 
they don’t work excessively, others will. But it is the 
effect of Combination that others won’t. Under Positive 


Institution they are not allowed. Under Combination 


they are determined not. And as the forming of an | 


intelligent resolution, and the abiding by it, are higher 
exercises of mind than the mere passive obedience 
to authority, so is the good effected by Combination a 





- -.-. 


a 


at Ck eee ee 





LAW IN POLITICS. 373 


higher good than that resulting from Factory Legislation. 
It tends to form and to strengthen character. It tends to 
subordinate the present to the future, and the temporary 
interests of Self to the permanent welfare of a Brother- 
hood of men. And this it tends to do in classes other- 
wise prone to follow only the impulse of the moment, 
and to consider only the apparent interests of the in- 
dividual. 

These considerations should disabuse our minds of. 
the unjust and unreasonable prejudice against the prin- 
ciple of Combination which still betrays itself so strongly 
in the language of many politicians. When the Working 
Classes combine for the protection of their own labour 
against the effects of unrestricted competition, they are 
simply taking that course which is recommended alike 
by reason and by experience. It is the course which 
Parliament has indicated as the right course both by 
what it has itself done, and by what it has declined to do. 
Nor can there be any greater mistake than to suppose 
that this course involves necessarily any rebellion against 
the laws of economic science. Combination is an appeal 
‘to the most fundamental of all Natural Laws—to the law 
of Contrivance—to the power of Adjustment—wielding, 
through Reason and Conscience, the elementary forces 
of Human Character. Of the constancy and “ invaria- 
| bility ” of these no doubt or denial is involved. Rather 


a 
6 
——— ee 


374 THE REICN OF. LAW. 


the reverse. It is upon instinctive trust in that constancy 
that all social and political Contrivance rests. And so 
we need not be surprised to find that, through the orga- 
nised efforts of communities of men, the evils which arise 
by way of natural consequence out of the helplessness 
and thoughtlessness of the individual Will, are evils 
which to a large extent can be met and overcome. 
But though all this is true, universally, of the principle 
of Combination, it is very far from being true, univer- 
sally, of the particular purposes to which Combination is 
applied. All the sources of error which have so long 
perverted Legislation, are equally powerful in perverting 
the aims, and in misdirecting the efforts of Voluntary 
Association. If the upper classes, with all the advan- 
tages of leisure, and of culture, and of learning, have . 
been so unable, as we have seen them to be, to measure 
the effect of the laws they made, how much more must 
we expect errors and misconceptions of the most grievous 
kind to beset the action of those who—through poverty 
and ignorance, and often through much suffering—have 
been able to do little more than strike blindly against 
evils whose pressure they could feel, but whose root and 
remedy they could neither see nor understand ? 
Accordingly, the history of Combination among the 
Working Classes has, until a very recent period, been a 
sad history of misdirected effort—of strength put forth 





ees ey 


LAW IN POLITICS. 375 





only in violence and disorder, and of the virtues of Bro- 
therhood lost in tyrannical suppression of all individual 
freedom. Its heaviest blows have been often aimed at 
the most powerful agencies for good. One of the very 
earliest forms of Combination has been that which was 
directed against the introduction and improvements of 


machinery. The Working Classes have always encoun- 


tered with jealousy and fear those triumphs of Mecha- - 


nical Invention whose function it is to economise labour 
and to multiply the fruits of industry. It would be hard 
to blame them. What class is there which can say with 
truth that they have themselves been able always to 
follow with intelligent fozesight the links of Natural Con- 
sequence through the darkness into which they so often 
lead? For almost every great step in the advance of civi- 
lization plunges at first through some passage which seems 
dangerous, or at least obscure. ‘The happiest achieve- 
ments of Contrivance have their own aspects of apparent 
danger, and their own real incidents of temporary evil. 
Every new machine displaces and disorganises pre-existing 
forms of labour; and we have seen that, even in its 
ultimate effects, the advance of Mechanical Invention 
developed new dangers to the Working Classes—dangers 
only to be avoided by measures which were not taken, 
and by-precautions which were not adopted. 

It would be well if, from the past convicted errors, 





376 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





Loth of Legislation and of Combination, we could extract 
some conclusions of general principle capable of helping 
us in the difficulties of our own time. In looking at the 


root of those errors, it would seem that, in order to avoid 


them, two things are necessary—first, unshaken faith in | 


great Natural Laws; and, secondly, a faith not less 
assured in the free agency of Man to secure by appro- 
priate means the working of those laws for good. ‘Thus, 
the love of gain is an instinct implanted in the human 
mind, and the endeavour to suppress it has always been 
the violation of a Natural Law. In like manner, Mecha- 
nical Invention is a Law of Nature in the highest and 
strictest sense. The power of it and the love of it are 
among the elementary forces of human character. Each 
fresh exertion of it is, and must be, according to the con- 
stitution and course of Nature—leading to higher and 
higher fulfilments of the original Purpose of Man’s Crea- 
tion; which was, that he should not only inhabit the 
’ Earth, as the beasts inhabit it, but that he should 
subdue it. , 

So also combination is natural to Man. The desire 
for it and the need of it, grow with the growth of know- 
ledge and with the increasing complications of Society. 
It has now, for the most part, emerged from the stage of 
_ tude ignorance which led to the breaking of machinery. 
It is conducted, comparatively at least, with high intel- 





— eS ee. OP 







—- Sa 





LAW IN POLITICS. 377 





ligence, and aims for the most part at legitimate objects 
of desire. Yet in the rebellion which has been roused 
against the doctrines of Necessity, founded on false con- 
ceptions of Invariable Law, there is a constant danger 
lest the Spirit of Association should attempt to act against 
“Nature instead of acting with it. There is, for example, 
a Law—an observed order of facts—in respect to Man, 
which the Working Classes too often forget, but which 
can neither be violated nor neglected with impunity. 
That Law is the Law of inequality—the various degrees 
in which the gifts both of Body and of Mind are shared 
among men. ‘This is one of the most fundamental facts 
of human nature. Nor is it difficult to see how it should 
be also one of the most beneficent. But it is a fact 
against which the spirit of Combination is very apt to 
assume an attitude of permanent insurrection. It is, of 
course, the business and the function of Combination to 
subordinate in some things the Individual to the Class; 
and the temptation is to make that subordination exclu- 
sive and complete. Hence the jealousy so often shown 
of wages measured by the amount of work performed. 
This is a jealousy of the superiority of reward which is 
naturally due to superiority of power, of industry, or of 
skill. But these are things which God has joined to- 
gether, and which no man or combination of men have a 


right to put asunder. It is a marriage made in the 


378 THE REIGN OF LAW 





morning of the world, and in every step of human pro- 
gress we see its blessing and its fruit. If it be stupid 
to break machines and to proscribe Mechanical Inven- 
tion, it is not less stupid to be jealous of this primeval 
adjustment between the varying energies of human 
character and the varying results which they are com- 
petent to attain. 

This is not the place to enter in detail on the difficult 
and complicated question as to the limits within which 
Combinations can, and beyond which they cannot, affect 
the rewards of labour. They have certainly succeeded 
in limiting the hours of labour in cases where Legislation 


could not well have interfered ;* and wherever the hours 


of labour are reduced without a corresponding reduction 


in wages, a substantial economic advantage is unques- 


tionably secured. Equal confidence is expressed by 


many Associations, that as a matter of experience and of | 


fact, they have succeeded in establishing higher rates of 


1 Of this the Baking Trade is a good example. The hours ot 
adult labour in this trade, under the effects of unrestricted compe- 
tition, had come to be most injurious and oppressive. In Glasgow 
and in Edinburgh this condition of things has been effectually re- 
medied by a Combination, whose exertions were successful, without 
(I believe) resort being ever had to the extreme measure of a Strike. 
The Baking Trade in London is still afflicted by the same oppressive 
hours of labour, because of the difficulty which has hitherto been 
experienced in organising there any Combination equally complete, 


—_” P= 


LAW TIN “POLITICS, 379 


wages than would have accrued under the system of 
unrestricted competition. This may very well be true. 
lt is a truth which casts no.doubt whatever on the 
imvariability of Economic Laws when these are rightly 
understood. ‘They are invariable in the same sense, and 
in no other, in which all other Natural Laws are in- 
variable. That is to say, they represent tendencies in 
human character determined by motives, which ten- 
dencies are constant, and may surely be relied on as 
producing always, under like conditions, their own appro- 
priate effects. It is upon this constancy that Com- 
bination must rely for any power it can ever have: and 
it is the same constancy in the action of specific motives 
which gets bounds to the power of Combination, beyond 
which it can néver pass. The same motive which impels 
the Workman to secure an adequate reward for his 
labour, impels the Manufacturer or the Trader to secure 
an adequate reward for his capital, his knowledge, and 
his skill. And although the desire of gain is not the only 
motive, and is often not the strongest motive, which 
unpels men to persevere in enterprises once begun, yet 
if Combinations of Workmen should attempt to raise 
wages so high as to trench upon the minimum rate of 
proht which will induce men to carry on any given trade, 
then by a natural consequence, not less certain than any 


other, capital and enterprise and skill will be withdrawn 





330 ~ THE REIGN OF LAW. ° 





from that trade, and those who depend upon it will be 
the first to suffer. Short, however, of this extreme result, 
there is generally a margin of ground upon which Com- 
bination may act with more or less effect. It may pre- 
vent arbitrary or capricious changes; and as there are 
practically many impediments in the way of men moving 
their capital from one employment to another, Com- 
bination may compel them to submit to lower rates of 
profit than would otherwise content them if those diffi- 
culties did not exist. | 

But to all these possibilities of influence there is a 
limit in the nature of things—in Natural Laws—that is, 
in the new motives which are brought into operation by 
new conditions. What that limit is, it must always 
be difficult to determine except by actual experiment. 
It is enough here to observe that in this, as in every 
other department of human conduct, men are being led 
gradually to a knowledge of the truth by the teachings of 
Natural Consequence. It is by the experience of actual 
results that we are taught both as to the objects which 
are legitimate objects of desire, and as to the proper 
methods by which these may be attained. The very 
attempt of the Working Classes to govern through Com- 
bination their own affairs, and to determine their own 
condition, is an Education in itself. On the extended 
scale in which that attempt is being made, it must 








LAW IN POLITICS. 381 





. 


accustom them to consider great general causes, and to 
estimate the manner and the degree in which these can 
be effected by the methods of Adjustment. Last, not 
least, it must lead them to study and to recognise the 
moral duties which are indeed the most fundamental of 
all Natural Laws. For it ought to be remembered, that 
the first and most important object of Combinations is ; 
one against which there can be no opposition founded 
on the doctrines of Economic Science. That object 
is to secure for the Working Classes those provisions 
against misfortune, sickness, accident, and age, which 
are amongst the first duties of all organised societies of 
men. How far through such agency the causes of 
pauperism may be successfully attacked, is a question 
on which we are only entering. In like manner, the 
conditions and limitations under which Combination 
may succeed in blending the functions and in uniting 
the profits of Capital and of Labour—this also is a 
question to be determined by Natural Laws, not yet 
fully explored or understood. But enough is known, 
and results sufficiently determinate have already been 
secured, to convince us that in this great department 
of Natural Law, as in every other, the Will of Man is 
not powerless when its energies are directed by wisdom, 
and when the choice of its methods is founded upon 
knowledge. 





382 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





ve 


This is, indeed, the great lesson to be learnt from 
every inquiry into the constitution and course of things. 
Nature is a great Armoury of weapons, and implements, 
“for the service and the use of Will. Many of them 
are too ponderous for Man to wield. He can only look 
with awe on the tremendous Forces which are every- 
where seen yoked under the conditions of Adjustment— 
on the smoothness of their motions,—on the magnitude 
and the minuteness, on the silence and the perfection, 
of their work. But there are also many weapons hung 
upon the walls which lend themselves to human hands 
—lesser tools which Man can use. He cannot alte 
or modify them in shape or pattern—in quality, or in 
power. The fashion of them and the nature of them 


are fixed for ever. ‘These are, indeed, invariable. Only - 


if we know how to use them, then that use is ours. 
Then also the lesser contrivances which we can set in 
motion are ever found to work in perfect harmony with 
the vaster mechanisms which are moving overhead. 
And as in the material world no effort gives so fully the 
sense of work achieved as the subjugation of some 


Natural Force under the command of Will, so in the — 


world of Mind no triumphs of the Spirit are happier than 
those by which some natural tendency of Human Cha- 
racter is led to the accomplishment of a purpose which 
is wise and good. It is for the gaining of these triumphs 


i) a oe 


a i ie i 


pa een 


LAW IN POLITICS. 383 





that Man has been gifted with the desire of Knowledge, 
and with the sense of Right, and with the faculties of 
Contrivance. In such triumphs lie the aim and purpose 
of all Natural Laws—for these they were all established— 
for these they all work, whether by way of encourage- 
ment, or of restraint, or of retribution. 

Nothing is more striking in the history of Discovery 
than the ages during which men have been blind to 
the suggestions of Natural Law—suggestions which now 
appear so obvious that we wonder how the interpreta- 
tion of them could’ have been missed so long. It is 
very easy to feel this wonder concerning others ; it is 
much more difficult to remember that the same wonder 
will certainly be felt concerning ourselves. Such as we 
‘now see to have been the position of former generations 
in respect to things which they failed to understand,— 
such, we may depend upon it, is precisely our own 
position in regard to innumerable phenomena now con- 
stantly passing before our eyes. We may be sure of 
this; and we ought to be as glad of it as we are sure, 
For the world is not so prosperous or so happy as tha 
we should readily or willingly believe in the exhaus- 
tion of the means which are at our disposal for its 
better guidance. Especially in the great Science of 
Politics, which investigates the complicated forces whose 
action and reaction determine the condition of Organised 





384 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





Societies of men, we are still standing, as it were, only 
at the break of day. Our command over the external 
elements of Nature is, beyond all comparison, in advance 
‘of our command over the resources of Human Cha- 


racter. 7 
Special causes retard the progress of knowledge in 


this department of inquiry. Many problems so difficult _ 


and intricate that they never can be solved except by 
patient observation, patient thought, and yet more 
patient action, are as yet hardly recognised to be pro- 
blems at all. We look on the facts of Nature and of 


human life through the dulled eyes of Custom and Tra- | 


ditional Opinion. And when some misery worse than 
others forces itself upon the acknowledgment of the 
world, men are slow to’discover or admit their own 
power over the sources whence such miseries come to 
be. That which is needed to open our eyes to such 
questions, is not mere intellectual power. "Rarer and 
finer qualities have this work to do. Among the cha- 
racteristics of the individual men who have exerted the 
most powerful influence for good on the condition of 
Society, no quality has been more remarkable than a 


certain natural openness and simplicity of mind. Readi- 


ness to entertain, willingness to accept, and enthusiasm . 


to pursue, a new idea, have always been among the most 


fruitful gifts of genius. 


= ae 








LAW 1N POLITICS. 385 


——— 


| Is it vain to hope that the thoughtfulness and candour 
which have been the natural inheritance of a few, may 
~yet be more common among all educated men? The 
whole constitution and course of things would receive 
an earlier fulfilment did we carry about with us an 
habitual belief in the inexhaustible treasures which it 
holds—in the power of the agencies which it offers to 
i Knowledge and Contrivance. For then the results of 
Natural Consequence would be accepted for that which 
they teach, and not simply submitted to for that which 
they inflict. ‘The disorders of Society would not so 
often be supinely regarded as the result of inevitable laws, 
but would be seen as the fruit always of some ignorance 
or of some rebellion ; and so the exhilarating conviction 
would be ours, that those disorders are within the reach 
of remedy through larger Knowledge and a better Will. 
We hear much now of the “ blessed light of Science ;” 4 
and if the methods and conditions of Physical inquiry 
were applied in a really philosophical spirit to Spiritual 
Phenomena, the influence of Science for good would 
be more powerful than it is. Meanwhile it is well to 
remember that although readiness to accept a new idea 
is essential to Discovery, it is equally true that new 
dangers beset and surround all new aspects of the truth, © 
1 See a remarkable passage in the concluding pages of “ Ecce 
Homo,” 
ce 





386 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





_ Paradoxical as it may sound to say so, this is a consequence 
of the splendour of Man’s endowments, of his freedom 
from direction,—of the swiftness and the subtlety of 
his mental powers. On her own narrow path Instinct 
is a surer guide than Reason, and accordingly it is often 
the higher faculties of the mind which are the most 


misleading. The Speculative Faculty is impatient of , 


waiting upon Knowledge, and is ever as busy and as 
ingenious in finding out new paths of error as in sup- 
plying new interpretations of the truth. Hence in Philo- 
sophy the most extravagant errors have been constantly 
associated with the happiest intuitions, and it has 
remained for the successors of great men in another 
generation to separate their discoveries from their delu- 
sions. Hence also in Politics the great movements of 
Society have seldom been accomplished without raising 
many false interpretations of the Past, and many extra- 
vagant anticipations of the Future.! It cannot, indeed, 


- 


be said with truth that the calamities of Nations have 


gencrally arisen from too great play being given to novel 
or theoretical conclusions. Rather the reverse. They 
have arisen, for the most part, from too little attention 
being paid to the progress of opinion, and to the insen- 
sible development of new conditions. 


1 ‘*Nos péres en 1789 ont été condamnés a passer des perspectives 
g 


du Paradis aux scénes de l’Enfer.”—Guizot, “ L’Eglise et la Société, 
p- 2186 





_ LAW IN POLITICS. 387 





The question has been often raised, whether there is 
any law of growth, of progress, and of decay prevailing 
over Nations, as over individual Organisms. Whatever 
the solution of this question may be, it is certain that 
some causes are no longer in existence which produced— 
not indeed the corruption, but—the final overthrow of 
the great historical Nations of Antiquity. The epoch 
of conquering Races destroying the Governments, and 
reconstructing the Populations of the World, is an epoch 
which has passed away. ‘Whatever causes there may be 
now of political decline are causes never brought to such 
rough detection, and never ending in catastrophes so 
complete. Yet, in modern days a condition of stagnation 
and decline has been the actual condition of many Polli- 
tical Societies for long periods of time. It is a condition 
prepared always by ignorance or neglect of some moral 
or economic laws, and determined by long-continued 
perseverance in a corresponding course of conduct. 
‘Then the laws which have been neglected assert them: 
selves, and the retributions they inflict are indeed 
tremendous. In the last generation, and in our own 
time, the Old and the New Worlds have each afforded 
memorable examples of the Reign of Law over the 
course of Political events. Institutions maintained 
against the natural progress of Society have “ foundered 
amidst fanatic storms.” Other institutions upheld and 

Ccc2 





388 THE REIGN OF LAW. 








cherished against justice, and humanity, and conscience, 
have yielded only to the scourge of War. 


It is in the wake of such convulsions that reactions of 


opinion so often sweep over the Human Mind, as hurri- 
canes sweep Over the surface of the Sea. But whatever 
new forms of error are begotten of reaction, it is a com- 
fort to believe that there are always some steps gained 
which are never lost. No man can look back on the 
history of modern civilisation without seeing that it pre- 
sents the phenomena of development and growth. Nor 
can it be doubted, surely, that whatever may be the 
decline of particular Communities, the progress of man- 
kind, on the whole, is a progress to higher and better 
things. And if this be true, no particular exceptions 
should shake our faith in the general rule that all safe 
_ progress depends on timely recognition being given to 
the natural developments of Thought. They can never 
be resisted in the end, and they are most liable to take 
erroneous directions when they are resisted long. For 
this is among the most certain of all the laws of Man’s 
nature—that his conduct will in the main be guided by 
his moral and intellectual convictions. “All human 
society is grounded on a system of fundamental 
opinions.” Such is the Law arrived at by the newest of 
modern Philosophies,! and it would be well if all its 


1 “The Positive Philosophy of Aug. Comte,” by J. S. Mill, p. ror, © 


’ 
ach 
iy 
— Ss 2. 





LAW IN POLITICS. 389 


——_——— -— 





discoveries were as near the truth. This is the Law to 
which Christianity appeals, and in which its very roots 
are laid, when it asserts, as no other Religion has ever 
asserted, the power and virtue of Belief. And in this 
Law lies the error which those commit who imagine they 
can hold by the Ethics of Christianity, whilst regarding 
with comparative indifference its History and its Creed. 
This, too, is the Law which lends all their importance 
to the speculations of Philosophy. False conceptions 
of the truth, in apparently the most distant provinces of 
Thought, may and do relax the most powerful springs 
of action. Among these false conceptions of the truth, 
none are now more prevalent:than those which concern 
the definition, and the function and the power of 
“Taw.” Instead of regarding the Constancy of Nature 
<s incompatible with the energies of Will, we must learn 
to see in it the most powerful stimulus to inquiry, and the 
most cheering encouragement to exertion. 

The superstition which saw in all natural phenomena 
the action of capricious Deities was not more irrational 
than the superstition which sees in them nothing but the 
action of Invariable Law. Men have been right and 
not wrong, when they saw in the facts of Nature the 
Variability of Adjustment even more clearly and more 
surely than they saw the Constancy of Force. They 
were tight when they identified these phenomena with 


a a ES A, RS 
‘ 


399 THE REIGN OF LAW. 





the phenomena of Mind. ‘They were right when they 
regarded their own faculty of Contrivance as the nearest 
and truest analogy by which the Constitution of the 
Universe can be conceived and its order understood. 
They were right when they regarded its arrangements 
as susceptible of Change; and when they looked upon 
a change of Will as the efficient cause of other changes 
without number and without end. It was well to feel 
this by the force of Instinct ; it is better still to be sure 
of it in the light of Reason. It is an immense satis- 
faction to know that the result of Logical Analysis does 
but confirm the testimony of Consciousness, and run 
parallel with the primeval Traditions of Belief. It is 
an unspeakable comfort that when we come to close 
quarters with this vision of Invariable Law seated on the 
Throne of Nature, we find it a phantom and a dream— 
a mere nightmare of ill-digested Thought, and of “ God’s 
great gift of speech abused.” We are, after all, what we 
thought ourselves to be. Our freedom is a reality, and 
not a name. Our faculties have in truth the relations 
which they seem to have to the Economy of Nature. 
Their action is a real and substantial action on the 
Constitution and Course of things. The Laws of Nature 
were not appointed by the great Lawgiver to baffle His 
creatures in the sphere of Conduct, still less to confound 
them in the region of Belief. As parts of an Order of 





ig 


LAW IN POLITICS. 391 





things too vast to be more than partly understood, they 
present, indeed, some difficulties which perplex the intel: 
lect, and a few also, it cannot be denied, which wring 
the heart. But, on the whole, they stand in harmonious 
relations with the Human Spirit. They come visibly 
from One pervading Mind, and express the authority 
of one enduring Kingdom. As regards the moral ends 
they serve, this, too, can be clearly seen, that the pur- 
pose of all Natural Laws is best fulfilled when they are 
made, as they can be made, the instruments of intelligent 
Will, and the servants of enlightened Conscience. 





NOTES. 


Note A.—PAGE 46. 


THE article by Mr. Waliace in the Journal of 
Science (No. XVI.) for Oct. 1867, on “Creation by 
Law,” implies much misconception of the whole drift 
and aim of the observations [ have made on Mr. 
Darwin’s “Theory of the Origin of Species.” 

Two separate questions arise in respect to that 
Theory :— 3 

1st. Does it adequately explain the Physical Agencies 
by which new Forms have come to be? 

2a. Does it, even if successful in this explanation, 
supplant or impair the argument for Purpose and 
Design, as founded both on the results and on the 
methods of Creation? 

Of these questions, which are entirely distinct, the 
last is by far the most important of the two: and 





304 NOTES. 





this second question is the one which I have chiefly 


dealt with in the “Reign of Law.” As regards the . 


first question, indeed, I have indicated my opinion that 
the explanation of Physical Agencies is very far from 
being complete, and that the hypothesis can always 
be driven back to some starting point where the very 
condition of things is assumed for which the theory 
professes to account. In this edition, and in answer to 
Mr. Wallace’s challenge, I have added some farther 
indication of the difficulties which remain unsolved, 


and indeed untouched. 


But my main argument has been addressed to 


the second question, and has been aimed chiefly at 
this conclusion— that even supposing the theory to 
be. established, so far 2s it can go, it cannot affect or 
disturb the inseparable relation which exists between 
the intricate adjustments of Nature and Mental Purpose 
—as their sole conceivable origin ‘and cause. In respect 
to this argument, Mr. Wallace virtually admits all 
I have maintained, when he says, “It is simply a 
question of how the Creator has worked.”1 I have 
said nothing of “incessant interference,” of “ continual 
rearrangement of details,” or of “the direct action of 
the Mind and Will of the Creator.” On the contrary, 
I have said that no purpose is ever attained in Nature 


1 Fournal of Science, p. 473. 





os 


NOTES. 395 
except by the enlistment of Laws as the means and in- 
struments of attainment ;! that although Law “is never 
present as a master, it appears never to have been absent 
as a servant,” ? that we have. “no certain reason to believe 
that God ever works otherwise than through the use of 
means;” or, in other words, through the instrumentality 
of those elementary forces or properties of matter and 
of mind which we call.‘ Laws.” The idea of “incessant 
interference” is one which I hold to be essentially 
erroneous. It involves the idea of natural forces 
being agencies altogether external to, and indepen- 
dent of, the Creative Mind. This is the very idea 
to which Mr. Wallace himself gives expression in its 
extremest form, when he limits the function of the 
Creator to that.of so co-ordinating general laws “at the 
jirst introduction of life upon the earth,”? as that they 
shall work “ of necessity” and “ by themselves” the results 
we see. This is unquestionably the way in which they 
appear to usto work. It remains true that “no man hath 
seen God at any time.” But even this conception does . 
not make the word “ contrivance” (to which Mr. Wallace 
objects) less applicable to the adjustments of Nature, 
On the contrary, it makes it more strictly and literally 
applicable than any other conception, because it likens 
the Creative: process more closely to those methods 

1 P. 100, 2 P. 208. ® Journal of Science, Pp. 474. 





396 NOTES. 


adopted by human ingenuity, to which the word con- 
trivance specially refers. The highest efforts of that 
ingenuity are precisely those in which natural forces are 
made to work “necessarily” and “by themselves.” Self- 
acting machines are the most ingenious machines of all. 
The self-action of the “governor” in a Steam-engine is 
the most beautiful of the contrivances by which the ele- 
mentary expansive force of steam is made to do the work 
of Will. Mr. Wallace thinks it “an extraordinary idea 
to imagine the Creator of the Universe contriving the 
various complicated parts of an Orchis, as a mecranic 
might contrive an ingenious toy or puzzle.”! But this is 
precisely the idea he himself supports, when he reduces 
the Creator’s work to the first starting of the forces of 
organic life, and to the foresight merely of the conse- 
quences which must naturally and necessarily arise from 
their first co-ordination. ‘This is an accurate description 
of the method in which a mechanic contrives the most 
ingenious self-operating machines. No doubt the idea of 
Omnipresence, which is the distinctive idea of God’s 
work as distinguished from Man’s work, is an idea which 
it is difficult for us to grasp or to keep steadily in view. 
I do not deny or dispute that “self-action” is and must 
be the aspect in which Nature presents herself to us, 
It could not be otherwise, unless the Invisible were to 
1 Fournal of Science, p. 474. 








NOTES. 397 


become the object of sight and touch. But in proportion 
as we appreciate the infinite intricacy of Natural Ad- 
justments, in the same proportion do we estimate the 
impossibility of conceiving them as the result of Me- 
chanical Necessity, which indeed is an inadequate 
explanation even of our own methods of operation upon 
the material world. 

Mr. Wallace’s article is an excellent example of the 
arguments used in support of the Darwinian theory, both 
in their strength and in their weakness. Their strength 
‘lies in the hold they have of the idea and of the fact 
that Nature is one vast system of Invisible Forces in a 
condition of mutual adjustment. Their weakness lies in 
the idea that the methods of that adjustment can ever be 
explained as the result of mechanical necessity, or of 
the mere elementary propertics of matter working “ by 
themselves.” 





398 NOTES. 


Note B.—Pace 85. 


Although the distinction I have made between Pur- 
pose as a general inference, and Purpose as a particular 
fact, is a distinction which seems to me to be clear 


enough when it is pointed out; yet it. may be well to | 


give some further illustrations here which could not be 
conveniently added to the text. What Positivists profess 
to insist upon is, that in describing a scientific fact, we 
shall not import into it ideas which it does not neces- 
sarily involve, and which are in the nature of inferences 
from the fact. What we, their opponents, have an 
equal, right to insist on is this—that in describing 
scientific facts, the description must not exclude any 
of the ideas which the facts do involve, and that 
the full and adequate description of those facts be 
not evaded in order to keep out an idea which the 
describer may choose to call an inference. Let us 
take an illustration. Let us suppose that we find a 
tube placed anyhow in such a position that we can 
look through it to the sky at night. We do so, and we 
see a star. The facts may be such that this descrip- 
tion fully exhausts them. That the tube was intended 


—s” 


NOTES. 399. 





to bear upon that particular star, or upon any star, . 
would be a mere inference. But now let us suppose 
that, when we look again after some considerable interval 
of time, we find that the.tube still bears upon the 
same star, and let us further suppose the same experi- 
ment repeated with the same result during some hours, 
then we should not describe the fact fully by simply 
stating that the tube bore upon the star. It would be 
necessary, in order to exhaust the facts, to say that the 
tube was so adjusted as to follow the apparent motion of 
the sidereal heavens, and so to counteract the natural 
effects of the earth’s motion as to keep its axis always 
upon the same star. Here instantly we have the lan- 
guage of intention, because the idea of intention is 
inseparable from the facts. We might know nothing of 
the method by which this adjustment is achieved— 
nothing more of the Mind that had devised the method 
than the bare fact of the intention. But that bare fact is 
-an essential part of the observed phenomena, And the 
same argument applies to the mechanism—if that also 
were discovered—by which the adjustment is effected 
between the axis of the tube and the apparent motion 
of the star. That mechanism could not be fully de- 
scribed unless it were described as a mechanism so con- 
trived as to bring about the adjustment which is actually 
effected. 


400 NOTES. 


Take again another case, from the organic world. A 
calf, or any other young animal, discovers by smell or 
by accident, the fact that milk is contained inside a skin 
or bag, and that, by applying its mouth or its tongue to 
some opening, it can get at the milk. The whole fact 
in this case is exhausted when we say that the calf gets 
the milk. It is no part of this fact that the calf was 
intended to get it. But when a calf goes for milk to its 
mother’s udder—when the lacteal glands of the cow are 
recognised as an apparatus for secreting that milk, and 
the teat for delivering it,—then the facts are not ex- 
hausted, the scientific description is not complete or 
truthful, unless we use language importing this adjust- 
ment of apparatus to Purpose in the plan by which 
nourishment is afforded to the young in all mammalia. 
This idea cannot be expelled from science as a mere 
‘“‘inference,” except on the same arguments of bad 
metaphysics, as I hold them to be, by which also 
the existence of Matter and of an External World are 
referred to the same category, 





NOTES. AOL 


Note C.—Pacr 26, 


In illustration of the assertion in the text, that the 
relations of Number, which are the very basis of all 
“verifiable” knowledge, may be reduced by similar 
arguments to mere creations of the Mind, I may here 
remind the reader of the passage which relates to this 
subject in the famous argument of Berkeley :— 

“ That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even 
though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, 
will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing 
bears a different denomination of number as the mind 
views it with different respects. ‘Thus the same exten- 
sion is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind 
considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. 
Number is so visibly relative and dependent on men’s 
understanding, that it is strange to think how any one 
should give it an absolute existence without the mind. 
We say one book, one page, one line; all these are 
equally units, though some contain several of the others. 
And in each instance it is plain the unit relates to some 
particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together 
by the mind.”—Pyrin. of Hum. Knowl., Part I. § xii. 

DD 





402 NOTES. 





Note D.—PAGE 204. 


Mr. Mill, in his “System of Logic” (Book I. c. ii, 
§§ 6, 7, 8), has told us that both of Bodies and of Minds, ~ 
‘“‘philosophers have at length provided us with a defi- 
nition which seems unexceptionable.” As regards Body, 
this definition is—‘“The external cause, and (according 
to the more reasonable opinion) the unknown external 
cause, to which we refer our sensations.’ ‘This defi- 
nition, though very defective, is at least not erroneous, 
It is necessary, however, to observe that the word 
“unknown” cannot be accurately predicated of that 
respecting which the very terms of the definition imply 
that something is known. The. definition of Body 
is the definition of that which is known respecting it. 
Three things are involved in this definition, as known 
respecting Body ;—these are (1) Externality, (2) Ix- 
tension, and (3) Causation—that is to say. the power 
of causing or exciting” sensations in sentient beings. 
Or perhaps these three items of knowledge may 
be merged in one—the knowledge of Force acting 
from outside upon us, and exciting sensations in us. 
But this is knowledge. When the woid “unknown” 


aa ie al ae a eS 
NOTES. 403 





therefore is inserted in the terms of the definition 
given by Mr. Mill, it can only mean that other 
things still remain to be known respecting the nature 
_and properties of Body. In‘ this sense—that is, when 
translated into “partially known” —no philosopher 
would deny the correctness of its application. The 
definition of both Body and Mind is given by Mr. 
Mill in another passage, which also, so far as it goes, 
is unexceptionable. ‘‘ As Body is understood to be the 
mysterious something which excites the Mind to feel, so 
Mind is the mysterious something which feels and 
thinks.” The same two fundamental ideas of Exter- 
nality and Causation are here also implicitly and inextri- 
cably involved. Mr. Mill adds that the farther discussion 
of this question belongs not to Logic but to Metaphysics, 
- to which science he leaves it. 

Two chapters, accordingly, in Mr. Mill’s “‘ Examination 
of Hamilton” (xi. and xil.), are devoted to a discussion of 
the “ Psychological Theory of the Belief in an External 
World,” and of the question how far the same theory 
may or may not be also applicable to Mind. The 
conclusion to which I have referred in the text is 
the conclusion defended in the first of these chap- 
ters. It is the conclusion of a Pure Idealism—an 
Idealism much more extreme than the theory of 
Berkeley. It is true that Berkeley denied the existence 

DD2 


404 NOTES. 

of Matter as a thing apart from Mind—not, be it 
observed, as a thing apart from our minds, but as 
a thing apart from some mind. But - this was only 
because he sublimed it into the action of another 
Spirit upon our own. In his system the idea of. 
Causation was tenaciously retained, The very essence 
of his. argument was that our ideas must have a 
cause—“some cause whereon they depend, and which 
produces them and changes them.” As this cause 
could not be the ideas themselves (which ideas are all 
that we know of matter), “it remained that the cause 
of Ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit.”! 
This argument is repeated in several forms, as again 
where he says,” that men were “‘ conscious that they were 
not the authors of their own sensations, which they 
evidently knew were imprinted Jrom without, and which 
therefore must have some cause distinct from the Minds 
on which théy were imprinted.” But the Psychological 
Theory of Mr. Mill involves all the weak points of the 
. Berkeleian theory with none of its strength. Mr. Mill’s 
formula is expressly framed so as to eliminate as much as 
possible the idea of Causation, and to keep out of sight 
the connexion which exists between our sensations and 
that which excites them. The attempt, indeed, is not 


successful, because Mr. Mili carnot express himscif 


2 6 Prin. of Hum. Know.” § xxvi. % Ibid. § li. 





through many consecutive sentences without assuming 
the very ideas which he is trying to account for as a mere 
product of more elementary conceptions. This has been 
shown clearly, and with abundant illustration, in Dr. 
M‘Cosh’s “ Examination of Mr. J.S. Mill’s Philosophy.” 
Mr. Mill pleads upon this point that he must use common 
language, but that the whole of this language has its own 
special meaning under the Psychological Theory as well 
as under the common Realistic Theory. This may be 
"true ; but there are certain words which must have the 
same meaning under all theories ; and, in spite of his 
efforts, he is compelled to employ words which show 
that neither he nor any one else can maintain 
consistently a purely subjective conception of Matter, 
—that is to say, a conception which dispenses with 
an external agency or force. He says, that ‘almost 
all philosophers, wno have narrowly examined the sub- 
ject, have decided that Substance need only be postu- 
lated as a support for phenomena, or as a bond of 
connexion to hold a group or series of otherwise un- 
connected phenomena together.” Mr. Mill goes on with 
much simplicity: “Let us only then “Azzk away the 
support, and suppose the phenomena to remain, and to 
be held together in the same groups and series by some 
other agency, or without any agency but an internal law— 


and every consequence follows without Substance, for 








406 NOTES, 





the sake of which Substance is assumed.”! The de- 
mand here made upon us, to “ ¢iznk away” the support 
of phenomena, is certainly made less formidable when, 
in the next breath, we are told to think it back again 
under another form of words, as “ another agency,” or 
as an “internal law.” 

The same vain attempt to get behind ultimate ideas 
may be traced in the word “ Permanent,” with which 
Mr. Mill qualifies Matter considered as “ A Possibility 
of Sensation.” The new formula is “A Permanent 


’ 


Possibility of Sensation.” Why permanent? Permanent 
means enduring. But what has the element of Time to 
do with it? The percipient minds are not permanent, 
so far as the sensations of their existing organism is 
concerned. In what sense, then, are the “ Possibilities 
of Sensation” permanent? What is it that is described 
as permanent? Not the sensations—not the individual 
sentient beings. What then? Clearly the Power or 
Agency which causes, or is capable of exciting sensa- 
tions in organisms that are, or that are to be. Here, 
then, we have the ideas of Externality and of Causation 
brought back under the covering of Time. ‘ What is it 
we mean,” asks Mr. Mill, ‘when we say that the object 
we perceive is external to us, and not a part of our own 

1 Appendix to chaps. xi, and xii. ‘‘ Mill on Hamilton,” 6th ed, 


p: 246, 


et ee 


NOTES, 407 


$$$ 





thoughts?” The reply to this question, in the first 
Edition, ran as follows: ‘‘ We mean that there zs zz our 
perceptions something which exists when we are not 
thinking of it, which existed before we ever thought of 
mite and would exist if we were annihilated.” In the 
recent Edition, this reply has been altered so as to 
avoid the obvious absurdity of supposing that. things 
which are conceived to exist only “in our perceptions,” 
could nevertheless continue to exist “if we were anni- 
hilated.” Accordingly the reply now runs thus: ‘‘We 
mean that there is concerned in our perceptions,” &c. 
Yes; but how concerned? As an exciting Force or pro- 
ducing Cause, and in no other way. Similar observations 
apply to the word “ Possibility,” as applied in Mr. Mill’s 
Psychological Theory. Possible can only mean Poten- 
tial. A Possibility of sensation must mean a Potential 
Cause of sensation. And here, again, we have the same 
fundamental ideas involved in the very language by 
which it is attempted to evade them. 

Mr. Mill appears to me to be equally unsuccessful in 
starting fairly in this Psychological Theory—that is to 
say, in the definition of postulates which steer clear 
of involving the very ideas for which he professes to 
account. His first postulate is that the Human Mind 
is capable of Expectation. Certainly; but what does 


Expectation involve? It involves acts of Memory, 





408 NOTES. 

and of Comparison, and of Reason. In particular, it 
involves, or at least he is not entitled to deny that it may 
involve, the intuitive belief that actual sensations already 
experienced arose from an external cause, and that the 
same cause is capable of exciting them again. My belief 
is that the mind cannot place itself in the attitude of 
expectation without the presence of ideas which involve 
the whole question in dispute. 

Iam disposed, therefore, to agree with Mr. Mill, that 
the existence of an external material world cannot be 
proved ;—just in the same sense, and for the same 
reason, that the proposition—“ Things that are equal 
to the same thing are equal to one another,” cannot 
be proved. 

Mr. Mill thinks that, though the existence of an external 
Material world cannot be proved, an external Immaterial 
world can be proved—that is to say, the existence of 
other minds can be proved. I think he only succeeds 
in showing that our belief in this existence can be 
confirmed by corroborative evidence. But such cor- 
roboration and confirmation is equally available in 
support of the belief in the existence of Matter, con- 
sidered as an External Cause of sensation. The truth 
is, our knowledge of other minds is only reached through 
our previous knowledge of Matter, and of the impressions 


it makes uvon us. My own mind, as well as the mind. 


NOTES. 409 
of all the beings around me, is, or seems to be, in- 
separably connected with a Material Organization, and 
there are no manifestations of Mind which do not come 
to me directly or indirectly thfough material signs. 

_Mr. Mill has often warned us, and I accept the 
warning, against the system of discussing metaphysical 
questions, under the threat, as it were, that the conclu- 
sions to which we are opposed are inconsistent with 
some one or more Theological Beliefs. We know that 
the Ideal Theory, in the form at least which it took in 
the hands of Berkeley, was put forward in the interests 
of Religion. “ The existence of matter, or bodies un- 
perceived, has not only been the main support of 
Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth 
Idolatry likewise, in all its various forms, depend. Did 
men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and 
every other object of the senses, are only so many sensa- 
tions in their own minds, which have no other existence 
but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never 
. fall down and worship their own /éeas, but rather 
address homage to that Eternal Invisible Mind which 
produces and sustains all things.”1 Such was the 
animating principle of the Bishop of Cloyne’s famous 


speculation. I confess I have a profound distrust of 


1 ** Prin, of Hum. Knowl.” § xciv, 


410 NOTES, 


all attempts to found the teachings of Faith upon the 
principles of Scepticism. I am not tempted, in order to 
escape the danger of Materialism, to deny the existence 
of that, which I know by my own structure, ‘and by 
the structure of all around me, to be different from 
Mind. JI am content to understand the world as my 
own faculties have been co-ordinated with external 
things to reveal those things to me I look in 
my friend’s face, and I see the expression of power, 
and of intellect, and of goodness. These are attri- 
butes of Mind. I do not know ow these attributes 
can be shown forth so evidently in the colours and 
in the lines of flesh and blood. But I do not try 
to persuade myself that his hand or his face are the 
same things, either with the perceptions which they 
excite in me, or with the emotions which they express 
in him. Ido not pretend to understand the nature of 
the connexion between these Material Forms and the 
qualities of Mind. But after their own diverse kinds and 
measures they are both equally “real” to me. I will 
not deceive myself by verbal quibbles—pretending to 
be able to stand outside myself, and to prove by reason 
that the very tools with which reason works are rotten 
in her hands. There is but one sentence in these two 
chapters of Mr, Mill’s work which conveys any really 
important truth. In regard to the existence of Matter, 


are 
de 
a a - 7 





NOTES. 411 


as well as in regard to the nature of Memory and of 
Mind, we may indeed well say with him: “By far the 
wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable 
facts, without any theory how it takes. place ; and when’ 
we are obliged to speak of them in terms which assume 
a theory, to use them with a reservation as to ther 
meaning.” : 


412 NOTES. 





NoTEe E.—PacE 299. 


When I wrote this passage in the text, I had not read 


a curious note by Sir W. Hamilton in his edition of 


Reid’s Works.! It is almost droll in its confession of the 


puzzling significance of such facts, in respect to animals, 
as those I have referred to. ‘ Nothing in the compass 
of inductive reasoning appears more satisfactory than 
Berkeley’s Demonstration of the necessity and manner of 
our learning, by a slow process of observation in com- 
parison alone, the connexion between the perception of 
vision and touch, and, in general, all that relates to the 


distance and real magnitude of external things. But 


although the same necessity seems in theory equally 
“incumbent on the lower animals as on man, yet this 
theory is provokingly (!)—and that by the most manifest 
experience—found totally at fault with regard to them ; 
for we find that all the animals who possess at birth the 


power of regulated motion (and these are those only. 


through whom the truth of the theory can be brought to 
the test of a decisive experiment), possess also from birth 
the whole apprehension of distance, &c, which they are 


4 Vol. I, p, 182, note, 


a) 





NOTES. | 413 


ever known to exhibit. The solution of this difference 
by a resort to instinct is unsatisfactory ; for instinct is in 
fact an occult principle—a kind of natural revelation,— 
and the hypothesis of instinct, therefore, only a confession 
of our ignorance: and at the same time, if instinct be 
allowed in the lower animals, how can we determine 
whether and how far instinct may not in like manner . 
operate to the same result in man?” 

Well might Sir W. Hamilton ask this question. It is 
one which Philosophers will find it hard to answer. My 
own conviction is that more than half the “ inductive 
reasoning” by which men have pretended to account for 
their intuitive perceptions is altogether unsound. Man, 
besides being man, is also an animal—and through his 
animal organisation the mechanics of his mind are to a 
large extent regulated on the same principles which regu- 
late the lower Intelligences around him—that is to say, 
by processes unconsciously pursued. This is the proper 
definition of operations which are Instinctive; and, as 
Sir W. Hamilton observes, they may best be conceived 
as the result of “ Natural revelation.” 





414 NOTES. 


NoTE F.—PAGE 304. . = 


In the number of the Dublin Review for April 
1867, there is an article on “ Science, Prayer, Free Will,’ 
and Miracles,” in which some portions of this work are 
criticised. With much of that criticism I have every 
reason to be satisfied. ‘The main objection taken may be 
stated in two sentences. I have said that (under certain. 
limitations as to the meaning of the words) the “abstract 
predictability of human conduct” may be admitted with- 
out involving the denial of anything essential to the doc- 
trine of Free Will. Dr. Ward denounces this concession - 
as absolutely fatal to that doctrine, and maintains that 
in making such a concession, as well as in other more 
direct forms of statement, my view comes to be “ pre- 
cisely identical with Mr. Mill’s,” which, nevertheless, I 
am “professing” to oppose. This position he proceeds 
to support by an elaborate argument, which I shall here. 
examine with all the care due to the gravity of the 
question raised, and to the duty of using no language 
upon such a subject which is not justified by as much 
precision of thought as is attainable in regard to it. 

As Dr. Ward speaks upon this subject with some 





NOTES. 415 


warmth of feeling, perhaps I may expiain at once that 
he is mistaken in supposing that I am “a. Calvinist,” 
in the sense of holding “the Necessitarian Doctrine.” 
I hold the doctrine of Free Willi in the only sense 
in which it is to me intelligible. I set the highest 
value upon it; and in the result, though not in this 
particular argument, I believe I agree with Dr. Ward 
himself. I am willing to accept without reservation 
the definition which he quotes from certain Jesuit 
theologians : “Potentia libera est que, positis omnibus 
requisitis ad agendum, potest agere et non agere.” 
But Dr. Ward does not seem to observe that in this 
definition the whole question in dispute may be covered 
under its contingent clause. Everything depends on 
the further definition to be given of “all the requisites 
for action.” Is, or is not, the condition of the mind 
itself to be considered as one of those “requisites ?” 
Is knowledge, and the possession of those motives 
which knowledge gives, a “ requisite” or not? Do the 
“requisites” intended, by the Jesuit definition, refer to 
nothing more than the presence or absence of physical 
constraint? The truth is that such abstract definitions 
go very little way in explanation of themselves. I have 
asserted the freedom of the Will under several forms of 
statement which are much more explicit, because much 


more full and more detailed. Thus, Ihave said, “ Among 


416 - NOTES. 





the motives which act upon mind, Man has a selecting 


power. He can, as. it were, stand out from among 
them—look down from above them—compare them 
among each other, and bring them to the test.of con- 
science.” This is freedom, if there be such a thing 
conceivable in thought. But Dr. Ward’s impetuous zeal 
in favour of Free Will blinds him to certain truths which 
are perfectly compatible with this doctrine, and which 
not only must be admitted, but must be claimed, if we 
are ever to wield against Necessitarians the weapon of 
analysis. The principal object of this work has been 
to show that, in so far as science has successfully estab- 
lished in physics the idea of the Reign of Law, that idea 
does not affect or traverse the Reign of Mind, and the 
supremacy of Purpose. In hke manner, I think it 
can be shown that in so far as Psychology can success- 
fully establish the idea of Causation; as applicable to 
Mind, that idea is perfectly compatible with the true 
freedom of the Will. Dr. Ward says very truly, that the 
Necessitarian doctrine has in all ages been embraced by 
many powerful minds. This indicates that, in so far as 
it is false at all, its falseness probably depends on some 
partial aspects of truth mingled with the fallacies . of 
definition. My owh opinion unquestionably is, that 
when Necessitarians have been compelled to disown 
and abjure the idea of compulsion, their doctrine ceases 





NOTES. . 417 


to be the doctrine of Necessity at all in any legitimate 
sense of the word. What I mean by freedom is free- 
dom from compulsion, and nothing else. When I say 
that the Will is free, I do not mean that its movements 
can be separated from the inducements internal and 
| external under which it moves. But then I insist that 
“Motive” shall have the widest meaning—that it shall 
include such motives, evolved out of the very con- 
stitution of the mind itself, as “ Love, and Reverence, 
and Gratitude, and Hunger after Knowledge and Desire 
of Truth.” Of course this is not given as a complete 
list, but only a sample of the things which must be 
claimed as “motives.” In this sense, not only is the 
det2rmining power of Motive inseparable from the very 
idea of Mind; but the higher is the quality of a mind, 
the more certain and definite will be the motives of its 
action. By some strange confusion of thought, Dr. 
Ward seems to regard with horror the idea of the 
Will being regarded as part of “the constitution of 
the mind.” This is a mere question of words. But 
if by Will, Dr. Ward does not understand a particular 
power of mind, 1 do not know what he means. To 
analyse Mind at all, we must of course consider its 
different powers as separate from each other; but it 
does not the less remain true that they are all parts 
of one whole. In this point of view, Dr. Ward’s 
EE 








418 NOTES. 





own definition of Free Will is far from ‘clear... * The 


Will, we maintain, has a certain power of deciding 


for itself what weight it shall attach to motives.” 


Certainly, if the Will be understood as including the 
Deliberative Faculty whose function it is to “ weigh.” But 


in coming to this decision it must be guided by some- 


thing, which something may always itself be resolved ~ 


into another “‘ motive.” 


And if this appears to be a mere play on words, I° 


grant it. It is the very point and object of my argu- 
ment to show that in so far as the Necessitarian doc- 
trine has any apparent force, it does depend on mere 
ambiguities of language. For example—exclude from 
the word “motive” all the influences which come upon 
the spirit from the mind itself—from conscience, from 
the action upon it of another Spirit, human or divine— 
confine the word “motive” (as many do, tacitly by 
implication, though not consciously) to that class of 


motives which come from external and material things, 


—in short, confine it to the appetites or desires, then it 


absolutely ceases to be true thatthe Will is determined 
by “motives.” On the other hand, include in the word 
“motive” a@dZ/ that can ever influence the mind, whether 
from within or from without, then it ceases as absolutely 
to be true that the Will can ever be “free” from such 
motives, But then, in this sense, the Necessitarian doce 





NOTES. 4i 9: 


trine resolves itself, as Mr. Mansel says, into the identical 
proposition that “the prevailing motive prevails.” It 
becomes perfectly harmless, because in reality. perfectly 
unmeaning. Dr. Ward is very indignant that I should 
represent my view as “a mere truism.” But it is not 
my own view, but the Necessitarian doctrine, when thus— 
reduced by analysis to its real value, which I have repre-. 
sented as a mere truism. 

All these fallacies and confusions of thought arise, in: 
my opinion, from neglect of the fact that freedom has no 
absolute, but. only a relative meaning. Freedom can 
only mean “the not being bound,” and bonds can only 
consist in something binding. Freedom of the Will can 
only mean that the Will is free from compulsion. If 
Necessity does not mean compulsion, it either means 
nothing at all, or nothing inconsistent with freedom : 
when properly defined and understood. 

“We now come to what is called the “Abstract pre- 


dictability of human conduct.” ‘This is the phrase into 


which Mr. Mill retreats, as containing the residuum of 
truth which still belongs to the Necessitarian doctrine 
after it has abjured the idea of compulsion. It is not my 
phrase, or one which I approve of, because it involves a 
great number of assumptions which lie, as it were, con- 
cealed within it. But I adhere to the opinion that, when 
strictly defined, the idea it involves is perfectly capable 
EE2 








420 NOTES. 


of being reconciled with the freedom of the Will. The 


_ truth is, that it is capable of being resolved into the same 
identical proposition as the Necessitarian doctrine in 
cther forms. 

If by “abstract predictability” 1s meant that predic- 
tion would be possible under the conditions of com- 
plete, universal, and perfect knowledge, I do not see 
either how it can be denied, or to what purpose it can 
be affirmed. The proposition is that, if ALL the condi- 
tions were known which determine the Will in deciding 
for itself, or “in giving weight to motives,” the result of 
that decision would thereby become also known. Of 
the Necessitarian doctrine expressed in this general 
form, I have said, and I repeat, that it is “very like 
a truism.” But if it is useless as an affirmation, it is at 
least not capable of denial. Dr. Ward, however, does 
deny it, and supports his denial by reasoning which is 
clearly untenable, as an admission made by himself will 


show. His idea seems to be, that no “predictable” 


conduct can be “free ;” that nothing which can be 
abstractedly foreseen can be the result of freedom. But 
Dr. Ward does not, and cannot maintain this view con- 
sistently. He admits that, “taking any given man at 
any given moment, there are certain things so good, and 


certain things so bad, that we may infailibly calculate 


he will do neither the one nor the other.” Would 


i i 





——2 


NOTES. 421 





Dr. Ward then admit that as regards those ‘very bad,” 
and those “ very good,” deeds, this man is not “ free ?” 
Or does he think he escapes this difficulty, by putting 
the man’s conduct in the negative instead of the positive 
form? As regards the action of the Will, no such dis- 
tinction is of any avail. The not doing one thing is the 
doing of another. The not doing a very good deed, 
‘which he has power to do (“ positis omnibus requisitis 
ad agendum”), is willing not to doit. The not doing 
a very bad deed is willing to do something else. If 
then the conduct of the man in those cases “can be 
calculated with perfect certainty,” it is so calculable 
only because knowledge of his character is convertible 
into knowledge of the manner in which his Will is sure 
to act. Is it not then a clear violation, both of the 
ordinary and of the philosophical use of language, to say 
that a man is not “free” to do a very bad act, because 
we know certainly beforehand that his character, and the 
motives on which he habitually acts, will prevent him 
from doing it? 

But then Dr. Ward proceeds to argue that though in- 
fallible calculation may be possible in respect to deeds 
very good, and very bad, it will not be possible in 
regard to deeds only a little good and a little bad. But 
how does this greater difficulty arise? Is it not because 


the number of motives telling on the Will is greater, 


~ 


i a ES OS 





422 NOTES. 


more nicely balanced, and therefore less known? And 
is not this difference precisely the kind of difference 
which would disappear, if he could pass from know- 
ledge which is partial only, to knowledge which is 
complete and absolute? But whatever difficulty may 
arise from imperfect knowledge is (as I understand the 
phrase) eliminated by the word “abstract,” as qualifying 
“‘ predictability.” No one asserts that prediction can 
be founded on partial knowledge. But the question 
raised is whether even perfect knowledge of all the 
elements of motive and of character can render pre- 
dictable the conduct of a really Free Agent. The 
question is one involving a logical principle, which, ’ 
if applicable to the conduct of a Free Agent in any case, 
must be equally applicable to his conduct in all cases. 
If it is abuse of terms, or a confusicn of thought, to 
2firm that a man’s Will is not free to do or not to do 
very bad actions, because we can calculate infallibly the’ 
decision of his Will in regard to them, it must be equally 
fallacious to affirm that his Will would not be free in 
regard to lesser degrees of vice and virtue if, in like 
manner, we were able fror perfect knowledge of his cha- 
racter to predict his conduct also in respect to them. The 
doctrine of. Free Will, like every other doctrine of Mental 
Science, can only be defended by clear definitions of 


what it is. Its defenders have in my opinion established 








NOTES. 423 





their case when they have compelled Necessitarians | 
to discard the idea of compulsion. All attempts to deny 

that the Will is determined by “ motives” are futile, and 

only result in giving a seeming victory to those who have 

in reality been defeated. ; 

In order to illustrate what I mean, I will suppose a 
particular case; and to comply with the conditions of 
Dr. Ward’s argument, it shall be a case where no de- 
termination, either very good or very bad, is involved. 
I will suppose that in arguing with a friend on the 
subject of Free Will, a plate of oranges is offered to 
me. My friend tells me that “he knows which of these 
oranges I shall choose.” I tell him he cannot possibly 
know this—that my Will is free, and therefore he cannot 
predict my choice. He insists upon it that he can, I 
then observe that one orange has a smoother skin than 
the others, and is of a deeper yellow colour. I then 
recollect that I had once mentioned in my’ friend’s 
hearing that I considered a pale colour, or a rough 
skin, as indications of sour or tasteless oranges; and’ 
remembering this fact, I at once. perceive that my friend 
is calculating my conduct from a motive which, as he 
knows, does habitually determine my choice of oranges. 
Iam conscious also that in this particular case I should — 
have been so determined—if this dispute had not arisen. 
But in order to show my friend that my Will is really 





meas See tee tee 


424 NOTES. 


free from this power of “motive,” I determine to exert 
that freedom by choosing the palest, or the roughest 
orange in the plate, and I accordingly do so. This is 
an assertion of my Free Will—a practical denial of the 
doctrine that I am the slave of “motives.” But is it 
not clear in this case, that my conduct has been deter- 
mined after all only by another and a stronger motive 
than the one which usually acts with me in the matter 
—even by the motive of proving to my friend that he 
was wrong, and that I was night ?—a motive which is 
strong with all men, and is supposed to have special 
attractions for a Scotchman. And is it not equally clear, 
that if my friend had had more perfect knowledge of 
my character, and had known that I recollected the 
former conversation, and could therefore guess the 
grounds of his prediction, he might, and would have 
been able to foresee correctly the new motive which 
had thus arisen to overpower the other? And finally,’ 
is it not equally evident that, if he had been able by this 
extraordinary sagacity to predict my choice correctly, 
the correctness of that prediction would not have im- 
plied the existence of any constraint on the freedom of 
my Will, but, on the contrary, would have been founded 
on his knowledge of my freedom to pass from the old 
motive and to give effect to the new one? #eH"" j 

A thousand different examples of the same kind might 








NOTES. 425 — 


be given. That on which the Will finally determines to 
act may always be called, and is always properly called, 
amotive. And this is observable in respect to the whole 
question, that precisely in proportion to the high qualities 
of any given mind—in proportion to its intellectual 
power and its moral strength—in proportion to its keen 
insight into the causes and tendencies of things, and its 
appreciation of truth and righteousness—in the same 
proportion will the distinction vanish in its eyes between 
things “very bad,” and things onlya little bad. In the 
same proportion, therefore, will its own conduct be 
guided by definite and certain motives: in the same 
proportion, finally, will that conduct become predictable, 
because in the exercise of its freedom it is governed by 
moral laws which never change. ~_ 


(426 NOTES. 





Note G.—PaAcE 306. 


Mr. Mahaffy, in his article in the Contemporary 
Review, has taken objection to the breadth of meaning 
which I have given in this passage to the word “ motive.” - 
He says, I have “ surely fused together two opposite 
theories under the ambiguous meaning of motive.” This 
is precisely what I have done, and what I meant to do. 
I adopt all that I consider to be true in the so-called 
- Necessitarian Doctrine, which, when cleared from the 
idea of compulsion, is no doctrine of necessity at all. 
The residuum of truth is, that the Will must always act 
on some motive. I have taken also all that is of any 
value in the Doctrine of Free Will, which is—that among 
the “motives” of the mind must be reckoned those 
inducements which arise out of its higher, as well as 
out of its lower faculties. But Mr. Mahaffy is, in my 
opinion, clearly wrong when~he objects to the word 
“motive” being employed with this breadth of meaning. 
His objection indeed is explained to be that. the word 
“‘ motive” ought not to be applied to the “ action of the 
Will upon itself.” But I have not so applied it, because 
I have no notion what “the action of the Will upon itself”: 





NOTES. 4 


to 
~w 





means. Mr. Mahaffy gives a farther explanation of this 
expression, when he speaks of the Will “creating prin- 
ciples of action for itself.” But I deny altogether that 
the “creating” of anything is’ the function of the Will. 
It is by an act of Will that we fix our attention upon any 
given motive, or turn, on the contrary, our attention from. 
it. But if we are to analyse the mind at all, if for the con- 
venience of thought and of discussion, we are to divide its 
inseparable Unity into different powers, we must make the 
division as logical as we can—that is, as consistent as 
possible with definite ideas of distinct mental functions. 
In considering the Will as a separate Power, we must 
strictly confine it to what may be called the Execu- 
tive of the Mind. In this light it would be altogether 
incorrect to ascribe the “ creation” of any motive to the 
Will. Motives of all kinds, both the highest and the 
lowest, may rise, and do rise unbidden in the mind. It 
is by an act of Will that we summon different motives 
to the presence of the Deliberative Faculties, that we 
cherish one and dismiss another, or determine to spend 
thought and time in making our choice between motives 
which are conflicting. But the Will cannot with accu- 
racy be said to be the creator of motives. Intellectual 
and moral conceptions, held together by the bonds of 
Memory, are-the fountains from which the highest 
motives come. Mr. Mahaffy admits that “anything 





423 NOTES. 





brought to bear upon the Will from without itself, even 
from the intellectual part of the mind, is a motive.” 
But according to my definition of the Will all motives 
come equally from outside the Will, and assuredly I seeno ~ 
ground for the distinction Mr. Mahaffy seems to draw 
between the Intellectual and the Moral faculties. In 
denying the name of motive to those inducements which 
come from the affections or from the sense of right and 
wrong, he imposes a restriction on the meaning of the 
word which is not less inconsistent with common usage 
than with philosophical accuracy. Affection and grati- 
tude, the love of man and the love of God, are all surely 
“motives” in the most proper sense of ‘the term. Yet 
Mr. Mahaffy asks, “Is it not an abuse of language 
to say that the man who resists temptation by creating 
within his breast a strong feeling of moral responsibility 
is determined by motives?” To this question I reply 
at once (passing over the question of the “ creation ” of 
motives) that it is no abuse of language, but, on the 
contrary, the employment of language in its natural and 
ordinary sense. On what principle is the love of know- 
~ ledge (being intellectual) to be called a motive, if the 
love of God is not? On what principle is a desire 
of producing physical results to be called a motive, if 
the desire of attaining moral ends is denied the name? 
No such distinction is tenable in a philosophical point 








NOTES. 429 


—— 





of view, and no such distinction is known in the usual 
and familiar employment of the word “motive.” Mr. 
Mahaffy, however, in making this objection, has put his 
finger upon the point on which the whole discussion 
turns. Like many other metaphysical questions, it 
depends almost entirely on a definition of terms. If. 
the word “motive” be arbitrarily limited to mental 
affections of one or two particular kinds, if it be con- 
fined to the lower appetites and desires, or even if it be 
extended to the higher appetites of the Intellect, whilst 
it is denied to the inducements of morality, of con- 
science; of Religion,—then it ceases to be true that the 
mind is determined by motives alone. The result is 
that the so-called “Necessitarian” Doctrine, in so far 
as it is true at all, must not only exclude the idea of 
compulsion, but it must include-all that class of induce- 
ments, on the pre-existence of which, and on the power 
‘of choice among them, the responsibility of the Will 
depends. 

The view presented in the text of the great question 
of Necessity and Free Will does fuse together some 
portions of the two opposite Theories which have so 
long divided men’s minds regarding it. But in this fusion 
I do but follow the process pursued by Dante in a pro- 
found and beautiful passage of his “ Purgatorio” (Canto 
18th). To Necessity he ascribes the existence and the 





430 NOTES. 


power of Motive. Motives arise out of the relations 


pre-established between the Human Spirit and ali the : 


Influences by which it is surrounded. No other account 


can be given of them. Dante sees no difficulty, as some 


modern defenders of the Free Will doctrine do, in com- ' 


paring the ultimate nature and origin of all our mental 
desires with the natire and origin, equally inexplicable, 
of the Instincts of the lower animals. Hear the lines, 
not less musical in sense than they are in sound— 


** Perd, 14 onde venga lo intelletto 
Delle prime notizie, uomo non sape 
E de’ primi appetibili l’affetto ; 

Che sono in voi, si come studio in ape 
Di far lo mele.” 


To Free Will he ascribes the power of Counsel—of 
deliberation and of choice among the motives which 
thus arise from the very nature and constitution of the 


Mind. This power guards the “ Threshold of Assent ;”— 


*¢ Innata v’é la virti che consiglia, 
E dell’ assenso de’ tener la soglia.” 


On this power depends the responsibility of cons 
duct :-— 
*¢ Quest’ é’l principio 14 onde si piglia 
Cagion di meritare in voi, secondo 
Che buoni amori 0 rei accoglie e viglia, _ 





oy eS a eee ae 


iin th 





NOTES. 431 


= mAbs 


The passage closes with these beautiful and striking: 
lines -— 


** Color che ragionando andaro al fondo 
S’accorser d’esta innata libertate ; 
Perd moralita lasciaro al mondo, 
Onde pognam che di necessitate 
Surga ogni amor, che dentro a voi s’accende $ ’ 
- Di ritenerlo é in voi la potestate.” 


It would be difficult to give so much philosophy in 
fewer words, 





432 NOTES, 


Pi 
SD 








Note H.—PaGE 309. 


In the last edition of Mr. Mill’s work (1867), he has 
made an addition to the sentence quoted in the text, 
so that it now runs thus :—“ I deny it as strenuously as 
any one, iz the case of human volitions, but I deny it 
just as much of all other phenomena.” If Mr. Mill means, 
by this addition, to imply that he can deny compulsion 
(for example) in the behaviour of a billiard-ball, when 
it is struck, “just as much” as he can deny it, of the 
behaviour of a man when he is insulted, he renders his 
previous explanation valueless, and restores again to the 
doctrine of Necessity that very element of meaning which 
he professes to disclaim. Compulsion is predicable of 
the effects of Physical Force exerted upon Matter, in a 
sense in which it is not predicable of the effects of Moral 
or Intellectual inducements exerted upon Mind. This is 
precisely the distinction which Necessitarians are per- 
petually confounding ; and so long as they do confound 
it, their doctrine is justly open to the objection implied 
in the name usually assigned to it. Even if it be true, 
as Mr. Mill holds, that we have no other idea of 
Physical Causation than that of uniform and invariable 





Ol mee en Re eo ee 





NOTES. 433 


—_—_ 





sequence,—no_ idea of Necessity in Causation,—still it 
remains true that Compulsion is, apparently to us, 
involved in the effects of Physical Forces upon Matter, 
‘in a sense in which it is. not involved in the effects 


of “Motive” upon Mind, 





IN-DE X. 


ABORTED Limbs in various ani- 
mals, 194-5 ; Member, no, in 
man, 201 ; Organs, to be read 
either in the light of History, 
or of Prophecy, 205 ; Organs, 
existence of, the fact most diffi- 
cult to disengage from the 
Theory of Development, 266. 

Abstract Conceptions, Law as 
applied to, 65; Men’s Idols 
nowadays their own, II2. 

Acland.) Dro H. W. on ‘* Pur- 
pose,” 83. 

** Act of Parliament, you cannot 
make men moral by,” in what 
sense a truism, in what a fal- 
lacy, 365. 

Adapted Colouring in the Ani- 
mal Kingdom, 177, e¢ seq. 

‘« Adherence to Type,” in the 
nature of a Mental Purpose, 
259; these words express a 
Purpose fulfilled in Organic 
Forms, 270. 

Adjusted. Organs, Man’s want 
of certain, 295; Forces, how 
far our Volitions are subject 
to, 322. 

Adjustment, Principle of, no 
meaning except as -the result 
of Purpose, 78; fundamental 
Principles of, never altered 
through the whole scale ot 
Organic Life, 269; as applied 
to the Mental Faculties, 283 ; 


how Watt subjected the in- 
variable energies of Steam to 
the variable conditions of, 
340; Variability of, in the 
facts of Nature, 389. 

Adjustments of Organization, | 
phenomena of Mind mediately 
dependent on, 294. 

Affections, the, dependent on 
material structure, 278. 

African Savages debating a greut 
Homological Q: ‘stion, 195. 

Agassiz’ Geological Sketches, 
269. 

Air, Navigation of the, a beau- 
tiful example of Animal Me- 
chanics, 129 ; Elasticity of, the 
Law which, in the flight f 
birds, counteracts gravi*v, 
132; French scientific men 
advance of English on. the 


subject of locomotion ia, 
170. 
Albatross, the mechanism of 


flight in, 150; the flight Y, 
described, 152 ; how it sails or 
wheels round a ship, 154. 
Ammonites, great beauty of, 180. 
Analogy between the operations 
of God and the operations of. 
men’s minds, illustrated by 
every known instance of Coa- 
trivance, 128. 
Analogy in Use and Homolcgy 
in Structure, 199, 
FF 2 


436 


Ancient Lawgivers always aim- 
ing at Standards of Political 
Society, 326: 

Andes, the, species of Humming 
Birds peculiar to, 228. 

Angraccum Sesquipedale 3 see 
Madagascar Orchis, 44. 

Animal Creation, the Power of 
God as manifested in; Pro- 
fessor Owen’s work quoted, 
263. 

Animals, a definite Pattern for 
each class of, 211. 

Antecedents, no phenomena, 
mental or physical, without, 


313. 
sinthropoid Apes, skeletons of, 

gaat. 

Apprenticeship, earlier mills 
worked under a system of, 
348. 

Apteryx, useless wing-bones in, 
195. 

Aichetypal arrangement in Or- 
chids, 44. 

Argus Pheasant, 193. 

Aristotle, Philosophy of, 328- 
330: 

Arkwright, 344, 347. 

Ashley, Lord, first effectual mea- 
sure on the Factory Question 
passed through the exertions 
of, 362. 

Asiatic Deserts, Sand-grouse of, 
their colouring, 182. 

Assimilative Colouring not ex- 
tended to Woodpeckers, 179. 

Association, conditions under 
which the spirit it evokes be- 
comes a new ‘‘ Law,” 370. 

Associations, higher rates of 
wages established under, than 
under unrestricted competi- 
tion, 378. 

Astronomy, according to Sir 
G. C. Lewis, an interest almost 
purely scientific belonging 


INDEX, 


to, 12; Sir J. Herschel’s Out- 
lines of, 122. 

Atheism, false charge of, against 
Professor Huxley, 89. 

Atmosphere, the, resisting force 
of, toa body moving through 
it, 131. 

Automatic Faculties in Mind as 
well as in Body, 292. 

**Azoic” Rocks, the Rhizopods 
discovered near the very low- 
est of, 210. 


B. 


Backward flight in a bird, why 
impossible, 140. 

Bacon quoted, 4. 

Baking Trade, the, in Edinburgh 
and Glasgow, good effects of 
combination in, 378. 

Bats’ finger-bones, how modified, 
169. 

Beauty, love of, a purpose we see 
fulfilled in Nature, 271. 

Being, the great mystery of our, 

1272, ’ 

Beliefs, intelligent spiritual, only 
widened by the progress of 
Physical Seience, 114. 

Biblical Narrative of Creation, 
the, room left in it for a 
Material Process, 27. 

Bilateral Arrangement of Or- 
ganisms, 247. 

Bird, a, and a Balloon, difference 
between, 130. 

Birds, aérial evolutions of, made 
possible by weight, not buoy- 
ancy, 142; condition of the 
atmosphere indispensable to 
the soarmg of, 143; bones 
of, lighter and more hollow 
than those of mammals, 145 ; 
stationary power of, on. what 
it depends, 160; the Hum- 
ming, furnish the most re- 


ee 


a 


INDEX. 





markable examples of the ma- 
chinery of flight, 166 ; species 
of, amongst which the law of 
assimilative colouring almost 
exclusively ‘prevails, 181 ; 
bright colours and conspi- 
cuous ornaments in male, 247. 

** Blessed Light of Science,” the, 
385. 

Bodies, our, seem part of* the 
external world to us, 276. 

Body, Congenital Habits of the, 
connected with Congenital 
Habits of tne Mind; 300. 

Body Politic, the, Verification 
drawn by Adam Smith from 
the complicated phenomena 
of, 341. 

Borelli’s erroneous theory of. 
steerage in flight, 163. 

Brain, the, no additional know- 
ledge gained by proving the 
connexion between any one 
mental faculty and a special 
bit of, 280; changes in the 
substance and structure of, 
cause of changes in the 
charactcr of the Mind, 278; 
how Thought is a Function 
“t, 279; exertion of, like 
the exertion of a Muscle, 
285. 

Butler, Bishop, on our ignorance 
of God’s notion of means and 
ends, 80. 

Butler’s, Bishop, position, that 
all the truths and difficulties of 
Religion have-their type in 
Natures, 26. 


C. 
Carpenter, Dr. on Life prece- 
ding Organization, 118. 
Cartwright, 344. 


Cats, blue iris in, associated with 
deafness, 247;  tortoiseshell 








437 





colour in, associated with the 
female sex, 247. 

Causation of the World, the, 
agency of Man’s Mind and 
Will, the -first and foremost 
agency in, 6. 

Central America, Orchids in the 
forests of, 227. 

*“Cerebration,” philosophers who 
fancy Thought is explained by 
calling it, 282. 

Cerebral Organization, ascending 
scale of, coincident with as- 
cending scale of Mental capa- 
city, 279. 

Chadwick, Mr. on Insurance of 
ships and cargoes as relaxing 
the motives of self-interest, 
3606. 

Chameleon, the, 177. 

Chance, no such thing as, a ne- 
ecessary truth, 312. 

** Changeable Wills,’ Comte’s 
confused idea of phenomena 
not being governed by, 

19. 

Chemical Combination, laws of, 
amongst the most wonderful 
and beautiful, 94. 

Children in Factories, liable to 
dismissal if properly cared for 
by their parents, 353. 

Christian miracles, the idea of 
Law made the very basis of, 
24. 

Christianity, what lies at its root, 
according to M. Guizot, 1; 
Gibbon’s attempt to account 
for the spread of, by natural 
causes, 20; does not require 
a belief in any exception to 
the universal prevalence of 
Law, 51. 

Cicero, De Wat. Deor, 201, 284, 


Circulation of the Blood not dis- 
covered before the discovery 








A38 ~ INDEX. 





of much concerning the circu- 
lation of the Planets, 276. 

Civilization, Modern, its deve- 
lopment and growth, 388. 

Classification, the marshalling of 
physical facts in an ideal order, 
the basis of Science, 84. 

Coal, how correlated with the 
needs and powers of man, 
260; these external correla- 
tions of, arise out of Internal 
Correlations, 261. 

Cobbett, on the opposition to 
the restrictive measures which 
were proposed by Sir R. Peel 
the Elder, 352. 

Cogito, ergo sum, 7. 

Colour, power in fish to change 
rapidly, 177; determined in 
young animals through the 
eyes of the female parent, 178. 

Colouring, adapted, in the Ani- 
mal Kingdom, object of, 177; 
apparent rule under which ap- 
plied, 178; assimilated, not 
extended, as Mr. Darwin fan- 
cies, to Green Woodpeckers, 
179. 

Combe, Dr. A. on our ignorance 
of how the Brain operates in 
generating Thought, 284. 

Combination and affinity in Che- 
mistry, laws of, 67, 94: 

Combination,—in Nature, for the 
accomplishment of Purpose, 
79; this an ascertained fact in 
Science, 85; and adjustment 
as regards the phenomena of 
the Mind, 274; conring in 
the place of Positive Institu- 
tion, 372; resort to, for 
the protection of labour, re- 
commended’ by reason and 
experience, 373; all this true 
universally of the principle of, 
but not true universally of the 
particular purposesto which ap- 


plied, 374; its history amongst 
the Working Classes, until re- 
cently a sad history of mis- 
directed effort, 374; desire 
for, and need of, grows with 
the growth of knowledge, and 
with the increasing complica- 
tions of society, 376; business 
of, in some things, to subor- 
dinate the individual class, 
377; what sets bounds to, 
379; most important objects 
of, amongst the first duties of 
organized society, 381 ; con- 
ditions under which it may 
blend the functions, and unite 
the profits, of Capital and 
Labour, a question to be de- 
termined by Natural Laws 
not yet explained or under- 
stood, 381. 

Combinations of Force, having 
reference to the fulfilment of 
Purpose or the discharge of 
Function, 65. 

Combinations, limits of, as af- 
fecting rewards of Labour, 
378. | 

“ Comet ” Humming Bird, 233. 

Commercial Policy, Modern, its 
central idea, 337. 


Common Words, pestilent fault 


of using them in an artificial 
sense, 318. 
Community of Aspect in created 


Things, what it suggests, 


224. : 

Comparative Anatomy, Profes- 
sor Owen on, 102; Professor 
Huxley on, 149. 

Competition, International, be- 
tween Capitalists, arguments 
based on, 354. 

Competition, the ‘* Law” of, re- 
sults in excessive labour, 372. 

Competitive Industry, inevitable 
track of, 359. 


Sf 


a 


INDEX. 


439 





Comte, Auguste, on “ Change- 
able Wills,” 319. 

Conditions, favourable, useless- 
ness of direct appeals to men’s 
faculties and feelings when 
these have not been placed 
under, 325; external, which 
tell on the individual Will, 
are but conditions depending 
_on the aggregate Will of those 
around us, 367. 

“Coney” of Scripture, the, 248. 

Congenital Constitution, charac- 
ter of Mind determined by, 
301. 

Conscience, how man, unlike 
the lower animals, can bring 
his motives to the test of, 306. 

Consciousness, direct evidence 
of, large class of phenomena 
beyond the, 286. 

Conservation of Energy, modern 
doctrine of, 122. 

Constancy in Nature not incom- 
patible with the energies of 
Will, 389. 

‘Constitution and Course - of 
Things; the whole, under what 
conditions it would receive an 
earlier fulfilment, 385. 

Constitution of the Universe, 
the, man’s faculty of Contri- 
vance, the nearest analogy by 
which to understand, 390. 

Contractions, muscular, two 
kinds of, stand near the origin 
of all~we do, 292; of the 
Brain, probably stand near the 
origin of all we think, 292. 

Contrivance, in Orchids, to be 
traced as clearly as in the dif- 
ferent parts of a steam-engine, 


Contrivance and Adjustment, 
doctrine of, not so metaphy- 
sical as the doctrine of Homo- 
logies, 83. 


Contrivance, the word, impossi- 
bility of dispensing with it in 
describing physical pheno- 
mena, 90; what is? 127; in 
Nature, never reduced to a 
single Purpose, 186; happiest 
achievements of the, have 
their own aspects of apparent 
danger, 375. 

**Coquette’?’ Humming Bird, 
the, Principle of ornament in, 


Cee 

Correlation of Growth, the, Mr. 
Darwin’s idea of, 241; has a 
deeper significance than this, 
242; in another and higher 
sense, 244; in its simplest 
form, and in visible connexion 
with its immediate cause, 245 ; 
having reference to certain 
mental purposes, 245; two 
entirely separate classes of 
phenomena grouped by Mr. 
Darwin under the name of, 
246; general impression left 
by the observance of organic, 
249 ; required in the establish- 
ment of a new form of Life, 
250; high and complex, the 
most constant and obvious of 
all the facts of Nature, 251; 
apparent, between webbed 
feet and spoon-shaped bills, 
252; real, between both these 
conditions and external con- 
ditions of Life, 252; between 
a particular kind of feather 
and a particular member of 
the body, in all birds capable 
of flight, 254; in all birds, 
between the auricular feathers 
and the ear-bones, 254; In- 
‘ternal, in Nature, entirely sub- 
ordinate to External, 255; 
External correlation between 
the Retina and certain vi- 
brations, 2573 as connected 


—— 











4a 6 INDEX. 


with Origin of Species, 259; 
Forces of, in flowers, indepen- 
dent, as Mr. Darwin admits, 
of Natural Selection, 267; 
inference from this admission 
concerning, a time before Na- 
tural Selection had room to 
play, 267; External, between 
the Mind and the Things 
around it, 296. : 

Correspondences, perception of, 
as much a fact as the sight, or 
touch, of the things in which 
they appear, 33. 

Cotopaxi, special forms of Hum- 
ming Birds, peculiar to, 228. 

Creation,—of Man, the, out of 
‘*the dust of the ground,” an 
indication of the personal 
agency of God, 27; the em- 
bodiment of a Divine Idea, 
30; work of, carried on under 
rules of adherence to Typical 
Forms, 76; history of, ‘‘an 
Observed Order of Facts” in, 
209; by Law, idea of, on 
what founded, 212 ; adaptation 
and arrangement of Natural 
Forces, in what sense of the 
Nature of, 216; idea of 
centres of, suggested by the 
geographical distribution of 
Humming Birds, 225 ; by Law, 
only senses in which we get a 
glimpse of it from the theory 
of Natural Selection, 261; 
spoken of as not Creation, 
unless it work from nothing 
as its material, and by nothing 
as its means, 262; doctrine of, 
only possible serious adver- 
saries of, 262; by Birth, how 
it explains the existence of 
useless organs, 266; nearest 
methods of, probably behind a 
veil too thick for man to 
penetrate, 273. 


Creative Power, the rule which 
seems to have guided, in the 
origin of New Species, 229. 

Creeds, decay in, resulting from 
dissociating in the popular 
exposition of them the doc- 
trines of Religion from the 
analogy and course of Nature, 
52: eho: 

Crompton, 344, 347. 

Custom and Traditional Opinion, 


on the facts of Nature and 
Human Life, as seen through 
the dulled eyes of, 384. 

Cuvier’s Science of Homologies, 
197. 

Cynanthus Humming Bird, or- 
nament in the, changing from 
blue to green, 239. 


D. 


Darwin, Mr. his conclusion a3 
to ‘‘silent members,” 32; his 
work on the fertilization ot 
Orchids, 373 answers the 
question of Intention with 
precision and _ success, 38; 
fails to solve the question, out 
of what ‘‘ primordial ele- 
ments” the parts of the Or- 
chis were developed, 38; idea 
of special use as the control- 
ling principle of construction 
never absent from his mind, 
40 ; his reduction of the forms 
of Orchids to the archetypal 
arrangement of Threes within 
Threes, 443 cannot con- 
ceive how a voltaic battery 
can be made out of the tissues 
of a fish, 104; his curious 
mistake concerning Green 
Woodpeckers, 176; his re- 
ference to the discovery of 
“* Rhizopods” near the bottom 


of ‘‘ Azoic” Rocks, 210; his - 








INDEX. 


ey 


44t 





theory of Development sug- 
gests less of anything ap- 
proaching to a Law in Crea- 
tion than did the earlier 
theories, 214; his theory of 
Development, to what extent 
an established scientific truth, 
219; his theory — self-con- 
demned, 220; claims for it 
a wider range than belongs to 

. it, 220; mere advantage, in 
Mr. Darwin’s. sense, not the 
rule in the Origin of New 
Species in Humming Birds, 
229; his theory does not ac- 
count for the origin or spread 
of Humming Birds, 234; offers 
no explanation how new Births 
may be the means of. intro- 
ducing New Species, 239 ; his 
theory on Natural Selection 
has no bearing on the Origin 
of Species, 240; admits that 
the doctrine of Natural Selec- 
tion ‘‘takes cognizance of Va- 
riations only after they have 
arisen, and regards Variation 
as due to chance,” 240; 
groups under the name ‘‘ Cor- 
relation. of Growth” two 
classes of phenomena, en- 
tirely separate in idea, 246; 
shows how an improved Bill, 
once produced, will be pre- 
served, 251; on the phrase 
‘* Adherence to Type,” 259; 

- on Inheritance, what it is, 264. 

Decaying fallen leaves, imitation 
of, in the Woodcock’s plu- 
mage, 182. 


Design and Mental Purpose, 


exhibited in the Correlation of 
the Retina with certain vibra- 
tions, 257. 

Detected Method in Nature, the 
Ultimate Question, above and 
behind every, 272. 


Development, Hypotheses of, 
the, in the form which they 
have as yet assumed, are de- 
prived of all scientific basis, 
29 ; theories of, what they have 
simply been, 31; theories, 
idea common to all, that a 
new species is simply an un- 
usual birth, 214; Mr. Dar- 
win’s theory of, difference be- 
tween it and other theories of 
development, 218; of Man’s 
Nature, boundless discoveries 
open to those who would in- 
vestigate the laws governing 
the, 325; and yrowth of. 
Modern Civilization, 388. 

Diatomacee, 190. 

Digestive Organs, the, Mechan- 
ism of the, extends through a 
long range of Creation, 269. 

Discovery, outbreak of old De- 
lusions on every fresh, 113 ; 
the most striking thing in the 
history of, 383. 

Disease brings out correlations 
not perceived in health, 247. 
Divine Government, Divine 
Thoughts, Divine Purposes, 
and Divine Affections, rules 

and principles of, 53. 

Divine Will, the ONE Forcz, 
perhaps, in itself a mode of 

» action of the, 127. 

Diving Birds, Correlation in, 253. 


E. 


Economic Error of the Old 
Commercial Systems, 362. 
Econamic Science, Combination 

involves no Rebellion against 
the Laws of, 373. 
Economists, Pelitical, hostile to 
Restriction, 362. 
Electric Ray, or Torpedo, an 
instance of an extraordinary 





442 cele 





result produced by a common 
law yoked to extraordinary 
conditions, I01; Fish and 
Electric Telegraph, absolute 
necessity of conforming to de- 
finite conditions in making 
each, 102; Telegraph, the, 
Babbage’s Calculating Ma- 
chine, the Steam Engine, and 
the Solar System, all work by 
Natural Consequence, 107. 

Everlasting Will, the, some pur- 
pose of it to be seen working 
everywhere, 123. 

Experience, Association, or In- 
tuition, origin of our ideas 
how far due respectively to, 
289; Mr. J. S. Mill on, 290. 

Explanation, the mere ticketing 
and orderly assortment of exter- 
nal facts, not, 3; what it is, 79. 

External Correlations provided 
beforehand by Utility, 256; 
Elements of Nature, our com- 
mand over the, in advance of 
our command over the re- 
sources of Human Character, 
384. 

‘‘EKyes” in the wing of the 
Argus Pheasant, compared to 
the ‘‘ ball and socket” orna- 
ment in Art, 193. 


Fact, Purpose not an Inference 
merely, but a, 82; Purpose as 
a general Inference, and as a 
particular, distinction between 
them not sufficiently observed, 
83. 

Facts, the, of Function, consti- 
tute not Final, but Immediate 
Purpose, 81; Man controls, 
only because he interferes with 
Laws, 318; Men always try- 
ing to evolve out of their owa 


INDEX. 





minds knowledge only to be 
acquired by patient inquiry 
into, 326, 

Factories, effects of ** free” la- 
bour in, 4515" Labotrs ‘of 
children in,. in what sense 
“free,” 3533 in what’ sense 
not ** free,” 353; Owners 
of, powerful motives in opera- 
tion on the, 353; Inspectors 
of, in 1864, 359. 

Factory System, the, how it 
arose, 344; Act of 1802, in 
what sense invaluable, 350 ; 
Acts, false intellectual con- 
ceptions at the bottom of op- 
position to, 352; Acts, the, 
the first Legislative recognition 
of, a great Natural Law quite 
as important as Freedom of 
Trade, 360 ; Legislation, Pro- 
gress of Political Science in 
nothing happier than in, 364 ; 
Combination effects a higher 
good than that resulting from, 
372. 

Fallacies, Verbal, of Mr. Man- 
sel exposed by Mr. Mill, 310. 

False Theory and mistaken Con- 
duct found out by the working 
of Natural Consequence, 362. 

Feather, Wing, a production 
wholly unlike any other ani- 
mal growth, 168. 

Feathers, of a bird’s wing, ~~ 
fold division of the, 155; one 
fundamental plan in, 253. 

Final ends not to be seen, 80, 

Fish, power of many, to change 
colour rapidly, 177. 

Flight, the true Theory of, may 
be tested by the eye, 139. 

Fly Shuttle in Weaving, inven- 
tion of the, the impulse it 
gave, 346. 

Flying Animal, no, lighter than 
the air it moves in, 146, 





INDEX. 





443 





Foraminifera, 119. 

Force, or Forces, an Observed 
Order of Facts is the Index 
and the Result of the work- 
ing of some, 68; the Law of 
Gravitation is that, the exact 
measure of whose operation 
was numerically ascertained 
by Newton, 69; each, if left 
to itself, would be destructive 
of the Universe, 91 ; what is 
it? 119; the idea of, traced 
to its Fountain Head, 120; 
ONE, all Natural Forces re- 
solvable perhaps into, 127 ; 
this, perhaps, in itself a mode 
of action of the Divine Wili, 
127; of Gravitation, the most 
familiar of all Forces in all 
Azes, 1120; this © Force, 
chiefly that concerned in flight, 
130; or Forces, to which the 
phenomena of Life can be 
traced, no knowledge of the, 
212; a, emanating from Exter- 
nal things, and moulding the 
structure of an organism in 
harmony with themselves, no 
conception of, 251 ; Furnisher 
of, no substance comparable 
as a, to Coal, 260; One, the 
source and centre of the rest, 
275; ultimate seat of, the, we 
know nothing directly of, 275 3 
nearest conception of this de- 
rived from our own conscious- 
ness, 275; or Power, developed 
through an organ, not identi- 
cal with that organ, 279; 
or Forces, implied in an 
‘Observed Order of Facts,” 
283; Expenditure of, in severe 
Thinking, 284. 

Forces, Correlation of, modern 
doctrine of the, 6; Law as 
applied to individual, the 
measure of whose operation 


has been more or less de- 
fined, or ascertained, 65; 


“Law in. its most habitual 


sense, as Natural, related to 
Purpose, and subvervient to 
the discharge of Function, 79 ; 
irresistible tendency in the lan- 
guage of Science to personify, 
$9; no phenomena visible to 
man governed by zzvariable, 
but by variable combinations of 
invariable forces, 93; Con- 
vertibility of, modern doctrine 
of the, 122; Natural, Law 
in what sense the co-operation 
of, working together for ful- 
filment of obvious Intention, 
216; Vital, how made to 
evolve a new Form of Life, 
261 ; all, in their mutual re- 
lations, governed by principles 
of arrangement purely Mental, 
275; Material, manifestations 
of mental Energy and Will, 
275; apparent barrier against 
our conceiving how any com- 
bination of, can resuli in mind, 
284; Material, miscenception 
of, 285 ; Immaterial, working 
in matter, 285; Bystanders 
often see the, telling on our 
Wills, more clearly than we 
do ourselves, 288 ; Action of, 


.on our minds, how to be 


traced, 289; ageregate of 
what, may be called the Laws 
which determine human action 
and opinions, 303; or Laws 
which operate on the Mind, 
exceedingly difficult to reduce 
them in their boundless variety 
to system, 303; our Volitions 
how far subject to adjusted, 
322; the fixedncss of all, in 
one sense, constitutes their in- 
finite pliability in another, 
323; of Nature, one of the 





444 





INDEX. 





most tremendous of the, re- 
duced to obedience by Waitt, 
340 ; Separate and Individual, 
in Man and Nature, alone in- 
variable, 368 ; Combinations 
of these, of endless variety 
and endless capability of 
change, 368. 

Foreknowledge, Perfect know- 
ledge must be perfect, 312. 

Form, of Life, new, correlation 
required in the establishment 
of a, 250; such correlation, as 
far as we can see, without any 
Physical cause, 251; and 
Spirit, the connexion between, 
sanctioned by the doctrine of 
the Resurrection, 286. 

Forms, Typical, work of Nature 
carried on under rules of ad- 
herence to, 76; of Life, suc- 
cessive introduction of, higher 
and higher, 210; allied, spe- 
cific and generic, bond of 
connexion between them, 218. 

Forward Motion, the power of, 
how given to birds, 138. 

Fossil Remains, what Forms to 
be traced in, 211; Animals, 
approximating to the Forms 
of the Horse and the Ox, Pro- 
fessor Owen on, 211. 

Fossils designated <t0e Sports 
of Nature,” 267. 

Free Agency of Man, faith re- 
quired in the, to secure the 
working for good of great 
Natural Laws, 376. 

Free Labour, those who opposed 
restrictions on, met with no 
adequate reply, 355; advo- 
cates of Restriction cn, igno- 
rant of the principles at issue, 


355+ 

Free Will, erroneously called 
the peculiar Prerogative of 
Man, 304 ; and Necessity, pro- 


gress at last on the vexed 
question of, 308. 

Freedom, a relative term, not an 
absolute, 302. 

Freedom of Exchange, in the 
products of Labour, results 
of, compared with: the re- 
sults of perfect freedom of 
competition in Labour itself, 
358. 

Freedom of Man’s Will not more 
mysterious in directing the 
Mind to one motive, and di- 
verting it from another, than 
in the turning of the Body 
to the right hand rather than 
the left, 314. 

Fulmars, mechanism of flight in, 
150. 

Puede definition of, 279; of 
Coal in the world, 260. 

Function of an Organ, the, its 
Purpose, 82. 


G. 


Galileo, period of, 343. 

Gallinaceous Bir ds, sort of wings 
in, 1553 comparatively no in- 
fancy in, 297; fact of immense 
significance connected with, 
299. 

Gannet, the, diving for fish, 144. 

Genesis of Organic Life, modern 
idea of the, 30. 

Geographical distribution of 
Humming Birds, 224. 

Gipsies, case of the, not pa- 
rallel with that of the Jews, 20. 


Gladstone’s, Mr. description of 


the old Commercial Pelicy, 


37- 

God’s Will, extraordinary mani- 
festations of, how they may be 
wrought, 16. 

God, operations of, and of Men’s 
Minds, light thrown on the 








INDEX. 





445 





analogy between them by 
every known instance of Con- 
trivance, 128. 

Gold, laws relating to, in An- 
cient Sparta and, in Modern 
Spain, 336. 

Gould, Mr. on the action of the, 
wing in Humming Birds, 167; 
on the reason for the gorgeous 
colouring of those birds, 231 ; 
his description of ditto, 233; 
on the absence of Hybridism 
between any two Species of 
Humming Birds, 237; on cer- 
tain local varieties near Bo- 
-gota, whose ornament is 
changing colour, 239; his 
** Birds of Australia,” 299. 

Government, Divine ; see Divine 
Government. 

Government, principle of, only 
recognised in modern times, 
326; the Science of, two 
great discoveries made _ in, 
during the present century, 
334- 

Gravitation, Law of, the dis- 
covery of it the highest exer- 
cise of pure intellect through 
which the Human Mind has 
found its way, 72; the most 
familiar of all Forces in all 
Ages, 129; the chief Force 
in flight, 130. 

Grote’s ‘‘ Plato,” 327. 

Grouse, 
imitation in, to the tinting 
and mottling of the ground on 
which they lie, 181. 

Growth, Correlations of; see 
Correlations of Growth. 

Growth, Progress and Decay, 
whether any Law of, in Na- 
tions as in Individual Organ- 
isms, 387. 

Guizot, M. on the Supernatural, 
iy sy 22, 27,29, 58; on the 


feathers. of the, close | 


only serious adversaries of the 
doctrine of Creation, 262; on 
the introduction of the human 
pair into the world, 269; on 
misconceptions of the Past, 
and false anticipations of the 
Future, 380. 


H. 


Hamilton, Sir William, exami- 
nation of the Philosophy of, 
by Mr. J. S. Mill, 308, ef seg. 

Hargraves, 344, 347. 

Hawks, classified as ‘‘ noble,” 
or ‘‘ignoble,” 158. 

Hebrides, remarkable chase of a 
Merlin after a Snipe, in the, 
158. 

Hereditary Transmission of 
Mental Qualities, 289; of 
Innate Ideas, 300. 

Heron’s Wing, curious experi- 
ment with an outstretched, 
140. 

Herschel, Sir John, quoted, 73, 
122. 

Homology, of Orchids, 43; in 
Structure, and Analogy in 
Use, 199. 

Homologies, doctrine of, doc- 
trine of Contrivance and Ad- 
justment not so metaphysical 
as the, 83 ; Science of, as de- 
veloped by Cuvier, Hunter, 
Owen, and Huxley, an intri- 
cate, almost a transcendental, 
Science, 197. 

Horse, the, ‘‘silent members” 
in, 195. 

Hudibras quoted, 184. 

Human Action and Opinions, 
aggregate of Forces which may 
be called Laws which deter- 
mine, 303. 

Human Character, elementary 








446 INDEX, 





Forces having a _ constant 
operation on, 325. 

fluman Law, function of, as dis- 
_tinguished from Natural Law, 
325; Law, idea of founding 
it on the Laws of Nature never 
systematically entertained in 
the Ancient World, 326. 

Human Society, odious concep- 
tions of, in Plato’s Republic, 
Boy, 

Human Instincts, and faculties 
of Contrivance, impeded by 
clumsy machinery, 340. 

Human Labour, Factory System 
as affecting, 344. 

Human Spirit, Natural Laws in 
harmonious relation with the, 
391. 

Humming Birds, the most re- 
markable examples of the 
machinery of flight, 166; pe- 
culiarities of, 221; their dis- 
tinctiveness from ali other 
families of birds, 222; geo- 
graphical distribution of, 224 5 
divisible only into two Sub- 
families, 225; generic and 
specific differences between 
these, 226; species of, pecu- 
liar to Cotopaxi, to Chimbo- 
razo, Juan Ferdandez, &c. 
228; a curious example of 


Ornament for Ornament’s sake, - 


233; the Creation of sepa- 
rate species of, suggests the 
idea of some Creative Law, 
of the nature and conditions 
of which we know nothing, 
2306. 

Hunting Grounds of Eagles, 
Falcons, and Hawks, 180. 
Clutton, Captain, on the flight 

of the Albatross, 165. 
Huxley, Professor, false charge 

of Atheism against, 89; his 

assertion that Life precedes 


Organization, 118; rhetorical 
designation of “ Life’’ in his 
‘Elements of Comparative 
Anatomy,’ 213; frontispiece 
to his ‘*Man’s Place ‘in 
Nature,” 265. ; 

Hybridism unknown between 
two species of Humming 
Birds, 237. 

Hyrax, or ‘‘ Coney,” the, teeth 
and hoofs of, resemble those 
of the Rhinoceros, 248. 


L 


Ideas, in what sense born with 
us, 296; formation of, all that 
comes from the Mind itself in 
the, 297. 

Identic Shapes, Forces which 
aggregate particles of matter 
in, 268. 

Idols, Men’s, nowadays their 
own abstract Conceptions, 
112. 

Immediate Purpose, Facts of 
Adjustment and of Function 
constitute not Final, but, 81. 

Imponderable, the Great, 151. 

Incubator, Artificial, prepared 
by the Megapode, 298. 

Individual Force, Law immu- 
table only as an, 97; Will, 
Laws against which; cannot 
contend, 359; Will, the, 
helplessness and thoughtless- 


ness of, to a great extent to 


be overcome, 374. 
Inductive Sciences, Whewell’s 
History of the, 110. 
Inequality of Men, in the sense 
of gifts of Mind and Body, 377. 
Inheritance, bond of, according 
to Mr. Darwin, 218; Theory 
of, when it startles us, 263. 
Inorganic Compounds, relations 


’ 





ee ee Pe, 


—|— ——- 


INDEX. 








447 





of certain to the Chemistry of 
Life, 94. 

Inspectors of Factories, Reports 
of, 360. 

Instinct, or Intuition, not Expe- 
rience, teaches us  uncon- 
sciously how to use the ma- 
chinery causing Muscular Con- 
tractions, 292. 

Instincts of the nature of Ideas, 

-297; Natural, when to be 
trusted, 358 ; when the Higher 
Faculties must impose their 
Will on the, 358: 

Institution, Positive, Authorita- 
tive Interference of, with the 
freedom of the Individual 
Will, still required in Fac- 
tories, 364. 

Institutions, Positive, stand con- 
trasted with Natural Law in 
one sense only, 333. 

Intellect, Laws of, Philosophers 
who fancy they are reduced to 
scientific expression when de- 
scribed as the working of the 
“ cerebral ganglia,” 282. 

Intention, exhibited in the me- 
chanism of Orchids, the ques- 
tion Mr. Darwin sets himself 
to answer, 38; Obvious, Law 
in what sense meant as the co- 
operation of Natural Forces, 
working together for the ful- 
filment of, 216 ; and Purpose, 
the Law of Structure entirely 
subordinate to the Law of, 
265. 

Intuition, Origin of our Ideas 
how far due to, 289; a word 
not liked by supporters ot the 
doctrine of Experience, 291. 

Ictuitions, Copernicus, Kepler, 
and Galileo guided in their 
profound conceptions of visible 
phenomena by, 110; the 
most extravagant errors in 


Philosophy often associated 
with the happiest 386. 

Invariability, doubie meaning of, 
in the Necessitarian Philo- 
sophy, 309; of Sequence, an 
ambiguous phrase, 310. 

Invariable Law, Phenomena zof 
governed by, 318; Vision of, 
on the Throne of Nature, 
390. 

Invention, Mechanical, Scientific 
Men forced to borrow the lan- ~ 
guage of, 256; triumphs of, 
regarded often with fear and 
jealousy by the Working” 
Classes, 375; a Law of Na- 
ture in the strictest sense, 
376 7 

Invisible, the, all the Realities 
of Nature are in the region 
of, 118. 


J. 


Jelly, blobs of, without parts, or 


organs, or visible structure, 
Vital Force in, 119. . 

Jevons, Mr. W. S. on the Coal 
Question, 260. 

Jews, preservation of the, a 
striking illustration of depar- 
ture from the ordinary course of 
Nature effected through Na- 
tural means, 20. 

Job on the Stars, 114. 

Juan Fernandez, three species of 
Sees Birds peculiar to, 
2206. 


K. 


Kepler, three Laws of, 66. 

Kestrel hovering, 161. 

** Knowing how to do it,” in 
Nature as in Art, all done 
seems done by, 127. 





448 INDEX. 





L. 


Labellum in Orchids, its use, 
40. 

Labour, Restrictions on, de- 
nounced by Adam Smith, 
338; Children’s, in Factories, 
in what sense “free,” in 
what zot ‘‘free,” 3533 in- 
stincts of, when blind to all 
results save money-making, 
358; resort to Combination 
for the protection of, recom- 
mended by Reason and Ex- 
perience, 373; Rewards of, 
Limits within which Combi- 
nations can, and beyond which 
they cannot, affect the, 378. 

Languages grow and change 
by rules of which the men 
speaking .them are uncon- 
scious, 76. 

Law, Idea of, made the basis of 
the Christian miracles, 245 
highest, known to Man, 61; 
the word, in its primary sig- 
nification, 64; FIVE different 
senses in which the word is 
habitually used—jrst, as ap- 
plied to an Observed Order of 
Facts ; secondly, to that Order 
as involving the action of 
some Force, or Forces, of 
which nothing more may be 
known ; ¢hzrvdly, as applied to 
individual Forces, the mea- 
sure of whose operations has 
been more or less defined 
and ascertained ; fourthly, as 
applied to Combinations of 
Force having reference to 
the fulfilment of Purpose or 
the discharge of Function; 
jijithly, as applied to abstract 
conceptions of the M:nd— 
these five great leading sig- 
nifications of, ' + questions 





they circle round, 65 ; neatest 
illustrations of, used in the 
first sense, to be found in 
Kepler’s Three Laws, 66; in 
the second sense, the index 
and result of the working of 
some Force, or Forces, 68; of 
Gravitation defined, 69; in its 
highest sense, as Natural Forces 
related to Purpose, and sub- 
servient to the discharge of 
Function, 79; a, only immu- 
table as an Individual Force, 
97; the term, as used to de. 


- signate an Abstract Idea, 


108; illustration of this in 


the “First Law of Motion,” 


108; in what sense meant as 
the co-operation of Natural 
Forces working together for 
the fulfilment of. Obvious In- 
tention, 216; difference be- 
tween that to which the Lower 
Animals are subject and that 
to which Man is subject, 304. 


Laws—of Nature, Man’s Mind 


strangely excluded by Profes- 
sor Tyndall from the, 6; if 
not unchangeable, could not 
be used as instruments of Will, 
97; Natural, unchangeable- 
ness-and universality of, essen- 
tial to their use as instruments 


ee Will, 146; or Forces, the, 


which operate on the Mind, 
exceedingly difficult to re- 
duce them to system, 303 ; 
interference with, the only 


way in which Man can con- - 


trol Facts, 318 ; against which 
Individ al Will cannot con- 
tend, 359 ; Economic, invaria- 
bility of, rightly understood, 


379- 


Lecky, Mr. on the Rise and 


Influence of Rationalism in 
Europe, 16, 





INDEX. 449 





Legislation, Wise and Successful, 
on the recognition of what 
causes it depends, 302 ; double 
movement in, ever since the 
First Factory Act, 361. 

Leverage, Law of, as applied to 
Wings, 150. 

Lewes, Mr. G. H., 70, 117, 124, 
204. 

Lewis, Sir G. C., on Astronomy, 
12: 

Life, the. Cause of Organization, 
118; Leading Types of, in 
Geological ages, an orderly 
gradation in, 210; Origin of, 
nothing known or guessed at 
in, corresponding with Law 
in its strictest sense,! 212; 
New Forms of, if developed 
from the Old, the working of 
Creative Power, 216. 

Living Effort, our conceptions 
of Force formed from our own 
consciousness of, 120. 

Lizards, Flying, in other Ages 
of the World, 169. 

Locke, quoted, 24. 

Longfellow, Professor, 129. 


M. 
Machine, Idea and Essence of 


a, 90. 

McCosh, Dr., on the Super- 
naturalin relation to the Natu- 
Pai, £7. 

Malformation, Correlations 
brought out by, 247. 

Man, Is he Supernatural ? 7. 

Man’s agency, relation of, to the 

_ Physical Laws of Nature, 11. 

Man and the Lower Animals, 
common Relationship of, by 
descent, at least conceivable, 
29. 

Man and Nature, works of both 


done through the means of 
Law, 107; and’ the Lower. - 
Animals, amount and kind of 
difference between, spite of 
close affinities of bodily struc- 
ture, 264; and the highest 
Animals below him, secret 
of the boundless difference 
between, 306 ; in what sense’ 
subject to the Law of Causa- 
tion, 313 ; Reason, Conscience, 
Imagination, Belief, as much 
a part of, as his desires and 
instincts, 332; Combination 
natural to, 376. 

Mankind, Combination, among 
many Motives, a means of in- 
fluencing, to an extent as yet 
unknown, the conduct and 
condition of, 368 ; progress of, 
to higher and better things, 
338. 

Mansel’s, Mr., ‘‘ Essay on Mira- 
cles,” 18; his Limits to Re- 
ligious Thought, its Verbal 
faliacies, exposed by Mr. J. 
S. Mill, 310. 

Mantis, strange imitation of 
Vegetable growths in the body 
of the, 184. 

Marine Mollusca, beautiful shells 
of, 189. 

Material, World, increasing 
power exercised over the, by 
Man’s Will, 97; World, the, 
and the World of Mind, Law 
in the same sense prevails in 
the phenomena of both, 275 ; 
Frame, in which we live, some 
of the most distant objects of 
the Universe more accessible 
to our observation and _ intel- 
ligible to us than, 276 ; Struc- 
ture, our Affections dependent 
on, 278. 

Materialism, Suggestions o% lie 
thickest on the surface of 

GG 





450 : INDEX. 





em ST 





things, 113; two great ene- 
mies to, in the heart and the 
intellect, 115. 

Matter, Immaterial Forces work- 
ing in, 285. 

Means, God governing the world 
by the choice and use. of, 

-16; and Ends, our iynorauce 
of God’s notions of, 80, 

‘*Measure,” inaccurately termed 
the “verifiable element” in 
our knowledge, 70. 

Mechanism of Orchids, Inten- 
tion exhibited in the, 39; of 
Flight in the Albatross and in 
Seagulls, 150. 

Megapodes, Innate Ideas in the, 
298. 

Memory often paralysed by the 
stroke which paralyses a Limh, 
278. 

Men, in what sense “ fellow- 
workers with God,” and made 
**nartakers of the Divine Na- 
ture,” 9. 

Mental Purpose and Physical 
Cause, ideas of, not antago- 
nistic, 32; and Resolve, the 
one thing our Intelligence 
perceives with direct and in- 
tuitive recognition, 34; Pur- 
poses, Correlation having re- 
ference to certain, 245. 

Merlin, a, swooping on its prey, 
1445 chase of a, aftera Snipe 
in the Hebrides, 158. 

Metaphors, the, employed in 
Language, generally founded 
on Analogies instinctively and 
often unconsciously perceived, 


4. 

Method of Nature, proper object 
of Science to detect, if she can, 
the, 271. 

Methods, some, of operating on 
Men’s Minds known to us 
instinctively, 325. 


Mill, Mr. J. S., his admission 


that our muscular contractions 
are not the result of ‘* :xpe- 
rience,” 290; Comments on 
this admission, 16, 291, ef s¢g.; 
on the meaning of the word 
“* Necessity,” 308, 309; his 
use of the vague word ‘* An- 
tecedent,” 313 ; his definition 
in ‘‘ Auguste Comte and Posi- 
tivism,”’ of the Positive as 
distinguished from the Theo- 
logical Mode of Thought, 


315; dissection of these . 


phrases, . « 390). 53723 aamon 
‘Changeable Wills,” 319. 


Mind and Will of Man in one 


sense ‘‘ separate” from ‘‘ Na- 
ture”? and belonging to ‘the 
“ Supernatural,” 8. 


Mind, Character of, expressed in 


lines and shapes of matter, 
265; Phenomena of, an ob- 
served Order of Facts in the, 
274; the, unconscious of its 
dependence on the Body, 
277; first to be mapped, and 
then its Organ, 280 ; and Or- 
ganization, parallel Pheno- 
mena of, 282; and Brain, 
connexion between them re- 
cognised as a Law by us only 
in the sense of an “‘ Observed 
Order of Facts,” 283; the, to 
be regarded as having, like 
the Body, Automatic Facui- 
ties, 293; Phenomena of, 
words used to describe the, 
suggestive of analogies be. 
tween Mental and Material 
things, 302 ; influences which 
attract the Polar Force com- 
pared to, 303 ; and Character 
of Man, knowledge of, how 
it may be governed, to be ob- 
tained only by slow degrees, 
325; Human, Love of Gain 


INDEX. 





45% 





an instinct implanted in the, 
376 ; openness and simplicity 
of, great characteristics of 
Men who have exercised an 
influence for good on Society,’ 


384. 

Mineral Salt, crystallising under 
a Voltaic current, Correlation 
of Growth in its simplest 
form, 245. 

Miracle, a, commonly understood 
as a suspension or violation of 
the Laws of Nature, 17. 

Miracles, when they lose every 
elemént of inconceivability, 
23; Christian, idea of Law 
made the very basis of the, 
24; the idea of, performed by 
the use of means, regarded by 
many with jealousy and sus- 
picion, 26. 

Modern Policy and Anctent, 
striking difference between the 
spirit of, 335; Politicians, 
great aim of, to open new 
sources of national opulence, 
336; Political Societies, stag- 
nation and decline the actual 
condition of many, 387. 

Mollusca, the, Vital Forces in, 
made to work to order, 215. 

Monkeys, “ Silent members” 
in, 195. 

Muscles, the seat of two oppos- 
ing Forces, 77. ; 

Muscular Power, great con- 
centration of, in the Organism 
of Birds, 133. i 


N. 


Narwhal, the, Aborted Germ 
in, 195. 

Nasmyth, Mr, James, on the 
shadows and ‘high light” in 
the ‘eyes in the wing of the 
Argus Pheasant, 193. 


Nations, calamities of, their 
origin in the insensible de- 
velopment of New Conditions, 


Natural Consequence, way of, 

_ Steam Engine and Solar Sys- 
tem both worked by, 108. 

Natural Forces, Idea of, quite 
separate from the ascertained 
measure of their energy, 70 ; 
found to operate under ruics 
having strict reference to 
Space and Time, 74; must 
be conformed to and obeyed, 
126. 

Natural Law, Common Idea of 
the Supernatural as at variance 
with, above, or in violation of, 
4; True conception of, on what 
founded, 326; the idea of, as 
affecting mankind, on what 
founded, 331; in what sense 
contrasted with Positive In- 
stitution, 333; Law, Signal 
illustration in England this 
century of circumstances in 
which, may be trusted, and 
of those in which it required 
to be controlled, 334; and 
Positive Institution, antagon- 
ism between, 356; ever work- 
jag to convict error and con- 
firm truth, 357; working on 
the Human Willwhile exposed 
to overpowering motives and 
under debased conditions of 
the understanding and the 
heart, 362. 

Natural Laws, founded on the 
right exercise of Reason in 
the highest and best sense, 
333; best fulfilled when 
made the instruments of in- 
telligent Will, and the servants 
of enlightened Conscience, 391. 

“Natural Selection” can do 
nothing exeept with the mate- 


GG2 


452 





rials presented to it, 219; 


what it accounts for and what - 


it does zo¢ account for, 220; 
the only point, with reference 
to the Sub-Families of Hum- 
ming Birds, on which it has 
any bearing, though it does 
not touch the facts of the 
case, 226; does not account 
for the origin or spread of 
Humming Birds, 236; real 
bearing of, 240 ; seizes on Ex- 
ternal Correlations, but can- 
not enter the womb and shape 
the New Form in harmony 
with the modified conditions 
of External Life, 256; ope- 
rates only through the agency 
of use and disuse on organs 
already existing, and capable 
of discharging function, 267; 
Selection, idea of, excluded 
by the theory of Creation by 
Birth, 267, 

Nature, Power and Works of, 
all Superhuman, 2; glorious 
result of a right method in the 
study of, 4; what, in. the 
largest sense, to be understood 
as including, 5; in the nar- 
row sense of Physical Nature, 
7; and the Supernatural, Dr. 
Bushnell on, 8; Man’s, Phe- 
nomena of, included in the 
term ‘“‘ Natural,” 113  ordi- 
nary course of, 13; the Su- 
perhuman and the Superma- 
terial, familiar facts in, 23 ; 
the Great Parable, 54; Uni- 
versal Presence of combina- 
tions of Force in, 76; Rela- 
tion of an Organic Structure 
to its Purpose in, 99 ; com- 
parison illustrative of this be- 
tween the Menai Bridge and 
the Shells of Barnacles, 99; 
one vast system of Contri- 


ee 


New 


INDEX, 





vance, 1273; Mechanics of, 
highest problem in, 133 ; Pur- 
pose of particular structures 
in, often misconceived, 176 ; 
Laboratory of, process in the, 
by which natural tints can be 


transferred to substances pre- 


pared to receive them, 177; 
Facts of, High and Complex 
Correlation the most constant 
and obvious of all the, 251; 
no fictions or bad jokes in, 
268 ; no short cuts in, 331; a 
great Armoury for the use of 
Will, 382; Man’s command 
over the external elements of, 
in advance of his command 
over the resources of Human 
Character, 384; Man’s, most 
certain of all the Laws of, 
388. 

Necessity,” Progress at last _ 
on the vexed question of, 
308; Rebellion against the 
Doctrines of, founded on false 
conceptions of Invariable Law, 

ad 
oe 

Forms, Mr. Darwin's 
Theory, how far it suggests 
anything of the nature of Crea- 
tive Law to explain the intro- 
duction of, 221. 


New Species, a, according to 


Mr. Darwin, simply an un- 
usual birth, 218 ; Creation of, 
has followed some plan in 
which variety is in itself an 
aim, 228; a, must be born 
male and female, 237; of 
Humming Birds, if born from 
the Old, how they must be 
born, 238. 


Newton, Sir Isaac, his agitation 


on discovering the Law of - 
Gravitation, 74. 


Numerical Computation, Intui- 


tive Powers of, 293; Rela- 











INDEX. 


453 





tions, Ideas of Order based 
on, meet us in Nature at 
every turn, 49. 


O. 


Orchis, the Madagascar, its 
long and deep nectary, how 
developed, 44. 

Orchids, Fertilization of, 373 
Intention in the mechanism 
of, the question Mr. Dar- 
win sets himself to answer, 
38; Labellum in, its use, 
40; large Family of, in the 
forests of Central America, 
bay a 

Observed Order of Facts, an, 
implies a Force, or arrange- 
ment of Forces, out of which 
the Order comes, 283. 

Order, a subtle and pervading, 
binding together all Living 
things, 209; of Nature, the, 
very complicated, the Mind 
perplexed by the vast variety 
of subordinate Facts, 173; 
of Thought, the basis of 
all other Order in the works 
of Man and of Nature, 82. 

Organic Forms, Mr. Darwin's 
denial that Beauty for its own 
sake can be an end in, 188; 
Growth, symmetry to be de- 
tected in all variations of, 
242; Growths, general im- 
pression left by the obser- 
vance of Correlation between, 
249; Life, never any altera- 
tion in the whole scale of, in 
those principles of Chemical 
and Mechanical adjustment on 
which Respiration, Circulation, 
and Reproduction have been 
provided for, 269. 

Organism, Parts of an, bound 


together as one whole by a 
pervading system of Correla- 
tions, 247. 

Organisms, Inheritance the only 

cause which can produce, 

quite like or nearly like each 
other, 264 ; Bilateral Arrange- 
ment common to all, down to 
the Radiata, 268; New, no 
knowledge of the Laws con- 
nected with the Creation or 

development of, 213. 

Origin of New For ms, Darwin’s 
Theory does not profess to 
trace to a definite Law the, 
217; of our Ideas, how far due 
respectively to Experience, 
Association, or Intuition, 
289 ; clear definition of terms 
greatly required in the discus- 
sion of such questions as the, 
295. 

Origin of Species, the true,.in 
what it consists, 240; only 
sense in which we can get 
from the Theory of the, a 
glimpse of Creation by Law, 
261 ; New Species, rule which 
seems to have governed Crea- 
tive Power in the, 229. 

Ornament in Nature in itself a 
Purpose, 188; was so before 
Man was born, 189; for Or- 
nament’s sake, the rule in 
reference to which Creative 
Power seems to have worked 
in Humming Birds, 232. 

Ornament and Use ; see Use and 
Ornament. 

Ornithoryncus Paradoxus, 253. 

Owen, Professor, on the Mental 
conception of the Plan of all 
Vertebrate Skeletons, 32; on 
the Battery of the Electric 
Ray, 101 ; on Fossil Approx- 
imations to the forms of the 
Horse and the Ox, 211, 








q —- 2 
hi, . oe 
Tes 
5 INDEX. nt 
4 4 ; 3 ay, a be 
Bs ad * 
P. : ledge of the Force or Forces 
to which the, cam be traced, 
Parable, why so much can be 212; of, Mind,~ the; an > 
conveyed in the Form of, 53. Observed Order of Facts, 
Parliament, refusing to regulate ‘294; Law. in one Senses; 


“< Free Labour,” 349 ; Combi- 
nation indicated as the right 
course by, 373. 

Pauperism, in how far to be at- 


tacked through Combination, ~ 


381. - 

Peel, Sir Robert, the Elder, the 
first to interfere by law with 
unrestricted competition in 
Human Labour, 349; his Bill 
limited to the regulation of 
the labour of Apprentices, 
349; presses a new measure 
of Restriction, 351. 

Penguins, 148. 

Peregrine Falcon, sharp-pointed 
structure of wing in the, 


187; 

Perfect Knowledge, the little 
way we can ever traveltowards, 
311. 

Personal Agency of God, the 
Creation of Man “ out of the 
dust of the ground ” an indi- 
cation of the, 27. 

Personal Will, the Idea of, sepa- 
rable from the Forces which 
work in Nature, in a sense the 
projection of our own Per- 
sonality, 123. 

Personality and Will, impossi- 
bility of describing any facts 
in Science without investing 
the Laws of Nature with, 


: 1 » 

Petrals, Mechanism of flight in, 
150. 

Phas in the British Museum, 
Specimen of, with wings spot- 
ted like a larva-eaten leaf, 
187. 

Phenomena of Life, no know- 











prevails in the, both of the © 
Material and Mental world, 
275; never the result of in- — 
dividual Forces, but always 
of the variable conditions - 
under which several indivi- 
dual Forces are combined, © 
318. ey. 

Philosophy of History, on the 
recognition of what causes it 
depends, 302. oe 

Phrenological School, funda- 
mental error of the, 281. 

Phrenology, a name which is 
itself a fallacy, 280. 

Physical Cause and Mental Pur- 
pose, Ideas of, not antagonis- 
tic, 32 

Physical Cause, Correlation in 
the establishment of a New 
Form of Life, so far as we can 
see, without any, 250. 

Physical Forces all working to 
Order, 260, 

Physical Laws of Nature, rela- 
tion of Man’s agency to the, 
Ir; advancing knowledge of, 
accompanied with advancing 
power over the Physical 
World, 13. 

Physical Science, advances in, 
can only widen intelligent 
Spiritual Beliefs, 114. 

Physics, World of, Certainties 
in the world of Mind as absu- 
lute as any in the, 312. 


Physiological Discovery, the 
Dependence of Mind on 
Bodily Organization, a fact 


containing within itself the 
lesser facts of, 283. 
Physiology, recent Investigas 





wile 





INDEX, 


* . 





455 





¥ 


tions in, as tothe Muscles, 77 ; 

' every fact in, its intimate 

- bearing on some question of 
‘the Philosophy of Mind, 290. 

Planets, the, much discovered 

~ by man concerning the circu- 
lation of, before he discovered 
the circulation of the blood, 

> 276. 

Plants, basis of many Correla- 
tions of Growth in, 243. 

Plato’s Republic, 327. 

Polar Force of Magnetism, 303. 

Polarity, in Magnetic Force, ul- 
timate nature and source of, 
245. 

Polarity, Principle of, developed 
in a circle in the Radiata, 
268. 

Policy, Modern Commercial, 
Central idea of, 337. 

Political Society, Ancient Law- 
givers always aiming at stand- 
ards of, 326; Events, me- 
morable Examples in the last 
a\id present generations of the 
Reign of Law over the course 
of, 387. 

Positive Institution, and Natural 
Law, antagonism between, 
356; Combination coming in 
the place of, 372. 

Positive Philosophy, the word 
Will, how used in, 320. 

Positivism, a sentence the con- 
centration of all that-is erro- 
neous in, 316. 

Posterity’s wonder 
ourselves, 383. 

Potential Use in Nature, 202. 

Power, Law in its primary sig- 
nification, the authoritative 
expression of Human Will 
enforced by, 64; of God, Pro- 
fessor Owen’s Instances of the, 
as manifested in his Animal 
Creation, 263. 


respecting 


Prayer, real Essence of, 61. 

Primeval Traditions of Belief, 
immense satisfaction to know 
that Logical Analysis confirms 
the testimony of Consciousness 
and runs parallel with the, 

* 390. 

Problem, the most difficult of 
all, in the Science of Govern- 
ment, 334. 

Progress of Mankind, order of 
facts observable in the, that 
long ages of silence and in- 
action are breken up and 
brought to an end by shorter 
periods of almost preternatu- 
ral activity, 343. 

Protection, a hindrance to the 
Wealth of Nations, the skill 
of Crafts, and the success of 
Trade, 341. 

Psychology and _ Physiology, 
neither independent of the 
other, 290. 

Ptarmigan, close imitation in 
the Plumage of the, to the 
mottling of ground, 181. . 

Purpose, the only thing we can 
surely know in the relation 
of Created Forms to our own 
Minds, 33; Principle of Ad- 
justment no meaning except 
as the result of, 78; Function 
of an Organ, its, 82; as a 
general inference, and as a 
particular fact, distinction be- 
tween them not sufficiently 
observed, 83; in Nature at- 
tained only by the enlist- 
ment of Laws as Means, 100 ; 
instance of this in the Electric 
Ray, where an extraordinary 
result is produced by a com- 
mon Law yoked to extraor- 
dinary conditions, 101 ; Con- 
trivance necessary for the aus 
complishment of, 126; Cons 


456 





rete, 





INDEX. 





trivance in Nature never re- 
duced to a single, 186; 
of the One Plan of Organic 
Life, 196; how Material 
Laws follow the steps of, 
208; Mental, Correlation of 
Growth having reference to 
a certain, 245; Correlation of 
Growth in the only sense we 
can connect it with the Origin 
of Species not a Physical cause 
but a Mental, 259; and In- 
tention, the Law of Structure 
entirely. subordinate to, 265 ; 
only, to be detected in the 
adaptibility of the Vertebrate 
Type to the Infinite varieties 
ot Life, 271. 


R, 


Radcliffe’s, Dr. Theory of Mus- 
cular and Nervous Action, 


77- 

Radiata, the, 268. 

Reason, Doctrine that things 
contrary to, were not beyond 
his faith, held by a late eminent 
clergyman of the English 
Church, 60; and Imagination, 
falling impotently on analogy 
and conjecture in endeavour- 
ing to get at Nature’s method, 
272; paralysed by the same 
stroke which paralyses a limb, 
278; and Feelings, direct 
appeals to the, entirely useless 
when these faculties have not 
been placed: under favourable 
conditions, 324; on what path 
Instinct a surer guide than, 
386. 

Regions where means of investi- 
gation cease, and processes of 
Verification are of no avail, 
241. 

Reign of Law, the, in Nature, 


so far as we can see it, Uni- 
versal, 4; Universal, perfectly 
consistent with a power of 
making those laws subservient 
to design, 22; the, the reign 
of Creative Force, directed by 
Creative Knowledge, worked 
under the control of Creative 
Power, and in fulfilment of 
Creative Purpose, 273. 

Religion, Nothing in, incom- 
patible with the belief that all 
exercises of God’s Power are 
effected through the instru- 
mentality of Means, 22, 50; 
or Nature, the Will of the 
Supreme either in, one in 
which ‘‘there is no variable- 
ness,” 51; and Science, Doc- 
trine that they should be 
thought separate open to 
one fatal objection, 57; dis- 
astrous effect of the belief in 
their separation, 58. 

Research, Physical, Transcen- 
dental character of the results 
of, 116. 

Restrictions on Labour, great 
discovery of the absolute ne- 
cessity of imposing, 335 ; from 
Trade, immense advantage of 
removing, 335. 

Restriction on Free Labour, 
those who opposed, met with 
no adequate reply, 355 ;: Ad- 
vocates of, ignorant of the 


fundamental principles at 
issue, 355. 
Resurrection, Connexion  be- 


tween Spirit and Form sanc- 
tioned by the doctrine of the, 
286. ; 

Retina, external Correlations of, 
25%, 

Rhizopods of enormous size 
found near the bottom of 
**Azoic” Rocks, 210, 





INDEX. 


Rudimentary Organs, said to be 
intended merely to suggest a 
History which was never true, 
and a Method which was never 
followed, 268. 


S. 


Sand-Grouse of Asiatic Deserts 
and their colouring, 182. 

Sand Partridges of ditto, 182. 

Science, the great Quest of, 
yi: Classification the basis 
of, 84; Astronomical, ulti- 
mate fact of, 92; included in 
Philosophy, 113 ; the “ under- 
standing by Faith ” mentioned 
by the writer of the Epistle 
to the Hebrews, now an as- 
sured doctrine of, 117; Proper 
object of, to detect the method 
of Nature,.if she can, 271 ; 
True, bondage under which it 
lies, 331: of Government, 
two great discoveries made in 
the, during the present cen- 
tary, 334; of Politics, the, 
still in its infancy, 383. 

Sciences, Physical, remarkable 
product of the immense deve- 
lopment of the, 3. 

Scientific Truth, a sharp eye to 
be cast on every form of 
words professing to represent, 
56; Men who, though trust- 
worthy on the facts of their 
own science, are zof to be 
trusted on the place of those 
facts in the general system of 
truth, 112. 

Scripture, Language of, nowhere 
conscious of a distinction be- 
tween the Natural and the 
Supernatural, 30. 

Seagulls, Mechanism of flight 

_ in the soaring of, 143, 150. 





457 


Seasons, Revolutions of the, de- 
pendent on a multitude of 
Laws, each of which would © 
produce utter confusion if not 
balanced against others in the 
right proportion, 93. 

Seers, great, of the Old Testa- 
ment, correspondence of their 
language with a great modern 
Scientific Idea, 127. 

Self-consciousness the Truth in 
the light of which all other 
truths are known, 7. 

Self-evident Truths, and Truths 
not self-evident, breakdown 
of the distinction between, 294. 

Sensation, no new light thrown 
on, because Sensation can be 
traced to certain nerves, 282. 

“Sensory Ganglia,” Philoso- 
phers who think they cast 
new light on Sensation by 
calling it an affection of the, 
282. 

‘* Silent members” in Animal 
Frames, views on the subject 
by Mr. Darwin, 32; deeper 
and wider views of Professor 
Owen on, 32. 

Silurian Sea, Old, richly carved 
shells and corals of. the, 
189. 

‘¢ Slowworm,” the Common, 
‘¢ Blade bone” and ‘‘ Collar 
bone ” of, —‘‘ aborted limbs” 
in, 195. 

Smiles’ Life of Watt, 342. 

Smith, Adam, 337 e¢ seg. ; work 
of, inseparably connected with 
the work of James Watt, 339 ; 
not dissimilar to Watt’s work 
in its relation to the Reign of 
Law, 340; opinions influenced 
by personal observation of the 
ill-treatment of Watt by the 
* Burgesses and Craftsmen of 
Glasgow,” 342; doctrines of, 








453 INDEX. 


patie 





where a hindrance, not a help, 

Bech 

Snakes, rudiments of Legs in, 
195. 

Snipe-chased by a Merlin in the 
Hebrides, 158. 

Snipes, Feathers of, imitating 
the colour of bleached vege- 
table stalks, 184. 

Society, Sanction of, given, or 
withheld, its influence for 
evil, or good, 366; desire 


and need for Combination . 


‘ grows with the growth of 

~ knowledge and with the in- 
creasing - complications of, 
376; openness and simplicity 
of mind great characteristics 
of those men who have ex- 
erted an influence for good on, 
3843 disorders of, the fruit 
of ignorance or rebellion, 
385. 

Solar System, the, like the 
Steam Engine, works by way 
of Natural Consequence, 
108. 

Space and Time, can we say 
more of their wonders than 


was said by David and Job? . 


aeeee 

Spain, Modern, prohibition of 
gold from leaving the State, 
336. 

Sparrow Hawk chased and 
‘“chaffed” by little birds, 
158. 


Sparta, Ancient, Law of, pro- 


hibiting gold from ever coming 
into the State, 336. 

Species, the Preservation and 
Distribution of, when they 
have arisen, the real bearing 
of the doctrine of Natural 
Selection, 240. 


Spindle, the, on Egyptian 


monuments, @ similar instru- 


Superhuman, 


ment familiar in the High- 
lands ‘until a few years ago, 
345. 

Spinning Jenny, the, coming 
to economise the work of 
human hands, 347. 

Spinning Wheel in Yorkshire 
in 1760, 345. 

Spontaneousness of Nature, no 

~such thing as, according to 
Professor Tyndall, 6; illus- 
tration of ‘‘ spontaneous ” de- 
sign in the Professor’s own 
mind, 13. 

Statute of A perentioades aie 
Watt’s time, 344. 

Steam Engine, Discovery of the: 
a new stimulus to the mind’s 
motives, 341. 

Stewart’s, Dugald, account of 
the Life and Writings of 
Adam Smith, 337. 

“Strong.Arm of the Law,” 
what it really is as proposed 
by Mr. Baker, the Factory 
Inspector, 360. 

Structure, Bodily, Affinities be- 
tween the, of Man and that of 
the Lower Animals, amongst 
the profoundest mysteries of 
Nature, 265. 

‘* Struggle for Existence,” the, 
of Organisms, 220. 

Stunted and distorted growth in 
large portions of mankind, in 
how far these conditions are 
subject to the control of Will 
through the Use of Means, 

ere 

much that was 
once thought, not thought so 
now, 13. 

Superhuman and the Super- 
material, the, familiar facts in 
nature, 23. 


Supernatural, Belief.in the, es- 
sential to all Religion, an. 


a ee 
© Pe 
ee 


INDEX. 





——— 4 


459 





assertion true only in a special 
sense, 51. 

Supreme Will and Supreme In- 
telligence. in. the. Laws of 
Nature, our own Wills and 
Intelligence enable us to con- 
ceive of a, 23. 

Swallow,Common, sharp- pointed 
structure of Wing in the, 157. 

Swift, the, dropping, not flying 
backwards, 141; its wonder- 
ful and unceasing evolutions, 


147. 
Sylph Humming Bird, the, 233. 
Symmetry a relation we de- 
tect in all variations of Or, ee 
Growth, 242. 


qe 
Tails in Birds, 162. 
Taylor, Jeremy, on Resem- 


blances, 53. 

Teachers in Politics, Time and 
Natural Consequence the 
great, 357. 

Tennyson’s Idylls of the King, 
61; Maud, 100; In Memo- 
riam, 53, 116, 286. 

ferns, Mechanism of Flight in, 


150. 

“¢Theine,” and ‘*Strychnine,” 
identical in elements, differ 
only in the proportions in 
which they are combined, 95. 

Theology, Systematic, an idea 
which it regards with sus- 
picion, 52. 

‘* THINGS HOPED FOR,” the 
Power of, a Power catch 
never dies, ar5. 

Thought and Emotion, exciting 
Causes of, must come from the 
external world, 297. 

Threes within Threes, Arche- 
typal Arrangement of, in Or- 
chids, 44. 


Time, said to’ be a powerful 
Factor, 263. 

Torpedo, number of Hexagonal 
columns in the battery of the, 
Iol. 

Trade, immense advantage of 

_ abolishing Restrictions on, 335, 
success in, hindered by Protec- 
tion, 341. 

Triumphs, for which man has 
been gifted with knowledge, 

a sense of right, and faculties 
of Contrivance, 383. 

Truth, every one, connected with 
every other Truth in the 
Universe, 56; Ultimate, be- 
yond the reach of Science, 


272...) - | 
Tulloch, Principal, quoted, 23. 
Tycho Brahe, 343. 
Tyndall, Professor, quoted, 6, 


7 
Tee or Pattern, a definite, for 
each class of Animal adhered 
to, 211. 
Typical Forms, work of Crea- 
tion carried on under rules ie 
adherence to, 76, 


a. 


Ultimate Question, the, What is 
it by which this is done? lies 
above and behind every de- 
tected Method in Nature, 272; 
Force, seat of, we know no- 
thing directly of, 275. 

Unconscious Metaphysics of 
Human Speech, 303. 

Unity of Design amid Variety 
of Form, a universal feature 
in Nature, 198. 

Unknown and Unknowable, the, 
result to Professor Huxley of 
using this vague phrase, 89. 

Universe, question lying at the 
root of our conceptions of the, 


460 


is 


63 ; constitution of the, Man’s 
faculty of Contrivance the 
nearest analogy by which to 
understand the, 390. 

Unusual Birth, an, Idea common 
to all Development Theories 
that a New Species is simply, 
214. 

Use and Ornament in Nature 
may often arise out of the 
same conditions, 193. 

Useless Organs, how explained 
by the Theory of Creation by 
Birth, 266. 

Utility, acting through Motive 
as a Mental Purpose, the pro- 
vider beforehand of external 
Correlations, 256; Correlated 
Growth in Flowers, the 
Forces of, according to Mr. 
Darwin, modify structures in- 
dependent of Utility, and 
therefore of Natural Selec- 
tion, 267. 


V. 


Variability of Adjustment in the 
facts of Nature, 389. 

Variable Combinations of J7- 
variable Forces, Phenomena 
governed by, 98. 

Variation, Laws of, Mr. Darwin 
confesses “our ignorance of 
the Laws of Variation is pro- 
found,” 2183 so-called Laws 
of, for the most part simply 
observed Facts in respect to 
Variation, 241. 

Variety in itself an object in 
the creation of New Species, 
228. 

Velocity of Flight, the heavier a 
bird the greater its possible, 


144. 
Vertebrate Type, Purpose in the 
adaptibility of the, to the in- 


INDEX. 


sie: 


» 





finite varieties of Life, 206, 


271. 

Verities of the World, a pre-ad- 
justed relation to the, 295. j 

Virgil, quoted, 142. 

Vital Force, the Great Impon- 
derable, 151. 

Vital Power, the nearest concep- 
tion we can ever have of Force 
derived from our consciousness 
of, 275. Ps 

Volitions, our, how far subject 
to Adjusted Forces, 322. 

Voltaic Battery, Mr. Darwin 
cannot conceive how a, can be 
made out of the tissues of a 
fish, 104. 

Voltaic Current, Mineral Salt 
crystallizing under a, corre- 
lation of growth in _ its 
simplest form, 245. 

Voluntary Society, the mere 
founding of a, the powerful 

. latent force it evolyes, 369. 


WwW 


Wages, Economic Advantages 
gained when hours of labour 
are reduced without corre- 
sponding reduction in, 378. 

Wallace, Mr. his description of 
Humming Birds _ balancing 
themselves in the air, 167. 

“Watch Force,” and “ Vital 
Force,” analogy between them 
precise and accurate, 124. 

Water, the Old Motive Power, 
Factory System begun under, 


347- 
Watt, James, 339, e seg. 
Wealth, views of the accumu- 
lation of, in Ancient Political 
Philosophy, 335 ; of Nations 
hindered by Protection, 341. 


Wenham, Mr, F. H. on the 
Mechanical Principle involved 





eee at 





in the sufficiency of very nar- 
rgw Wings, 154. 

Whales, Teeth in young, which 
never cut the gum, 195. 

What men naturally do, no sure 
test of what they ought, or 
ought to be allowed, to do, 


334: 

Whewell, Dr. on the leading 
.characters in the minds of 
great Scientific Discoverers, 
110, 

Will, Man’s, instruments of, 12 ; 
real difficulty in the idea 
of, exercised without the use 
of means, 143 God’s, extraor- 
dinary manifestations of, how 
they may be wrought by the 
use of Laws of which Man 
knows nothing, 16; God’s, 
seeking and effecting the ful- 
filment of designs as our living 
Wills in their little sphere 
effect their little objects, 21 ; 
Human, Law in its pri- 
mary signification, the autho- 
ritative expression of, enforced 
by Power, 64 ; Man’s, increas- 
ing power exercised by, over 
the Material World, 97; the 
Everlasting, some Purpose of 
it to be seen working every- 
where, 123; relation of, to 
Law, and Law to Will, in 
Man’s works and in God’s, 
126 ;\_Unchangeableness and 
Universality of the Natural 
Laws essential to their use as 
instruments of, 1463; cases in 
which Law does not seem 
subservient to, 172; mani- 
fested in -Material Forces, 
2753 circuitous communica- 
tion between direct acts of 
' the, and movements of the 
‘ Body, 277; the, often para- 
lysed by the stroke which 


a en ee 


INDEX. 461 


\ 


paralyses a limb, 278; the,: 


its instinctive knowledge, how 
to use the Organism born with 
it, 293; in the Lower Ani- 
mals, acted on by fewer and 
simpler motives than Will in 
Man, 304; Men’s, “free” in 
one sense, and in one only, 
305 ; a Variable, indispensable 
to stability of Character, 320; 
the Human, if unchange- 
able, then no such __ thing 
as changeability conceivable, 
321; of Society, collective, 
two ways in which it operates 
on the conduct, 326; conscious 
energies of the, ever tempted 
to march directly on objects 
only to be reached circuitously, 
341 ; Individual, Laws against 
which it cannot contend, 359 ; 
Natural Law working on 
Human, 3623; Individual, 
Authoritative Interference of 
Positive Institution with the 
freedom of, still required as 
regards Factories, 364 ;_Indi- 
vidual, external conditions 
which tell on, often nothing 
but conditions depending on 
the aggregate Will of those 
around us, 367; Energies of, 
Constancy of Nature not in- 
compatible with the, 389; 
Change of, the efficient cause 
of numberless other changes, 
390. 

Wills, conclusions regarding our, 
against which we are apt te 
rebel, 287 ; our, not free from 
motives, 302; free from com- 
pulsion, and from nothing else, 


307. 
Wilson’s, Professor, Sonnet, ** A 
Cloud,” 154. 
Wing, Bird’s, pulsations in a, 
usually impossible to count; 





462 


instances in the Partridge, 
Pheasant, Blackcock, Pigeon, 
-and Diver, 133 ; Bird’s, down- 
ward: blow of a, indispensable 
to flight, 135 ; convex and con- 
cave surfaces of a, indispen- 
sable to flight, 136; sort of, 
required by Birds which seek 
their food in the air, 147; 
‘peculiarity of, in Divers, 148; 
- peculiarity of, in Birds which 
. feed on the surface of the 
sea, 1493 peculiarity of, in 
‘Birds of great and long- 
sustained powers of flight, 
150; a long, the implement 
used by the Bird’s Vital Force 
against the force of Gravity, 
' 1513 threefold division of the 
feathers of a Bird’s, 155; 
sharpness of a, on what it 
depends, 156; a Rook’s, an 
example of what, 157; Bones 


of a Bird’s, the bones of the | 


Mammalian arm and hand, 
169. 

‘¢Windhover,” machinery of 
flight in the, 159. 

Wings, Bird’s, Law of Leverage 
appealed to in, 150; sort of, 
in Gallinaceous Birds, 1553 
Birds with short, 155; Birds 
with short and blunt, how 
they catch their prey, 158; 

- Humming Bird’s, amazingly 
rapid motion of, 166. 

Wolf, Mr. J. his drawing of the 


& 


INDEX. 





wing of the Golden Plover, 
156; his illustration of a Kes- 
trel hovering, 161. 
Woodcock’s Plumage, the, co- 
loured like decaying fallen 
leaves, 182 ; Tail Feathers ca- 
pable of forming a ‘beautifully 
tinted fan, 183 ; lustrous black 
eye betrayed it to the fowler, 
184. ; 
Woodpeckers, Law of Assimila- 
tive Colouring not extended 


= tO, '1 70: Tas 
Words, which should be the ser- 
-vants of Thought, too often its 
masters, 63.° - . 
Wordsworth on Nature, as in- 
cluding all ‘‘in the Mind of 
Man,” 5; his Ode to Immor- 
tality, 59. 
Working Classes, always regard 
with fear and jealousy those 
triumphs of mechanical inven- 
tion which tend to the econo 
mising of labour, 375 ; Com. _ 
bination amongst the, an Edu- 
cation in itself, 380; Men, 
Combination the only means 
by which adult working, can 
defend themselves, 372. a 


Z. 


*¢Zambesi and its Tributaries,” 
Dr. . Livingstone’s work, 
quoted, 193. TA 




















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